In re Marriage of Ellen

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: April 7, 2026
• Docket: 4-25-0568
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE 2026 IL App (4th) 250568-U This Order was filed under FILED April 7, 2026 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is NO. 4-25-0568 Carla Bender not precedent except in the 4th District Appellate limited circumstances allowed IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL under Rule 23(e)(1). OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

In re MARRIAGE OF ELLEN T., ) Appeal from the Petitioner-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of and ) Sangamon County NICHOLAS T., ) No. 21D198 Respondent-Appellant. ) ) Honorable ) Tawnya L. Frioli, ) Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE DeARMOND delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Lannerd and Grischow concurred in the judgment.

ORDER ¶1 Held: The appellate court affirmed, finding (1) the language in the marital settlement agreement was insufficient to render respondent’s maintenance obligation nonmodifiable and (2) respondent failed to demonstrate any error in the trial court’s award of child support.

¶2 Petitioner, Ellen T., and respondent, Nicholas T., married in 2005. Their marriage

was dissolved in 2021. As part of the dissolution proceedings, the trial court incorporated the

parties’ marital settlement agreement (MSA) into the judgment of dissolution. The MSA

provided that Nicholas would pay maintenance to Ellen in the amount of $3,000 each month for

a term of four years. The MSA also provided that “[m]onthly maintenance may be paid off in a

lump sum by [Nicholas] if he chooses.”

¶3 Later, Ellen filed motions to modify maintenance and child support, alleging a

change in circumstances in that Nicholas’s income had increased and Ellen was primarily responsible for caring for and raising their children. Ultimately, the trial court modified the term

of maintenance through April 2031, kept the monthly amount at $3,000, and increased

Nicholas’s monthly child support payments to $4,108.

¶4 Nicholas appeals, arguing the trial court erred by (1) improperly construing the

MSA as modifiable and (2) using standardized, rather than individualized, deductions to

calculate his child support obligation. We affirm.

¶5 I. BACKGROUND

¶6 A. The Dissolution of Marriage and Initial Proceedings

¶7 Ellen and Nicholas married in 2005. The marriage produced two children. In the

last year of their marriage, Ellen worked as a baker in Springfield, Illinois; Nicholas worked as a

physician at Southern Illinois University.

¶8 In May 2021, the parties dissolved their marriage. The trial court incorporated the

parties’ MSA into its judgment of dissolution. In doing so, by docket entry, the court stated the

“settlement agreement [was] presented and approved by the court as being fair and equitable to

the parties.” The MSA contained the following section relevant to this appeal: “[Nicholas] shall

pay to [Ellen] maintenance/spousal support in the amount of $30,000 (already paid) plus

$3,000.00 per month for the following period: 4 years. Monthly maintenance may be paid off in

a lump sum by [Nicholas] if he chooses.”

¶9 The parties thereafter entered into an agreed order regarding child support in

which Nicholas agreed to pay Ellen a total of $1,498.56 each month beginning in September

2022. Nicholas also agreed to pay for all daytime childcare expenses for the minor children.

¶ 10 B. Proceedings on Ellen’s Petitions to Modify Child Support and Maintenance

¶ 11 In September 2024, Ellen filed a motion to modify Nicholas’s child support

-2- obligations. In her motion, Ellen alleged Nicholas’s income had substantially increased and there

was a substantial change in circumstances due to that change in income, warranting a

modification in child support.

¶ 12 In February 2025, Ellen filed a “Motion to Extend Maintenance” based on

significant changes in parenting time and employment. According to Ellen’s motion, since the

dissolution of the marriage, Nicholas had relocated to Ohio and was now earning “in excess of

$500,000 per year.” Ellen, on the other hand, earned “approximately $24,000 per year” on a

part-time basis. Ellen further alleged that she was “primarily responsible for caring for and

raising the minor children” after being granted “all regular weekly parenting time during the

school year.” Ellen requested the trial court modify maintenance in the amount the court saw fit.

¶ 13 In response, Nicholas filed a motion for summary judgment, which Ellen

responded to. Later, in his reply to Ellen’s response to his motion for summary judgment,

Nicholas argued that “maintenance in the present case is not reviewable” because the MSA, as

reflected in the judgment, “clearly show[ed] that both [Ellen] and [Nicholas] agreed that

maintenance would terminate at the end of a four-year time period.”

¶ 14 In March 2025, the trial court conducted a hearing on all pending matters. While

there is no transcript from the hearing, a bystander’s report signed by both attorneys and the

judge presiding is included in the record on appeal. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 323(c) (eff. July 1, 2017)

(permitting a bystander’s report if a transcript of the trial court proceedings is unavailable).

According to the bystander’s report, Ellen submitted various documents, including the parties’

financial affidavits and paystubs. Nicholas’s most recent paystub identified his monthly gross

income of $39,954.92, monthly deductions for taxes of $9,487.22, and a monthly mandatory

retirement contribution of $5,593.69. The bystander’s report also indicated that Ellen submitted a

-3- support obligation worksheet, proposing that Nicholas pay $4,800 in monthly child support.

¶ 15 The trial court thereafter entered its written decision granting Ellen’s motions to

modify maintenance and child support. In its order, the court set forth the terms of Nicholas’s

support modification and ordered him to pay maintenance to Ellen in the amount of $3,000 per

month through April 2031. The court also calculated the parties’ basic child support obligation of

$5,086 based on their monthly combined net income, and it increased Nicholas’s monthly

payments to $4,108.

¶ 16 This appeal followed.

¶ 17 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 18 On appeal, Nicholas contends that the language in the MSA was sufficient to

render his maintenance obligation to Ellen nonmodifiable. He also argues the trial court erred in

determining his monthly net income for the purpose of calculating child support. In particular, he

argues the court erred by using standardized, rather than individualized, deductions to calculate

his child support obligation. We address these arguments in turn, but we first turn to the

timeliness of our disposition in this matter.

¶ 19 Illinois Supreme Court Rule 311 (eff. July 1, 2018) requires accelerated

dispositions in appeals involving child custody or allocation of parental responsibilities cases.

Rule 311(a)(5) provides: “Except for good cause shown, the appellate court shall issue its

decision within 150 days after the filing of the notice of appeal or granting of leave to appeal

pursuant to Rule 306(a)(5).” Ill. S. Ct. R. 311(a)(5) (eff. July 1, 2018). November 2, 2025,

marked the end of the 150-day deadline following the filing of the notice of appeal in this case.

However, Nicholas requested multiple extensions of time to file his opening brief, and the case

was not docketed until November 13, 2025. Oral arguments were originally set on the court’s

-4- January 2026 oral argument calendar. Then, Ellen’s counsel filed a motion to continue oral

argument due to a family matter, which Nicholas did not oppose. This court granted counsel’s

motion to continue oral argument to the March 2026 term. Accordingly, we find good cause for

issuing our disposition after the 150-day deadline.

¶ 20 A. Modification of Maintenance

¶ 21 Generally, both the form and amount of maintenance to be awarded lie within the

discretion of the trial court, and a maintenance award ordering a spouse to pay a fixed sum of

money in installments for a fixed period is not subject to modification based on a change in

circumstances. In re Marriage of D’Attomo, 2012 IL App (1st) 111670, ¶¶ 24-25; 750 ILCS

5/504(a), (b-4.5)(1) (West 2020). However, parties to a dissolution action are permitted by

statute to enter into agreements regarding matters such as maintenance. 750 ILCS 5/502(a) (West

2020). When that happens, “[t]he terms of the agreement *** are binding upon the court unless it

finds *** that the agreement is unconscionable.” 750 ILCS 5/502(b) (West 2020). “A marital

settlement agreement is construed in the manner of any other contract, and the court must

ascertain the parties’ intent from the language of the agreement.” Blum v. Koster, 235 Ill. 2d 21,

33 (2009). When interpreting a contract or marital settlement agreement, a court’s primary

objective is to give effect to the intent of the parties. In re Marriage of Dundas, 355 Ill. App. 3d

423, 426 (2005). The best indication of the parties’ intent is the unambiguous language of the

agreement, given its plain and ordinary meaning. Dundas, 355 Ill. App. 3d at 426. “If the parties

do not provide that maintenance is non-modifiable in amount, duration, or both, then those terms

are modifiable upon a substantial change of circumstances.” 750 ILCS 5/502(f) (West 2020);

In re Marriage of Dynako, 2021 IL 126835, ¶ 19. We review a trial court’s construction of a

marital settlement agreement de novo. Dundas, 355 Ill. App. 3d at 426.

-5- ¶ 22 Here, the parties agreed that Nicholas “shall pay to [Ellen] maintenance/spousal

support in the amount of $30,000 in one lump sum (already paid) plus $3,000.00 per month for

the following period: 4 years. Monthly maintenance may be paid off in a lump sum by

[Nicholas] if he chooses.” The parties’ MSA was incorporated into the judgment. The trial court

found the terms of the MSA to be appropriate and conscionable. And while Nicholas argues that

the provision of the MSA that called for a termination “at the end of four years or via a second

lump sum payment” barred the court’s ability to modify maintenance, the case law simply does

not support Nicholas’s position. Rather, “the intent of the parties to preclude or limit

modification *** of maintenance must be clearly manifested in their agreement.” (Emphasis in

original). In re Marriage of Brent, 263 Ill. App. 3d 916, 923 (1994). “[W]here the language

utilized by the parties is not an express preclusion of modification, the court retains its authority

to modify maintenance.” (Emphasis added.) Brent, 263 Ill. App. 3d at 925. In such cases, “it is

error to hold the maintenance nonmodifiable.” In re Marriage of Scott, 205 Ill. App. 3d 561, 565

(1990).

¶ 23 The language of the MSA is ambiguous at best; it does not provide that

maintenance is nonmodifiable in amount, duration, or both. In fact, the lack of such a provision

differentiates the present case from those found to involve nonmodifiable maintenance awards

and lends credence to the position the instant maintenance provision was modifiable. See

Dynako, 2021 IL 126835, ¶ 20 (holding the settlement agreement’s detailed maintenance

schedule and express provision that maintenance payments shall be nonmodifiable

“demonstrated the intent of the parties to make the obligation nonmodifiable”); In re Marriage of

Schweitzer, 289 Ill. App. 3d 425, 429 (1997) (holding the settlement agreement unambiguously

precluded modification because it expressly provided that it was not modifiable); Brent, 263 Ill.

-6- App. 3d at 923 (“Had the [parties] expressly agreed maintenance could be terminated or

modified only under the circumstances set forth in their agreement, the agreement would operate

as a limitation on the court’s ability to modify maintenance.” (Emphases in original.)).

Additionally, the MSA’s clause regarding the “lump sum” option is similarly ambiguous and

raises several questions. How is the lump sum calculated? Is it a yearly option or is it for the

entire four-year period? Does payment of the lump sum terminate the obligation or merely

prepay it while the maintenance period still runs? Does Ellen receive the lump sum all at once or

is it paid to her in installments? So, even though Nicholas contends the “lump sum” language

“clarifies that the maintenance was for a finite time period,” it says nothing about its effect on the

modifiability of the MSA, and it is far and away from a clear manifestation that the parties

intended to limit or preclude modification. The fact that Nicholas bargained for maintenance

does not affect the court’s ability to modify the agreement.

¶ 24 In sum, the language used by the parties does not expressly bar any future

modification, and nothing in the language of the MSA definitively establishes that maintenance

was intended to be nonmodifiable. See Brent, 263 Ill. App. 3d at 925. Consequently, the trial

court’s conclusion that it could apply the statutory basis for an extension of maintenance was

correct.

¶ 25 B. Modification of Child Support

¶ 26 We now turn to the question of whether the trial court erred in determining

Nicholas’s net income for the purpose of calculating child support. On review, we consider

whether the court’s child support order “is an abuse of discretion or the factual predicate for the

decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence.” Slagel v. Wessels, 314 Ill. App. 3d 330,

332 (2000).

-7- ¶ 27 To place Nicholas’s argument in context, it is helpful to set forth the relevant

statutory provisions. Awards of child support are governed by section 505 of the Illinois

Marriage and Dissolution Act (Act) (750 ILCS 5/505 (West 2024)). That section provides that

the trial court may order either or both parents owing a duty of support to pay an amount that is

“reasonable and necessary” for support. 750 ILCS 5/505(a) (West 2024). In calculating an award

of child support, the court must first determine each party’s gross and net incomes. Subject to

exceptions not applicable here, section 505 defines “gross income” as “the total of all income

from all sources.” 750 ILCS 5/505(a)(3)(A) (West 2024). In turn, “net income” is defined in

relevant part as “gross income minus either the standardized tax amount *** or the

individualized tax amount.” 750 ILCS 5/505(a)(3)(B) (West 2024).

¶ 28 The term “standardized tax amount” means “the total of federal and state income

taxes for a single person claiming the standard tax deduction, one personal exemption, and the

applicable number of dependency exemptions for the minor child or children of the parties, and

Social Security and Medicare tax calculated at the Federal Insurance Contributions Act rate.”

750 ILCS 5/505(3)(C) (West 2024). The term “individualized tax amount” is defined as the

aggregate of “federal income tax (properly calculated withholding or estimated payments),”

“[s]tate income tax (properly calculated withholding or estimated payments),” and “Social

Security or self-employment tax, if applicable (or, if none, mandatory retirement contributions

required by law or as a condition of employment) and Medicare tax calculated at the Federal

Insurance Contributions Act rate.” 750 ILCS 5/505(3)(D) (West 2024).

¶ 29 In calculating “net income,” the trial court must use the “standardized tax amount

*** unless the requirements for an individualized tax amount *** are met.” 750 ILCS

5/505(3)(B) (West 2024). Section 505(3)(E) of the Act then provides that “a determination of an

-8- individualized tax amount may be made” instead of a standardized tax amount under certain

circumstances: (1) by agreement of the parties, (2) in a summary hearing where an eligible party

opts in to the individualized tax amount method, or (3) if the court determines child support in an

evidentiary hearing. (Emphasis added.) 750 ILCS 5/505 (a)(3)(E)(I)-(III) (West 2024).

¶ 30 Nicholas complains the trial court’s alleged “misuse of the standardized tax

amount in lieu of the individualized tax amount creates a higher net income for [him].”

(Emphasis omitted.) The thrust of his argument comes primarily from the fact that he stopped

contributing to Social Security when he changed jobs, and he now makes a mandatory teacher’s

retirement contribution. Nicholas argues this contribution should have been deducted from his

gross income. However, section 505(B) of the Act provides the “standardized tax amount shall

be used unless the requirements for an individualized tax amount *** are met.” (Emphasis

added.) 750 ILCS 5/505(a)(3)(B) (West 2024). Subparagraph (E) then uses the permissive “may”

when describing situations in which the court can use an individualized tax amount formula. See

750 ILCS 5/505(a)(3)(E) (West 2024). “[T]he word ‘shall’ is commonly deemed mandatory

[citation] and ‘may’ is generally deemed discretionary.” The Bigelow Group, Inc. v. Rickert, 377

Ill. App. 3d 165, 170 (2007). Thus, a plain reading of the statute shows the court had discretion

to use the individualized tax amount but was not mandated to do so.

¶ 31 Moreover, as the appellant, Nicholas has the burden of persuasion on appeal. See

Healy v. Bearco Management, Inc., 216 Ill. App. 3d 945, 958 (1991) (“The party prosecuting the

appeal bears the burden of showing affirmatively the errors assigned on review.”). Yet he neither

references nor cites the actual figures relied upon by the trial court when it calculated the parties’

net incomes. He also does not identify or cite any figures he submitted to the court for

consideration, and it does not appear that Nicholas submitted a worksheet with his calculation of

-9- child support. But given the parties’ high combined net income, it is not clear if the statutory

guidelines applied in this case beyond setting a floor for the amount the court could award. See

750 ILCS 5/505(a)(3.5) (West 2024) (“A [trial] court may use its discretion to determine child

support if the combined adjusted net income of the parties exceeds the highest level of the

schedule of basic child support obligation, except that the basic child support obligation shall not

be less than the highest level of combined net income set forth in the schedule of basic child

support obligation.”).

¶ 32 For instance, after applying the statutory individualized tax amount formula to

Nicholas’s most recent paystub, and factoring in his $3,000 monthly maintenance payment,

Nicholas’s monthly net income comes to $21,874.01. Nicholas does not allege the trial court

incorrectly calculated Ellen’s monthly net income of $5,386. Under Nicholas’s preferred

calculations, the parties’ combined monthly net income totals $27,260.01. The highest level of

combined monthly net income set forth in the most recent schedule of basic child support

obligation is $26,724.99, and it assigns a $5,086 monthly support obligation for parties with two

children. See 2025 Addendum to the Illinois Schedule of Basic Obligations and Standardized Net

Income Table, February 28, 2025. So regardless of the tax formula used, it makes no difference;

the court awarded the lowest monthly support obligation possible. See In re Marriage of Wilder,

122 Ill. App. 3d 338, 344 (1983) (“[N]ot every error committed by the trial court in a civil case

leads to reversal.”). As such, and without evidence from the record indicating otherwise, we can

find no merit to Nicholas’s challenge to the court’s child support award. See Slagel, 314 Ill. App.

3d at 332.

¶ 33 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 34 For these reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

- 10 - ¶ 35 Affirmed.

- 11 -