NOTICE 2025 IL App (4th) 241016-U FILED This Order was filed under July 15, 2025 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is NO. 4-24-1016 Carla Bender not precedent except in the 4th District Appellate limited circumstances allowed IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL under Rule 23(e)(1).
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
In re MARRIAGE OF EADS ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of (Christopher Paul Eads, ) Peoria County Petitioner-Appellee, ) No. 23DN119 and ) Mary Josephine Eads, ) Honorable Respondent-Appellant). ) Daniel M. Cordis, ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE VANCIL delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Doherty and DeArmond concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s judgment of dissolution of marriage awarding maintenance to the husband, but it reversed the court’s allocation of debts and assets and its order requiring the wife to pay most of the husband’s attorney fees.
¶2 In April 2023, after nearly 10 years of marriage, petitioner, Christopher Paul Eads,
petitioned for the dissolution of his marriage to respondent, Mary Josephine Eads. After a trial on
the issues of spousal maintenance and the allocation of marital debts and assets, the trial court
ordered Mary to pay Christopher $769 per month in maintenance for 45 months, largely because
Christopher’s disability severely limited his prospects of working in the future. The court also
allocated slightly more value in marital assets to Christopher than to Mary and ordered Mary to
pay most of Christopher’s attorney fees.
¶3 Mary appeals the trial court’s judgment. She challenges the court’s allocation of debts and assets, its order that she pay maintenance, and its order that she pay Christopher’s
attorney fees.
¶4 We affirm the trial court’s award of maintenance to Christopher, but we reverse its
allocation of marital debts and assets and its attorney fees award, and we remand for further
proceedings.
¶5 I. BACKGROUND
¶6 Mary and Christopher married on September 26, 2013. On April 21, 2023,
Christopher filed a petition for dissolution of marriage, and eventually the matter proceeded to
trial.
¶7 At trial, Christopher testified that he had chronic obstructive pulmonary disease
(COPD), emphysema, two replacement hips, spinal stenosis, type 2 diabetes, “spinal problems,”
and “lumbar problems.” At the time of the trial, he lived in a one-bedroom unit in a “halfway
home,” and he brought only his clothes with him when he moved out of the marital residence. He
was not employed. He began receiving Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) benefits in
2018, and his monthly benefits had recently increased to $2,193 per month.
¶8 Christopher contrasted his standard of living at the time of trial with his standard
of living during his marriage. Describing the couple’s lifestyle together, he testified, “It was good.
We pretty much did what we wanted. You know, we went out to eat when we wanted.” At the
beginning of the marriage, the parties first lived in a three-bedroom home in Hopewell Estates,
outside Chillicothe, Illinois. They had to sell the house because the payments were too high, and,
according to Christopher, Mary refused to contribute. Afterwards, they moved to a house in
Chillicothe on Hoyt Street. Christopher testified that he wrote Mary checks for between $750 and
$1,000 per month from his SSDI for living expenses. He also claimed that he “would buy all of
-2- the groceries” and pay for meals when they went out to eat.
¶9 Christopher testified that he worked for Dunlap School District at the beginning of
the marriage, but he was asked to resign in 2015. After he left that position, he received
unemployment benefits for about six months. He was asked if he had another job when his
unemployment benefits ended, and he answered, “I didn’t have to because my father died and left
me money.” He received a total of $75,000 from his father’s estate. He testified that he “[s]pent it
on us,” referring to himself and Mary. He also cashed in his 401(k) for $25,000. He testified, “We
purchased a four wheeler, trailers, motorcycles, go-karts, four wheelers, you name it, all kinds of
stuff we probably shouldn’t have been buying. A camper I believe was involved in all that.” He
added that he had to sell these vehicles after he “got sick” in 2016. He also spent money on a
cleaning franchise, which lasted only about five months. He claimed that after he sold off
everything, he used the money to pay “bills.” He tried a job performing minor maintenance work
at a trailer park. He also tried working part-time for a nursing home. But, he testified, “I can’t
breathe good, and I have two new hips, and I have a terrible back.” He acknowledged that he still
smoked, he used to have problems with alcohol, and he had been to “rehab” three times.
¶ 10 Christopher possessed a 2010 Chevrolet Silverado. The couple owned a 2014
Dodge Challenger, 2020 Chevrolet Blazer, and a 2012 Harley Davidson. The couple also owned a
2016 Cub Cadet all-terrain vehicle (ATV), a 14-foot Jon boat, a paddle boat, and a kayak, as well
as a cabin at Giant Goose Ranch. During the pendency of the case, Mary sold the parties’ house
on Hoyt Street to fund the purchase of a new house. Christopher testified that in 2021 or 2022,
Mary went on five vacations.
¶ 11 Mary testified she worked for Caterpillar in Peoria, Illinois, as a procurement
engineer. Her salary was $84,000. She typically received a year-end bonus, which, in 2023, was
-3- $12,637. From 2021 to the beginning of 2023, she also worked as a property manager, and she
estimated she made at least $5,000 per year from that work.
¶ 12 In 2022, Mary’s daughter and granddaughter died in a car crash, and Mary took
custody of her other two grandchildren. She received slightly over $2,200 per month from social
security on behalf of the children, and the children each have $33,000 in an account that they can
access when they turn 18.
¶ 13 Mary insisted that she paid much more of the couple’s bills during the marriage.
According to Mary, Christopher gave her $750 per month, never $1,000, unless he was paying her
back for something, and for some months he paid nothing. She added that Christopher bought
groceries only for himself. She claimed that Christopher lied about the amount he inherited, and
whatever he received, she “didn’t see it.” She testified that she hardly ever used the vehicles
Christopher purchased. She also claimed that when he cashed in his 401(k), he used the funds for
his cleaning business and vehicles, which he later sold. She assumed he used that money for drugs
and alcohol.
¶ 14 Mary denied that she contributed nothing to the household at the beginning of the
marriage. She testified that, at that time, she worked as an administrative assistant, making $12,000
per year. Her 2015 W-2, which was admitted into evidence, showed that her salary that year was
$52,829.70. She expected that she started handling more of the financial obligations in 2016 or
2017. She also testified that when she purchased the Chillicothe house in 2018, Christopher did
not contribute anything.
¶ 15 Once Christopher began receiving SSDI benefits, he also received a back payment.
The following exchange took place between Mary and her attorney:
“Q. He received a settlement?
-4- A. Uh-huh for back pay.
Q. What kind of settlement?
A. Back pay for—
Q. Of disability?
A. It was, uh-huh, it was like $5,000.
Q. $56,000?
A. I’m sorry. $56,000.
Q. So, you received a check of $56,000 in back pay?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you see any of that money?
A. No.
Q. Did he use it to contribute to the bills or the debts?
Q. Did he use it to do any upgrades on the house?
A. On the Hoyt house?
Q. Yes?
Q. So, he received [an SSDI] back pay of $56,000 while you were providing
all the food and everything during that time?
Q. And then he gets the settlement and didn’t pay you back for any of the bills or
anything like that?
-5- Q. Do you know what he did with the money?
A. He bought a camper which, yes, I used. He bought a four wheeler and a
trailer to do—he was going to do his own business again, so he bought an enclosed
trailer. He was going to do a construction business. That never happened. I don’t
remember what else was bought.”
¶ 16 Mary testified that she had back problems, including two bulging discs, that
required surgery. She had six previous back surgeries related to her spinal stenosis and
degenerative disk disease. She was able to work at the time of the trial, but she testified, “I don't
know how long I’m going to be able to continue.”
¶ 17 Mary admitted that she had taken a two-week vacation in April 2022 to Germany,
Italy, Ireland, and Spain. This trip cost about $4,000, which her son paid upfront, and she gradually
reimbursed him. In May 2022, she went to Florida. She was asked if she took “any other vacations
during [her] marriage with [Christopher].” She answered that they took trips to Arizona and
Tennessee. Later, she said that she thought the Tennessee trip took place before the marriage.
¶ 18 Mary insisted that Christopher was able to work while he received SSDI. She
claimed that if he could sit in court for hours at a time, then he could sit at a desk for a few hours
as well. She added that he was able to drive for at least an hour, and he did manual work around
the house, including remodeling the kitchen.
¶ 19 Christopher took the stand again and denied that he spent his retirement and his
inheritance just on himself. He insisted:
“I was so good to her family. I gave them money, and I gave them things. They—
we all ate really good, and they—all the kids would come over, and they rode the
Go-Karts, and the dirt bikes, and the 4 wheelers, and it was a big, fun time, big
-6- party.”
¶ 20 Kendra Deemie, Mary’s daughter, testified that she visited her mother at her house
at least once a week. She saw Christopher repairing or remodeling the bathroom and the kitchen.
Deemie testified that Christopher rarely helped with cleaning or cooking, and he drank a lot. On
five or six occasions, she heard Christopher tell Mary that he did not have money to give her
toward rent. She knew that he contributed, but sometimes he did not.
¶ 21 The evidence also included the parties’ financial affidavits, Kelly Blue Book
estimates for the value of the parties’ vehicles, pictures of Mary’s home, pictures of vehicles,
pictures of the cabin, a closing statement for the sale of the Hoyt Street residence, Mary’s W-2
from 2015 from Caterpillar, loan statements, and bank statements, among other documents.
¶ 22 The trial court issued a thorough written opinion detailing its factual findings and
allocating marital debts and assets. The court found that Christopher was the “primary
breadwinner” at the beginning of the parties’ marriage, but Mary later took over that role. She
worked for Caterpillar and advanced in position and salary throughout the marriage, earning
almost $85,000 by the time of the trial. She received annual bonuses, expected to be between
$10,000 and $12,000. After obtaining guardianship of her two grandchildren in 2022, Mary
purchased a new home, and she received $2,200 per month from social security for childcare
expenses.
¶ 23 The trial court found that Christopher began receiving SSDI benefits in 2018, and
he received $2,193 per month. Since he lost his job with Dunlap schools in 2015, he tried a few
other jobs, including part-time work at a nursing home, which was not “sustainable for him.” The
court found that Christopher used his $75,000 inheritance and $25,000 from his retirement account
to “purchase many recreational items such as a camper, go-cart(s), trailer(s), motorcycles, an ATV
-7- and the like.” The court found that during the marriage, “the parties were able to dine out, purchase
extra vehicles such as motorcycles or the Dodge Challenger, engage in recreation with the various
items of equipment/vehicles referenced, purchase a cabin for leisure/vacation/recreation and travel
for vacations.” The court added that Mary traveled more than Christopher and that the housing and
vehicles generated “a fair amount of debt.”
¶ 24 The trial court then analyzed each of the statutory factors relevant to assigning
marital debt and assets, specifying whether each factor counted in either party’s favor. See 750
ILCS 5/503(d) (West 2024). The court acknowledged Mary’s obligations to her grandchildren and
considered this a factor in favor of a more generous allocation to Mary. However, it found more
factors favored Christopher. For example, considering the parties’ economic circumstances after
the divorce, the court found, “Christopher is earning about one-quarter (1/4) of what Mary earns.”
The court especially noted, “The Federal government has concluded he is disabled.” It also found
Christopher has less opportunity for future acquisition of income and assets. The court found many
of the factors were neutral or not applicable. Most notably, the court found that each party’s
contribution to the marital estate did not affect its allocation.
¶ 25 The trial court elaborated on a few specific aspects of its allocation. For example,
the court determined that all of Mary’s 401(k) was marital property, so it ordered that each party
receive half of the value of the account. The court also stated:
“The Court does not know exactly how much is owed by Christopher for back pay
associated with his [SSDI] award. Mary testified the liability is $56,000.00, but
there were no contemporaneous statements introduced into evidence. It is equitable
to make Christopher responsible for this debt due to him being the recipient of the
[SSDI] benefits. Even so, that is a large debt in this marital estate, and making
-8- Christopher responsible for it further justifies ‘tipping the scales’ a bit in his favor
in terms of the distribution of the other assets and debts in Exhibit A.”
¶ 26 The trial court attached to its opinion a chart laying out the allocation of the parties’
debts and assets, labeled “EXHIBIT A.” To Mary, the court assigned assets totaling $403,889 and
debts totaling $345.439, for a net value of $58,450. Mary’s new house accounted for most of her
debts and assets. To Christopher, the court assigned $88,593.48 in assets and $26,593.00 in debts,
for a net value of $62,000.48. The court assigned the “SSDI-Back Debt” to Christopher, without
listing a balance on that debt, and the “2023 Income Tax Refund” to Mary, without assigning a
value. The court also ordered the parties to sell their cabin and divide the proceeds evenly.
¶ 27 The trial court ordered Mary to pay Christopher $769 in maintenance for 45
months, referring to the calculations provided by Christopher’s attorney. Discussing the statutory
factors regarding spousal maintenance, the court first stated that its division of debts and assets
was close to equal, but “Christopher’s income situation [was] significantly inferior to that of
Mary.” The court rejected Mary’s contention that Christopher only chose not to work, finding
instead that Christopher’s disability limited his opportunities for employment.
¶ 28 The trial court also explained:
“A somewhat related argument by Mary is that Christopher did drugs, drank
alcohol to excess and was overall a financial millstone around the marriage’s neck.
Even if all of this were accurate, the Court sees the issue differently—if, upon the
loss of Christopher’s long-time job at Dunlap schools, he became depressed or
turned to drugs and alcohol to make himself feel better and cope, that does not
per se make him unworthy of a spousal maintenance award. Each case and every
person is different. Christopher has been in and out of rehab several times. He
-9- appears to be succeeding at sobriety at present, and he has been living in communal
sober housing in Peoria. Bottom line—Christopher’s addictions and struggles do
not disqualify him from receiving spousal maintenance.”
The court acknowledged that Mary’s need to provide for her grandchildren supported a denial of
maintenance. But, overall, the court found more factors in favor of maintenance. See id. § 504.
¶ 29 Finally, the trial court ordered Mary to pay $3,000 out of Christopher’s attorney
fees. Citing section 503(j) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Marriage Act)
(id. § 503(j)), the court referred to its earlier analysis of marital property and maintenance to
explain this award. This $3,000 was listed as one of Mary’s debts in the court’s Exhibit A.
¶ 30 Mary filed a motion to reconsider or vacate the judgment, which the trial court
denied.
¶ 31 This appeal followed.
¶ 32 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 33 Mary asks us to reverse the trial court’s order awarding Christopher maintenance,
allocating marital debts and assets, and requiring her to pay $3,000 in Christopher’s attorney fees.
¶ 34 A. Maintenance
¶ 35 We begin with maintenance. “[T]he propriety of a maintenance award is within the
discretion of the trial court and the court’s decision will not be disturbed absent an abuse of
discretion.” In re Marriage of Schneider, 214 Ill. 2d 152, 173 (2005). “A trial court abuses its
discretion only where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court.” Id. On
appeal, the party seeking reversal of the trial court’s decision bears the burden of showing an abuse
of discretion. Id. Additionally, when reviewing the trial court’s award of maintenance, we will
accept the court’s factual findings unless those findings are contrary to the manifest weight of the
- 10 - evidence. In re Marriage of Sturm, 2012 IL App (4th) 110559, ¶ 3. “Findings are against the
manifest weight of the evidence where the opposite conclusion is clearly evident or where the
court’s findings are unreasonable, arbitrary, and not based on any of the evidence.” In re Marriage
of Smith, 2012 IL App (2d) 110522, ¶ 46. “Generally, we also will not disturb a trial court’s
credibility determinations.” In re Marriage of Edson, 2023 IL App (1st) 230236, ¶ 105.
¶ 36 In considering whether to award maintenance, the trial court relied on the factors
listed in section 504(a) of the Marriage Act (750 ILCS 5/504(a) (West 2024)). From this list, the
court determined the following factors favored awarding Christopher maintenance: the income and
property of each party (id. § 504(a)(1)); each party’s present and future earning capacity (id.
§ 504(a)(3)); the time necessary for Christopher to acquire appropriate education, training, or
employment, and his ability to support himself through appropriate employment (id. § 504(a)(6));
the parties’ standard of living during the marriage (id. § 504(a)(7)); the age, health, station,
occupation, income, skills, employability, liabilities, and needs of each party (id. § 504(a)(9)); and
all sources of income, including SSDI and retirement income (id. § 504(a)(10)). The court found
Mary’s needs, especially her obligation to provide for her two grandchildren, weighed against
maintenance for Christopher. See id. § 504(a)(2). The court concluded that the remaining factors
did not apply.
¶ 37 On appeal, Mary challenges three aspects of the trial court’s analysis: the parties’
standard of living, Christopher’s disability, and how Christopher’s alleged depression affected his
ability to support himself or contribute to the marital estate.
¶ 38 First, Mary argues the trial court improperly inflated the parties’ lifestyle during
their marriage. Although the court referred to the parties’ vacations, cabin, and recreational
vehicles as examples of luxuries the couple could afford, Mary insists the parties enjoyed these
- 11 - comforts only early in their marriage. She argues that the court improperly took a “snapshot” from
the parties’ station in 2015 instead of considering the entire nine-year marriage. She further
contends that the court inflated the value of their extra vehicles and cabin, failing to recognize the
substantial debts that remained on those purchases. Finally, Mary argues that the court ignored that
she also could not maintain the same standard of living because, soon before the parties’
separation, she became responsible for two of her grandchildren. She argues, “[E]ven if the parties
had stayed married, their lifestyle and standard of living that they enjoyed prior to this tragedy
would never have been the same.”
¶ 39 The trial court’s characterization of the parties’ standard of living was not contrary
to the manifest weight of the evidence. The court fairly restated the parties’ testimony concerning
their many vehicles and their cabin. Based on Mary’s own testimony, the court found that she took
vacations to Arizona, Tennessee, Florida, and Europe. These vacations were not limited to the first
few years of the marriage. Moreover, Mary’s claim that the court failed to recognize the debt
associated with these expenditures is incorrect. The court explicitly recognized that the couple had
“taken on a fair amount of debt with regard to housing and vehicles.” The court summarized the
evidence at trial reasonably, so we accept the court’s factual findings on the parties’ standard of
living.
¶ 40 The trial court also did not abuse its discretion in considering this factor in
Christopher’s favor, despite Mary taking responsibility for her grandchildren. Although Mary’s
standard of living certainly changed after the parties separated, she also moved into a
three-bedroom house and held a well-paying job. Christopher rented a one-bedroom “halfway
home,” and he had no or very limited work prospects. The court also recognized Mary’s childcare
obligations as a factor weighing against maintenance.
- 12 - ¶ 41 Mary next disputes the trial court’s determination that Christopher was unable to
support himself. She contends that Christopher has deliberately chosen not to work full-time since
2015, when he received the $75,000 inheritance and cashed in his 401(k). According to Mary,
Christopher was able to work, as indicated by the maintenance work he performed and his ability
to sit through the court proceedings. At the very least, Mary insists, he can work an office job.
¶ 42 Mary compares this case to Smith, 2012 IL App (2d) 110522. There, a wife
petitioned for a dissolution of marriage, and the respondent husband sought spousal maintenance.
Id. ¶¶ 1, 26. The husband received SSDI benefits and claimed he was “unable to earn a living.” Id.
¶ 28. The wife disagreed, claiming he was capable of at least some forms of gainful employment.
Id. ¶ 9. Although the trial court awarded the husband some maintenance, it also agreed with the
wife that he could work, so it reduced the maintenance award accordingly. Id. ¶ 35. On appeal, the
husband argued that the trial court abused its discretion, and he should receive more in
maintenance. Id. ¶ 43. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s finding, agreeing that the
husband’s frequent trips to the dog track to gamble indicated he could leave the house frequently
to work. Id. ¶ 48. Mary contends that the same reasoning applies here, and Christopher likewise is
capable of “holding a desk job.”
¶ 43 Once again, we accept the trial court’s factual determinations. The court found
Christopher had “very limited earning potential[ ]” because of his physical limitations.
Undeniably, Christopher received SSDI benefits. He testified to a long list of ailments, including
COPD and emphysema. We note especially Christopher’s testimony that he tried working
part-time at a nursing home. But, he explained, “I can’t breathe good, and I have two new hips,
and I have a terrible back.” All this evidence supported the court’s conclusion.
¶ 44 Smith does not change our analysis. There, the trial court found the husband was
- 13 - not permanently disabled. Id. Here, the court found Christopher was. We defer to the trial court’s
credibility determinations. See Edson, 2023 IL App (1st) 230236, ¶ 105. Moreover, we see nothing
in the appellate court’s opinion in Smith comparable to Christopher’s explicit testimony about his
unsuccessful attempt to hold a specific part-time job after developing his disability. Considering
this evidence, we cannot say that the court’s factual findings here were “unreasonable, arbitrary,
and not based on any of the evidence.” Smith, 2012 IL App (2d) 110522, ¶ 46.
¶ 45 Finally, Mary argues the trial court erroneously assumed that Christopher abused
drugs and alcohol because of depression resulting from the loss of his job. She claims that no
evidence was introduced showing that Christopher suffered from depression or drank because of
depression. Instead, Mary testified that Christopher had a drinking problem throughout the
marriage, even before he lost his job in 2015. Therefore, according to Mary, the court’s finding
otherwise was contrary to the manifest weigh of the evidence.
¶ 46 Mary’s argument does not affect our decision. When discussing Christopher’s
likelihood of supporting himself through appropriate employment in the future, the trial court
considered Mary’s claim that Christopher “did drugs, drank alcohol to excess and was overall a
financial millstone around the marriage’s neck.” The court responded, “Even if all of this were
accurate *** that does not per se make him unworthy of a spousal maintenance award.” The court
did not make an explicit factual finding that Christopher became depressed after losing his job in
2015. Instead, it found that “Christopher’s addictions and struggles do not disqualify him from
receiving spousal maintenance.” Mary cites no authority to refute this conclusion, and we see no
reason to reject it.
¶ 47 Having rejected Mary’s challenges to the trial court’s decision to award
maintenance, we briefly address her assertion that the court erred in the amount and duration of
- 14 - maintenance. The court awarded Christopher $769 in maintenance for 45 months, adopting
Christopher’s calculations, which followed the statutory guidelines set by section 504(b-1)(1) of
the Marriage Act. See 750 ILCS 5/504(b-1)(1) (West 2024). Mary does not raise any specific
argument here. She does not argue that the court misapplied the statutory guidelines in section
504(b-1)(1). She does not cite any place in the record to refute the numbers that Christopher and
the court relied on for these calculations. Nor does she argue that the court abused its discretion by
following the guidelines. Instead, she simply refers to her arguments regarding the award of
maintenance generally, and she urges us to order the trial court to reconsider the duration and
amount of maintenance.
¶ 48 We affirm the trial court’s decision. We reject Mary’s arguments for the same
reasons discussed above. The court’s characterization of the parties’ standard of living was not
contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence, and its determination that this factor weighed in
Christopher’s favor was not an abuse of discretion. The same is true for the court’s determination
that Christpher was disabled, with severely limited earning potential. Finally, the court did not find
that Christopher was depressed or that this depression prevented him from working. Instead, it
found that even if mental illness or addiction contributed to Christopher’s lower earning potential,
this would not per se affect maintenance. Mary provides no other reasons for us to disturb the trial
court’s determinations, so we decline to do so.
¶ 49 B. Marital Assets and Debts
¶ 50 Mary next asks us to reverse the trial court’s allocation of marital debts and assets.
“The court has broad discretion in the distribution of marital assets.” In re Marriage of Walker,
386 Ill. App. 3d 1034, 1042 (2008). “The touchstone of proper and just apportionment is whether
it is equitable in nature.” In re Marriage of Dunlap, 294 Ill. App. 3d 768, 778 (1998). “An award
- 15 - of property in just proportions does not mean equal proportions, and a trial court does not abuse
its discretion in awarding a larger share of the marital property to one party.” Walker, 386 Ill. App.
3d at 1042.
¶ 51 Section 503(d) of the Marriage Act lists factors for a trial court to consider in
allocating marital debts and assets. 750 ILCS 5/503(d) (West 2024). Here, the trial court found
that the parties’ relevant economic circumstances favored a greater award for Christopher because
of Mary’s substantially higher income and Christopher’s medical conditions, although it also
acknowledged Mary’s childcare obligations. See id. § 503(d)(5). As with its maintenance analysis,
the court determined that the parties’ age, health, station, occupation, income, skills, employability,
estate, liabilities, and needs favored Christopher. See id. § 503(d)(8). It reached the same
conclusion regarding each parties’ opportunity for future acquisition of capital assets and income,
at least “to a limited extent.” See id. § 503(d)(11). The court treated Mary’s custody of her
grandchildren as a factor supporting a greater award for her. See id. § 503(d)(9). The court found
the remaining factors were “neutral” or favored neither party, including each party’s contribution
to the value of marital and nonmarital property. See id. § 503(d)(1). Based on these factors, the
trial court awarded Christopher a net total of $62,000.48 in assets and awarded Mary a net total of
$58,450, plus the 2023 income tax returns.
¶ 52 Mary claims that the trial court abused its discretion in allocating debts and assets.
First, she argues that the court erred by treating the parties’ contributions to the marital estate as a
neutral factor. According to Mary, she paid the household bills and the loan payments on the
parties’ cabin and vehicles throughout their marriage. When Christopher received his inheritance
and his SSDI back pay and cashed in his 401(k), he used these funds to purchase vehicles and other
luxuries for himself, some of which he later sold. Mary insists Christopher could have worked
- 16 - after receiving SSDI, and he chose not to. She insists that the court failed to acknowledge that she
contributed much more to the marital estate than he did.
¶ 53 We disagree. Although Mary was the primary breadwinner for much of the
marriage, the trial court reasonably found that Christopher provided the couples’ primary source
of income at the beginning of their marriage. Christopher also testified that, at the beginning of the
couple’s relationship, he alone made regular payments on their home. Even after Christopher lost
his job, he contributed to living expenses, groceries, and meals at restaurants. Christopher spent
money on luxuries, like the camper, but Mary also used these, at least somewhat. Mary also spent
money traveling. Deferring to the trial court, we reject Mary’s assertion that Christopher simply
chose not to work. The court accepted that Christopher was disabled, and that finding was
reasonable. The court determined that any discrepancy between Mary’s and Christopher’s
contributions to the marital estate was not so great as to warrant a greater award to Mary. This
determination was not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence, and the court did not abuse
its discretion by treating this as a neutral factor.
¶ 54 Next, Mary argues that the trial court erred by dividing her 401(k) between her and
Christopher. She insists that the court’s decision was not equitable and that the court failed to
adequately explain this decision. Especially because of her obligations to her two grandchildren
and her own health problems, she claims the court abused its discretion by awarding Christopher
half of her 401(k).
¶ 55 Again, we disagree. Mary concedes that her 401(k) was part of the marital estate.
Therefore, the trial court rightly considered Mary’s 401(k) as part of the overall value of the debts
and assets to be divided. Although the court did not explain specifically why the 401(k) should be
split in half, it thoroughly reviewed the statutory factors and explained why it allocated the debts
- 17 - and assets as it did, awarding slightly more to Christopher over Mary. Mary offers no reason to
separate the 401(k) from the other assets, and we do not find that the trial court was required to do
so.
¶ 56 Finally, Mary contends the trial court misunderstood her testimony regarding
Christopher’s SSDI back pay. Mary testified that Christopher received $56,000 in SSDI back pay
during the marriage. However, the court allocated a SSDI back pay “debt” to Christopher. This
debt did not exist, and neither party testified that it did.
¶ 57 Mary is correct that the trial court’s factual finding that the Christopher had a debt
associated with his SSDI back pay was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. As she
observes, no witness testified to this, and the evidence showed only that Christopher received a
$56,000 payment from SSDI.
¶ 58 In response to this clear error, Christopher simply asserts that the error was
“harmless” because the trial court’s division of marital debts and assets was otherwise nearly equal
and the court assigned no value to this “debt” in its chart in Exhibit A. The court found it
“equitable” that Christopher be responsible for this debt, but it did not specify the balance of the
debt. Instead, the court simply treated this “debt” as a reason for “ ‘tipping the scales’ a bit in his
favor in terms of the distribution of the other assets and debts.”
¶ 59 We cannot be sure that the trial court’s error had no effect on its allocation of debts
and assets. Contrary to Christopher’s argument, we do not find it decisive that the court’s allocation
was otherwise nearly equal, as “[a]n award of property in just proportions does not mean equal
proportions.” Walker, 386 Ill. App. 3d at 1042. Moreover, because the court assigned no value to
the debt, we cannot determine precisely how this error affected its judgment. At the very least, the
court considered this debt to be a reason to “ ‘tip[ ] the scales’ ” in Christopher’s favor, suggesting
- 18 - at least some impact on the court’s overall distribution. In this context, we find that the proper
remedy is to reverse the allocation of marital debts and assets and to remand so that the trial court
can reevaluate its allocation without this error. See In re Marriage of Johns, 311 Ill. App 3d 699,
704 (2000) (remanding for reconsideration of the entire property division where the trial court
incorrectly disregarded a presumption that the marital residence and its associated lot and garage
were marital property and it was “unclear” how this error affected the rest of its judgment). If the
SSDI error had no significant effect on the court’s allocation, it need not dramatically alter its
allocation on remand. But reversal and remand will allow the court to correct any possible effect
the error may have had.
¶ 60 C. Attorney Fees
¶ 61 Finally, Mary challenges the trial court’s order that she pay $3,000 of Christopher’s
attorney fees. Section 503(j) of the Marriage Act allows the court to grant a party’s petition for
contribution to fees and costs. 750 ILCS 5/503(j) (West 2024). Section 503(j)(2) instructs the court
to consider the criteria for dividing marital property in section 503 of the Marriage Act and the
criteria for awarding maintenance in section 504. Id. § 503(j)(2). On review, “[t]he circuit court’s
decision to award attorney fees will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.” In re Marriage
of Heroy, 2017 IL 120205, ¶ 13.
¶ 62 We reverse the trial court’s award of attorney fees. As stated above, the court
erroneously allocated marital debts and assets based on an SSDI debt that did not exist. This
allocation included ordering Mary to pay $3,000 of Christopher’s attorney fees. The court did not
elaborate on this decision, other than saying it made this decision “[f]or the same reasons already
articulated in this order.” Although the court could properly consider the factors for dividing
marital property when deciding whether to award attorney fees (see 750 ILCS 5/503(j)(2) (West
- 19 - 2024)), because the court erred in allocating debts, that same erroneous reasoning may have
affected its attorney fees award. The trial court must reconsider its award of attorney fees, along
with its reconsideration of the allocation of marital property.
¶ 63 Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s order requiring Mary to pay Christopher’s
attorney fees. We also reverse the trial court’s allocation of marital debts and assets, but we affirm
its decision regarding maintenance.
¶ 64 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 65 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment in part and reverse it in
part, and we remand for further proceedings.
¶ 66 Affirmed in part and reversed in part; cause remanded.
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