In re Marriage of d'Escoto

2021 IL App (1st) 210139-U

Opinion

2021 IL App (1st) 210139-U

FIFTH DIVISION September 24, 2021

No. 1-21-0139

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT

In Re MARRIAGE OF ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Cook County. RODRIGO d’ESCOTO, ) ) Petitioner-Appellee, ) ) v. ) 2016 D 004314 ) JEANNINE IMBRENDA, ) Honorable David E. Haracz, ) Judge Presiding. Respondent-Appellant. )

JUSTICE CONNORS delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Delort and Justice Hoffman concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The trial court’s order that modified the parties’ allocation judgment with respect to parenting time and allocation of decision-making responsibilities was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶2 Respondent Jeannine Imbrenda (Jeannine) appeals from the trial court’s January 8,

2021, order that modified certain portions, including parenting time and allocation of decision-

making responsibilities, of the Allocation Judgment and Agreed Parenting Plan between

Jeannine and petitioner Rodrigo d’Escoto (Rodrigo). On appeal, Jeannine contends the trial No. 1-21-0139

court’s findings were arbitrary and did not reflect the best interests of the children. She argues

that the trial court completely disregarded the guardian ad litem’s and section 604.10(b) (750

ILCS 5/604.10(b) (West 2018)) evaluator’s findings, which were credible, unimpeached, and

uncontradicted.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 Jeannine and Rodrigo were married in 2005. During their marriage, two minor

children were born, including E.D., who was born in May 2007, and L.D., who was born in June

2013. In May 2016, Rodrigo filed a petition for dissolution of marriage, asserting that there were

irreconcilable differences that caused an irretrievable breakdown of the marriage. In May 2018,

the trial court entered a judgment for dissolution of marriage and noted the court had previously

entered the Allocation Judgment and Agreed Parenting Plan (Allocation Judgment) on

September 14, 2017, which remained in full force and effect.

¶5 The Allocation Judgment set forth the allocation of parenting time and decision-

making responsibilities. With respect to educational decisions, it provided, inter alia, that

Rodrigo “shall take the lead on all major educational decisions related to the children including

but not limited to: choice of schools, tutors, and other significant decisions related to the

education of the minor children.” With respect to medical decisions, it provided, inter alia, that

Jeannine “shall take the lead on all medical decisions related to the [c]hildren.” The section on

medical decisions also provided that the “party in possession of the child shall have decision-

making authority over day-to-day medical decisions for the children while they are in his/her

possession including doctor visits if the children are sick.” As for extracurricular activities and

religion, the Allocation Judgment provided that the parties shall jointly decide all issues related

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to the selection of the extracurricular activities” and were equally responsible for any religious

decisions.

¶6 The Allocation Judgment set forth a parenting time schedule, providing for regular,

holiday, and vacation schedules. With respect to the regular parenting time schedule, it provided

that the children would alternate weeks between Jeannine and Rodrigo. The transition between

homes would occur on Monday mornings, with the transition occurring when the children were

dropped off at school or camp.

¶7 Post-Decree Litigation

¶8 Shortly after the court entered the judgment of dissolution of marriage in May 2018,

the parties filed various motions with the circuit court, including motions regarding summer

parenting time schedules and motions requesting the court to enforce orders. In August 2018,

Jeannine filed an emergency motion to enforce the Allocation Judgment and reappoint the

child’s representative wherein she asserted that Rodrigo violated the Allocation Judgment

because he unilaterally enrolled E.D. in tackle football without her knowledge or consent.

Thereafter, Rodrigo filed an emergency motion to restrain Jeannine from interfering with E.D.’s

participation in football. In September 2018, the court entered an order that provided that E.D.

should continue to participate in football and both parties should ensure his attendance at

practices and games during their parenting times. The order stated that Rodrigo offered to

provide transportation to games on Jeannine’s parenting time and that the parties should address

issues with the child representative, Michael Bender, in accordance with the Allocation

Judgment.

¶9 Thereafter, in October 2018, Jeannine filed a petition for rule to show cause,

instanter, and for indirect civil contempt, wherein she alleged that E.D. was injured playing

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football and that Rodrigo unilaterally determined that he should continue playing even though he

was injured. She alleged that Rodrigo violated the Allocation Judgment because it provided that

she had the lead on all medical decisions and that after she took E.D. to a doctor for his injury,

Rodrigo took him to a different doctor for a second medical opinion and allowed him to continue

to play football. In November 2018, the circuit court entered an order that provided, inter alia,

that any and all post-decree petitions filed by both parties were dismissed with prejudice and that

Michael Bender shall act as the parenting coordinator.

¶ 10 In May 2019, Rodrigo filed a petition for rule to show cause and for a finding of

indirect civil contempt, in which he alleged Jeannine monitored the communications between

E.D. and Rodrigo and she regularly refused to provide transportation for E.D. to his scheduled

activities during her parenting time. Thereafter, in June 2019, the court appointed Jay Dahlin as

guardian ad litem (GAL) for the children.

¶ 11 Rodrigo’s Petition to Modify Allocation of Parental Decision-Making

Responsibilities and Parenting Time

¶ 12 In September 2019, Rodrigo filed a petition to modify allocation of parental decision-

making responsibilities and parenting time under the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of

Marriage Act (IMDMA) (750 ILCS 5/501) (West 2018) (750 ILCS 5/602.5, 602.7) (West 2018))

(750 ILCS 5/603.5) (West 2018)) (750 ILCS 5/610.5) (West 2018)). He alleged, inter alia, that

Jeannine monitored and restricted the children’s access to him during her parenting time and she

was unable to communicate with him in any meaningful manner without injecting high conflict

into the situation. He requested the court allocate parental decision-making responsibilities to

him with respect to all significant issues affecting the children, including education, medical,

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religion, and extracurricular activities. He also requested the court allocate the majority of

parenting time to him, with Jeannine having frequent and liberal parenting time.

¶ 13 In Jeannine’s response, she asserted that Rodrigo ignored the Allocation Judgment,

and she was forced to file post-decree motions due to his repeated refusal to follow it. She

asserted that Rodrigo refused to communicate with her and blocked her from communicating

with him through email, phone, and text messages and she had to communicate with him through

his assistant. She claimed that Rodrigo interfered with her access to the children during his

parenting time and refused to allow them to speak with her. Jeannine requested the court deny

Rodrigo’s petition in its entirety. In Jeannine’s supplemental response to Rodrigo’s petition, she

argued that Rodrigo repeatedly usurped her medical decision-making authority. She asserted that

he unilaterally selected a therapist for E.D. without her knowledge and consent and that the

therapist he selected had been Rodrigo’s and the parties’ marital therapist. She stated that she

agreed that the Allocation Judgment should be modified and that she should have primary

decision-making authority for both medical and educational decisions as well as the majority of

the parenting time.

¶ 14 Proceedings After Rodrigo Filed the Petition to Modify the Allocation Judgment

¶ 15 In November 2019, Rodrigo filed a motion to appoint an evaluator pursuant to section

604.10(b) of the IMDMA (750 ILCS 5/604.10(b) (West 2018)). Thereafter, in December 2019,

the parties entered into an agreed order whereby they agreed that if their mediation was

unsuccessful, Dr. Robert Shapiro would be appointed as the section 604.10(b) evaluator.

¶ 16 On February 13, 2020, Rodrigo filed an emergency motion to compel therapy and

incorporate the GAL’s recommendation regarding a therapist. Rodrigo asserted that the GAL had

recommended therapy for E.D. since November 2019, that Jeannine had rejected Rodrigo’s

5 No. 1-21-0139

suggestions for therapists since August 2019, and that Jeannine had rejected the therapist

recommended by the GAL. On February 14, 2020, the circuit court ordered E.D. to immediately

begin therapy with the physician recommended by the GAL and the court appointed Hollie Sobel

as a parenting coach.

¶ 17 First Appeal:

In Re Marriage of Rodrigo d’Escoto v. Jeannine Imbrenda, 2021 IL App (1st) 200883-U

¶ 18 In January 2020, Jeannine filed an emergency motion to compel enforcement and

maintain status quo after Rodrigo informed her that he planned to remove L.D. from the British

International School of Chicago, South Loop to St. Helen’s School for the 2020-2021 school

year. Following a hearing, on August 17, 2020, the court entered an order that denied Jeannine’s

motion and provided that Rodrigo may enroll L.D. in St. Helen’s School for the 2020-2021

school year. Jeannine subsequently appealed and on August 21, 2020, we entered a stay of the

trial court’s order pending appeal and allowed L.D. to remain at the British School until we

issued a decision on the matter. In March 2021, we dismissed the appeal as moot given the trial

court’s January 8, 2021, ruling on Rodrigo’s petition to modify, which is at issue here. In that

order, the trial court modified the Allocation Judgment “giving Rodrigo sole responsibility for

major educational decisions on behalf of the children, with no required collaboration with, or

notice to, Jeannine.” In Re Marriage of Rodrigo d’Escoto v. Jeannine Imbrenda, 2021 IL App

(1st) 200883-U, ¶¶ 9-11.

¶ 19 Guardian ad Litem’s November 2019 Report

¶ 20 As previously stated, in June 2019, Jay Dahlin was appointed as the GAL for the

children. In November 2019, he issued a written report and provided his initial

recommendations, which stated as follows. The initial impression of the family dynamic was that

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the current parenting plan where each parent had equal parenting time and each parent held final

decision-making authority on a different area was “dysfunctional in its form and application.” He

had not “been witness to a single functional conversation” between Rodrigo and Jeannine since

his appointment. The rules and routines in each home could not be more different, as Rodrigo

was “more open and permissive,” and Jeannine was “extremely engaged and regimented.” Their

medical decision-making philosophies were “diametrically opposed.” His initial impression was

“to abandon the equal allocation of parenting time” and have one parent act as the primary

residential parent. He did not recommend which parent should be the primary residential parent.

¶ 21 In Dahlin’s initial report, he also recommended that the parties engage in direct

communication using Our Family Wizard and that Rodrigo unblock Jeannine’s phone number.

With respect to therapy, Dahlin stated that E.D. needed therapy and offered suggestions for

therapists. He stated that the parents should not speak negatively about the other parent and

should not discuss the litigation, parenting schedule, or interrogate the children as to what

happens at the other parent’s home. He stated that the disparagement of the other party was a

“serious problem that the children are very attuned to, and which is causing them a tremendous

amount of stress.” (Emphasis in original.)

¶ 22 Guardian ad litem’s June 1, 2020, Report

¶ 23 On June 1, 2020, Dahlin issued a second written report pursuant to his appointment.

He stated that he investigated the parties’ allegations set forth in their filings and had multiple

interviews with the parties, their current partners/spouses, the children, the therapists, the

teachers, and Michael Bender, who was the former GAL. Dahlin stated in his report as follows.

Jeannine’s and Rodrigo’s communication styles were incompatible. Jeannine did “not respect

boundaries, either the boundaries between her home and Rodrigo’s, or the boundaries of what is

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appropriate to discuss with the children and what is not.” Dahlin’s area of “deepest concern”

with Jeannine’s parenting was that she discussed parenting and financial issues with the children

“extensively.” She “actively and consistently” discussed parenting issues with them, which

“place[d] them squarely in the middle of their parents’ battles.” Both children had

“independently reported ‘hour long’ debriefing sessions after returning home from Rodrigo’s

house.”

¶ 24 Dahlin stated that Rodrigo’s assistant conducted most of the written communications

with Jeannine, which was a problem, and Rodrigo blocked Jeannine’s phone calls. When the

parties began using Our Family Wizard in January 2020, Rodrigo started to use direct written

communications but his inability to conduct any verbal communication was a serious

impediment to co-parenting. There was no evidence that Rodrigo actively disparaged Jeannine to

the children but “it was clear that Jeannine is a cause of stress and discord” in his home. The

children reported that they were not “supposed to talk about their mom while at their dad’s

house,” and that “while not disparagement, it does send the same message.”

¶ 25 Dahlin further stated in his report as follows. Rodrigo “consistently overstep[ped]”

his authority, especially on medical issues, noting that he acted unliterally to schedule medical

and therapy appointments. Jeannine was often “over-aggressive” in interpreting/enforcing her

medical decision making authority and there was “some evidence that Jeannine may be slow to

respond to medical issues.” Rodrigo would “then attempt to act unilaterally, and Jeannine will

object citing her authority—thus sending the parties into a spiral of authority debate/contempt

claims while missing the big picture of overall care of the children.” The parties agreed in early

2019 that E.D. needed to see a therapist. Rodrigo sought therapy for E.D. with Dr. Gordon and

Jeannine objected to the selection “[b]ut nonetheless she offered no alternatives.” The matter

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lingered until February 2020 when Dahlin was able to secure a therapist for E.D. Rodrigo

administered over-the-counter medication to the children, including ibuprofen for E.D. during

the football season and melatonin to L.D. to help him sleep, which were appropriate decisions, as

“each parent is responsible [for] the day-to-day care of the children while in their possession.”

¶ 26 Dahlin also stated in his report as follows. Jeannine often overstepped her authority in

attempting to regulate Rodrigo’s care of the children in his home,” which caused friction

between the parties. When Rodrigo attempted to get braces for E.D., E.D. told Rodrigo, “ ‘That’s

my mom’s decision to make. She has medical.’ ” This statement was highly concerning because

the “children know far more about the divorce and the specifics of the Allocation Judgment than

they should.” Dahlin stated it was “far more likely that Jeannine is discussing the Allocation

Judgment with the children than Rodrigo is.” Jeannine “over communicated” and attempted to

insert herself during Rodrigo’s parenting time” and Rodrigo chose to “deal with this by avoiding

further communications.”

¶ 27 Dahlin stated that travel records produced in discovery as well as conversations with

Jeannine and James Lee, who had been in a relationship with Jeannine, showed that Jeannine

traveled extensively when she did not have the children, which was not a substantive issue, as

she was free to travel when she did not have them. He noted that her absence from Chicago 50%

of the time “inhibited her ability to remain actively and consistently involved in the children’s

activities and events and lead to some of the communication problems and activity/medical

scheduling discord early in the post-judgment years (which in turn lead into many of Rodrigo’s

unilateral actions).” Dahlin noted that Jeannine’s travel had been greatly reduced during the

litigation.

9 No. 1-21-0139

¶ 28 With respect to football for E.D., Dahlin stated that Rodrigo unilaterally facilitated

E.D.’s involvement with football. Jeannine’s objection to E.D. playing football was

understandable, “but her position demonstrated a substantive disconnect with E.D.’s

personality,” noting he loved football “to the point of being defined by it.”

¶ 29 As for Dahlin’s assessment of the parenting time schedule, he stated that his first

impression was that the current 7/7 parenting plan needed to be modified, noting that the parents

had “no ability to substantively communicate, or even to have an actual civil conversation, and

as such the cooperating and coordination necessary to equally share parenting time is severely

lacking.” He also stated that modification of the current parenting schedule did not offer any

actual solution to their problems and recommended the status quo be maintained, other than

changing the exchange time from Monday mornings to Sunday evenings. He stated that

transitioning to a slightly deviated schedule such as 8/6 of 9/5 did not accomplish anything

because the same issues would continue to exist. Transitioning to a heavily deviated schedule

such as 10/4 or 12/2 would reduce inconsistencies and communication problems but neither

parent had “demonstrated the parenting strengths or weaknesses to justify such a draconian

schedule.” Dahlin concluded that “[j]oint parenting requires extensive communication and

cooperation between the parents, both of which are sorely lacking in this family.”

¶ 30 Dahlin did not recommend modifications to the educational decision-making

responsibilities. With respect to medical decisions, he stated that the parties had very different

opinions on medical care and Jeannine was “somewhat overreaching in her attempts to apply her

philosophies to Rodrigo’s home.” He stated that “[a]lthough Rodrigo has overstepped his

authority on implementing medical plans for children, his actions have generally been well

reasoned and in the children’s best interests.” Rodrigo was “more proactive in addressing

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medical issues (therapy, vaccines)” and the current arrangement where one parent makes all

education and the other all medical decisions “often creates problems when these issues

overlap.” He recommended consolidating decision making with one party and stated that the

court “may want to consider granting Rodrigo sole authority on the children’s major medical

decisions.” This recommendation was based more on his regarding cross-authority than on any

major needs or deficiencies in the parties’ individual decision-making processes. Dahlin deferred

to Dr. Shapiro for a more thorough examination on this issue. He recommended the parties

participate in co-parenting coaching with Dr. Hollie Sobel.

¶ 31 Dr. Robert Shapiro’s Written Report – June 27, 2020

¶ 32 On June 27, 2020, Dr. Robert Shapiro, the section 604.10(b) court-appointed

evaluator issued a written report on the allocation of parenting responsibility and time. He stated,

inter alia, as follows. The parties had spent most of the two years post-decree in “ongoing

conflict and/or litigation” and had “essentially been engaged in litigation the past four years.” He

stated that “[i]n many ways they are still married—certainly still caught in some of the raw

emotions that undermined their marriage and now undermines their ability to successfully

manage their post decree parenting plan.” They disagreed about multiple medical issues,

including the administration of medicine, a therapist for E.D., vaccinations, and day-to-day

health care of the children. The children have had two GALs during the course of litigation,

neither of which could resolve the conflict. The children were “warmly and positively” attached

to both Rodrigo and Jeannine, both of whom were good parents. Rodrigo and Jeannine falter

when they bring their children into the ongoing post-marital disputes, which will not get fixed by

court orders or by changes to the parenting plans. He stated that Rodrigo “discourages” the

children from talking about Jeannine in his home and both of them “either purposefully or

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inadvertently” talk in front of, or directly to, the children about this litigation. Shapiro stated that

in late June 2020, he received a phone call from Jeannine, during which E.D. told him that L.D.

had recently said in an outburst that dangerous action may be taken to produce injury. 1

¶ 33 Shapiro concluded in his written report as follows. He concurred with Dahlin’s

findings and conclusions for the most part. He recommended the court make no changes to the

present allocation of parenting responsibilities and parenting time, noting that a change from the

50/50 current plan to Rodrigo’s proposed parenting time would not be in the children’s best

interests and would not rectify the problems that occur between the parents. Shapiro proposed 14

recommendations, which included that Jeannine should not micromanage Rodrigo’s

administration of over-the-counter medication and a therapist should be immediately found for

L.D.

¶ 34 Guardian ad litem’s Written Supplemental Report

¶ 35 Dahlin issued a supplemental report after Shapiro’s June 2020 report was issued, in

which Dahlin recommended that the parties maintain the status quo with respect to the current

parenting schedule. He also recommended that Rodrigo select all extracurricular activities for

E.D. and Jeannine select them for L.D., with the summer activities being determined by the

parent in possession. As for medical decision-making authority, Dahlin stated that “[b]ased on

Dr. Shapiro’s recommendation, Jeannine would retain major medical decision making.” He

recommended that the parties terminate co-parenting coaching with Dr. Hollie Sobel.

¶ 36 Hearing on Rodrigo’s Petition to Modify Allocation of Parental Decision-Making

and Parenting Time

¶ 37 Jay Dahlin

1 We have rephrased what the child said throughout the order, but the record is agreed upon as to the words the child used during the incident.

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¶ 38 Jay Dahlin, who was appointed the GAL on June 27, 2019, testified as follows. He

described Rodrigo as a “loving, deeply caring father” who put the children’s “best interests

above all else.” He stated that “I do think that that’s what he wants more than anything, to

provide a good home for them, provide good education and a loving environment for them.” The

children had a great relationship with and were attached to him. He described Jeannine as very

attentive to the children’s needs, very in touch with them, and that she loved the children “a great

deal and they love her a great deal.” Jeannine had an excellent relationship with the children, and

she was very attuned to their education. Jeannine and Rodrigo have “wildly divergent parenting

styles,” with Jeannine being strict and Rodrigo being more relaxed. In his June 2020, report, he

noted that Jeannine’s and Rodrigo’s communication style were “incompatible.”

¶ 39 With respect to medical decisions, he testified as follows. In his June 2020 report, he

concluded that Jeannine was “often over-aggressive” in interpreting/enforcing her medical

decision-making authority and “at times may lag in implementing [proper] medical care” and

may be slow to respond to medical issues. Rodrigo would not react well when Jeannine would

“pester[] him about whether he administered melatonin or ibuprofen or day-to-day over-the-

counter prescriptions” and felt like he should be left alone on those issues during his time.

Rodrigo acted in the children’s best interests with respect to their medical needs and his medical

decisions were generally well-reasoned and proactive. Rodrigo “identifies an issue and just acts

unilaterally and addresses it” and acted “responsibly in terms of the children’s needs.”

¶ 40 As for therapy, he testified that in 2019, both parents acknowledged that E.D. needed

therapy, but it took Dahlin’s involvement to actually get him a therapist. With respect to the

incident where L.D. made statements in an outburst that serious action may be taken to produce

injury, which Shapiro had discussed in his June 2020 report, Dahlin first learned about this

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incident when he read Shapiro’s report. Jeannine never called Dahlin or Rodrigo to inform them

of the incident. If the incident was as serious as it was presented, then Dahlin and Rodrigo should

have known about it. He agreed that Jeannine should have immediately sought and obtained a

therapist after the incident. Other than calling Shapiro, there was no evidence that from the date

of the incident to the date Rodrigo filed his emergency motion for a therapist, Jeannine took

action. This was problematic because she had sole medical decision authority. It took several

weeks after Shapiro’s report came out for L.D. to get a therapist. Dahlin learned from his

investigation that E.D. had claimed that L.D.’s statements in the outburst related to L.D. having

been denied access to electronics at Jeannine’s home.

¶ 41 Dahlin further testified that in his report he stated it was “far more likely that

Jeannine is discussing the allocation judgment with the children than Rodrigo,” which was still

his conclusion. In his report, he stated that Jeannine discussed parenting and financial issues with

the children “extensively” and that the children reported that Jeannine “would speak with them

extensively” after they would come home from Rodrigo’s home. E.D. told Dahlin about a

situation when he sat in the car after coming home from Rodrigo’s house and E.D. stated that

“Mom would question me for an hour about, you know, everything that was going on.” In his

report, Dahlin stated that E.D. was resistant to getting braces with Rodrigo because it was his

“mom’s decision to make.” This statement from a child was “highly concerning” and one of

Dahlin’s primary concerns with Jeannine because the children “know far more about the divorce

and the specifics of the allocation judgment than they should.” He testified that Jeannine had

“discussed the conflict with them a lot” and “extensively,” which was putting the kids “squarely

in the middle of this conflict.” When the children were in Jeannine’s home, she monitored text

and email messages between the children and Rodrigo.

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¶ 42 Dahlin further testified that both children reported on multiple occasions that they

were not supposed to “say their mom’s name when they are at their dad’s house,” and “it upsets

their dad to talk about the mom,” which was a problem. Rodrigo reported to him in August 2019

that “I can’t let her seep into our lives while the boys are here” and that Jeannine’s involvement

with the kids in any format during his parenting time caused a lot of stress in his house and he

actively worked to “sort of keep her involvement out when he has the kids.” This was not good

for the children because they need to know that they can contact, talk about, or interact with

either parent regardless of whose parenting time it was. He testified that there was “a lot to like”

about Rodrigo but did not think he had the “willingness and ability to facilitate that relationship,”

which was one of his weakest aspects in this case. In his report, he noted that there was no

evidence that Rodrigo disparaged Jeannine to the children, and they had privacy to speak with

her at any time. Asked whether it was fair to say that Rodrigo also placed them “squarely in the

middle of their battles” through his more articulate and non-overt communication, he responded,

“[h]e does” and “I think the kids are conscious of it” and they were “definitely conscious when

their mom does it.” When Dahlin first started in the case, Rodrigo would not take communicate

with Jeannine directly. Their communication improved since they started using the Our Family

Wizard application.

¶ 43 Dahlin testified that E.D. loved football and was his number one interest. Jeannine

objected to E.D. playing football because it was a contact sport. In his report, he noted that

Jeannine’s position “demonstrated a substantive disconnect with E.D.’s personality.” Jeannine’s

support of E.D. playing football “came around eventually.” She went to a couple of games and

did not attend his practices. Rodrigo took E.D. to practice during Jeannine’s parenting time.

When Rodrigo would take E.D. back to Jeannine’s home after football practice, Rodrigo would

15 No. 1-21-0139

have dinner with E.D. even though he was required to take him directly home under the

Allocation Judgment. Dahlin testified that Rodrigo was “going to do his thing” and was “[s]ort of

like a habitual line stepper in that regard. And this is sort of like a good microcosm with him.”

He testified that Rodrigo “will have an agreement and then do his own thing,” which was “a

problem that reoccurs a lot of the time.”

¶ 44 Dahlin further testified that since the entry of the divorce, E.D. was “dealing with a

lot of problems” and he agreed that L.D. was in a “crisis.” The problems the children were

having were due to the parties’ conflict and the post-decree litigation.

¶ 45 Although Dahlin’s first impression was that the current parenting plan needed to be

modified and the parties had serious problems facilitating a 7-7 schedule, he recommended that

the court maintain the status quo with respect to the current parenting schedule. He testified that

both children really wanted to keep the same schedule and they were adjusted to both

communities. He testified that modification would not offer any solution to the problems and

would not be in the children’s best interests. Dahlin agreed with his initial assessment that

transitioning to a heavily deviated scheduled, including a 10-4 or 10-2, would reduce the

inconsistencies and communication problems. However, neither parent had “demonstrated

parenting strengths or weaknesses to justify such a draconian schedule” and changing the

parenting schedule was not going to change any of the underlying issues. He testified that

“although there’s a lot to like about Rodrigo, if you base the kids with him 80 percent of the

time, it would have the effect of essentially eliminating Jeannine as a parent.” He also testified

that “[d]oing nothing is not a solution.” He testified that all qualifiers should be removed from

the parties’ agreement and that “the more detail, the more qualifiers, the more problems, the

more arguments.”

16 No. 1-21-0139

¶ 46 As for allocation of parental decision-making responsibilities, Dahlin testified that in

his report, he recommended the court consider consolidating the decision making into one parent

because that would reduce conflict and acrimony between the parties. He acknowledged he noted

in his report that the court “may want to consider granting Rodrigo sole authority on the

children’s major medical decisions,” but that he ultimately deferred to Shapiro for a more

thorough examination. Based on Shapiro’s assessment, Dahlin recommended keeping the

authority for the children’s major medical decisions with Jeannine. His initial suggestions that

the court may want to consider giving Rodrigo sole authority for medical decisions was based on

his concerns regarding cross-authority rather than major deficiencies in the parties’ individual

decision-making processes. He testified that vesting sole authority on all decision-making with

Rodrigo was not going to solve the family problems, which would “exist regardless.” He

recommended that Rodrigo maintain authority on educational decisions and that Rodrigo select

the extracurricular activities for E.D. and Jeannine select them for L.D.

¶ 47 Dr. Robert Shapiro

¶ 48 Dr. Robert Shapiro, a licensed clinical psychologist, who was appointed by the court

to conduct a section 604.10(b) evaluation, testified as follows. Both parents had a warm, bonded,

and attached relationship with the children. Rodrigo was attentive, taught the children not to

sweat the small stuff, got them to finish their schoolwork, was fun, and played video games with

E.D. Rodrigo also talked “too much about the litigation,” had shown E.D. court orders, and

limited how much the children could talk about Jeannine. Jeannine was structured, focused on

nutrition and good sleep habits, and was almost compulsive about making sure the children told

the truth and were respectful. Jeannine also talked “way too much about this stuff, either in front

of the kids or to the kids,” talked to E.D. about “adult stuff,” and overcommunicated with her

17 No. 1-21-0139

children. Jeannine had an “undercurrent of criticism” regarding Rodrigo in that “my way of

feeding you is better” and “my movie choices are better.” E.D. and L.D. got more attention from

Jeannine than Rodrigo and she was more nurturing.

¶ 49 Shapiro had not witnessed a single functional conversation between Jeannine and

Rodrigo during his appointment and they could not communicate or cooperate. In his report, he

noted that Jeannine and Rodrigo demonstrated a “remarkable inability to communicate and

cooperate in day-to-day minor decisions, let alone some of the more significant decisions in E.D.

and L.D.’s lives.” Both parents talked about the other parent to the children about information

that was not in the children’s best interests, and both talked to the children about the litigation.

The conflict between the parties flowed down to the children and caused distress. In his report,

he noted that the acrimony between the parties negatively affected their development and both

children were “struggling with some significant psychological problems.” E.D. was “desperately

trying to survive the emotional storm” and L.D. was “struggling with some emotional issues,”

which was demonstrated by the outburst.

¶ 50 Dr. Shapiro further testified that Jeannine talked to the children too much about the

conflict between her and Rodrigo. He agreed with the statement in Dahlin’s report that Jeannine

“does not respect boundaries, either the boundaries between her home and Rodrigo’s or the

boundaries of what is appropriate to discuss with the children.” He agreed with Dahlin’s

assessments that “Jeannine’s biggest issue is with regard to what we’re talking about and the

appropriateness or inappropriateness of discussing with the children these issues” and that

“Jeannine actively and consistently discusses issues with the children which places them

squarely in the middle of their parents’ battles.”

18 No. 1-21-0139

¶ 51 Shapiro also testified that L.D. was “painfully aware” that he could not talk about his

mom at his dad’s house. In his report, he stated that L.D. told him his dad “Yells and tells me not

to talk about mom at his house” and that L.D. said “I asked if he loves my mom, and he said,

Don’t talk about your mom in this house. Dad doesn’t like E.D. to talk about mom either. But it’s

okay if I talk about dad at mom’s house.” Shapiro testified that these statements spoke to the

level of conflict between Rodrigo and Jeannine. Rodrigo had indicated to Shapiro that “I have a

problem with it if they ramble on. Mommy this, mommy that, mommy this. I feel like she is

putting her values into my house.”

¶ 52 Shapiro testified that in his report, he noted that L.D. indicated that e-learning was

easier at Jeannine’s house because she sat with him. He testified that L.D. had expressed a

preference to spend more time at Rodrigo’s home and, at one point, told him he wished he could

stay there for two weeks and Jeannine’s house on the weekends but that he also wanted “it to be

fair.” Shapiro testified that a six-year-old would not typically come up with this type of statement

and he questioned whether it came from “someplace else.” He noted that L.D.’s expressed

motivation to have the parenting time that Rodrigo was seeking was driven by L.D. having more

toys and being able to play video games at Rodrigo’s house.

¶ 53 Shapiro testified that on June 25, 2020, Jeannine called him about L.D. stating in an

outburst that serious action may be taken to produce injury. Shapiro told Jeannine that L.D.

needed to be in therapy, and Jeannine indicated to him that therapy was “either in the works or

was going to take place.” She did not ask for a recommendation for a therapist for L.D. A few

days later, he spoke with E.D. about the incident, who told Shapiro that L.D. had also made

statements during that incident relating to how he was “always bored.” Shapiro testified that the

connection between being bored and L.D.’s other statements during that incident was his “way of

19 No. 1-21-0139

expressing how upset he is that he is so restricted at mom’s house, and he feels he has so much

freedom at dad’s house.” Shapiro did not think L.D. would take dangerous action to produce

injury, but that the incident was significant and needed to be addressed.

¶ 54 Shapiro testified that he did not believe that the seven days off, seven days current

schedule was dysfunctional or that the parents had serious problems facilitating it. Based on

Shapiro’s experience, it was his opinion that the parties’ problems could not be fixed by court

order or by changes to the parenting time. He did not recommend changing the 50/50 parenting

time schedule and testified that it was “workable,” the children were familiar with it, and it was

in the best interests of the children to continue with it. He testified that if he had to choose one

parent, he would recommend Jeannine because her availability “and some of her values, not the

way she communicates, but some of her values.” Shapiro did not recommend any changes to the

allocation of parental responsibility. He agreed with Dahlin’s conclusion that “joint decision-

making on any issue is out of the question” and with his recommendations regarding the

allocation of extracurricular activities. Shapiro agreed with Dahlin’s recommendation that the

parents continue seeing the parenting coordinator, Hollie Sobel. He also testified that even with

the help of Sobel, he did not think there was a scenario where Rodrigo and Jeannine would agree

on things.

¶ 55 Jeannine Imbrenda

¶ 56 Jeannine testified as follows. She disagreed with Dahlin’s statements that she was

often over-aggressive in interpreting and enforcing her medical decision authority, she often

overstepped her authority in attempting to regulate Rodrigo’s care of the children, and her

traveling inhibited her ability to be consistently involved in her children’s activities in school.

She does not travel anymore, and she would only question the children about what happened at

20 No. 1-21-0139

Rodrigo’s house if they had recounted some sort of incident. She acknowledged that the

Allocation Judgment had been mentioned to her children indirectly and it was inappropriate. She

agreed that the litigation was negatively affecting the children and it would help the children if

the parties stopped fighting.

¶ 57 Jeannine testified about the incident regarding L.D.’s outburst as follows. In late June

2020, the children were playing video games downstairs and E.D. came and told her he was very

upset because L.D. made statements relating to how serious action may be taken to produce

injury. L.D. told Jeannine that he got upset because E.D. was not paying attention to him and

would not play with him. Jeannine thought the incident was serious and she was concerned.

About 30 minutes after the incident, she called Dr. Shapiro because he was a “neutral” person

and could give her mental health advice and she called the parent coordinator, Hollie Sobel. She

did not call Rodrigo or Dahlin and acknowledged she “made an error in judgment” by not calling

Rodrigo. She testified that it was not due to lack of concern, but that Rodrigo was unreachable,

had blocked her phone number, and would take three days to respond to emails. She spoke with

James Lees, who was her boyfriend at the time, about the incident and told him that L.D. was

being “overly dramatic,” and she did not think it was a big deal. She knew she needed to get a

therapist for L.D. and from the time of the incident to the date Rodrigo filed the emergency

motion to secure a therapist for L.D., she had been in the process of securing one.

¶ 58 With respect to therapy for E.D., she testified as follows. When the parties separated

in 2016, they agreed that E.D. needed a therapist. She contacted Michael Bender, who was the

court appointed GAL at the time, to see if he had any suggestions for therapists. In 2017, E.D.

started seeing Dr. Teresa LaBarre and saw her for about four to six months. Rodrigo refused to

take him to therapy and, as a result, the therapist terminated the relationship in June 2017.

21 No. 1-21-0139

Thereafter, Jeannine set up weekly therapy visits for E.D. with the school counselor that lasted

until the end of the 2018 school year. From about June 2018 through May 2019, E.D. did not

have a therapist. In May 2019, Rodrigo informed her that he took E.D. to see Dr. Gordon for

therapy. Jeannine was concerned about Dr. Gordon because he had been their marital therapist as

well as Rodrigo’s therapist. Jeannine did not secure a therapist for E.D. from May 2019 to

January 2020, which was a mistake.

¶ 59 Asked about her concerns with the children when they were in Rodrigo’s care,

Jeannine testified that she was concerned about their “general needs,” including nutrition, as

Rodrigo would give L.D. hot dogs all the time. She was also concerned about their bedtimes,

hygiene, and homework when the children were at Rodrigo’s house. L.D. told her that he did not

complete his work at Rodrigo’s house because his dad was busy, and he was told to go in his

room and figure it out. Jeannine testified that she was concerned with the amount of time the

children used electronics at Rodrigo’s house and that E.D. informed her that L.D. was on his

iPad all day until he goes to bed. Jeannine monitored E.D.’s text messages with his friends and

did not monitor his phone communications with Rodrigo.

¶ 60 As for E.D.’s participation in football, Jeannine testified that she had been to several

practices and a couple of games, and she initially had concerns about injuries. Asked whether she

had emailed E.D. videos of kids getting hurt playing football, she responded that “E.D. and I

have e-mailed videos regarding football” and there was “one incident where a high school

student was hurt and I had asked E.D. to be careful.”

¶ 61 Jeannine testified that “anything that I’m trying to accomplish with Rodrigo for the

kids feels like we’re in front of a judge. There’s no in between. There’s no conversation. * * *

And we wind up in court every time. And it is—it’s not sustainable.” She also testified that she

22 No. 1-21-0139

believed she and Rodrigo could “at some point with some help figure this out” and the current

schedule and decision-making was sustainable for the children. She acknowledged she told Dr.

Hollie Sobel that coparenting coaching probably would not work. Jeannine wanted to maintain

the status quo with parenting time.

¶ 62 Rodrigo d’Escoto

¶ 63 Rodrigo testified as follows. Less than two months after the parties divorced in May

2018, they returned to court to litigate disputes regarding summer parenting time and football for

E.D. Rodrigo had enrolled E.D. in football because he loved it, it improved his confidence, and

changed him for the better. After the judge decided that E.D. could play football, E.D. did not

believe Rodrigo, so he showed E.D. the court order to convince him, which was the only time

Rodrigo showed E.D. a court order. Rodrigo adjusted his work schedule in order to take E.D. to

football practices and his business sacrificed so he could help coach E.D.’s team. Rodrigo

attended all but a handful of his football practices.

¶ 64 Rodrigo testified that “everything” with Jeannine was in conflict and that “I make a

decision, she tells me not to, then she doesn’t make a decision. Then I make a decision, it’s—

even when I legally have a right to make a decision, I am not allowed to make a decision.” He

testified that Jeannine was “unable to communicate kindly, nicely,” “there’s always someone to

blame,” and “[t]here’s always a bad—a villain and just—life just happens, and she’s unable to

accept that.” Rodrigo testified that his problems with Jeannine had been cascading down on the

children and they were struggling with significant psychological problems. He agreed with

Dahlin’s assessment that the children were in a “crisis.” E.D. had been “in the middle of this,”

which negatively affected him, and needed therapy since May 2019. Rodrigo decided to get E.D.

therapy with Dr. Gordon, whom Rodrigo and Jeannine had both seen before. Rodrigo

23 No. 1-21-0139

acknowledged he did not have authority under the Allocation Judgment to select a therapist, as

that was Jeannine’s decision, and he should have told her before he took E.D. there. He testified

he knew it would cause conflict and “was going to be a big, big thing by me taking action to help

my son.” Jeannine did not select a therapist between May 2019 and February 2020, when he filed

an emergency petition to secure Dr. Jesse Klein.

¶ 65 In early July, Rodrigo learned from Shapiro’s report about the incident where L.D.

made statements regarding how dangerous action may be taken to produce injury. Rodrigo was

shocked and scared and believed L.D. was in a crisis. Shapiro had concluded in his report that

L.D. needed a therapist, so Rodrigo filed an emergency petition regarding therapy for L.D., after

which a therapist was secured for L.D. He did not think Jeannine really thought L.D. was at risk

and the “whole thing was staged.” He testified that Jeannine capitalized on L.D.’s “pain and

suffering” and put the children “squarely in the middle just so she could win the decision on

schools.” Rodrigo acknowledged that he had a part in the conflict and that “sometimes, yes, I

imagine I’m not perfect.”

¶ 66 Rodrigo testified that they have a calendar and chore board at his house, and they eat

breakfast and dinner together. He testified that bedtime was “pretty strict” for L.D. and E.D. had

a strict bedtime during the week. Rodrigo was currently using the Our Family Wizard application

with Jeannine to communicate, which was effective. Rodrigo was requesting a change to the

parenting schedule because it would reduce the time the children would be “in the middle of

this” and would give them more stability and reduce stress. Neither mediation with a judge nor

coparenting sessions with Dr. Hollie Sobel had helped them avoid litigating disputes. He agreed

with Dahlin’s report that the parties had serious problems facilitating a 7-7 schedule and a

heavily deviated schedule would reduce inconsistencies and communication problems. Rodrigo

24 No. 1-21-0139

and Jeannine could not operate under the current Allocation Judgment, and he did not think that

they would ever be on the same page with decision-making for the children.

¶ 67 Jay Dahlin

¶ 68 At the end of the testimony described above, Jeannine’s counsel called Dahlin to

testify again, and he testified as follows. The parents had problems with communication and

decision making, not parenting time, and it was in the children’s best interests to maintain the

50/50 schedule. In Dahlin’s three reports, he never suggested modification of the schedule. In his

November 2019 report, he “contemplated a potential modification to the schedule early on but

didn’t recommend anything.” In his June 2020 and September 2020 reports, he did not

recommend modifying the schedule. He recommended that Rodrigo maintain educational

decision-making responsibility and Jeannine maintain major medical decision-making

responsibility. He recommended terminating the parents’ joint decision-making responsibility on

activities, with Rodrigo having sole decision-making on E.D.’s extracurricular activities and

Jeannine having sole decision-making on L.D.’s extracurricular activities. He recommended a

parenting coordinator.

¶ 69 Dahlin also testified that during the parties’ school dispute on transferring L.D. to St.

Helen’s school, Jeannine used the incident when L.D. made statements in the outburst to

“manipulate” a benefit her and took advantage of a situation during litigation to keep L.D. in the

school at that time. He testified it was “very, very problematic what she did” but did not think it

negatively impacted L.D., as Dahlin believed L.D. should have remained in the British school.

He testified that Jeannine put the kids squarely in the middle of her disputes with Rodrigo, that

she did so more than Rodrigo, and she instigated arguments more than Rodrigo. Dahlin testified

25 No. 1-21-0139

that “[d]oing nothing is not going to get us anywhere.” He testified that the parties had been on

better behavior since they had been in litigation.

¶ 70 Circuit Court’s Ruling

¶ 71 On January 8, 2021, the circuit court issued a written ruling on Rodrigo’s petition to

modify the Allocation Judgment. The court stated as follows:

“Since its inception in 2016, this case has had a life of its own that has enveloped the

parties, the lawyers, the experts, and this court in an ongoing tug of war to meet the best

interests of the two minor children. It is a struggle that shifts constantly making it

difficult for the evaluators and professionals to be ahead of each turn or change. Even

after the 604.10(b) report was finished at the end of June 2020, there have been an

additional six months of conflict and disagreement between the parties, not the least of

which was the school decision debacle involving the youngest child this past August. The

three-afternoon hearing regarding school choice was followed by a far lengthier second

trial addressing the above listed matters. In between, this Court and/or the GAL spent

many, many hours with lawyers and litigants attempting to mediate a settlement or

fashion some partial resolution of the issues. Unfortunately, an agreement was not

reached. At this point, the options as presented by the parties’ [sic] in their closing

arguments are to either make small changes and leave the parenting schedule and

decision-making judgment largely the same or to make more drastic alterations. After

reviewing all the testimony, the exhibits, the 604.10(b) report, and the applicable law, the

Court now finds that to do the latter is in the best interests of the children.”

The court further stated:

26 No. 1-21-0139

“This Court’s experience during the entirety of this litigation including the six months

since the 604.10(b) report was released, in conjunction with its finding that the minor

children are suffering emotionally from the destabilization caused by their parents’

conflict, leads it to step beyond the recommendations of its own expert and the GAL.”

The court found the GAL’s and Shapiro’s factual findings were credible and that Rodrigo was a

credible witness.

¶ 72 The court stated that it “acknowledges that both parties have alleged in verified

pleadings that the Allocation Judgment needs to be modified.” It further found as follows:

“There has been a substantial change in circumstances since the entry of the

Allocation Judgment. Specifically, and by way of example, by all witnesses accounts the

children are in crisis and the current parenting plan (7 on / 7 off, with each parent holding

final decision-making authority on a different area) is dysfunctional in its form and

application. The court further finds that the parties have serious problems facilitating a

7/7 schedule.”

¶ 73 The court also found as follows. The current parenting plan “created tremendous

conflict” between the parties, which negatively affected the children’s development. Jeannine

had precipitated the majority of the post-decree litigation and she actively and consistently

discussed issues, including parenting and financial, with the children, which placed them

“squarely in the middle of their parents’ battles.” Jeannine failed to timely secure a therapist for

E.D. and L.D., she undermined Rodrigo’s day-to-day decisions as a parent, and attempted to

regulate behaviors with Rodrigo’s home through the children. Jeannine reasonably objected to

E.D. playing football but once E.D. was enrolled by court order, she did not support him in a

way that served his best interest. Jeannine “fabricated the degree of L.D.’s suicidal ideation to

27 No. 1-21-0139

gain an advantage in the school dispute.” With respect to Rodrigo, he acted in the children’s best

interests, made well-reasoned decisions in the children’s best interests, and proactively sought

and procured necessary therapy for each child since the divorce. Rodrigo facilitated E.D.’s

attendance at football during Jeannine’s parenting time and supported him in his interests.

¶ 74 The court stated it agreed with Dahlin that the “singular concern” was “reducing the

inconsistency and communication between the parties” because that was “the source of problems

and stress for the children.” The court found it was in the children’s best interests to transition to

a heavily deviated parenting schedule, noting it would reduce the inconsistencies and

communication problems in the family. The court agreed with Dahlin’s assessment that joint

decision-making on any issue was out of the question and the current agreement, with Rodrigo

making educational and Jeannine making medical decisions, created problems and consolidated

decision making would reduce the acrimony between the parties.

¶ 75 The court concluded that after a review of the factors set forth in sections 602.7 (750

ILCS 5/602.7(b) (West 2020)) and 602.5 (750 ILCS 5/602.5(b) (West 2020)) of the IMDMA, the

children’s best interests would be served with Rodrigo having sole decision-making authority for

all major decisions relative to the children as well as having a majority of the parenting time

during the school year, as it would remove the children from the parties’ conflict. Specifically,

the court ordered the Allocation Judgment to be modified to provide that Rodrigo “shall be

solely responsible for all major medical decisions on behalf of the children as defined in the

IMDMA” and “shall be solely responsible for major educational decisions on behalf of the

children.” With respect to parenting time, the court ordered that during the school year, Jeannine

“shall have parenting time with the children on alternating weekends from Thursday after

28 No. 1-21-0139

school/camp/activity *** through Tuesday morning drop off at school” and Rodrigo “shall have

parenting time at all other times.” This appeal followed.

¶ 76 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 77 We initially address the timeliness of our decision. This case is designated

“accelerated” under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 311(a) (eff. July 1, 2018), which requires this

court to issue a decision within 150 days after the filing of the notice of appeal, “[e]xcept for

good cause shown.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 311(a)(5) (eff. July 1, 2018). Jeannine filed her notice of appeal

on February 8, 2021. The 150-day period to issue our decision expired in July 2021. However,

there was good cause for not meeting that deadline. Jeannine’s counsel filed a motion for

extension of time to file her opening brief, which we granted, and Rodrigo’s counsel filed two

motions for extension of time to file his response brief, which we granted. Thereafter, on July 7,

2021, we granted Jeannine’s counsel’s motion for extension of time to file her reply brief to July

16, 2021, after which Jeannine’s counsel filed a motion to withdraw. On July 15, 2021, we

granted Jeannine’s counsel’s motion to withdraw and ordered appellant to comply with Illinois

Supreme Court Rule 13(c)(5) ( July 1, 2017) within 21 days. There was no response filed to our

July 15, 2021, order, so on August 9, 2021, we entered an order that stated we were taking and

considering the case without a reply brief. Accordingly, because this case was not ready for our

review until August 2021, we find good cause to issue our decision after the 150-day deadline in

Rule 311(a)(5). See In re B’Yata I., 2013 IL App (2d) 130558, ¶ 26.

¶ 78 Turning to the arguments raised on appeal, Jeannine contends that the trial court’s

findings and determination to modify the parenting time and the allocation of decision-making

responsibilities were against the manifest weight of the evidence.

29 No. 1-21-0139

¶ 79 Section 610.5(c) of the IMDMA, sets forth the standard for modifying a parenting

plan or allocation judgment and states as follows:

“the court shall modify a parenting plan or allocation judgment when necessary to

serve the child’s best interests if the court finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that

on the basis of facts that have arisen since the entry of the existing parenting plan or

allocation judgment or were not anticipated therein, a substantial change has occurred in

the circumstances of the child or of either parent and that a modification is necessary to

serve the child’s best interests.” 750 ILCS 5/610.5(c) (West 2020).

Accordingly, the court may modify parenting time or the allocation of parental responsibilities if

a substantial change has occurred in the circumstances of the child or each parent since the

existing allocation judgment was entered and such a modification is necessary to serve the

child’s best interests. In re Marriage of Virgin, 2021 IL App (3d) 190650, ¶ 43; In re Marriage

of Burns & Lifferth, 2019 IL App (2d) 180715, ¶ 26.

¶ 80 Jeannine contends that the evidence did not show that there was a change in

circumstances since the entry of the Allocation Judgment that would necessitate modifying the

Allocation Judgment. She asserts that the evidence the court relied upon for its finding that a

change in circumstances had occurred was either known, or could have been anticipated by the

court and the parties.

¶ 81 We will uphold a trial court’s finding that there was a substantial change in

circumstances that warranted a modification of parenting time or allocation of parental decision-

making responsibilities unless that finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re

Marriage of Adams, 2017 IL App (3d) 170472, ¶ 19; In re Marriage of Bates, 212 Ill. 2d 489,

515 (2004). Under this standard, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the appellee

30 No. 1-21-0139

and when there are multiple reasonable inferences, we will accept the inferences that support the

trial court’s ruling. In re Marriage of Bates, 212 Ill. 2d at 516. A decision is against the manifest

weight of the evidence only when an opposite conclusion is apparent, or when the finding is

unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence. Jameson v. Williams, 2020 IL App (3d)

200048, ¶ 47. Under this standard, we may affirm the trial court’s ruling if there is any basis in

the record to support its findings. In re Custody of G.L., 2017 IL App (1st) 163171, ¶ 24.

¶ 82 Here, the trial court concluded that there was a substantial change in circumstances

since the entry of the Allocation Judgment and found that the “by all witnesses accounts the

children are in crisis,” and the current parenting plan was “dysfunctional in its form and

application.” The evidence supports the trial court’s findings. The GAL testified that since the

entry of the parties’ divorce, E.D. was “dealing with a lot of problems,” L.D. was in a “crisis,”

and that these problems were due to the post-decree litigation and the parties’ conflict. Shapiro

stated in his report that the parties had spent most of the two years post-decree in “ongoing

conflict and/or litigation.” Both Shapiro and the GAL testified that the parties could not

effectively communicate or cooperate, and the children were negatively impacted by the parties’

conflict. Accordingly, based on this evidence, including the parties’ post-decree conflict that

negatively impacted the children, we cannot find that the trial court’s finding that there was a

substantial change in circumstances was unreasonable, arbitrary, or that an opposite conclusion is

apparent.

¶ 83 We also note that the court stated in its order that both parties had alleged in verified

pleadings that the Allocation Judgment needed to be modified. Indeed, in Jeannine’s

supplemental response in opposition to Rodrigo’s petition to modify, she did not argue that there

was no change in circumstances since the entry of the Allocation Judgment. Rather, she asserted

31 No. 1-21-0139

that she “agrees that the current Allocation Judgment should be modified—and it is she who

should have primary decision-making for both education and medical issues” and the children

should spend the majority of their time with her, subject to reasonable parenting time allocated to

Rodrigo.

¶ 84 Next, we address the trial court’s finding that it was in the best interests of the

children to modify the parenting time to give Rodrigo the majority of the parenting time during

the school year. Jeannine contends that there was no evidence that supported the trial court’s

conclusion that modifying the parenting schedule would reduce conflict or serve the children’s

best interests. Jeannine argues that the GAL and Shapiro agreed in the assessment that the

parenting schedule should not be modified, and it was not in the children’s best interests to

modify it. She asserts the trial court completely disregarded their recommendations.

¶ 85 The court must allocate parenting time and decision-making responsibilities

according to the best interests of the child. In re Marriage of Virgin, 2021 IL App (3d) 190650, ¶

43; Jameson v. Williams, 2020 IL App (3d) 200048, ¶ 47. To determine the child’s best interests

for the allocation of parenting time under section 602.7(b), the court must consider all relevant

factors, including:

“(1) the wishes of each parent seeking parenting time;

(2) the wishes of the child, taking into account the child’s maturity and ability to

express reasoned and independent preferences as to parenting time;

(3) the amount of time each parent spent performing caretaking functions with respect

to the child in the 24 months preceding the filing of any petition for allocation of

parental responsibilities or, if the child is under 2 years of age, since the child’s birth;

32 No. 1-21-0139

(4) any prior agreement or course of conduct between the parents relating to

caretaking functions with respect to the child;

(5) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with his or her parents and

siblings and with any other person who may significantly affect the child’s best

interests;

(6) the child’s adjustment to his or her home, school, and community;

(7) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved;

(8) the child’s needs;

(9) the distance between the parents’ residences, the cost and difficulty of

transporting the child, each parent’s and the child’s daily schedules, and the ability of

the parents to cooperate in the arrangement;

(10) whether a restriction on parenting time is appropriate;

(11) the physical violence or threat of physical violence by the child’s parent directed

against the child or other member of the child’s household;

(12) the willingness and ability of each parent to place the needs of the child ahead of

his or her own needs;

(13) the willingness and ability of each parent to facilitate and encourage a close and

continuing relationship between the other parent and the child;

(14) the occurrence of abuse against the child or other member of the child’s

household;

(15) whether one of the parents is a convicted sex offender or lives with a convicted

sex offender and, if so, the exact nature of the offense and what if any treatment the

33 No. 1-21-0139

offender has successfully participated in; the parties are entitled to a hearing on the

issues raised in this paragraph (15);

(16) the terms of a parent’s military family-care plan that a parent must complete

before deployment if a parent is a member of the United States Armed Forces who is

being deployed; and

(17) any other factor that the court expressly finds to be relevant.” 750 ILCS

5/602.7(b) (West 2020).

A trial court is not required to make explicit findings on each factor, nor is it required to refer to

every factor. Jameson, 2020 IL App (3d) 200048, ¶ 47.

¶ 86 The trial court is in the best position to assess the credibility of witnesses and to

determine the child’s best interest. In re Marriage of Virgin, 2021 IL App (3d) 190650, ¶ 45. As

such, the trial court has broad discretion in determining issues relating to the allocation of

parenting time and decision-making and its judgment is afforded great deference. In re Custody

of G.L., 2017 IL App (1st) 163171, ¶¶ 24-25; In re Marriage of Debra N. & Michael S., 2013 IL

App (1st) 122145, ¶ 45. As a reviewing court, we will not disturb a trial court’s ruling on the

allocation of decision-making responsibilities or parenting time unless that decision is against the

manifest weight of the evidence. In re Marriage of Virgin, 2021 IL App (3d) 190650, ¶ 45;

Jameson v, 2020 IL App (3d) 200048, ¶ 47. A trial court’s decision is against the manifest

weight of the evidence when an opposite conclusion is apparent or when the court’s findings are

unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence. In re Marriage of Verhines & Hickey,

2018 IL App (2d) 171034, ¶ 51. To determine whether a judgment is contrary to the manifest

weight of the evidence, we will review the evidence in the light most favorable to the appellee.

In re Marriage of Debra N. & Michael S., 2013 IL App (1st) 122145, ¶ 45. As previously stated,

34 No. 1-21-0139

under this standard, a reviewing court may affirm the trial court’s ruling if there is any basis in

the record to support its findings. In re Custody of G.L., 2017 IL App (1st) 163171, ¶ 24.

¶ 87 Here, the court set aside the 50/50 parenting plan and modified it such that Rodrigo

would have the majority of the parenting time during the school year. Specifically, the court

modified the parenting time to provide that during the school year, Jeannine would have the

children on alternating weekends from Thursday after school/camp through Tuesday morning

drop off at camp/school, with Rodrigo having parenting time at all other times. The trial court’s

decision was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 88 “[C]ourts have traditionally viewed 50/50 joint parenting time with caution” and “[i]n

cases where the evidence clearly showed that parents had too much animosity to be able to

cooperate, 50/50 arrangements have been set aside.” In re Marriage of Virgin, 2021 IL App (3d)

190650, ¶ 47. Here, the evidence clearly shows that the parties were unable to effectively

communicate and cooperate. The GAL concluded in his report that “[j]oint parenting requires

extensive communication and cooperation between the parents, both of which are sorely lacking

in this family” and that he had not witnessed a “single functional conversation” between the

parties. The GAL also stated that the parties’ communication styles were incompatible, and they

had “no ability to substantively communicate, or even to have an actual civil conversation, and

as such the cooperating and coordination necessary to equally share parenting time is severely

lacking.” Likewise, in Shapiro’s written report, he stated that the parties had spent most of the

two years post-decree in “ongoing conflict and/or litigation,” they had “essentially been engaged

in litigation the past four years,” and two GALs appointed in the case could not resolve the

conflict. Shapiro further stated that the parties demonstrated a “remarkable inability to

communicate and cooperate in day-to-day minor decisions, let alone some of the more

35 No. 1-21-0139

significant decisions” in the children’s lives. At trial, Shapiro testified that he had not witnessed

a single functional conversation between them. Accordingly, the evidence shows that the parties

had been in an ongoing post-decree conflict and were unable to effectively cooperate and

communicate.

¶ 89 Further, the record shows that children were negatively impacted by the parties’

ongoing conflict and inability to cooperate. As previously stated, the GAL testified that since the

entry of the parties’ divorce, E.D. was “dealing with a lot of problems,” L.D. was in a “crisis,”

and these issues were caused by the parties’ conflict and the post-decree litigation. Likewise,

Shapiro testified that the parties’ conflict flowed down to the children and caused distress. In his

written report, he noted that the acrimony between the parties negatively affected the children’s

development, and they both were “struggling with some significant psychological problems.”

Further, the GAL testified that “doing nothing is not a solution for these children.” Accordingly,

given the parties’ contentious relationship and post-decree conflict, which negatively impacted

the children, the court’s decision to set aside the 50/50 parenting plan, which requires

communication and cooperating, was based on the evidence and was not unreasonable nor

arbitrary.

¶ 90 We note that the record shows that both parties had a good relationship with the

children. Indeed, Shapiro testified that both parents had a warm, bonded, and attached

relationship with the children. However, “[a] 50/50 arrangement is not a substitute for making a

difficult choice between two good parents, especially where such an arrangement may add to the

insecurity, which is frequently experienced by children of divorce.” In re Marriage of Virgin,

2021 IL App (3d) 190650, ¶ 52.

36 No. 1-21-0139

¶ 91 In addition, in modifying the parenting plan and awarding Rodrigo the majority of the

parenting time during the school year, the court found Rodrigo credible and that he acted in the

children’s best interests. The court also found that Jeannine had precipitated the majority of the

post-decree litigation, she actively and consistently discussed parenting issues with the children

that placed them squarely in the middle of the parties’ battles, and she undermined Rodrigo’s

day-to-day decisions. There is support in the record for these findings. With respect to Rodrigo,

the GAL stated in his written report that “[a]lthough Rodrigo has overstepped his authority on

implementing medical plans for children, his actions have generally been well reasoned and in

the children’s best interests.” As for Jeannine, the GAL stated in his report that Jeannine

discussed parenting and financial issues with the children “extensively” and she had “discussed

the conflict with them a lot,” which was putting the children “squarely in the middle of this

conflict.” Shapiro testified that Jeannine talked to the children too much about the conflict and

agreed with the statement in the GAL’s report that Jeannine did “not respect boundaries, either

the boundaries between her home and Rodrigo’s or the boundaries of what is appropriate to

discuss with the children.” He agreed with the GAL’s assessments that “Jeannine actively and

consistently discusses issues with the children which places them squarely in the middle of their

parents’ battles.” The GAL also stated in his report that it was “far more likely that Jeannine”

discussed the Allocation Judgment with the children than Rodrigo did.

¶ 92 Jeannine asserts that there was conflicting testimony between the parties and that the

only evidence the court relied upon to support its decision was Rodrigo’s testimony, whom both

the GAL and Shapiro found to have equally contributed to the parties’ issues. We acknowledge

the evidence supporting Rodrigo’s role in the parties’ conflict and inability to effectively

coparent, communicate, and cooperate. However, as a reviewing court, we may not reweigh the

37 No. 1-21-0139

evidence, assess witness credibility, or set aside the trial court’s decision simply because a

different conclusion could have been drawn from the evidence. See Jameson, 2020 IL App (3d)

200048, ¶ 51 (“It is well settled that a reviewing court’s function is not to reweigh the evidence

or assess witness credibility and set aside the circuit court’s decision simply because a different

conclusion may have been drawn from the evidence.”).

¶ 93 We next address the trial court’s ruling that modified the Allocation Judgment by

giving Rodrigo sole decision-making authority for decisions related to medical, education, and

extracurricular activities. To determine the allocation of decision-making responsibilities under

section 602.5(c) of the IMDMA, the court shall consider all relevant factors, including:

“(1) the wishes of the child, taking into account the child’s maturity and ability to

express reasoned and independent preferences as to decision-making;

(2) the child’s adjustment to his or her home, school, and community;

(3) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved;

(4) the ability of the parents to cooperate to make decisions, or the level of conflict

between the parties that may affect their ability to share decision-making;

(5) the level of each parent’s participation in past significant decision-making with

respect to the child;

(6) any prior agreement or course of conduct between the parents relating to decision-

making with respect to the child;

(7) the wishes of the parents;

38 No. 1-21-0139

(9) the distance between the parents’ residences, the cost and difficulty of

transporting the child, each parent’s and the child’s daily schedules, and the ability of

(10) whether a restriction on decision-making is appropriate under Section 603.10;

(11) the willingness and ability of each parent to facilitate and encourage a close and

continuing relationship between the other parent and the child;

(12) the physical violence or threat of physical violence by the child’s parent directed

against the child;

(13) the occurrence of abuse against the child or other member of the child’s

(14) whether one of the parents is a sex offender, and if so, the exact nature of the

offense and what, if any, treatment in which the parent has successfully participated;

and

(15) any other factor that the court expressly finds to be relevant.” 750 ILCS

5/602.5(c) (West 2020).

¶ 94 As previously stated, as a reviewing court, we will not disturb a trial court’s ruling on

the allocation of decision-making responsibilities unless that decision is against the manifest

weight of the evidence. Jameson, 2020 IL App (3d) 200048, ¶ 47. “It is no small burden to show

that a circuit court’s ruling on decision-making responsibilities is against the manifest weight of

the evidence.” Id. ¶ 50.

¶ 95 We find that the trial court’s finding that it was in the children’s best interest to

modify the Allocation Judgment by giving Rodrigo sole responsibility for all major medical,

educational, and extracurricular activity decisions is supported by the evidence. As previously

39 No. 1-21-0139

discussed, the evidence showed that the parties could not effectively communicate or cooperate,

and they consistently disputed and litigated medical, educational, and extracurricular decisions.

In Shapiro’s written report, he stated the parties were engaged in ongoing conflict and litigation

for two years post-decree and the parties disagreed about multiple medical issues, including the

administration of medicine, therapists, vaccinations, and day-to-day health care of the children.

The parties could not work together to address decisions regarding whether E.D. could play

football and which school L.D. should attend and sought court intervention to address these

¶ 96 Moreover, with respect to medical decision making, the evidence shows that Rodrigo

made well-reasoned decisions and that Jeannine was sometimes slow to respond. The GAL

testified that Rodrigo acted in the children’s best interests with respect to their medical needs, his

medical decisions were generally “well-reasoned” and “proactive,” and he “acted “responsibly in

terms of the children’s needs.” The GAL also stated in his report that Rodrigo was “more

proactive in addressing medical issues (therapy, vaccines).” As for Jeannine, in the GAL’s

written report, he stated that Jeannine “at times may lag in implementing [proper] medical care”

and may be slow to respond to medical issues. Shapiro testified that the incident where L.D.

made statements in the outburst about how dangerous action may be taken to produce injury

needed to be addressed and the GAL testified that, other than calling Shapiro, there was no

evidence that Jeannine took action after this incident until Rodrigo filed the emergency motion.

¶ 97 Accordingly, under these circumstances, we cannot find that the trial court’s decision

to give Rodrigo sole authority for all major medical, educational, and extracurricular decisions

was arbitrary, unreasonable, or that an opposite conclusion is apparent. Thus, the trial court’s

decision was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

40 No. 1-21-0139

¶ 98 Lastly, Jeannine contends that the trial court completely disregarded the GAL’s and

Shapiro’s findings and recommendations, which were credible, uncontradicted, and unimpeached

and that it abused its discretion when it rejected their testimony. We acknowledge that the trial

court’s determination to modify both the parenting time and the allocation of decision-making

responsibilities differed from the recommendations of the GAL and Shapiro, the section

604.10(b) evaluator. However, the trial court “is the ultimate fact finder in a child custody case,

not the expert witness.” In re Marriage of Saheb & Khazal, 377 Ill. App. 3d 615, 628 (2007).

Further, the court has discretion to seek independent expert advice, but it is not bound to abide

by the opinions or recommendations of the experts it appoints. In re Marriage of Wendy L.D.

and George T.D., 2017 IL App (1st) 160098, ¶ 88. Rather, experts and consultants are advisors

to the court, and it is within the trial court’s discretion to accept or reject some or all of the

advice within the parameters of what is reasonable under the facts of a certain case. Id. Here,

although the court’s conclusions did not reflect the GAL’s and the section 604.10(b) evaluator’s

recommendations, the trial court was free to accept or reject some or all of the advice, and there

was sufficient evidence, as described above, to support the trial court’s findings and conclusions.

¶ 99 In addition, the court acknowledged in its order that it was not following the

recommendations of the GAL and Shapiro and it explained its reasoning as follows:

“This Court’s experience during the entirety of this litigation including the six months

since the 604.10(b) report was released, in conjunction with its finding that the minor

children are suffering emotionally from the destabilization caused by their parents’

conflict, leads it to step beyond the recommendations of its own expert and the GAL.”

41 No. 1-21-0139

Accordingly, under the deferential standard of review, we cannot find that the court’s judgment

was against the manifest weight of the evidence simply because it did not follow the GAL’s and

the section 604.10(b) evaluator’s recommendations.

¶ 100 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 101 In sum, the trial court’s ruling that modified the Allocation Judgment is not against

the manifest weight of the evidence. The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

¶ 102 Affirmed.