NO. 4-09-0605 Filed 3/26/10
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
In re: the Marriage of ) Appeal from JEROLD S. CULP, ) Circuit Court of Petitioner-Appellant, ) Vermilion County and ) No. 99D56 SUSAN K. CULP, n/k/a SUSAN FOX, ) Respondent-Appellee. ) Honorable ) Joseph P. Skowronski, ) Judge Presiding. _________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE KNECHT delivered the opinion of the court:
In February 1999, petitioner, Jerold S. Culp (Jerry),
filed a petition for the dissolution of his marriage to
respondent, Susan K. Culp, n/k/a Susan Fox. As part of their
settlement agreement, the parties agreed Jerry's retirement
benefits were to be "equally divided as of April 20, 1999,
pursuant to a separate [Qualified Illinois Domestic Relations
Order (QILDRO)]." Because Jerry was not near retirement at the
time of the dissolution, the trial court reserved jurisdiction
for the entry of a QILDRO at a later date.
In January 2009, Susan filed a motion for entry of a
QILDRO along with a proposed order directing Jerry to sign his
consent to the QILDRO. The proposed QILDRO set forth a formula
for determining the value of the marital portion of Jerry's
pension and dividing it between the parties. After a March 2009
hearing at which Jerry objected to Susan's proposed QILDRO, the
trial court entered a written order directing Jerry to sign his
consent. Jerry appeals, arguing the trial court erred in finding
Susan's proposed QILDRO conformed to the parties' settlement
agreement. We disagree and affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
The parties married June 7, 1975. In February 1999,
Jerry filed for dissolution of marriage. At the time Jerry filed
the dissolution petition, he was 43 years old and employed as a
master sergeant with the Illinois State Police (ISP).
In June 1999, the trial court entered its dissolution
order, reserving unresolved issues for a later date. In August
1999, the court conducted a final hearing in which the parties
entered into a settlement agreement on all remaining issues. The
agreement provided for the custody, support, education expenses,
and visitation of the parties' minor child and distribution of
the parties' property. Pertinent to this appeal is the
distribution of Jerry's State Employees' Retirement System (SERS)
defined-benefit plan pension, which he obtained from his
employment with ISP.
The pension's value began to accumulate during the
marriage, as Jerry's employment began after the parties married,
and was the parties' major marital asset. Article C, paragraph
23, of the settlement agreement states as follows:
"[Jerry] has certain retirement benefits
through [SERS] which are valued at
approximately $84,000 as of April 20, 1999,
the date of entry of the [j]udgment of
- 2 - [d]issolution of [m]arriage on grounds. Said
retirement benefits shall be equally divided
as of April 20, 1999, pursuant to a separate
QILDRO to be entered by agreement of the
parties or by order of the court."
No other portion of the agreement addresses Jerry's pension.
In September 1999, the trial court entered the
settlement agreement as an agreed supplemental order to its
dissolution judgment. In the order, the court noted the
agreement was "fair[,] reasonable[, and] not unconscionable."
Nearly two years passed during which neither an
agreement by the parties nor an order by the trial court divided
the pension pursuant to a QILDRO. In June 2001, the court
entered a written order stating "[t]he entry of a *** []QILDRO[]
is reserved. [Jerry] shall notify [Susan], in writing, 30 days
prior to making any application for retirement or request for
retirement benefits" to allow Susan time to file for entry of a
QILDRO prior to the commencement of the pension's disbursement.
No further action occurred until January 2009, when
Susan filed a motion for entry of a QILDRO along with a proposed
order directing Jerry to sign his consent to the QILDRO. The
record before us on appeal does not reflect whether Susan did so
as a result of Jerry notifying her of his impending retirement.
In the QILDRO, Susan named herself as alternate payee
and recipient of 50% of the marital portion of Jerry's monthly
retirement benefit, any lump-sum payment upon termination of the
- 3 - benefit, any partial refund becoming payable to Jerry, and any
benefits payable to Jerry's beneficiaries upon his death. The
QILDRO set forth the following formula for calculating the
marital portion of the pension: (A/B) x C x D where:
"'A' equals the number of months of ***
regular plus permissive *** service that
[Jerry] accumulated in [SERS] from the date
of marriage[, June 7, 1975,] to the date of
divorce[, June 4, 1999]. ***
'B' equals the number of months of ***
[Jerry] accumulated in [SERS] through [his]
effective date of retirement. ***
'C' equals the gross amount of:
(i) [Jerry's] monthly
retirement benefit *** calculated
as of [Jerry's] effective date of
retirement *** including ***
permissive service, upgrades
purchased, and other benefit
formula enhancements;
(ii) [Jerry's] refund payable
upon termination or lump[-]sum
retirement benefit that becomes
payable, including any payable
interest *** calculated as of the
- 4 - time said refund becomes payable to
[Jerry];
(iii) [Jerry's] partial
refund, including any payable
time said partial refund becomes
payable to [Jerry]; or
(iv) the death benefit payable
to [Jerry's] death benefit
beneficiaries or estate, including
any payable interest *** calculated
as of the time of said benefit
becomes payable to [Jerry's]
beneficiary.
'D' equals the percentage noted in [the
sections of this QILDRO pertaining to monthly
retirement benefit, termination refund,
partial refund, and lump-sum death benefit],
which ever are applicable."
The QILDRO further provided if Jerry's retirement benefits were
subject to postretirement increases, Susan's share of the
benefits "shall *** be recalculated or increased annually to
include a proportionate share of the applicable annual
increases."
In March 2009, the trial court held a hearing. At the
hearing, Jerry's counsel objected to Susan's proposed QILDRO,
- 5 - arguing the formula it set forth for distributing Jerry's SERS
pension deviated from the court's September 1999 supplemental
order, which Jerry alleged awarded Susan $42,000--half of the
pension's value when he filed his dissolution petition in April
1999. In response, Susan's counsel argued the parties' intent
was not to limit her share of the SERS pension to $42,000
because the parties agreed to use a QILDRO to divide the pension
rather than listing a specific dollar amount in the supplemental
order and disbursing Susan's share of that value at the time of
dissolution. After the parties concluded their arguments, the
court granted Jerry 30 days to file a written objection to
Susan's proposed QILDRO. Jerry filed a timely objection,
raising the same arguments he presented before the court, and
thereafter Susan filed her response, which also contained
arguments similar to those raised at the hearing.
In June 2009, the trial court sent a letter opinion to
both parties, ruling in Susan's favor. In the opinion, the
court reasoned as follows:
"The [a]greed [s]upplemental [o]rder
specifically provided for the entry of a
QILDRO in which the retirement benefits were
to be divided as of April 20, 1999. ***
[T]he applicable statute had just been
enacted the month before the [a]greed
[s]upplemental [o]rder was entered, and the
matter was, therefore, new to all concerned.
- 6 - The [o]rder does not specify that [Susan] is
to receive $42,000[], and in the [c]ourt's
opinion, if that were the intention of the
parties, provision would have been made for
the entry of judgment in that amount and a
payment schedule. That was clearly not the
intention of the parties. If [Susan's]
portion were fixed at $42,000[], there would
be no need for a QILDRO. A subsequent
[o]rder on January 12, 2001[,] also reserved
the entry of the QILDRO.
*** [T]he [SERS pension] was the major
asset in the divorce proceeding, and [Jerry]
was only 44 years old at the time [the court
entered its order of dissolution].
Obviously, retirement was many years away.
[Jerry] was to notify [Susan] in writing when
he planned to retire so that the QILDRO could
be entered.
It would be unconscionable to conclude
now that the parties intended for [Susan] to
wait untold years to receive her interest in
the only major asset from the marriage, if
her interest was fixed at $42,000[] and no
more. Such an approach would deny her the
benefit of interest on her asset or the
- 7 - benefit of any [cost-of-living adjustment] or
other increases in the value of the asset.
The parties clearly intended to have a QILDRO
entered, with the benefits divided using the
customary formulaic approach. This is not a
case *** where the parties reached a clear
and unambiguous agreement that [Susan] should
receive $42,000[] at some time in the future,
with no interest on her asset and no increase
in value through the intervening years.
There was no such 'bargain[,]' and [Susan]
cannot be held to this strained
interpretation of the [a]greed [s]upplemental
[o]rder."
The court further found Susan's proposed QILDRO conformed to the
parties' agreement and ordered Jerry to sign the QILDRO and
submit it to the court for entry. The court incorporated the
letter opinion into its July 2009 written order.
This appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
On appeal, Jerry argues the trial court erred in
finding Susan's proposed QILDRO conformed to the parties'
marital settlement agreement. Specifically, Jerry contends (1)
the parties' agreement unambiguously valued the pension's
marital portion at $84,000 and provided Susan would receive
$42,000, exactly half without any interest or cost-of-living
- 8 - adjustments, and (2) no language in the agreement indicated the
use of the formula set forth in Susan's proposed QILDRO to
divide the pension.
A. The Pension's Value as Set Forth in the Settlement Agreement
First, Jerry argues the settlement agreement
"unambiguously" values Susan's share of the pension as $42,000
and her share did not increase past the date of dissolution.
Pension benefits attributable to contributions made
during marriage are marital property and thereby subject to
division upon dissolution of marriage. 750 ILCS 5/503(b)(2)
(West 2008). In the event of a dissolution, courts employ two
different methods in distributing pension benefits: (1) the
present-value or immediate-offset approach and (2) the reserved-
jurisdiction approach.
When using the immediate-offset approach, the trial
court "determines the present value of the pension plan, awards
the entire pension to the employed party, and awards the other
party enough other marital property to offset the pension
award." In re Marriage of Ramsey, 339 Ill. App. 3d 752, 758,
792 N.E.2d 337, 343 (2003). Frequently, this method is
impractical "either because of valuation difficulties or because
the couple lacks sufficient readily divisible assets to provide
an offsetting property award." Ramsey, 339 Ill. App. 3d at 758,
792 N.E.2d at 343. Thus, the reserved-jurisdiction method is
often the more feasible approach.
Pursuant to the reserved-jurisdiction approach, the
- 9 - trial court reserves jurisdiction to divide the pension "'if,
as[,] and when' the pension becomes payable. [Citations.]" In
re Marriage of Hunt, 78 Ill. App. 3d 653, 663, 397 N.E.2d 511,
519 (1979). Under this approach, a court determines the marital
interest in a pension benefit "by dividing the number of years
or months of marriage during which pension benefits accumulated
by the total number of years or months benefits accumulated
prior to retirement or being paid." In re Marriage of
Richardson, 381 Ill. App. 3d 47, 52, 884 N.E.2d 1246, 1251
(2008). "The value of the marital interest is then calculated
by multiplying the amount of each benefit payment as it is
disbursed by the marital interest percentage." Richardson, 381
Ill. App. 3d at 52, 884 N.E.2d at 1251.
In the case at bar, the trial court opted to reserve
jurisdiction as to the division of Jerry's pension until closer
to his retirement rather than awarding Susan a lump sum of the
pension's value at the time of dissolution. Over 10 years
later, the parties now disagree as to the value of Susan's
"equal" share.
"When interpreting a marital settlement, courts seek
to give effect to the parties' intent." Allton v. Hintzsche,
373 Ill. App. 3d 708, 711, 870 N.E.2d 436, 439 (2007). When the
agreement's terms are unambiguous, we determine the parties'
intent solely from the instrument's plain language. In re
Marriage of Schurtz, 382 Ill. App. 3d 1123, 1125, 891 N.E.2d
415, 417 (2008). An agreement is unambiguous when it contains
- 10 - language susceptible to only one reasonable interpretation. See
Allton, 373 Ill. App. 3d at 711, 870 N.E.2d at 439 (stating
"[a]n ambiguity exists when an agreement contains language that
is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation").
Language is not ambiguous merely because the parties do not
agree on its meaning. In re Marriage of Wassom, 352 Ill. App.
3d 327, 331, 815 N.E.2d 1251, 1255 (2004). Interpreting a
marital settlement agreement is a question of law, which we
review de novo. Blum v. Koster, 235 Ill. 2d 21, 33, 919 N.E.2d
333, 340 (2009).
The pertinent language in the marital settlement
agreement states as follows:
[d]issolution of [m]arriage on grounds. Said
Because the agreement states "[s]aid retirement benefits shall
be equally divided as of April 20, 1999 [(the dissolution
date)]" (emphasis added), Jerry contends the parties intended
Susan's share of the marital portion to be $42,000, exactly half
of $84,000, the pension's value as of the dissolution date. He
- 11 - further argues the agreement provided no express language
permitting Susan interest or cost-of-living adjustments on her
share of the pension. However, limiting Susan's share to
$42,000 would allow Jerry the marital portion's entire growth in
value between the date of dissolution and the date of his
retirement, thereby rendering the parties' shares of the marital
portion unequal. Accordingly, we find Jerry's interpretation of
the agreement unreasonable because the agreement simply states
an approximate value of the pension on the date of dissolution
and provides Susan receive 50% of the retirement plan pursuant
to a QILDRO filed in the future.
The settlement agreement never states Susan shall
receive $42,000. Instead, the settlement agreement lists
$84,000 as an approximate valuation of the pension's value on
the dissolution date. The agreement further lists the
dissolution date, April 20, 1999, for purposes of ascertaining
the duration of the marriage. Both the approximate value of the
pension and the end date of the marriage are set forth to assist
in the later assessment and division of the pension's marital
portion. The provision for entry of "a separate QILDRO" further
evidences the parties' intent to ascertain the value of and
equally divide the marital portion of the pension at a later
date.
Jerry's pension is a defined-benefit plan pension.
Under a defined-benefit plan, the value of the pension's benefit
is determined at retirement based on years of service and final
- 12 - salary. See Richardson, 381 Ill. App. 3d at 54, 884 N.E.2d at
1253. Each year of service is valued cumulatively: the longer
SERS members work, the higher the percentage of their final
salary they will collect as their pension. See Richardson, 381
Ill. App. 3d at 54, 884 N.E.2d at 1253. Because each year of
service contributes to the overall value of the pension, the
marital portion of the pension increases in value the longer the
pension holder works. Thus, its total value is unascertainable
until the time of retirement, which is often years after the
dissolution of marriage.
Essentially, Jerry argues the parties agreed to freeze
Susan's share of the pension at the dissolution date. This
interpretation of the settlement agreement's plain language
fails to award Susan the benefits associated with deferring
receipt of her share of the pension until Jerry retires. See
Ramsey, 339 Ill. App. 3d at 759, 792 N.E.2d at 343-44. Also, by
postponing the division of the pension until it is received,
both parties shared the risk Jerry would change jobs or die
before retiring, which would reduce the pension substantially or
forfeit its benefits completely. See Ramsey, 339 Ill. App. 3d
at 759, 792 N.E.2d at 343. Because Susan and Jerry shared those
risks when they agreed to postpone the division of the pension,
equity requires they share in the benefits of unforseen
increases in the value of the pension as well. See Ramsey, 339
Ill. App. 3d at 759, 792 N.E.2d at 343.
Susan had no incentive to postpone receipt of a flat-
- 13 - rate, lump-sum payment. The only reasonable interpretation of
the parties' settlement agreement is the parties knew the
marital portion would grow in value during the period between
the dissolution of marriage and Jerry's retirement and thus
opted to wait to equally divide the pension until its value
fully matured and became ascertainable. Because Jerry's
proposed interpretation of the agreement leads to an unfair and
unreasonable result, we cannot conclude the parties intended
Susan receive half the value of the pension's marital portion at
the time of the dissolution. See In re Marriage of Davis, 286
Ill. App. 3d 1065, 1068, 678 N.E.2d 68, 70 (1997).
B. Lump-Sum Survivor Benefit
Jerry also argues Susan's proposed QILDRO is contrary
to the parties' intent because it awards Susan a share of any
lump-sum survivor benefit paid in the event of Jerry's death.
At the time of dissolution in 1999, the Pension Code did not
permit division of any lump-sum survivor benefit pursuant to a
QILDRO. 40 ILCS 5/1-119(b)(4) (West 1998) ("A QILDRO shall not
apply to or affect the payment of any survivor's benefit [or]
death benefit"). According to Jerry, by agreeing to the entry
of a QILDRO, Susan thereby "effectively waived her right to any
lump-sum survivor benefit paid on account of [Jerry's] death."
In other words, Jerry contends Susan agreed to give up her share
of the funds contributed during the parties' marriage in the
event of Jerry's death.
However, Jerry raises this argument for the first time
- 14 - on appeal. At the March 2009 hearing in which Jerry objected to
Susan's proposed QILDRO, Jerry only argued the QILDRO was
improper because it awarded Susan a share of the pension
exceeding $42,000. Further, in his memorandum to the court
following the March 2009 hearing, Jerry never objected to a
lump-sum survivor benefit. Instead, he again focused his
objection on the QILDRO's distribution to Susan of a portion of
the pension exceeding $42,000, i.e., the interest on Susan's
portion of the pension. "Issues not raised before the trial
court are [forfeited] on appeal." Arcor, Inc. v. Haas, 363 Ill.
App. 3d 396, 406, 842 N.E.2d 265, 274 (2005). As such, we need
not consider Jerry's argument pertaining to the lump-sum
provision contained in the proposed QILDRO.
C. The Hunt Formula
Finally, Jerry contends the trial court erred in using
the Hunt formula to divide the pension's marital portion because
the settlement agreement lacked language explicitly directing
its use.
As determined above, the parties' settlement agreement
employs the reserved-jurisdiction approach. Thus, the parties
elected to distribute the marital portion of the pension upon
Jerry's retirement rather than awarding Susan her share in a
lump sum immediately following the April 1999 dissolution.
Under the reserved-jurisdiction approach, entry of a
QILDRO is necessary to direct the applicable governmental
retirement system to pay a portion of the pension to a payee
- 15 - other than the pension holder. 40 ILCS 5/1-119 (West 2008). A
"QILDRO" is "an Illinois court order that creates or recognizes
the existence of an alternate payee's right to receive all or a
portion of a member's accrued benefits in a retirement system."
40 ILCS 5/1-119(a)(6) (West 2008). To be valid, a QILDRO must
be entered by the court and contain written consent from the
party holding the pension. 40 ILCS 5/1-119(a)(6), (m)(1) (West
2008).
In the case at bar, the parties agreed to divide the
marital portion of the pension "equally" pursuant to the entry
of a QILDRO, and the trial court incorporated the parties'
settlement agreement into its September 1999 supplemental order.
During this time, section 1-119 of the Illinois Pension Code
required QILDROs contain, in pertinent part, the following
language:
"(i) Of the member's retirement benefit,
the [r]etirement [s]ystem shall pay to the
alternate payee $.......... per month,
beginning *** and ending upon the termination
of the retirement benefit or the death of the
alternate payee, whichever occurs first.
(ii) Of any member's refund that becomes
payable, the [r]etirement [s]ystem shall pay
to the alternate payee $.......... when the
member's refund becomes payable." 40 ILCS
5/1-119(n) (West 2000).
- 16 - In 2006, the General Assembly modified section 1-119 to include
within a QILDRO the formula by which to divide the marital
portion of a pension benefit. 40 ILCS 5/1-119(n) (West 2006).
The formula used, commonly known as the "Hunt formula,"
calculates the marital portion in each pension payment with "a
fraction of that payment, the numerator of the fraction being
the number of years (or months) of marriage during which
benefits were being accumulated, the denominator being the total
number of years (or months) during which benefits were
accumulated prior to when paid." Hunt, 78 Ill. App. 3d at 663,
397 N.E.2d at 519. The QILDRO provision enumerating said
formula states as follows:
"(2) .......% [enter percentage] per
month of the marital portion of said benefit
with the marital portion defined using the
[Hunt] formula ***." 40 ILCS 5/1-119(n)
(West 2008).
Here, the trial court found the parties intended to
divide the marital portion of the pension pursuant to the
"customary formulaic approach," as used in Susan's proposed
QILDRO. Jerry maintains the court erred in using the Hunt
formula to determine the value of the marital portion of the
pension because at the time of the court's agreed supplemental
order in September 1999, QILDROs did not specify the Hunt
formula for dividing the marital portion of pensions and
therefore the parties could not have intended the formula's use.
- 17 - In support of his argument, Jerry cites In re Marriage
of Wenc, 294 Ill. App. 3d 239, 689 N.E.2d 424 (1998), for the
proposition trial courts may not infer the parties intended use
of the Hunt formula when the marital settlement agreement lacked
language indicating application of any such formula. In Wenc,
the parties' settlement agreement stated, in pertinent part, as
follows:
"'[Husband/pension holder's] represented
adjusted contribution to the Teacher
Retirement Fund is *** $ 27,000. In addition
thereto, [husband's] estimated pension,
assuming a retirement age of 55, is in the
approximate sum of $ 677[] per month, with an
additional annuity of $ 1,212[] per month.
[Wife/alternate payee] shall be entitled to
receive 30% of all of [husband's] vested,
non[]vested[,] and/or accrued pension/
retirement benefits accumulated as of the
date hereof [i.e., the date of the
dissolution] at such time in the future when
and if said benefits are paid to [husband].
All benefits accrued or accumulated by
[husband] hereafter shall be his sole and
exclusive property.'" Wenc, 294 Ill. App. 3d
at 241, 689 N.E.2d at 425.
The Second District Appellate Court found the trial court erred
- 18 - in distributing the pension pursuant to the Hunt formula because
the agreement contained ambiguous phrases and sums. Wenc, 294
Ill. App. 3d at 244, 689 N.E.2d at 427. Specifically, the
Second District determined the agreement contained (1)
"unexplained verbiage"; (2) unclear phrases such as "'vested,
non-vested, and/or accrued pension benefits'" and "'accumulated
or accrued'"; and (3) a "mysterious reference" to a $1,212
additional annuity. Wenc, 294 Ill. App. 3d at 245, 247, 689
N.E.2d at 428, 429. Because the numerous, ambiguous terms
conflicted with the Hunt formula, the appellate court rejected
the trial court's use of the Hunt formula and remanded to
ascertain the parties' intent via extrinsic evidence. Wenc, 294
Ill. App. 3d at 248, 689 N.E.2d at 430.
Unlike the parties' settlement agreement in Wenc, the
parties' agreement in this case does not contain mysterious sums
and a surplusage of ambiguous phrases. Rather, it contains no
explicit language directing the trial court how to divide the
marital portion of the pension other than to do so "equally."
Therefore, this case is dissimilar to Wenc and more akin to
Richardson. In Richardson, pursuant to the parties' settlement
agreement, the trial court entered the following order:
"'Wife is hereby awarded one-half (1/2) of
Husband's pension as it has accrued form
[sic] the date of the marriage to the date of
the entry of this [j]udgment of [d]issolution
of [m]arriage. This court shall retain
- 19 - jurisdiction of this cause for the purpose of
entering a Qualified Domestic Relations
Order.'" Richardson, 381 Ill. App. 3d at 48,
884 N.E.2d at 1248.
Years later, the court divided the pension pursuant to the Hunt
formula. Richardson, 381 Ill. App. 3d at 51, 884 N.E.2d at
1251. The ex-husband appealed, arguing his ex-wife was limited
to 50% of the pension's value as of the date of dissolution.
Richardson, 381 Ill. App. 3d at 51, 884 N.E.2d at 1251. The
First District Appellate Court disagreed with the ex-husband and
affirmed, reasoning the parties clearly intended to use the
reserved-jurisdiction approach and the Hunt formula was a
reasonable method to calculate the marital portion of the ex-
husband's pension because the parties' agreement itself failed
to set forth how to calculate the marital portion. Richardson,
381 Ill. App. 3d at 53, 884 N.E.2d at 1252.
As in Richardson, the trial court's judgment
incorporating the parties' settlement agreement in this case did
not contain a provision specifying use of the Hunt formula to
divide the marital portion of the pension. Above, we determined
the parties intended to divide the marital portion of the
pension once it had fully matured, presumably at the time of
Jerry's retirement. The parties' agreement merely indicates
each party will receive an equal share of the marital portion,
but it contains no other language indicating how to value the
marital portion at the time of payout. The trial court stated
- 20 - the parties intended to divide the pension by "the customary
formulaic approach," and we agree. While the settlement
agreement did not expressly enumerate the formula by which to
equally divide the pension's marital portion, the parties'
intent is evidenced by the fact the parties chose to use the
reserved-jurisdiction approach and later entry of a QILDRO and
did not use language contrary to the customary formulaic
approach set forth in Hunt.
The Hunt formula, stated in 1979, is a widely used
method for dividing pensions' marital portions under the
reserved-jurisdiction approach, especially where the approach
applies to defined-benefit plan pensions. See Richardson, 381
Ill. App. 3d at 52, 884 N.E.2d at 1251; In re Marriage of
Sawicki, 346 Ill. App. 3d 1107, 1115, 806 N.E.2d 701, 708
(2004). This was the case at the time of the trial court's
supplemental order incorporating the parties' settlement
agreement in 1999. The General Assembly's subsequent
endorsement of the Hunt formula by amending section 1-119 of the
Illinois Pension Code to include it within QILDROs addressing
the division of governmental pensions' marital portions (see 40
ILCS 5/1-119(n) (West 2008)) further indicates the formula's
widespread acceptance. Jerry and Susan agreed to equally divide
the marital portion of the pension via the reserved-jurisdiction
approach and did not include within the settlement agreement any
language conflicting with the commonly accepted Hunt formula.
Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
- 21 - allocating the pension's marital portion pursuant to Hunt.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court's
judgment. We commend the trial court for its letter opinion,
which this court found most helpful.
Affirmed.
MYERSCOUGH, P.J., and POPE, J., concur.
- 22 -