ANDERSON, J.
¶ 1. Larry Charles Campbell appeals from a circuit court order setting his child support and child support arrearages at 25% of his income. Larry argues that the order is void because it is a retroactive modification of a prior valid support order contrary to Wis. Stat. § 767.32(2w) (1999-2000).
Julie Ann Campbell argues that Larry's appeal must be dismissed as untimely under Wis. Stat. § 808.04(1), which requires that an appeal be filed within ninety days of the entry of a final judgment or order. We agree with Julie; therefore, we dismiss Larry's appeal.
¶ 2. We briefly provide background and then restrict our discussion to facts relevant to the timeliness issue. On September 29, 1992, the circuit court, "using the percentage guidelines for two children of 25% (twenty-five)," ordered Larry to pay child support in the amount of $46.51 per week based upon a net personal income of $800.00 per month.
¶ 3. The September 29, 1992 order was still in place in June 1998 when Julie brought a motion for contempt against Larry for failure to notify her and the court of the change in his ability to pay support con
trary to Wis. Stat. § 767.263(1)
and for other relief as the court deemed just and reasonable. Julie's motion was premised on information that Larry was earning wages significantly higher than $800 per month. On August 27, 1998, a temporary order was filed requiring Larry to pay $800 per month based upon Larry's representation to the court that his income had changed to $3200 per month.
¶ 4. Subsequently, a hearing was held to address Julie's contempt motion. As a result, a series of orders followed. First, a September 29, 2000 order set child support but left the amount of arrearages unresolved until a court-ordered audit could be performed.
Second, after the audit was performed, an August 7, 2001
order incorporated the audit and settled the arrearages question, leaving open only the question of attorney's
fees.
Third, a November 16, 2001 order settled the remaining question of attorney's fees.
¶ 5. This case requires us to interpret Wis. Stat. §§ 808.03(1) and 808.04(1) in order to decide whether Larry's appeal was timely.
The goal of statutory interpretation is to discern the intent of the legislature.
State v. Davis,
2001 WI 136, 248 Wis. 2d 986, ¶ 13, 637 N.W.2d 62. The court must ascertain the legislature's intent from the language of the statute in relation to its context, scope, history, and objective intended to be accomplished.
Id.
A cardinal rule in interpreting statutes is to favor an interpretation that will fulfill the purpose of the statute over an interpretation that defeats the manifest objective of the act.
Id.
¶ 6. In order to determine timeliness, we must first determine which order was the final order of the court because an appeal of right can only be taken from a
final
judgment or order. Wis. Stat. § 808.03(1). Once
this is determined, we can discover if Larry's appeal is timely by calculating whether the appeal date was within ninety days of the final order as is required by Wis. Stat. § 808.04(1).
¶ 7. A final judgment or order is one that disposes of the entire matter in litigation as to one or more of the parties. Wis. Stat. § 808.03(1). In
ACLU v. Thompson,
155 Wis. 2d 442, 445-48, 455 N.W.2d 268 (Ct. App. 1990),
overruled on other grounds by Edland v. Wisconsin Physicians Service Insurance Corp.,
210 Wis. 2d 638, 563 N.W.2d 519 (1997), we addressed when a judgment or order will he considered final under § 808.03(1). There, we held that a judgment disposing of a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is final even though a request for costs and attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 remains pending.
ACLU,
155 Wis. 2d at 446.
¶ 8. In
Leske v. Leske,
185 Wis. 2d 628, 633, 517 N.W.2d 538 (Ct. App. 1994), we extended the
ACLU
holding to include other statutes and stated the rule as follows: "[T]he pendency of a claim for attorney's fees under a specific fee-shifting statute does not render a judgment or order nonfinal, provided that the judgment or order disposes of all of the substantive causes of action between the parties."
¶ 9. Most recently, in
Laube v. City of Owen,
209 Wis. 2d 12, 15-16, 561 N.W.2d 785 (Ct. App. 1997), we held that:
Even if a decision on [litigation] expenses is intertwined with the merits of the case, that does not make the situation different from other attorney fee cases. Any time attorney fees are requested, the opposing side may dispute the necessity of some of the work requiring the court to consider the merits of the case. Nothing in
ACLU
or
Leske
suggests that the finality of an order on
the merits might depend on the kind of analysis that will be necessary to resolve the fee issue. Furthermore, such a conclusion would cause difficulties in practice because it would leave potential appellants uncertain of whether the order on the merits is appealable until after the specific fee issues become clear.
¶ 10. Here we take the next logical step and apply the reasoning in
ACLU, Leske
and
Laube
to the family law context. In so doing, we draw the following conclusions.
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ANDERSON, J.
¶ 1. Larry Charles Campbell appeals from a circuit court order setting his child support and child support arrearages at 25% of his income. Larry argues that the order is void because it is a retroactive modification of a prior valid support order contrary to Wis. Stat. § 767.32(2w) (1999-2000).
Julie Ann Campbell argues that Larry's appeal must be dismissed as untimely under Wis. Stat. § 808.04(1), which requires that an appeal be filed within ninety days of the entry of a final judgment or order. We agree with Julie; therefore, we dismiss Larry's appeal.
¶ 2. We briefly provide background and then restrict our discussion to facts relevant to the timeliness issue. On September 29, 1992, the circuit court, "using the percentage guidelines for two children of 25% (twenty-five)," ordered Larry to pay child support in the amount of $46.51 per week based upon a net personal income of $800.00 per month.
¶ 3. The September 29, 1992 order was still in place in June 1998 when Julie brought a motion for contempt against Larry for failure to notify her and the court of the change in his ability to pay support con
trary to Wis. Stat. § 767.263(1)
and for other relief as the court deemed just and reasonable. Julie's motion was premised on information that Larry was earning wages significantly higher than $800 per month. On August 27, 1998, a temporary order was filed requiring Larry to pay $800 per month based upon Larry's representation to the court that his income had changed to $3200 per month.
¶ 4. Subsequently, a hearing was held to address Julie's contempt motion. As a result, a series of orders followed. First, a September 29, 2000 order set child support but left the amount of arrearages unresolved until a court-ordered audit could be performed.
Second, after the audit was performed, an August 7, 2001
order incorporated the audit and settled the arrearages question, leaving open only the question of attorney's
fees.
Third, a November 16, 2001 order settled the remaining question of attorney's fees.
¶ 5. This case requires us to interpret Wis. Stat. §§ 808.03(1) and 808.04(1) in order to decide whether Larry's appeal was timely.
The goal of statutory interpretation is to discern the intent of the legislature.
State v. Davis,
2001 WI 136, 248 Wis. 2d 986, ¶ 13, 637 N.W.2d 62. The court must ascertain the legislature's intent from the language of the statute in relation to its context, scope, history, and objective intended to be accomplished.
Id.
A cardinal rule in interpreting statutes is to favor an interpretation that will fulfill the purpose of the statute over an interpretation that defeats the manifest objective of the act.
Id.
¶ 6. In order to determine timeliness, we must first determine which order was the final order of the court because an appeal of right can only be taken from a
final
judgment or order. Wis. Stat. § 808.03(1). Once
this is determined, we can discover if Larry's appeal is timely by calculating whether the appeal date was within ninety days of the final order as is required by Wis. Stat. § 808.04(1).
¶ 7. A final judgment or order is one that disposes of the entire matter in litigation as to one or more of the parties. Wis. Stat. § 808.03(1). In
ACLU v. Thompson,
155 Wis. 2d 442, 445-48, 455 N.W.2d 268 (Ct. App. 1990),
overruled on other grounds by Edland v. Wisconsin Physicians Service Insurance Corp.,
210 Wis. 2d 638, 563 N.W.2d 519 (1997), we addressed when a judgment or order will he considered final under § 808.03(1). There, we held that a judgment disposing of a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is final even though a request for costs and attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 remains pending.
ACLU,
155 Wis. 2d at 446.
¶ 8. In
Leske v. Leske,
185 Wis. 2d 628, 633, 517 N.W.2d 538 (Ct. App. 1994), we extended the
ACLU
holding to include other statutes and stated the rule as follows: "[T]he pendency of a claim for attorney's fees under a specific fee-shifting statute does not render a judgment or order nonfinal, provided that the judgment or order disposes of all of the substantive causes of action between the parties."
¶ 9. Most recently, in
Laube v. City of Owen,
209 Wis. 2d 12, 15-16, 561 N.W.2d 785 (Ct. App. 1997), we held that:
Even if a decision on [litigation] expenses is intertwined with the merits of the case, that does not make the situation different from other attorney fee cases. Any time attorney fees are requested, the opposing side may dispute the necessity of some of the work requiring the court to consider the merits of the case. Nothing in
ACLU
or
Leske
suggests that the finality of an order on
the merits might depend on the kind of analysis that will be necessary to resolve the fee issue. Furthermore, such a conclusion would cause difficulties in practice because it would leave potential appellants uncertain of whether the order on the merits is appealable until after the specific fee issues become clear.
¶ 10. Here we take the next logical step and apply the reasoning in
ACLU, Leske
and
Laube
to the family law context. In so doing, we draw the following conclusions. The September 29, 2000 order was not final because child support and arrearages both comprised the "matter in litigation" and the matter of arrearages was left unresolved in this order.
See
Wis. Stat. § 808.03. To conclude otherwise would be to encourage two appeals — one from the order for child support and a second from the order setting the amount of arrear-ages. Moreover, our conclusion comports with legislative intent because the provisions of § 808.03 were designed to discourage multiple or piecemeal appeals.
See ACLU,
155 Wis. 2d at 448.
¶ 11. The August 7, 2001 order constituted the
final
order of the court. This order settled both the support and arrearages questions and the only question left to be determined was whether attorney's fees would be ordered, and if so, in what amount. The teachings of
ACLU, Leske
and
Laube
support our holding that in the family law context an order resolving the merits of a child support dispute but not an attorney's fee issue
is final within the meaning of Wis. Stat. § 808.03(1).
See ACLU,
155 Wis. 2d at 446.
¶ 12. Having established that the August 7, 2001 order is the final order on the merits, we can easily determine whether Larry's appeal from the final order was timely. Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 808.04(1), Larry's right to appeal this order began to run on August 7, 2001, and ended ninety days later on November 5, 2001. Larry's appeal was filed on February 11, 2002. Larry's appeal was not timely; it therefore warrants dismissal.
By the Court.
— Appeal dismissed.