NOTICE 2020 IL App (4th) 190807-U This order was filed under Supreme FILED Court Rule 23 and may not be cited NO. 4-19-0807 April 10, 2020 as precedent by any party except in Carla Bender th the limited circumstances allowed IN THE APPELLATE COURT 4 District Appellate under Rule 23(e)(1). Court, IL OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
In re MARRIAGE OF ) Appeal from the AZZA ABDELKARIM, ) Circuit Court of Petitioner -Appellee, ) Champaign County and ) No. 11D248 MAHER BAJIS, ) Respondent -Appellant. ) Honorable ) Wm. Hugh Finson, ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE DeARMOND delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Knecht and Holder White concurred in the judgment.
ORDER ¶1 Held: The appellate court affirmed, holding the trial court’s allocation of parenting time was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶2 In October 2019, the trial court entered an amended order for parenting time,
granting petitioner-wife (Azza) all decision-making responsibilities and allocating to her the
majority of parenting time.
¶3 On appeal, respondent-husband (Maher) contends the trial court’s order amending
the allocation of parenting time was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Maher also
claims the trial court erred by failing to mention his expert in its written order. We disagree and
affirm the trial court.
¶4 I. BACKGROUND ¶5 Maher and Azza married on September 19, 2007. The marriage produced one
child, Y.B., born in 2008. In April 2015, the trial court entered an agreed order granting joint
custody to the parties and awarding Azza legal custody and decision-making abilities, and in
December of that year, the court entered a dissolution of marriage between Maher and Azza. A
year later, in December 2016, Azza moved to modify the allocation of parenting time between
the parties, alleging a substantial change of circumstances; specifically, the minor child’s
visitation with Maher “may seriously endanger her physical, mental, moral, and emotional
health.” Azza claimed, in part, Maher made false accusations to the Department of Children and
Family Services (DCFS), alleging several issues including physical abuse to Y.B. by Azza and
Azza’s husband, Maher had an unhealthy emotional enmeshment with Y.B., and had
inappropriately interfered in the relationship between Y.B. and her therapist and between Y.B.
and Azza.
¶6 In an affidavit, Y.B.’s therapist, Trevor Kendrick, stated she (Kendrick)
previously had 67 sessions with Y.B., and she expressed concern about Maher and Y.B.’s
relationship. She stated Maher has “boundary issues” with Y.B. and “treats her more like a life
partner than a daughter.” Kendrick opined Maher has an improper and unhealthy emotional
enmeshment with Y.B. and has significantly interfered with the relationship between Y.B. and
Azza. Kendrick believed Maher caused serious emotional, mental, and moral danger to Y.B. and
it would be in Y.B.’s best interests to award Azza the majority of parenting time.
¶7 In February 2017, the trial court entered a temporary order awarding Azza the
majority of the parenting time. This order was entered upon agreement by both parties. Maher’s
explanation in agreeing to grant Azza the majority of parenting time was that he thought it would
only be for 120 days and “thought 120 days is a short time.” Starting in September 2018 and
-2- over the course of four nonconsecutive months and approximately nine separate hearings, the
court heard testimony from Y.B.’s counselor, psychiatrists, expert witnesses, and police officers.
The police officers testified about how they needed to be present during some of the custody
exchanges and Maher’s difficult behavior during the exchanges. Azza’s husband testified about
Maher’s chronic tardiness when conducting the custody exchange and his acrimonious
relationship with Maher.
¶8 A. The Hearings on Azza’s Motion to Modify the Allocation of Parenting Time
¶9 1. Trevor Kendrick
¶ 10 As the family therapist who held sessions with Y.B., Maher, and Azza, both
individually and together, Kendrick testified about Maher’s boundary issues. She stated she
became alarmed after learning Maher would instruct Y.B. to speak negatively about Azza during
the sessions and repeatedly attempted to negatively interfere with Azza and Y.B.’s relationship.
Kendrick testified that Maher instructed Y.B. via text message not to show Azza any of his
messages, thereby encouraging the negative relationship between her and Y.B. Kendrick
described Maher and Y.B.’s relationship as “emotional incest” due to the “complete blurring of
boundaries between parent and child.” She elaborated how this goes beyond a parent loving his
child because emotional incest is all about the parent’s needs being met, not the child’s. She
testified this behavior is very damaging and can lead to long-lasting unhealthy relationships for
the child. Y.B. told Kendrick she would get to choose who Maher dated, she was highly involved
in communicating with his “multiple girlfriends,” and she was allowed to go to his “massage
sessions.” He also promised he would not marry anyone else if Y.B. helped him get custody
back. After summarizing the negative consequences of emotional incest for Y.B., Kendrick
described it as “one of the most damaging things a parent can do to their child.”
-3- ¶ 11 2. Lawrence Jeckel
¶ 12 Dr. Jeckel testified he relied on Maher’s previous therapist and doctor’s reports,
including Kendrick’s, to help formulate a mental assessment of Maher. At times, Maher was not
taking his prescribed medications, which contributed to his mental health issues. His medical
records also indicated a cannabis use disorder, as Maher was at times using cannabis on a daily
basis. Maher admitted to cannabis use but claimed he used it only medicinally and never used it
when he was with Y.B. However, Dr. Jeckel noted how cannabis use could negatively interfere
with Maher’s prescribed medication and treatment. Maher also previously pleaded guilty to
domestic battery in 1997, which Dr. Jeckel found significant as another indicator of Maher’s lack
of impulse control. He also found it “strange” Maher claimed his post-traumatic stress disorder
(PTSD) was not present when he was with Y.B. because, in his sessions, Maher seemed to be
“edgy” and he has “never heard that a relationship would make PTSD symptoms go away.” Dr.
Jeckel noted Maher exhibited some signs of paranoia. For example, Maher expressed concern
Azza and her husband were attempting to provoke him into doing something to jeopardize his
parenting time, and Maher thought Dr. Jeckel was “going to deny him access to his daughter.”
Towards the end of Dr. Jeckel’s report, he summed up his session with Maher, stating: “I was
exhausted by the end of the two-hour session because I was forced to do the work of keeping the
interview neutral in response to his paranoid, demanding, defensive posture.” He diagnosed
Maher with PTSD and borderline personality disorder with a disrupted personality and disrupted
self-esteem system. Dr. Jeckel testified Maher had a “self-psychological bond that he uses to
keep himself intact.” He explained Maher views Y.B. as a distorted extension of himself, which
accounts for his lack of boundaries with Y.B. According to Dr. Jeckel, Maher blurs boundaries
so often with Y.B. that he “loses track of who’s who,” even though it is important for children to
-4- keep their boundaries straight. Dr. Jeckel recommended Maher’s parenting time be consistent
with the previous temporary order, which granted the majority of parenting time to Azza.
¶ 13 3. Karen Osgood
¶ 14 Dr. Osgood testified she became Y.B.’s therapist after sessions between Y.B. and
Kendrick were no longer feasible. Dr. Osgood testified she met with Y.B. approximately 10
times and administered an assessment of Y.B. based on self-reports from Y.B. Dr. Osgood
reviewed several unfounded reports made by Maher or Y.B. to DCFS, alleging, on different
occasions, physical abuse toward Y.B. by Azza or Azza’s husband. Dr. Osgood stated Y.B.
spoke with her in detail about ongoing issues between her parents but made no allegations
against her step-father or Azza. Dr. Osgood recounted seeing spiteful text messages from Y.B. to
her mother, stating Y.B. wished her mother “would die” and that she “was a horrible mother.”
Dr. Osgood learned Y.B. was with Maher when she sent these messages and this behavior
contrasted with earlier sessions when Y.B. spoke very positively of her mother. Dr. Osgood
stated, “I never once saw [Y.B.] express anything like that towards her mother” and “[I]
wouldn’t believe it was the same person.” One text message from Y.B. to Azza read, “Daddy
says the choice is always mine and I can choose to see my mother or father when I want.” Dr.
Osgood found this very concerning as this statement is contrary to delegation of parenting time
in the court’s temporary order and “creates false expectations as well as significant pressure on
[the child].” Dr. Osgood also stated the five unfounded DCFS reports from Maher or Y.B.
proved troubling because of the severity of the false accusations and because Y.B. never
mentioned these allegations during any of their 10 sessions. She concluded Y.B. has a
codependency with Maher. During their sessions, Y.B. related to Osgood that it is hard for her to
separate from Maher because she really worries about how Maher is going to feel and is
-5- concerned he might be lonely when she leaves. Dr. Osgood described this as an example of
codependency that is not normal or healthy, especially for a 10-year-old child, and could have
long-term effects on her future relationships. Osgood concluded she would have concerns if
Maher received any additional parenting time.
¶ 15 4. Luke Dalfiume
¶ 16 The court also heard testimony from Maher’s expert Dr. Dalfiume. Dr. Dalfiume
is a clinical psychologist and testified he met with Maher, Y.B., Azza, and Azza’s husband. He
met with Y.B. approximately a dozen times. Y.B. told him she wanted to spend more time with
her dad and is happier at his house. She was also concerned that any change in custody would
not allow her to see Maher’s family. He conducted two types of clinical tests which were
completed by Maher and Azza for custody evaluations. He also administered tests on Y.B. and
concluded the emotional closeness between Maher and Y.B. was much stronger than between
Y.B. and Azza. He diagnosed Y.B. with different forms of anxiety and depression. He noted
Maher, Azza, and Azza’s husband all exhibited symptoms of histrionic personality disorder, in
that all three like to have attention focused on them.
¶ 17 After several clinical interviews and tests with Azza, he concluded Azza attributes
the relationship issues she has with Y.B. to Maher. He stated Maher responded openly during the
interviews and Azza remained defensive. He said Maher is responsive to Y.B.’s needs, is likely
to have his own needs met appropriately, and would not use Y.B. for the purpose of satisfying
his own emotional needs. He diagnosed Maher as having generalized anxiety disorder and
symptoms of histrionic personality disorder. Dalfiume concluded Y.B. appreciated her father’s
approach to parenting more than Azza’s. He recommended the parenting time return to equal
parenting time because “Maher is stable enough and has a positive relationship with [Y.B.].”
-6- ¶ 18 On cross-examination, he admitted some of the clinical tests he administered to
Azza were not originally designed for non-native speakers of English, thereby affecting the
sample used within the tests. He also admitted (1) some of the clinical tests administered were
not originally designed to determine child custody and (2) he had received tens of thousands of
dollars from Maher to perform his services.
¶ 19 5. Maher’s Testimony
¶ 20 Maher testified to some of the custody exchanges with Azza and her husband and
to the tension between the parties during some of the exchanges. Maher testified to one occasion
where Y.B. was placed in her step-father’s car during a custody exchange, and he pulled away
quickly after the exchange, running over Maher’s foot and ankle. Maher claimed his former
father-in-law got out of the car and began kicking him while on the ground, that Maher was
taken away by an ambulance, and that he was scheduled to have surgery on his ankle due to the
incident.
¶ 21 Maher further testified he has had three girlfriends since he and Azza separated
and recounted at least two instances where Azza accosted his girlfriend in public. He testified he
has been consistently receiving therapy and counseling. He requested the trial court split
parenting time equally because he believed this would be better for Y.B.’s emotional health and
well-being. On cross-examination, Maher admitted as of July 2018, he had paid his controlled
expert, Dr. Dalfiume, approximately twenty thousand dollars. Additionally, he admitted to
attempting to persuade Azza to purchase a firearm. He claimed he wanted her to have it for her
protection but that he was not allowed to possess a firearm due to his PTSD. Cross-examination
also revealed that Maher filed a lawsuit against the individual who was appointed by the court to
conduct a home and background study and that Maher would provide massages to others within
-7- his home while Y.B. was present. Further, Maher acknowledged that enmeshment means his
love for Y.B. prevents her from loving other people and she would get jealous when he gave
attention to others. Additionally, he admitted to his therapist he contemplated the possibility of
giving up parental duties until his daughter is older.
¶ 22 6. Social Media and Text Messages
¶ 23 Azza’s counsel went through several of Maher’s social media posts. These
included a picture of Y.B. crying after he departed from her school after having lunch with Y.B.
One post indicated Y.B. was being punished for loving him. Another post, presumably directed
at Azza, stated, “you may have won the court order keeping [Y.B.] and I apart *** [but] I’ve
already won in the only battlefield that matters, [Y.B.’s] heart and mine *** She already resents
you and hates your abusive husband. You may have a court order, but I have her love and
respect.” Other posts requested some of his Facebook friends to speak up about the injustice
being committed, that Azza and her husband were trying to keep Y.B. away from him because
she’s too attached (enmeshed) to Maher, and how it was “crazy” that a judge went along with it.
He also described how Y.B. would sometimes make Instagram videos complaining about Azza
and her husband when she was with him. Maher stated he would delete some of her videos but
keep the ones that “make [Y.B.] feel empowered.” Via text message, he would also “remind”
Y.B. of things she may “want to mention” to the therapist before her therapy sessions. Further,
there was evidence he sent Y.B. information on sports bras when she was eight years old, posted
a picture of Y.B. in a swimsuit on social media, and a digital photo of Y.B. asleep in her bed in
her underwear.
¶ 24 B. The Trial Court’s Ruling
-8- ¶ 25 In February 2019, the parties concluded the presentation of evidence. In April
2019, Azza and Maher supplied written closing arguments to the trial court. In October 2019, the
trial court issued an “Amended Order for Parenting Time,” awarding Azza the majority of the
parenting time and granting her all decision-making responsibilities. Further, the order required
Maher to abstain from using cannabis during his parenting time and 12 hours prior to the
commencement of his parenting time, and to complete a program of counseling in dialectic
behavior treatment.
¶ 26 This appeal followed.
¶ 27 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 28 A. Parenting Time
¶ 29 Maher’s argument on appeal is twofold: (1) the trial court’s order modifying the
previous order and awarding the majority of parenting time to Azza was against the manifest
weight of the evidence and (2) the trial court’s failure to mention Maher’s expert testimony in its
order was arbitrary and against the manifest weight of the evidence. We disagree.
¶ 30 Under the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Dissolution Act),
section 610.5 addresses modifications to parenting time pertaining to minors in dissolution cases.
It states, in part:
“Except in a case concerning the modification of any restriction of
parental responsibilities under Section 603.10, the court shall
modify a parenting plan or allocation judgment when necessary to
serve the child’s best interests if the court finds, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that on the basis of facts that have
arisen since the entry of the existing parenting plan or allocation
-9- judgment or were not anticipated therein, a substantial change has
occurred in the circumstances of the child or of either parent and
that a modification is necessary to serve the child’s best interests.”
750 ILCS 5/610.5(c) (West 2016).
¶ 31 This court has previously stated that under the Dissolution Act, a party seeking a
modification in parenting time must demonstrate there has been a substantial change in
circumstances in order to request a modification pursuant to section 610.5(c) of the Dissolution
Act. In re Marriage of O’Hare, 2017 IL App (4th) 170091, ¶ 28, 79 N.E.3d 712. This is so there
is continuity in parenting plans and management with respect to the child. See In re Marriage of
Wycoff, 266 Ill. App. 3d 408, 409-10, 639 N.E.2d 897, 900 (1994). According to the statute,
before the court considers whether a modification is necessary to serve the child’s best interest,
the court must determine whether the movant has proved by a preponderance of the evidence a
substantial change in circumstances has occurred based on facts that have arisen since the entry
of the existing parenting plan or were not anticipated at that time. 750 ILCS 5/610.5(c) (West
2016). Accordingly, if the movant has met his or her burden of showing a substantial change in
circumstances has taken place, then the court will address whether modification is necessary or
appropriate based on the best interests of the child by considering the best interest factors set
forth in section 602.7(b) to determine the best interests of the minor child concerning parenting
time. See 750 ILCS 5/602.7(b) (West 2016). “Once the trial court has determined modification is
required by clear and convincing evidence, the reviewing court will not disturb that decision
unless it is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.” In re Marriage of Oros, 256 Ill.
App. 3d 167, 168, 627 N.E.2d 1246, 1248 (1994). It is not required to show harm has already
occurred to demonstrate a substantial change is warranted to modify parenting time. The trial
- 10 - court can modify custody among parties upon a showing that a change in circumstances has
occurred which could lead to future harm or otherwise adversely affect the child’s welfare. Such
preemptive judicial action falls comfortably within the court’s authority to modify custody “even
if the child has yet to suffer the adverse effects of those changes.” In re Marriage of Rogers,
2015 IL App (4th) 140765, ¶ 60, 25 N.E.3d 1213.
¶ 32 Here, the trial court’s order did not specifically address whether Azza proved by a
preponderance of the evidence that a modification was necessary due to a substantial change in
circumstances. However, in its order, the trial court granted Azza a majority of parenting time
after considering the evidence and weighing the best interest factors set forth in section 602.7(b)
of the Dissolution Act. 750 ILCS 5/602.7(b) (West 2016). We can readily surmise since the trial
court detailed, at length, 16 statutory best interest factors in its amended order for parenting time
and applied them to the evidence presented, the trial court concluded a substantial change in
circumstances had occurred before it undertook the time and effort to address each of the
statutory factors in its order. Because modification of parenting time and the allocation of
parenting time are subject to the same standard of review on appeal (contrary to the manifest
weight of the evidence), we turn to the trial court’s order and analyze the record to determine if
the trial court’s decision finding a substantial change in circumstances and allocation of
parenting time were contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence presented.
¶ 33 Regarding parenting time, section 802(a) of the Illinois Parentage Act of 2015
(750 ILCS 46/802(a) (West 2016)), states the issue of parenting time is governed by the relevant
portions of the Dissolution Act. Section 602.7(a) of the Dissolution Act (750 ILCS 5/602.7(a)
(West 2016)) states the trial “court shall allocate parenting time according to the child’s best
interests.” Section 602.7(b) (750 ILCS 5/602.7(b) (West 2016)), in turn, sets forth several
- 11 - factors the court should consider when determining the child’s best interests for purposes of
allocating parenting time including, inter alia, the wishes of the parents and the child; the
amount of time each parent spent performing caretaking functions in the 24 months preceding
the filing of the petition for allocation of parental responsibilities; the interrelationship between
the child and his or her parents and siblings; the child’s adjustment to his or her home, school,
and community; the child’s needs; the distance between the parents’ residences; the willingness
and ability of each parent to place the needs of the child above his or her own needs; the
willingness and ability of each parent to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing
relationship between the other parent and the child; the mental and physical health of the
individuals involved; and whether a restriction on parenting time is appropriate.
¶ 34 When deciding whether a modification of parenting time is appropriate, a change
in circumstances must be material to the child’s best interest to justify modification under the
Dissolution Act. Rogers, 2015 IL App (4th) 140765, ¶ 57. A reviewing court will not disturb a
trial court’s decision to modify the terms of a custody agreement unless its decision is against the
manifest weight of the evidence and constitutes an abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Debra
N., 2013 IL App (1st) 122145, ¶ 45, 4 N.E.3d 78. An appellate court reviewing a trial court’s
conclusion that a change in child custody is necessary is not to try the case de novo, but rather, is
to determine whether the trial court’s decision is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.
In re Marriage of Melton, 288 Ill. App. 3d 1084, 1088, 681 N.E.2d 1046, 1048 (1997). A
judgment is against the manifest weight of the evidence “if the opposite conclusion is clearly
evident or if the finding itself is unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence presented.”
Best v. Best, 223 Ill. 2d 342, 350, 860 N.E.2d 240, 245 (2006). Once the trial court concludes a
change of custody is necessary, great deference must be accorded that decision; the trial court
- 12 - alone is in the best position to judge the credibility of witnesses and determine the needs of a
child or children. Melton, 288 Ill. App. 3d at 1087-88.
¶ 35 In its ruling, the trial court found six of the aforementioned statutory factors
relevant and applicable to the present case, assessed them, and found all six factors favored
Azza. We will address each applicable factor in turn.
¶ 36 Regarding the wishes of the child, taking into account the child’s maturity and
ability to express reasoned independent preferences, the trial court acknowledged Y.B. wants to
spend as much time as possible with Maher. However, based on the evidence before it, the court
found Maher had manipulated Y.B.’s opinion. Specifically, the trial court noted how Maher
showed Kendrick’s affidavit supporting Azza’s motion to terminate equal parenting time to Y.B.,
which upset Y.B. and “completely sabotaged” the counseling relationship between Y.B. and
Kendrick. Even though Kendrick established a rapport with Y.B. through approximately 67
sessions, a new counselor had to be found to continue Y.B.’s counseling sessions. Further, the
evidence relied upon by the trial court for this factor included Maher telling Y.B. he would never
remarry as long as Y.B. helped him get full custody, relaying the terms of the agreed upon
temporary order to Y.B., fostering her anger towards Azza, allowing Y.B. to help him make
adult decisions like picking out a house or which woman he should date, and Maher’s
“enmeshment” with Y.B. to such a degree it has created an unhealthy “emotional incest.” Based
on the evidence, the trial court concluded this factor does not favor Maher.
¶ 37 Regarding the child’s needs, the trial court found Y.B.’s needs were very simple
considering her age—“to be raised to be a healthy, well-adjusted adult.” Evidence showed
Maher’s interactions with Y.B. caused her to feel “responsible for [Maher’s] happiness,” which
at times alienated her from her mother and could lead to a long-term maladjustment, thus
- 13 - interfering with her future relationships as she grows into adulthood. The evidence also showed
Maher has very few boundaries with Y.B. and, consequently, he has involved her in adult and
inappropriate decisions, including promising not to remarry if Y.B. helps him regain custody.
Further, Maher would often think of a fun activity or trip he could undertake with Y.B. which
would overlap in part with Azza’s parenting time. Maher would then encourage Y.B. to ask Azza
if she would agree, and if not, Azza would be viewed as the “bad guy” by prohibiting Maher and
Y.B. from engaging in fun trips or activities. Wanting to spend time with one’s 10-year-old
daughter is healthy normal behavior. However, tasking her with the burden of being responsible
for her father’s happiness is not. The court concluded this factor favors Azza because Y.B. is not
being raised the way she should due to Maher’s “lack of boundaries, enmeshment or emotional
incest and manipulation of [Y.B.].”
¶ 38 Regarding the mental and physical health of the individuals involved, the trial
court found neither party suffered from any physical health issues. The court found Azza and her
husband have some mental health issues, but these proved very minimal compared to Maher’s,
who suffers from PTSD, border-line personality disorder, and cannabis use disorder. Maher
testified, however, he did not suffer any symptoms of PTSD while with Y.B.; this in spite of the
testimony of Dr. Jeckel that in his professional experience he had never known PTSD to be
situationally dependent upon who the person was with. Maher also said he did not smoke
cannabis before or during visits with Y.B. Testimony indicated, however, Maher’s cannabis use
could interfere with his other prescribed medication, making him more unstable. His borderline
personality disorder was characterized by “disrupted personality, a distorted view of the world
and low self-esteem.” The trial court referenced Maher’s mental diagnosis and how it affected
Y.B., noting how Maher involved Y.B. in adult related decisions. The court also highlighted
- 14 - examples of Maher’s boundary issues, including Maher posting photos of Y.B. in a swimsuit on
social media, taking a picture of her asleep in her bed wearing underwear, asking her to bring
over her “tight shorts,” discussing what sports bras she should wear, and sharing inappropriate
jokes with her on social media. There was also testimony indicating Maher’s behavior could
have a detrimental long-term impact on Y.B. because of an unhealthy codependency. The
testimony indicated Y.B. worried about Maher being lonely and sad without her. Maher’s mental
health concerns have either intentionally or unintentionally resulted in Y.B. feeling responsible
for her father’s happiness. The trial court noted, regardless of Maher’s parenting style, each one
of these actions is “highly inappropriate” and found this factor favored Azza.
¶ 39 Regarding the parties’ daily schedules and the ability of the parties to cooperate in
the custody arrangement, the trial court found this favored Azza because of Maher’s habitual
tardiness in the custody exchanges. The testimony revealed Azza’s husband began documenting
when Maher arrived with Y.B. to facilitate the custody exchange. He testified Maher never
arrived on time for any custody exchanges. Maher’s tardiness ranged from being a couple
minutes late to over 30 minutes late. In addition, the evidence before the court revealed that after
arriving at the scheduled custody location with Maher, Y.B. would remain in Maher’s car for
several more minutes before finally departing and going with Azza or her husband. There was
also evidence Maher would request additional time with Y.B. right before a scheduled custody
exchange, prompting him to arrive late and causing further tensions between Y.B. and Azza if
Azza refused the last-minute request for extra parenting time.
¶ 40 Concerning the willingness and ability of each party to place the needs of the
child ahead of their own needs, the trial court found this factor favored Azza. Without doubting
the love for his daughter and his genuine desire to be with her, the court found it was reasonable
- 15 - to conclude, based on the evidence, Maher used his time with Y.B. to meet his needs, i.e.,
fostering his own happiness and alleviating his own emotional and mental issues. Indeed, the
court stated Maher’s actions were “intended to enable him to be with [Y.B.] as much as possible,
regardless of the consequences of those actions on [Y.B.’s] emotional growth and development.”
The court again noted how Y.B. felt responsible for Maher’s happiness and worried about him
when she was not around him.
¶ 41 The final factor the trial court found relevant was the willingness and ability of
each parent to help facilitate and encourage a close relationship between the child and the other
parent. Here, there was evidence Maher intentionally engaged in actions that fostered Y.B.’s
resentment toward Azza. The evidence before the court included Maher consistently telling Y.B.
about the court’s proceedings, including Azza’s motion to terminate joint custody and
Kendrick’s affidavit in support of Azza’s motion. This soured not only Y.B.’s relationship with
her mother but also damaged the close relationship between Y.B. and her therapist, who held
almost 70 appointments with her. Further, the evidence presented demonstrated Maher would
encourage Y.B. to make false accusations about Azza to Kendrick and false complaints about
Azza’s husband to DCFS. DCFS did not deem these allegations credible, and Y.B. confirmed
these allegations were false and apologized to Azza’s husband during a joint therapy session. As
was mentioned previously, there was evidence of Maher purposely proposing trips or activities
cutting into Azza’s time, placing her in the position of either consenting or being viewed as bad
for not allowing the additional time. Based on this evidence, the court’s finding that this factor
favored Azza was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 42 Based on the record and the reasoning provided by the court in its written order,
we cannot find the trial court’s decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence (Debra
- 16 - N., 2013 IL App (1st) 122145, ¶ 45), or that an opposite result of the trial court’s order is clearly
evident from the record (In re Marriage of Betsy M., 2015 IL App (1st) 151358, ¶ 61, 46 N.E.3d
373). Further, we will not disturb the trial court’s decision to modify a previous order concerning
the allocation of parenting time “unless it is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.”
Oros, 256 Ill. App. 3d at 168. Having failed to so find, we affirm.
¶ 43 B. Maher’s Expert
¶ 44 Maher’s second claim is that the trial court’s failure to mention Maher’s expert or
his report is somehow evidence of the court’s decision being arbitrary. While making this claim,
Maher also acknowledges the trial court is not bound to accept the recommendations and
opinions of any particular expert witness. However, contrary to Maher’s assertion, the court did
refer to some of his expert’s opinions indicating Azza, her husband, and Maher all suffered from
“some mental health issues.” Dr. Dalfiume found both Azza and her husband to exhibit features
and symptoms of histrionic personality disorder. Additionally, as the fact finder, the trial court is
permitted to give as much or as little weight to Maher’s expert’s testimony as it finds
appropriate. The “testimony of an expert witness is not to be accepted as truth per se, but must be
judged as to weight and credibility by the same rules applicable to other witnesses.” Racky v.
Belfor USA Group, Inc., 2017 IL App (1st) 153446, ¶ 112, 83 N.E.3d 440 (citing Morus v.
Kapusta, 339 Ill. App. 3d 483, 492, 791 N.E.2d 147, 155 (2003)). The court also heard evidence
that Maher’s controlled expert received tens of thousands of dollars from Maher and may well
have concluded this cast some doubt on his opinion and credibility; however, we need not
speculate on the trial court’s credibility determinations since those are left to the discretion of the
fact finder. Racky, 2017 IL App (1st) 153446, ¶ 107. Although Maher’s expert did find Y.B.
wanted to spend more time with Maher, the trial court provided reasons why it did not give her
- 17 - declarations significance; Maher’s consistent manipulation and boundary issues distorted Y.B.’s
perception of her mother and, consequently, how she relayed her preferences to Maher’s expert.
¶ 45 This court defers “to the trial court as the finder of fact because it is in the best
position to observe the conduct and demeanor of the parties and witnesses.” Best, 223 Ill. 2d at
350. “A reviewing court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court regarding the
credibility of witnesses, the weight to be given to the evidence, or the inferences to be drawn.”
Best, 223 Ill. 2d at 350-51. Here, we cannot conclude the opposite result is clearly evident from
the record. The trial court was free to determine which, if any, experts were credible or
persuasive, and there is nothing in the written order indicating it did not do so. Maher would
have us draw a negative inference against the propriety of the trial court’s ruling based solely
upon a failure to mention his expert by name or specifically reference his report with attribution.
The court, by failing to mention Maher’s expert witness by name, either did not give his
testimony much weight or, when weighed against the testimony of the other experts, did not find
it particularly compelling. As the trial court is in the best position to judge the credibility of
witnesses and weigh the evidence, this court will not disturb that determination.
¶ 46 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 47 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
¶ 48 Affirmed.
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