In Re: Mark Slotkin v. Elissa Miller

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: March 13, 2024
• Docket: 23-55098
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

FILED NOT FOR PUBLICATION MAR 13 2024 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

In re: MARK ABBEY SLOTKIN, No. 23-55098

Debtor. D.C. No. 2:22-cv-00021-FWS ______________________________

SLOTKIN DEFECTIVE TRUST OF MEMORANDUM* DECEMBER 14, 2012; et al.,

Appellants,

v.

ELISSA D. MILLER, Trustee,

Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Fred W. Slaughter, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted February 13, 2024 Pasadena, California

Before: W. FLETCHER, NGUYEN, and LEE, Circuit Judges.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. The Trustee in this Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding sought partial summary

judgment and injunctive relief in the form of an order directing the trusts and

limited liability companies (“LLCs”) to turn their assets over to debtor Mark

Slotkin’s bankruptcy estate. The bankruptcy court granted the relief sought by the

Trustee, and the district court affirmed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 158(d). We affirm.

We review de novo the district court’s judgment in the appeal of the

bankruptcy court’s grant of summary judgment. In re Raintree Healthcare Corp.,

431 F.3d 685, 687 (9th Cir. 2005). As the parties are familiar with the factual and

procedural history of this case, we need not recount it here.

Slotkin argues that the bankruptcy court erred by finding that he had

equitable ownership in the assets at issue and was the alter ego of the trusts and

LLCs that held the assets. None of Slotkin’s arguments create a genuine dispute of

material fact. It is undisputed that Slotkin maintained personal control over the

assets, commingled funds, used the assets to pay personal expenses, and failed to

maintain legally significant separation between himself and the trusts and LLCs

that held the disputed assets. These facts are more than sufficient to support the

bankruptcy court’s order. See In re Schwarzkopf, 626 F.3d 1032, 1038–39 (9th

Cir. 2010).

2 Slotkin also argues that the bankruptcy court was collaterally estopped from

finding alter ego by a prior court finding in Slotkin’s divorce proceedings. Slotkin

argues the divorce court affirmatively found no alter ego. His argument misreads

the plain language of the relevant document, in which the court clearly stated that it

was not reaching the issue of alter ego. Slotkin also misunderstands the law of

collateral estoppel. Even if the divorce court had reached the issue and even if the

issue had been the same in the two proceedings, the Trustee was neither a party to

the divorce proceeding nor in privity with the parties to that proceeding. The

Trustee therefore cannot be collaterally estopped in the bankruptcy proceeding by a

decision by the divorce court. See In re Harmon, 250 F.3d 1240, 1245 (9th Cir.

2001).

Finally, we note that the Trustee argued, both in the briefing and at oral

argument, that this appeal was equitably moot. Because we affirm the district

court’s judgment on the merits, we need not address this argument. See In re Point

Ctr. Fin., Inc., 957 F.3d 990, 1002 (9th Cir. 2020).

AFFIRMED.