In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
__________________
NO. 09-25-00331-CV __________________
IN RE MARK CAHILL
__________________________________________________________________
Original Proceeding Probate Court No. 1 of Montgomery County, Texas Trial Cause No. 12-29187-P __________________________________________________________________
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In a petition for a writ of mandamus, Relator Mark Cahill contends the trial
court abused its discretion by ordering Cahill to return seized funds to his judgment
debtor, Real Party in Interest Caroldene Cahill. Mark argues Caroldene failed to
provide any credible, admissible, or legally sufficient evidence to support her
claimed property exemption. He contends he lacks an adequate remedy by appeal
because the funds will be permanently lost before any appeal can be heard. We
temporarily stayed the trial court’s enforcement of the trial court’s Order on
Creditor’s Motion to Retain Funds while we considered the petition, and we obtained 1 a response from the Real Party in Interest and a reporter’s record of the August 29,
2025, hearing. We deny the petition for a writ of mandamus.
Background
In 2020, Mark and the Successor Dependent Administratrix of the Estate of
Aletha Wolf obtained a judgment against Caroldene, the former Independent
Executrix of the Estate. See Cahill v. Cahill, No. 09-20-00206-CV, 2022 WL
318452, at *4 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Feb. 3, 2022, pet. denied) (mem. op.). 1 On
February 5, 2025, the trial court signed an Amended Turnover Order. In the order,
the trial court ordered Caroldene and any third party in possession of the judgment
debtor’s property to turn over nonexempt property to Mark. The order provided that
if Caroldene asserted an exemption, Mark could only disburse or sell property with
Caroldene’s written consent or with a court order.
On June 13, 2025, Caroldene filed a Protected Property Claim Form with the
Montgomery County Clerk. Caroldene claimed, “Some of my money or property
has been frozen or taken. It is protected and should be returned to me because it is:
. . . Tax-deferred retirement accounts, like 401(k) and IRA accounts.” She requested
a hearing and asked that the money or property be returned to her. The mandamus
The distribution of assets and closing of the estate is the subject of Appeal 1
Number 09-25-00167-CV, In the Estate of Aletha Cahill Wolf. 2 record contains an Account Statement dated May 1-31, 2025, for a Contributory IRA
of Caroldene M. Cahill.
On June 17, 2025, Mark filed a Creditor’s Motion to Retain Funds. Mark
alleged Caroldene had failed to provide verifiable documentation substantiating the
existence of a 401(k) or an IRA account, and she had failed to demonstrate the source
of the funds.
After extending the Turnover Order on July 30, 2025, on August 13, 2025, the
trial court vacated its order extending the Amended Turnover Order.
On August 25, 2025, Mark filed a Creditor’s Objection to Debtor’s Claim of
Exempt Property and Motion to Strike Debtor’s Sworn Statements. Mark argued that
under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 193.6 the documents offered by Caroldene are
inadmissible due to her failure to disclose them. Mark argued Caroldene failed to
trace the funds to a protected source and failed to provide evidence that the funds
are held in a tax-qualified account.
On August 29, 2025, the trial court held a hearing attended by Mark and
Caroldene, with both appearing pro se. Caroldene stated that she had a 401(k) that
she rolled into an IRA when she left her job, “and it’s been in an IRA ever since.”
Mark argued the Contributory IRA statement was inadmissible because Caroldene
failed to include it in an initial disclosure under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 194.2.
3 Mark argued that proof the funds in the Contributory IRA Account were exempt
required a year-by-year paper trail tracing the funds to a tax-exempt source.
On August 29, 2025, the trial court denied Mark’s Creditor’s Motion to Retain
Funds and ordered Mark to return the funds taken from Caroldene’s IRA
Contributory Account by September 7, 2025.
Mandamus Review
We may issue a writ of mandamus to remedy a clear abuse of discretion by
the trial court when the relator lacks an adequate remedy by appeal. See In re
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135–36 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding);
Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839–40 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding). “A trial
court clearly abuses its discretion if it reaches a decision so arbitrary and
unreasonable as to amount to a clear and prejudicial error of law.” Walker, 827
S.W.2d at 839 (internal quotations omitted). A trial court also abuses its discretion
if it fails to correctly analyze or apply the law, because a trial court has no discretion
in determining what the law is or in applying the law to the facts. See Prudential,
148 S.W.3d at 135; Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 840.
The cases Cahill cites to support his mandamus petition are distinguishable
from the issue presented here. In Beaumont Bank, N. A. v. Buller, the administrator
of her deceased husband’s estate was a person in possession of the judgment debtor’s
4 non-exempt property. 806 S.W.2d 223, 226 (Tex. 1991). She transferred the funds
to her lawyer’s trust account, and she admitted to personally authorizing the transfers
from the lawyer’s trust account for the express purpose of thwarting the seizure of
the “C.D. monies” by Beaumont Bank. Id at 225. Over a two-year period, the lawyer
disbursed a total of $103,661.24 pursuant to Buller’s instructions. Id. The Supreme
Court held the trial court acted within its discretion when it disbelieved Buller’s
unsubstantiated claim that she had spent all the cash she received from the $100,000
certificate of deposit that was directly traceable to her in her representative capacity
and that $250,000 she deposited in an account in the Cayman Islands were proceeds
from an unspecified life insurance policy. Id. at 225-26. Here, the trial court believed
Caroldene when she stated the account was an IRA account.
Mark cites Jones v. American Airlines, Inc. to support his argument that
Caroldene failed to meet her burden of proof that the funds in her IRA account were
a direct rollover of exempt 401(k) funds that had not been comingled with non-
exempt funds. See 131 S.W.3d 261, 270 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, no pet.). In
Jones, the administrator for the employer of Jones’s ex-husband mistakenly paid
Jones funds she was not entitled to under the QDRO. Id. at 268. After obtaining a
judgment against Jones in federal court, the employer applied for a turnover order in
state court. Id. at 264. In the trial court Jones conceded she knew the overpayment
5 did not belong to her and that she was obligated to pay American Airlines in
accordance with the federal court’s judgment. Id. at 270. The trial court required
Jones to turn over the funds to the registry of the court. Id. at 264. On appeal, Jones
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In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
__________________
NO. 09-25-00331-CV __________________
IN RE MARK CAHILL
__________________________________________________________________
Original Proceeding Probate Court No. 1 of Montgomery County, Texas Trial Cause No. 12-29187-P __________________________________________________________________
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In a petition for a writ of mandamus, Relator Mark Cahill contends the trial
court abused its discretion by ordering Cahill to return seized funds to his judgment
debtor, Real Party in Interest Caroldene Cahill. Mark argues Caroldene failed to
provide any credible, admissible, or legally sufficient evidence to support her
claimed property exemption. He contends he lacks an adequate remedy by appeal
because the funds will be permanently lost before any appeal can be heard. We
temporarily stayed the trial court’s enforcement of the trial court’s Order on
Creditor’s Motion to Retain Funds while we considered the petition, and we obtained 1 a response from the Real Party in Interest and a reporter’s record of the August 29,
2025, hearing. We deny the petition for a writ of mandamus.
Background
In 2020, Mark and the Successor Dependent Administratrix of the Estate of
Aletha Wolf obtained a judgment against Caroldene, the former Independent
Executrix of the Estate. See Cahill v. Cahill, No. 09-20-00206-CV, 2022 WL
318452, at *4 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Feb. 3, 2022, pet. denied) (mem. op.). 1 On
February 5, 2025, the trial court signed an Amended Turnover Order. In the order,
the trial court ordered Caroldene and any third party in possession of the judgment
debtor’s property to turn over nonexempt property to Mark. The order provided that
if Caroldene asserted an exemption, Mark could only disburse or sell property with
Caroldene’s written consent or with a court order.
On June 13, 2025, Caroldene filed a Protected Property Claim Form with the
Montgomery County Clerk. Caroldene claimed, “Some of my money or property
has been frozen or taken. It is protected and should be returned to me because it is:
. . . Tax-deferred retirement accounts, like 401(k) and IRA accounts.” She requested
a hearing and asked that the money or property be returned to her. The mandamus
The distribution of assets and closing of the estate is the subject of Appeal 1
Number 09-25-00167-CV, In the Estate of Aletha Cahill Wolf. 2 record contains an Account Statement dated May 1-31, 2025, for a Contributory IRA
of Caroldene M. Cahill.
On June 17, 2025, Mark filed a Creditor’s Motion to Retain Funds. Mark
alleged Caroldene had failed to provide verifiable documentation substantiating the
existence of a 401(k) or an IRA account, and she had failed to demonstrate the source
of the funds.
After extending the Turnover Order on July 30, 2025, on August 13, 2025, the
trial court vacated its order extending the Amended Turnover Order.
On August 25, 2025, Mark filed a Creditor’s Objection to Debtor’s Claim of
Exempt Property and Motion to Strike Debtor’s Sworn Statements. Mark argued that
under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 193.6 the documents offered by Caroldene are
inadmissible due to her failure to disclose them. Mark argued Caroldene failed to
trace the funds to a protected source and failed to provide evidence that the funds
are held in a tax-qualified account.
On August 29, 2025, the trial court held a hearing attended by Mark and
Caroldene, with both appearing pro se. Caroldene stated that she had a 401(k) that
she rolled into an IRA when she left her job, “and it’s been in an IRA ever since.”
Mark argued the Contributory IRA statement was inadmissible because Caroldene
failed to include it in an initial disclosure under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 194.2.
3 Mark argued that proof the funds in the Contributory IRA Account were exempt
required a year-by-year paper trail tracing the funds to a tax-exempt source.
On August 29, 2025, the trial court denied Mark’s Creditor’s Motion to Retain
Funds and ordered Mark to return the funds taken from Caroldene’s IRA
Contributory Account by September 7, 2025.
Mandamus Review
We may issue a writ of mandamus to remedy a clear abuse of discretion by
the trial court when the relator lacks an adequate remedy by appeal. See In re
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135–36 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding);
Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839–40 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding). “A trial
court clearly abuses its discretion if it reaches a decision so arbitrary and
unreasonable as to amount to a clear and prejudicial error of law.” Walker, 827
S.W.2d at 839 (internal quotations omitted). A trial court also abuses its discretion
if it fails to correctly analyze or apply the law, because a trial court has no discretion
in determining what the law is or in applying the law to the facts. See Prudential,
148 S.W.3d at 135; Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 840.
The cases Cahill cites to support his mandamus petition are distinguishable
from the issue presented here. In Beaumont Bank, N. A. v. Buller, the administrator
of her deceased husband’s estate was a person in possession of the judgment debtor’s
4 non-exempt property. 806 S.W.2d 223, 226 (Tex. 1991). She transferred the funds
to her lawyer’s trust account, and she admitted to personally authorizing the transfers
from the lawyer’s trust account for the express purpose of thwarting the seizure of
the “C.D. monies” by Beaumont Bank. Id at 225. Over a two-year period, the lawyer
disbursed a total of $103,661.24 pursuant to Buller’s instructions. Id. The Supreme
Court held the trial court acted within its discretion when it disbelieved Buller’s
unsubstantiated claim that she had spent all the cash she received from the $100,000
certificate of deposit that was directly traceable to her in her representative capacity
and that $250,000 she deposited in an account in the Cayman Islands were proceeds
from an unspecified life insurance policy. Id. at 225-26. Here, the trial court believed
Caroldene when she stated the account was an IRA account.
Mark cites Jones v. American Airlines, Inc. to support his argument that
Caroldene failed to meet her burden of proof that the funds in her IRA account were
a direct rollover of exempt 401(k) funds that had not been comingled with non-
exempt funds. See 131 S.W.3d 261, 270 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, no pet.). In
Jones, the administrator for the employer of Jones’s ex-husband mistakenly paid
Jones funds she was not entitled to under the QDRO. Id. at 268. After obtaining a
judgment against Jones in federal court, the employer applied for a turnover order in
state court. Id. at 264. In the trial court Jones conceded she knew the overpayment
5 did not belong to her and that she was obligated to pay American Airlines in
accordance with the federal court’s judgment. Id. at 270. The trial court required
Jones to turn over the funds to the registry of the court. Id. at 264. On appeal, Jones
argued the funds she had rolled over from her ex-husband’s retirement account to
her IRA accounts were exempt from seizure pursuant to section 41.0021 of the Texas
Property Code. Id. at 269. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s turnover
order. Id. at 263. The appellate court held Jones failed to prove the funds were
exempt because the funds were not an eligible rollover distribution qualifying as a
nontaxable rollover contribution and thus were excess contributions that were not
exempt from seizure under the exemption in section 42.0021 then in effect. Id. at
265-66, 270.
Section 42.0021 provides that “qualified savings plan” includes an individual
retirement account. See Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 42.0021(a)(4). A person’s interest
in a qualified savings plan is exempt from seizure for the satisfaction of debts. Id. §
42.0021(b). The trial court believed Caroldene’s statements about the origin of her
Contributory IRA. “With respect to resolution of factual issues . . . the reviewing
court may not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court.” Walker, 827 S.W.2d
at 839.
6 We conclude that the relator has not established a clear abuse of discretion by
the trial court. Accordingly, we lift our stay order of September 6, 2025, and we deny
the petition for a writ of mandamus. See Tex. R. App. P. 52.8.
PETITION DENIED.
PER CURIAM
Submitted on September 24, 2025 Opinion Delivered October 30, 2025
Before Golemon, C.J., Johnson and Wright, JJ.