In Re Maria Sanchez v. the State of Texas

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: May 9, 2024
• Docket: 01-23-00309-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

Opinion issued May 9, 2024

In The

Court of Appeals For The

First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-23-00309-CV ——————————— IN RE MARIA SANCHEZ, Relator

Original Proceeding on Petition for Writ of Mandamus

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Relator, Maria Sanchez, has filed a petition for a writ of mandamus

challenging the trial court’s March 2, 2023 order titled “Motion to Set Aside Jury

Verdict and Grant a New Trial.” The trial court issued the challenged order

following a jury trial in the underlying divorce proceeding between Sanchez and real

party in interest, Ysidro Hernandez. In her petition, Sanchez asserted that the trial

court abused its discretion by “unilaterally ordering a new trial” and entering a

“one-page order [that] [was] facially invalid,” and that she lacked an adequate appellate remedy to challenge the trial court’s order. Sanchez’s mandamus petition

requested that this Court issue a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to (1)

vacate the March 2, 2023 new trial order and (2) enter a final judgment on the jury’s

findings.

This Court requested a response to Sanchez’s petition for writ of mandamus.

Hernandez, proceeding pro se, filed a response to the mandamus petition, and

Sanchez filed a reply in support of her mandamus petition.

We conditionally grant relator’s petition for writ of mandamus in part.1

Background

This original proceeding arises from a divorce proceeding initiated by

Sanchez on November 3, 2021. Sanchez and Hernandez were married on or around

December 21, 2000. Sanchez had two children prior to her marriage with

Hernandez, Marcos Antonio and Jordan Anthony Martinez. According to the

mandamus petition, Sanchez and Hernandez owned a residential property located on

Wallisville Road in Houston. It is undisputed that this residential property was

community property.

Sanchez stated in her mandamus petition that she also “assisted” Antonio with

purchasing several pieces of property to be used as collateral for a bail bond business

1 The underlying case is In the Matter of the Marriage of Maria Sanchez and Ysidro Hernandez, Cause No. 2021-72513, in the 309th District Court of Harris County, Texas, the Honorable Linda Marie Dunson presiding.

2 he was starting (the “bail bond properties”). According to Sanchez, although the

deeds to the bail bond properties were in her name, Antonio “fully paid for the

properties,” and neither Sanchez nor Hernandez “paid any money towards the

purchase” of the bail bond properties.

On January 18, 2022, Hernandez, acting through counsel, filed a

counter-petition for divorce. As a part of his counter-petition, Hernandez asserted

third-party claims against Antonio and Martinez, the adult children of Sanchez. In

relevant part, Hernandez’s counter-petition alleged that Sanchez and Antonio

committed fraud, theft, and conspiracy. Specifically, Hernandez alleged that

Sanchez and Antonio conspired to fraudulently transfer the bail bond properties into

Antonio’s name in an effort to defraud the community estate.

Prior to trial, the trial court dismissed Hernandez’s fraud, theft, and conspiracy

claims against Antonio. On January 9 and 10, 2023, there was a jury trial on all

remaining claims. The trial court’s charge to the jury included several questions for

the consideration of the jury. Relevant to this mandamus petition, the jury was

presented with the following questions:

Question 1: Do grounds exist for divorce? Question 2: Is the homestead located on Wallisville Road the community property of Sanchez and Hernandez?

Question 3: Are any of the properties purchased as collateral for Antonio’s bail bond business the community property of Sanchez and Hernandez?

3 Question 5: Did Sanchez commit fraud with respect to the community-property rights of Hernandez? The jury returned its verdict on January 10, 2023. In an 11-1 decision, the

jury found that: (1) grounds existed for divorce; (2) the Wallisville Road home was

community property; (3) none of the properties purchased as collateral for Antonio’s

bail bond business were the community property of the marital estate; and (4)

Sanchez did not commit fraud with respect to the community-property rights of

Hernandez.

After the trial court announced the jury verdict, the trial court polled the jury,

confirming the 11-1 verdict. The parties accepted the verdict, and the trial court

excused the jury. At the conclusion of the proceedings, the trial court granted the

divorce requested by Sanchez and Hernandez and stated, “[a]s for the just and right

division of the community property, the [trial court would] render on that, take it

under advisement, and . . . submit a written order to the parties.” The trial court then

ordered the parties to appear before the court for a “post-jury trial conference” on

February 3, 2023.

During the February 3, 2023 hearing, and without notice to the parties, and on

its own motion, the trial court informed the parties that she was ordering a new trial.

Sanchez objected to trial court’s ruling to set aside the jury verdict and grant a new

trial. But on March 2, 2023, the trial court entered an order titled “Motion to Set

Aside Jury Verdict and Grant a New Trial.”

4 In that order, the trial court stated that it was necessary to set aside the jury’s

verdict and grant a new trial because “[t]he [jury’s] verdict was against the great

weight and preponderance of the evidence combined with an explanation of how the

evidence or lack of evidence undermine[d] the jury’s findings.” In support of its

conclusion, the trial court stated that the “[j]ury failed to provide instructions for

completing the verdict certificate” and “[t]he [j]ury were provided the following

Instructions in relevant part of the Charge of the Court on pages 8-9:.”

Next, the trial court ruled that “[t]he jury failed to characterize the marital

property. The verdict simply stated what the marital property was not without

clearly characterizing the marital property. See attached Charge to the Jury as

Exhibit A.” Finally, the trial court concluded that “[t]he [j]ury verdict d[id] not

comport with the law. The [j]ury’s answer to the issues of characterization of marital

property d[id] not overcome the community property presumption because the

evidence or lack of evidence admitted undermine[d] the jury’s findings.”

For these reasons, the trial court stated, “the evidence supporting the [j]ury’s

finding [was] legally and factually insufficient to support the characterization of the

community assets in the just and right division of community property assets and

liabilities.” The trial court reset the case for a new trial and ordered “mutual

temporary injunctions for the preservation of the real property” while the case

remained pending.

5 In response to the trial court order granting a new trial, Sanchez filed her

petition for writ of mandamus, asserting that the “trial court’s new trial order [was]

facially invalid and the articulated reasons [were] not supported by the record.”

Sanchez requested that this Court issue a writ of mandamus directing the trial court

to (1) vacate the March 2, 2023 new trial order and (2) perform the ministerial task

of entering a final judgment on the jury’s verdict.

Standard of Review

Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that is only available in limited

circumstances. See Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839–40 (Tex. 1992).

Specifically, mandamus relief is only available where a relator establishes two

requirements. First, relator must establish that the trial court has abused its

discretion. See id. Second, a relator must establish that she has no adequate remedy

by appeal. In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135–36 (Tex. 2004).

Analysis

In her first issue, Sanchez argues that the trial court erred in unilaterally setting

aside the jury’s verdict and ordering a new trial because (1) the trial court’s order

was “facially invalid,” offering “no explanation why the verdict was allegedly

‘against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence’ and did ‘not comport

with the law,’” (2) there was “sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict,” and

(3) “any error in the signing of the jury certificate is not a valid basis for ordering a

6 new trial.” In her second issue, Sanchez argues she has no adequate remedy on

appeal. Texas courts have concluded that where a trial court erroneously grants a

new trial, “absent mandamus review,” a party “will seemingly have no appellate

review of the orders granting new trial.” See In re Columbia Med. Ctr. Of Las

Colinas, Subsidiary, L.P., 290 S.W.3d 204, 209 (Tex. 2009). Accordingly, to the

extent Sanchez establishes the trial court abused its discretion, mandamus relief is

appropriate.

In granting a motion for new trial, or otherwise ordering a new trial, a trial

court is obligated to provide litigants with “an understandable, reasonably specific

explanation” for setting aside a jury verdict and ordering a new trial. See id. at 213.

Where a new trial order fails to comply with this standard, mandamus relief is

available. See id.; see also In re United Scaffolding, Inc., 377 S.W.3d 685, 689–90

(Tex. 2012). Still yet, where a trial court order “satisfies these facial requirements,

[the Supreme Court of Texas has] further empowered appellate courts to ‘conduct a

merits review of the bases for a new trial order’ and grant mandamus relief ‘[i]f the

record does not support the trial court’s rationale for ordering a new trial.’” In re

Bent, 487 S.W.3d 170, 173 (Tex. 2016) (quoting In re Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A.,

Inc., 407 S.W.3d 746, 749 (Tex. 2013)).

Sanchez asserted in her mandamus petition that “[t]he trial court’s one-page

order [was] facially invalid.” However, to the extent this Court concludes that the

7 trial court’s order satisfied the facial requirements, Sanchez further asserted that

mandamus relief remained proper because the “evidence [was] legally and factually

sufficient to support the jury’s findings.”

Trial courts have traditionally been afforded broad discretion in granting new

trials. See In re Columbia, 290 S.W.3d at 210. The Texas Rules of Civil Procedure

vest trial courts with broad authority to order new trials “for good cause.” TEX. R.

CIV. P. 320. “Historically, trial courts sometimes granted new trials with little or no

explanation, and ‘[the Texas Supreme Court’s] decisions approved the practice of

trial courts failing to specify reasons for setting aside jury verdicts.’” In re Bent, 487

S.W.3d at 175 (quoting In re Columbia, 290 S.W.3d at 208).

However, the Texas Constitution guarantees that the right to trial by jury

“shall remain inviolate.” TEX. CONST. art. I, § 15. Given this inviolate right to a

jury trial, trial courts cannot enjoy unfettered authority to order new trials.

Therefore, the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Texas has evolved to more

firmly secure Texans’ constitutional right to a jury trial in the new trial context. See

In re Bent, 487 S.W.3d at 175. In this effort, the Supreme Court of Texas has

acknowledged that the authority of trial courts to order new trials is “not limitless.”

See In re Columbia, 290 S.W.3d at 210. At the very least, parties to a jury trial “are

entitled to an understandable, reasonably specific explanation why their expectations

8 are frustrated by a jury verdict being disregarded or set aside, the trial process being

nullified, and the case having to be retried.” Id. at 213.

Importantly, a “trial court need not provide a detailed catalog of the evidence”

in setting aside a jury’s verdict and ordering a new trial. See In re United

Scaffolding, 377 S.W.3d at 688. However, the trial court must “provide[] a cogent

and reasonably specific explanation of the reasoning that led the court to conclude

that a new trial was warranted.” Id. For example, the Supreme Court of Texas has

concluded that a “bare assertion that a new trial was ‘in the interests of justice and

fairness,’” amounts to “such a vague explanation in setting aside a jury verdict [and]

does not enhance respect for the judiciary or the rule of law, detracts from

transparency we strive to achieve in our legal system, and does not sufficiently

respect the reasonable expectations of parties and the public when a lawsuit is tried

to a jury.” See In re Bent, 487 S.W.3d at 176 (internal quotations omitted).

The Supreme Court of Texas has identified examples of new trial orders which

amount to an abuse of discretion, including when: (1) “the given reason, specific or

not, is not one for which a new trial is legally valid,” (2) “the articulated reasons

plainly state that the trial court merely substituted its own judgment for the jury’s,”

and (3) “the order, though rubber-stamped with a valid new-trial rationale, provides

little or no insight into the judge’s reasoning.” See In re United Scaffolding, 377

S.W.3d at 688–89.

9 Here, the trial court stated that “for good cause and in the best interests of

justice and fairness the jury[’s] verdict should be set aside and a new trial granted.”

The trial court further stated that the jury’s “verdict was against the great weight and

preponderance of the evidence.” While this language could be viewed as the type

of “vague” language identified by the Supreme Court of Texas, we note that here,

the trial court articulated three bases in support of its ruling:

a. The [j]ury failed to provide instructions for completing the verdict certificate. The [j]ury [was] provided the following Instructions in relevant part of the Charge of the Court on pages 8-9: b. The jury failed to characterize the marital property. The verdict simply stated what the marital property was not without clearly characterizing the property. See attached Charge to the Jury as Exhibit A.

c. The [j]ury verdict d[id] not comport with the law. The [j]ury’s answers to the issues of characterization of marital property d[id] not overcome the community property presumption because the evidence or lack of evidence admitted undermine[d] the jury’s findings. The trial court then concluded that “[f]or the above reasons, the evidence

supporting the [j]ury’s finding [was] legally and factually insufficient to support the

characterization of community assets in the just and right division of community

property assets and liabilities.”

While a trial court “need not provide a detailed catalog of the evidence” that

served as the basis for setting aside the jury’s verdict, the trial court must provide a

“cogent and reasonably specific explanation” of its reasoning. See id. at 687. In 10 conducting a facial review of the trial court’s reasoning here, we cannot conclude

that the stated reasons are “cogent” or “reasonably specific.”

For example, the first reason articulated by the trial court, that “[t]he [j]ury

failed to provide instructions for completing the verdict certificate,” is unclear and

unexplained by the trial court. Based on the language of the trial court’s order, it

appears that the trial court concluded there was an issue with the jury instructions,

but the trial court does not explain what the issue was in a cogent or understandable

way. More importantly, the trial court did not explain why any such issue warranted

setting aside the jury’s verdict and ordering a new trial.

The trial court went on to state that “[t]he [j]ury [was] provided with the

following Instructions in relevant part of the Charge of the Court on pages 8-9:.”

This statement is unclear, and further, the trial court’s use of a colon at the end of

the sentence implies that the trial court’s statement was incomplete. Perhaps the trial

court intended to quote language from a “relevant part” of the Instructions included

in the jury charge. However, there is no additional language after the colon. It is

unclear what “relevant part” of the Instructions provided to the jury was being

referenced by the trial court, and, more directly, why that language was relevant to

the trial court’s decision to set aside the jury’s verdict and order a new trial.

The second reason articulated by the trial court for setting aside the jury’s

verdict was that “[t]he jury failed to characterize the marital property,” and instead

11 “simply stated what the marital property was not without clearly characterizing the

property.” While those statements, in and of themselves, are “cogent,” the trial court

did not provide “specific facts and circumstances of the case at hand [that] explain

how the evidence (or lack of evidence) undermine[d] the jury’s findings.” See id. at

689. The trial court’s order referenced no specific facts and failed to provide any

explanation as to why the jury’s failure to characterize the marital property required

the trial court to set aside the jury’s verdict and order a new trial.

Similarly, the trial court’s third articulated reason for setting aside the jury’s

verdict, that “[t]he [j]ury verdict d[id] not comport with the law,” also failed to

identify “specific facts and circumstances of the case at hand [that] explain how the

evidence (or lack of evidence) undermine[d] the jury’s findings.” Id. The trial court

stated only that the “[j]ury’s answers to the issues of characterization of marital

property d[id] not overcome the community property presumption because the

evidence or lack of evidence admitted undermine[d] the jury’s findings.” This

explanation lacks clarity and reasonable specificity.

We note that reviewing courts are urged to consider “quality over quantity”

when reviewing new-trial orders and should “focus not on the length or detail of the

reasons a trial court gives” in new-trial orders, but instead “on how well those

reasons serve the general purpose of assuring the parties that the jury’s verdict was

set aside only after careful thought and for valid reasons.” See In re Bent, 487

12 S.W.3d at 176 (internal quotations omitted). However, we conclude that the trial

court’s stated reasons do not amount to a “cogent and reasonably specific

explanation of the reasoning that led the court to conclude that a new trial was

warranted.” See In re United Scaffolding, 377 S.W.3d at 688.

The trial court’s order failed to provide the litigants with “an understandable,

reasonably specific explanation” for setting aside the jury’s verdict and ordering a

new trial. See In re Columbia, 290 S.W.3d at 213. We therefore conclude that the

trial court has abused its discretion and Sanchez has no adequate remedy on appeal.

See id. at 209. We conditionally grant Sanchez’s mandamus petition to the extent

she requests that the trial court vacate its March 2, 2023 “Motion to Set Aside Jury

Verdict and Grant a New Trial.”

We now turn to Sanchez’s request that we direct the trial court to enter a final

judgment on the jury’s findings. We decline to grant such relief in this case.

Because the basis of the trial court’s order setting aside the jury’s verdict and

ordering a new trial is unclear, we are unable to determine whether Sanchez is

entitled to that relief. See In re United Scaffolding, 377 S.W.3d at 690 (“The trial

court’s failure to properly state why it granted a new trial does not mandate a

conclusion that it did not have a valid reason for doing so. And absent the trial

court’s having particularized its reason—or reasons—United would be entitled to

13 mandamus directing the trial court to render judgment on the verdict only if it

showed no valid basis exists for the new-trial order.”).

Conclusion

We conclude that the trial court’s “Motion to Set Aside Jury Verdict and Grant

a New Trial” failed to provide the litigants with “an understandable, reasonably

specific explanation” for setting aside the jury’s verdict and ordering a new trial.

See In re Columbia Med., 290 S.W.3d at 213. Accordingly, we conditionally grant

Sanchez’s petition for writ of mandamus, in part, and direct the trial court to vacate

the order. However, we deny Sanchez’s request that we direct the trial court to enter

a final judgment on the jury’s findings. We are confident that the trial court will

comply with this Court’s ruling, and the writ will issue only if the trial court fails to

comply within thirty days of the date of this opinion. All pending motions are

dismissed as moot.

April Farris Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Adams and Justices Guerra and Farris.