IN THE TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-18-00295-CR
IN RE MARCUS PILKINGTON
Original Proceeding
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Relator Marcus Pilkington seeks a writ of mandamus compelling the Honorable
Matt Johnson, Judge of the 54th District Court of McLennan County, to grant his motion
to quash an indictment against him. This is Relator’s second request for interlocutory
relief. See Ex parte Pilkington, 494 S.W.3d 330 (Tex. App.—Waco 2015, no pet.) (orig.
proceeding). We deny Relator’s petition.
Background
The underlying events are not disputed. Relator was indicted on November 10,
2015 in Cause No. 2015-22288-C2 for engaging in organized criminal activity. Relator’s
charges arise out of his alleged participation in the shoot-out at the Twin Peaks restaurant
in Waco, Texas on May 17, 2015. On May 9, 2018, the grand jury returned a second indictment against Relator also arising out of the Twin Peaks incident but charging him
with a different offense—participating in a riot. The second indictment bears the same
cause number as the first—2015-22288-C2—and is entitled “Re-Indictment.” Relator filed
a motion to quash the reindictment that was denied by the trial court after a hearing.
Relator then filed the present petition for writ of mandamus.
Analysis
The traditional test for determining whether mandamus relief is appropriate
requires a relator to establish the following: “First, he must show that he has no adequate
remedy at law to redress his alleged harm. Second, he must show that what he seeks to
compel is a ministerial act, not involving a discretionary or judicial decision.” State ex rel.
Young v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Appeals, 236 S.W.3d 207, 210 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)
(orig. proceeding). Relief will be denied if the relator fails to satisfy either prong. Id.
Relator first argues that the trial court failed to perform a ministerial act when he
refused to dismiss the reindictment. The ministerial act prong
is satisfied if the relator can show he has “a clear right to the relief sought”— that is to say, “when the facts and circumstances dictate but one rational decision” under unequivocal, well-settled (i.e., from extant statutory, constitutional, or case law sources), and clearly controlling legal principles. While a trial court has a ministerial duty to rule upon a motion that is properly and timely presented to it for a ruling, in general it has no ministerial duty to “rule a certain way on that motion.” By this we mean that mandamus will not lie to “compel the trial court ‘to rule a certain way’ on an uncertain and unsettled issue the resolution of which involved a fair amount of discretion.” In short, it is improper to order a trial court to exercise its judicial (as opposed to its ministerial) function in a particular way unless the relator has a “clear right to the relief sought,” i.e., the law he invokes is definite, unambiguous, and unquestionably applies to the indisputable facts of the case.
In re Pilkington Page 2 Id. (footnoted citations omitted). As Relator seeks a specific ruling, he has not established
that the trial court refused to perform a ministerial duty.
Relator also fails to establish that he has a clear right to the relief sought because
he has not demonstrated that “the law he invokes is definite, unambiguous, and
unquestionably applies to the indisputable facts of the case.” Id. Relator argues that the
reindictment violates art. 28.10 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which provides, in
pertinent part, that an indictment may not be amended over a defendant’s objection if the
amendment charges the defendant with an additional or different offense. TEX. CODE
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 28.10(c) (West 2006). Generally, an indictment may be amended
under art. 28.10 by motion from the state and with leave of court. See Id. art. 28.11 (“All
amendments of an indictment or information shall be made with the leave of the court
and under its direction.”); see also Riney v. State, 28 S.W.3d 561, 565-66 (Tex. Crim. App.
2000). In this case, there was no amendment to the indictment but rather a new
indictment returned by the grand jury. Article 28.10 does not supplant the ability of the
state to obtain an amended indictment from a grand jury, but rather allows the state to
correct technical deficiencies without requiring an additional appearance before the
grand jury. See Rose v. State, 807 S.W.2d 626, 628-30 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
1991, no pet.); see also Wisenbaker v. State, 782 S.W.2d 534, 536 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 1989, no pet.) (characterizing distinctions between amendment and reindictment);
Flournoy v. State, No. 05-95-01468-CR, 1997 WL 752562, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 8,
1997, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (article 28.10 not applicable to
In re Pilkington Page 3 reindictment);1 Garcia v. State, No. 05-94-00836-CR, 1995 WL 379589, at *4 (Tex. App.—
Dallas May 31, 1995, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (article 28.10 not applicable
to reindictment). Relator presents no authority that precludes a grand jury from
returning more than one indictment in a single case, although there is some authority that
such a circumstance is permissible. See Bryant v. State, No. 11-04-00104-CR, 2005 WL
1788892, at *2 (Tex. App.—Eastland July 28, 2005, no pet.) (not designated for publication)
(“There was no requirement that the re-indictment . . . be given a file number different
from the number of the original indictment. . . .”); see also Stafford v. State, No. 05-97-01231-
CR, 1999 WL 788567, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Oct. 5, 1999, no pet.) (not designated for
publication) (reindictment did not replace indictment for double jeopardy purposes).
Additionally, the reindictment in this case has all of the requisites of a valid indictment,
and Relator has not argued otherwise. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 21.02 (West
2009). Relator presents nothing that would require the trial court to dismiss the
reindictment in this case. Relator has failed, therefore, to show that he has a “clear right
to the relief sought,” or that the trial court failed to perform a ministerial duty. Young,
236 S.W.3d at 210.
Even assuming that Relator identifies a ministerial duty that the trial court failed
to perform, he fails to establish that he has no other legal recourse. “[M]andamus ‘is not
a substitute for and cannot be used to perform the office of an appeal.’” State ex rel Healey
1 Under Rule 47.7(a) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure, unpublished memorandum opinions not designated for publication have no precedential value but may be cited with the notation, “(not designated for publication).” Unpublished memorandum opinions are persuasive rather than binding precedent that the court may follow or reject. See Carrillo v. State, 98 S.W.3d 789, 794 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2003, pet. ref’d).
In re Pilkington Page 4 v. McMeans, 884 S.W.2d 772, 774 (Tex.
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IN THE TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-18-00295-CR
IN RE MARCUS PILKINGTON
Original Proceeding
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Relator Marcus Pilkington seeks a writ of mandamus compelling the Honorable
Matt Johnson, Judge of the 54th District Court of McLennan County, to grant his motion
to quash an indictment against him. This is Relator’s second request for interlocutory
relief. See Ex parte Pilkington, 494 S.W.3d 330 (Tex. App.—Waco 2015, no pet.) (orig.
proceeding). We deny Relator’s petition.
Background
The underlying events are not disputed. Relator was indicted on November 10,
2015 in Cause No. 2015-22288-C2 for engaging in organized criminal activity. Relator’s
charges arise out of his alleged participation in the shoot-out at the Twin Peaks restaurant
in Waco, Texas on May 17, 2015. On May 9, 2018, the grand jury returned a second indictment against Relator also arising out of the Twin Peaks incident but charging him
with a different offense—participating in a riot. The second indictment bears the same
cause number as the first—2015-22288-C2—and is entitled “Re-Indictment.” Relator filed
a motion to quash the reindictment that was denied by the trial court after a hearing.
Relator then filed the present petition for writ of mandamus.
Analysis
The traditional test for determining whether mandamus relief is appropriate
requires a relator to establish the following: “First, he must show that he has no adequate
remedy at law to redress his alleged harm. Second, he must show that what he seeks to
compel is a ministerial act, not involving a discretionary or judicial decision.” State ex rel.
Young v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Appeals, 236 S.W.3d 207, 210 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)
(orig. proceeding). Relief will be denied if the relator fails to satisfy either prong. Id.
Relator first argues that the trial court failed to perform a ministerial act when he
refused to dismiss the reindictment. The ministerial act prong
is satisfied if the relator can show he has “a clear right to the relief sought”— that is to say, “when the facts and circumstances dictate but one rational decision” under unequivocal, well-settled (i.e., from extant statutory, constitutional, or case law sources), and clearly controlling legal principles. While a trial court has a ministerial duty to rule upon a motion that is properly and timely presented to it for a ruling, in general it has no ministerial duty to “rule a certain way on that motion.” By this we mean that mandamus will not lie to “compel the trial court ‘to rule a certain way’ on an uncertain and unsettled issue the resolution of which involved a fair amount of discretion.” In short, it is improper to order a trial court to exercise its judicial (as opposed to its ministerial) function in a particular way unless the relator has a “clear right to the relief sought,” i.e., the law he invokes is definite, unambiguous, and unquestionably applies to the indisputable facts of the case.
In re Pilkington Page 2 Id. (footnoted citations omitted). As Relator seeks a specific ruling, he has not established
that the trial court refused to perform a ministerial duty.
Relator also fails to establish that he has a clear right to the relief sought because
he has not demonstrated that “the law he invokes is definite, unambiguous, and
unquestionably applies to the indisputable facts of the case.” Id. Relator argues that the
reindictment violates art. 28.10 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which provides, in
pertinent part, that an indictment may not be amended over a defendant’s objection if the
amendment charges the defendant with an additional or different offense. TEX. CODE
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 28.10(c) (West 2006). Generally, an indictment may be amended
under art. 28.10 by motion from the state and with leave of court. See Id. art. 28.11 (“All
amendments of an indictment or information shall be made with the leave of the court
and under its direction.”); see also Riney v. State, 28 S.W.3d 561, 565-66 (Tex. Crim. App.
2000). In this case, there was no amendment to the indictment but rather a new
indictment returned by the grand jury. Article 28.10 does not supplant the ability of the
state to obtain an amended indictment from a grand jury, but rather allows the state to
correct technical deficiencies without requiring an additional appearance before the
grand jury. See Rose v. State, 807 S.W.2d 626, 628-30 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
1991, no pet.); see also Wisenbaker v. State, 782 S.W.2d 534, 536 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 1989, no pet.) (characterizing distinctions between amendment and reindictment);
Flournoy v. State, No. 05-95-01468-CR, 1997 WL 752562, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 8,
1997, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (article 28.10 not applicable to
In re Pilkington Page 3 reindictment);1 Garcia v. State, No. 05-94-00836-CR, 1995 WL 379589, at *4 (Tex. App.—
Dallas May 31, 1995, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (article 28.10 not applicable
to reindictment). Relator presents no authority that precludes a grand jury from
returning more than one indictment in a single case, although there is some authority that
such a circumstance is permissible. See Bryant v. State, No. 11-04-00104-CR, 2005 WL
1788892, at *2 (Tex. App.—Eastland July 28, 2005, no pet.) (not designated for publication)
(“There was no requirement that the re-indictment . . . be given a file number different
from the number of the original indictment. . . .”); see also Stafford v. State, No. 05-97-01231-
CR, 1999 WL 788567, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Oct. 5, 1999, no pet.) (not designated for
publication) (reindictment did not replace indictment for double jeopardy purposes).
Additionally, the reindictment in this case has all of the requisites of a valid indictment,
and Relator has not argued otherwise. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 21.02 (West
2009). Relator presents nothing that would require the trial court to dismiss the
reindictment in this case. Relator has failed, therefore, to show that he has a “clear right
to the relief sought,” or that the trial court failed to perform a ministerial duty. Young,
236 S.W.3d at 210.
Even assuming that Relator identifies a ministerial duty that the trial court failed
to perform, he fails to establish that he has no other legal recourse. “[M]andamus ‘is not
a substitute for and cannot be used to perform the office of an appeal.’” State ex rel Healey
1 Under Rule 47.7(a) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure, unpublished memorandum opinions not designated for publication have no precedential value but may be cited with the notation, “(not designated for publication).” Unpublished memorandum opinions are persuasive rather than binding precedent that the court may follow or reject. See Carrillo v. State, 98 S.W.3d 789, 794 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2003, pet. ref’d).
In re Pilkington Page 4 v. McMeans, 884 S.W.2d 772, 774 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (orig. proceeding). If convicted,
Relator may present his objections to the reindictment on appeal. The problems that he
asserts he will face if he is forced to wait until after a conviction to appeal are the problems
faced by any other defendant when a pre-trial motion is denied. See Walker v. Packer, 827
S.W.2d 833, 839 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding); see also Woodward v. Eighth Court of Appeals,
991 S.W.2d 795, 797 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (orig. proceeding) (“In the event [the
defendant] is convicted and appeals, he will have an adequate remedy at law by way of
a point of error on appeal complaining of [the trial court’s] action. . . .”).
Possible appellate review at a later time, however, is not always or automatically
an adequate remedy. Greenwell v. Court of Appeals for the Thirteenth Judicial Dist., 159
S.W.3d 645, 649 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (orig. proceeding). A remedy may be considered
inadequate if it is “uncertain, tedious, burdensome, slow, inconvenient, inappropriate, or
ineffective. . . .” Greenwell v. Court of Appeals for the Thirteenth Judicial Dist., 159 S.W.3d
645, 648 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (orig. proceeding) (quoting Smith v. Flack, 728 S.W.2d 784,
792 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987)). To the extent appeal might be considered inadequate in this
case, Relator still has an additional remedy available—he may request the trial court to
assign a new cause number to the reindictment, which should resolve all of his objections.
Because Relator has an adequate remedy at law and seeks to compel a
discretionary act, we deny his petition for writ of mandamus.
In re Pilkington Page 5 REX D. DAVIS Justice
Before Chief Justice Gray, Justice Davis, and Justice Scoggins (Chief Justice Gray concurring) Denied Opinion delivered and filed November 7, 2018 Do not publish [OT06]
In re Pilkington Page 6