In re Manuel R.

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

In re Manuel R.

227 A.D.2d 355, 642 N.Y.S.2d 902, 1996 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 6154

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedMay 30, 1996

StatusPublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 227 A.D.2d 355 (In re Manuel R.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

In re Manuel R., 227 A.D.2d 355, 642 N.Y.S.2d 902, 1996 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 6154 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1996).

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Opinion

Order of disposition, Family Court, Bronx County (Stewart Weinstein, J.), entered April 21, 1995, which adjudicated respondent-appellant a juvenile delinquent and placed him with the Division for Youth in a limited secure facility for 18 months, following a fact-finding determination that he committed a designated felony act which, if committed by an adult, would constitute the crimes of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

We agree with Family Court that for purposes of the designated felony act adjudication (Family Ct Act § 301.2 [8] [vi]), it is irrelevant that the two prior findings of prior felonies were combined into a single order of disposition (see, Besharov, 1985 Supp Practice Commentary, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 29A, Family Ct Act § 301.2, 1996 Pocket Part, at 75-76). We also reject appellant’s argument that a designated felony act adjudication is analogous to Penal Law § 70.10 (1) (c) and to other Penal Law recidivist statutes requiring imposition of sentence on a prior conviction in order for it to qualify as a predicate felony. Again, the plain language of Family Court Act § 301.2 (8) (vi) requires only "two prior findings” of prior felonies, the existence of dispositional orders being irrelevant. Concur — Sullivan, J. P., Ellerin, Rubin and Tom, JJ.

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Order of disposition, Family Court, Bronx County (Stewart Weinstein, J.), entered April 21, 1995, which adjudicated respondent-appellant a juvenile delinquent and placed him with the Division for Youth in a limited secure facility for 18 months, following a fact-finding determination that he committed a designated felony act which, if committed by an adult, would constitute the crimes of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

We agree with Family Court that for purposes of the designated felony act adjudication (Family Ct Act § 301.2 [8] [vi]), it is irrelevant that the two prior findings of prior felonies were combined into a single order of disposition (see, Besharov, 1985 Supp Practice Commentary, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 29A, Family Ct Act § 301.2, 1996 Pocket Part, at 75-76). We also reject appellant’s argument that a designated felony act adjudication is analogous to Penal Law § 70.10 (1) (c) and to other Penal Law recidivist statutes requiring imposition of sentence on a prior conviction in order for it to qualify as a predicate felony. Again, the plain language of Family Court Act § 301.2 (8) (vi) requires only "two prior findings” of prior felonies, the existence of dispositional orders being irrelevant. Concur — Sullivan, J. P., Ellerin, Rubin and Tom, JJ.

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Bluebook (online)

227 A.D.2d 355, 642 N.Y.S.2d 902, 1996 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 6154, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-manuel-r-nyappdiv-1996.

Opinion

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