In re: Mallinckrodt PLC v. Citadel Securities LLC, et al.

CourtDistrict Court, D. Delaware
DecidedNovember 24, 2025
Docket1:25-cv-00114
StatusUnknown

This text of In re: Mallinckrodt PLC v. Citadel Securities LLC, et al. (In re: Mallinckrodt PLC v. Citadel Securities LLC, et al.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Delaware primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re: Mallinckrodt PLC v. Citadel Securities LLC, et al., (D. Del. 2025).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE

In re: MALLINCKRODT PLC, Chapter 11 Bankr. No. 20-12522 Reorganized Debtor

OPIOID MASTER DISBURSEMENT TRUST II,

Appellant, Civ. No. 1:25-cv-00114-SB

v.

CITADEL SECURITIES LLC, et al.

Justin R. Alberto, Patrick J. Reilley, COLE SCHOTZ P.C., Wilmington, Delaware; Kevin C. Maclay, Todd E. Phillips, Jeffrey A. Liesemer, Serafina Concannon, Lucas H. Self, CAPLIN & DRYSDALE, CHARTERED, Washington, D.C.

Counsel for Appellants.

Jeremy W. Ryan, Nicole K. Pedi, Gregory J. Flasser, Maria Kotsiras, POTTER ANDERSON & CORROON LLP, Wilmington, Delaware; Michael A. Barlow, QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART & SULLIVAN, LLP, Wilmington, Delaware; Christopher D. Kercher, Benjamin Finestone, Peter H. Fountain, QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART & SULLIVAN, LLP, New York, N.Y.; Phillip D. Anker, Noah A. Levine, Ross E. Firsenbaum, Michael McGuinness, Austin M. Chavez, WILMER CUTLER PICKERING HALE AND DORR LLP, New York, N.Y.

Counsel for Appellees.

MEMORANDUM OPINION November 24, 2025 BIBAS, Circuit Judge, sitting by designation. The opioid crisis is a scourge on our communities. Companies like Mallinckrodt perpetuated the crisis by promoting these drugs. When its business model started to

fail, Mallinckrodt artificially inflated its value by buying back its stock. This made its shareholders billions before it sought refuge in Chapter 11 bankruptcy. The Bankruptcy Code lets creditors recoup fraudulently transferred money. But it also shields payments to banks and transfers connected to securities contracts from being clawed back. The bankruptcy court found that hundreds of millions of dollars spent on fraudulent share repurchases by Mallinckrodt are so shielded. Though the contracts are void, the money paid is real. I adopt its findings and affirm.

I. AN OPIOID KINGPIN CASHES OUT BEFORE BANKRUPTCY Mallinckrodt is an Irish pharmaceutical company that started selling opioids in the 19th century. App. 152, 154. But it was not until the 21st century that business got good. Mallinckrodt became the dominant opioid manufacturer in the country. App. 153. In the aughts, it called its opioid business a “new economy.” App. 21. And by 2015 it accounted for a quarter of the DEA’s annual quota for controlled

substances. App. 159. The DEA called it “the kingpin within the drug cartel” because of its size, false marketing, and aggressive tactics. App. 129, 160–61. Being the largest opioid producer and seller was lucrative. But it came at a cost. And that cost was paid by people and communities from coast to coast. More than 600,000 died from opioids from 2000 to 2020; millions more are addicted. App. 150. Overall, the opioid crisis has cost our country trillions. App. 152, 221. A. Mallinckrodt buys back more than a billion dollars of its stock After a decade-plus of boom, the opioid market went bust. The CDC declared an “opioid epidemic.” App. 213. Governments and private parties rushed to the

courthouse to redress their huge injuries from Mallinckrodt’s bad acts. App. 213–16. By the time Mallinckrodt filed for bankruptcy in 2020, it had “tens of billions of dollars” in liabilities, far outweighing its roughly $3 billion in assets. App. 220–21. As Mallinckrodt watched the opioid crisis deepen and litigated thousands of cases, its Board hatched a plan to prop up the company’s share price. App. 216–17. The Board spent $1.6 billion to buy back outstanding shares from 2015–18. App. 222. This artificially inflated Mallinckrodt’s share price even as its core business was in a death

spiral. App. 222–24. And the debt-fueled share buybacks only accelerated as losses mounted and sales plunged. App. 227. The buybacks drove up share value for Mallinckrodt’s shareholders, enriching them to the tune of hundreds of millions of dollars. Many of those shareholders are financial institutions: banks, investment managers, and hedge funds. App. 135–49. To buy the shares back on the open market, Mallinckrodt worked with two brokers,

Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley. App. 1046–47. The outflow of money meant that there was less left over to pay the injured people, companies, and communities who were left holding the bag. App. 134–35, 243–45. B. The Trust tries to claw back fraudulent stock buybacks from financial institutions, who in turn seek a safe harbor After Mallinckrodt declared bankruptcy, all opioid-related claims against it were assigned to a Delaware statutory trust. App. 134; 12 Del. C. § 3801. That Trust brought claims to recover money fraudulently transferred out of Mallinckrodt while it was insolvent—including claims that sought to claw back the money Mallinckrodt paid to buy back its shares. App. 128.

Fraudulent transfer is a state-law tort preserved by the Bankruptcy Code. The Code lets the Trust “avoid any transfer of an interest of” Mallinckrodt “that is voidable under applicable law.” 11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(1). Then, if “a transfer is avoided under section 544,” § 550(a) lets the Trust recover “the property transferred, or, if the court so orders, the value of such property.” § 550(a). If “applicable law” renders a transfer “voidable,” the Trust can bring that claim on behalf of all creditors. § 544(b). The Trust did just that, claiming that Mallinckrodt’s creditors are entitled to “avoid

the transfers” and “recover the value” transferred. App. 247. In turn, the firms sought refuge in § 546(e)’s safe harbor, which provides that “the trustee may not avoid a transfer that is a … settlement payment … or that is a transfer made … in connection with a securities contract.” § 546(e); App. 274, 320, 335. They argued that “settlement payment” is broadly defined as the “payment of cash to the dealer by the purchaser” and a “transfer of cash or securities made to

complete a securities transaction.” App. 277 (quoting Bevill, Bresler & Schulman Asset Mgmt. Corp. v. Spencer Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 878 F.2d 742, 749 (3d Cir. 1989) and Lowenschuss v. Resorts Int’l, Inc. (In re Resorts Int’l, Inc.), 181 F.3d 505, 515 (3d Cir. 1999), abrogated in part on other grounds by Merit Mgmt. Grp., LP v. FTI Consulting, Inc., 583 U.S. 366 (2018)). The Trust countered that § 546(e) did not apply at all. App. 357. It reasoned that Irish law governed the share buybacks, and Irish law considers unlawful buybacks by an undercapitalized company “void.” App. 358–59. “Void” contracts are “void ab

initio,” so they are “nullities” with “no legal effect.” App. 364–65. On that reading, the contracts never legally existed. Thus, the transfers could not have been “settlement payments” because there was no qualifying transaction. App. 362. Nor could they be transfers made “in connection with a securities contract” because there was never “any valid securities contract.” App. 365. For support, the Trust relied on the one case to squarely address this issue, Enron Corp. v. Bear, Stearns Int’l Ltd. (In re Enron Corp.), 323 B.R. 857 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005) (Enron I).

C. The bankruptcy court finds for the firms The bankruptcy judge granted summary judgment for the firms. Section 546(e)’s safe harbor protects a “financial institution” only if it makes a “qualifying transaction.” App. 1058. The banks, hedge funds, and money managers are plainly “financial institutions.” 11 U.S.C. § 546(e); App. 1059–70.

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