In Re Major League Baseball Players Alumni Association

996 F.2d 1236, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 29128, 1993 WL 165138
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
DecidedMay 18, 1993
Docket92-1058
StatusUnpublished

This text of 996 F.2d 1236 (In Re Major League Baseball Players Alumni Association) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Major League Baseball Players Alumni Association, 996 F.2d 1236, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 29128, 1993 WL 165138 (Fed. Cir. 1993).

Opinion

996 F.2d 1236

26 U.S.P.Q.2d 1919

NOTICE: Federal Circuit Local Rule 47.8(b) states that opinions and orders which are designated as not citable as precedent shall not be employed or cited as precedent. This does not preclude assertion of issues of claim preclusion, issue preclusion, judicial estoppel, law of the case or the like based on a decision of the Court rendered in a nonprecedential opinion or order.
In re MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL PLAYERS ALUMNI ASSOCIATION.

No. 92-1058.

United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.

May 18, 1993.

Before NIES, Chief Judge, RICH and LOURIE, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

DECISION

Major League Baseball Players Alumni Association (Applicant) appeals from the August 21, 1991, decision by the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board of the Patent and Trademark Office affirming the examining attorney's refusal to register the mark shown in application serial No. 73/792,624. We reverse.

DISCUSSION

On the scant record before us, we are unable to conclude that MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL PLAYERS ALUMNI and accompanying baseball player design, for association services, namely promoting the interests of former professional baseball players, is likely to cause confusion with the registered service marks MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL, with and without a baseball player design, for baseball exhibitions and baseball promotional activity.*

While we must recognize the descriptive phrase "major league baseball" as a distinctive mark for baseball exhibitions in view of the section 2(f) registration, the words of its mark are not thereby precluded from all other uses by others in marks of their own. Registration on the Principal Register under this section merely recognizes that, as used in connection with specific services, the descriptive words have come to identify a single source for those particular services. In view of the wide disparity in the services set forth in the application and those of the registrations, together with the differences in both the words and designs of the respective marks, we hold that the board legally erred in its decision upholding the examiner's rejection. On the basis of the registrations and the application alone, we are unable to uphold the board's decision that the marks are likely to cause confusion.

RICH, Circuit Judge, concurring.

I join the unanimous panel decision to reverse the refusal to register herein, but I am unable to join a majority "per curiam" opinion which states only generalized reasons for its inability to "uphold the board's decision." Though the record is scant indeed, the Examining Attorney and the Board stated their reasons at length. My reasons for disagreement are extensive and I state them below. (Disregard a few inappropriate uses of the editorial "we.")

This appeal involves baseball terminology, and until we know what the term "major league baseball" actually means to the baseball cognoscenti on the North American continent, who constitute a large segment of the population, we cannot correctly decide it.

The record in this case provides us with very little information. This is not a dispute between rival claimants to a service mark registration. We deal only with an ex parte rejection of an application to register a service mark which is primarily a design, associated with some words which the Examining Attorney has insisted are totally descriptive, namely, "Major League Baseball Players Alumni." The applicant is a non-profit corporation of the District of Columbia named the Major League Baseball Players Alumni Association. On this appeal, after contesting the point in the PTO, it has finally agreed that the words in its mark are all descriptive and has expressed its willingness to disclaim them all.

Applicant's Mark and Services

The mark presented to the PTO in appellant's application, claiming use since March 1983, appears as follows:

NOTE: OPINION CONTAINS TABLE OR OTHER DATA THAT IS NOT VIEWABLE

The named services in the application, as amended and approved by the Examining Attorney, are: "Association services, namely promoting the interests of former professional baseball players." The issue before us is, therefore, whether the above mark is registrable for those services notwithstanding the grounds asserted in the final rejection by the Examining Attorney which was affirmed by the Board.

The Rejections

(1) Disclaimer

As the appeal came to us, there were two outstanding rejections. As already stated, the Examining Attorney insisted that the applicant disclaim all the wording in its mark "because this wording describes the group members to whom the services are directed," citing 15 USC 1056, § 6 of the Lanham Act. The Examining Attorney amplified his position in his brief, saying:

The applicant's assertion that the wording PLAYERS ALUMNI is not descriptive is incorrect. The members of the association are former professional athletes, and they are now ALUMNI of that group. There is no wording that is not descriptive. The entire phrase must be disclaimed. [Emphasis added.]

In affirming, the Board wrote as follows:

Applicant's membership comprises former major league baseball players, i.e., "alumni." Thus, the words MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL PLAYERS ALUMNI, in their entirety, immediately describe the membership composition of applicant's association. Applicant's services promote the interests of players who are major league baseball alumni. As such, the words are merely descriptive of applicant's services within the meaning of section 2(e)(1) of the Act. [Footnote omitted, emphasis added.]

Applicant's brief in this court renders this disclaimer issue moot by conceding its willingness to disclaim all the words. It cannot, however, enter a disclaimer in this court but may do so only in the PTO and seeks a remand for that purpose. That will dispose of the disclaimer issue and we need not discuss it further.

(2) Likelihood of Confusion

The sole remaining issue before us, therefore, is, broadly speaking, likelihood of confusion under § 2(d) of the Trademark Act, 15 USC 1052(d), which reads, in pertinent part, as follows:

No trademark by which the goods [or services] of the applicant may be distinguished from the goods [or services] of others shall be refused registration on the principal register unless it--

* * *

(d) Consists of or comprises a mark which so resembles a mark registered in the Patent and Trademark Office ... as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods [or services] of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive

....

Clearly, we must make two comparisons as to each reference: (1) between applicant's mark and the registered mark, and (2) between applicant's services and the registrant's named services.

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996 F.2d 1236, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 29128, 1993 WL 165138, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-major-league-baseball-players-alumni-associa-cafc-1993.