IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
2021-NCSC-99
No. 218A20
Filed 27 August 2021
IN THE MATTER OF: M.A.
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a1)(1) from an order entered on 27
February 2020 by Judge Shamieka L. Rhinehart in District Court, Durham County.
This matter was calendared for argument in the Supreme Court on 21 June 2021 but
determined on the record and briefs without oral argument pursuant to Rule 30(f) of
the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
The Law Office of Derrick J. Hensley, PLLC, by Derrick J. Hensley, for petitioner-appellee Durham County Department of Social Services.
Carrie A. Hanger for appellee Guardian ad Litem.
Peter Wood for respondent-appellant mother.
HUDSON, Justice.
¶1 Respondent, the mother of M.A. (Mark)1, appeals from the trial court’s order
terminating her parental rights on the grounds of neglect and willful failure to make
reasonable progress to correct the conditions that led to the child’s removal from the
home. Because we hold the trial court did not err in concluding that grounds existed
to terminate respondent’s parental rights under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1) based on
1 A pseudonym is used to protect the juvenile’s identity and for ease of reading. IN RE M.A.
Opinion of the Court
neglect, we affirm the trial court’s order.
I. Facts and Procedural History
¶2 On 1 June 2015, the Durham County Department of Social Services (DSS)
obtained nonsecure custody of then ten-month-old Mark and his fifteen-year-old
brother, J.M.2, and filed a juvenile petition alleging they were neglected juveniles. In
the petition, DSS alleged that respondent and the children were chronically homeless
and had been staying “from place to place.” The petition further alleged that on 21
May 2015, J.M. returned from school to the place where they had been staying and
was unable to locate respondent. Respondent did not leave any information or
instructions on where she could be found. After still not being able to find respondent
that evening, J.M. went to his maternal grandmother’s senior residential complex at
1:00 a.m. to have a place to stay. On 1 June 2015, the maternal grandmother informed
DSS that J.M. could no longer stay with her as her residence did not allow children,
and she was concerned about being evicted. DSS believed Mark was with respondent,
however she had not been located at the time of filing the petition.
¶3 On 2 June 2015, respondent showed up at DSS’s office with Mark. The social
worker addressed the allegations and petition with respondent and explained that
DSS had obtained legal custody of her children on 1 June 2015. Respondent left Mark
2 J.M. has reached the age of majority and is not a part of this appeal. Therefore, we
discuss the facts primarily as they relate to Mark. IN RE M.A.
in the custody of DSS, and he was placed in foster care.
¶4 On 20 August 2015, the trial court entered an order adjudicating the children
as neglected juveniles based on stipulations by the parties. In order to correct the
conditions that led to the children’s removal, the trial court ordered respondent to
complete a psychological evaluation with collateral contacts and objective testing, and
follow any recommendations for mental health treatment; complete a parenting class
and demonstrate and verbalize an understanding of the skills learned; obtain and
maintain stable housing; obtain and maintain stable employment; demonstrate an
ability and willingness to meet the children’s needs; refrain from substance abuse;
maintain contact with the social worker and provide current contact information; and
maintain visitation with the children. The trial court granted respondent two hours
of supervised visitation every other week.
¶5 Following a review hearing held 17 November 2015, the trial court entered an
order on 11 January 2016 continuing custody with DSS and placing Mark with his
paternal great grandmother. The trial court found that respondent was employed and
seeking housing, had started parenting classes, had completed a substance abuse
assessment from which no services were recommended, and had completed a
psychological evaluation.
¶6 In a review order entered on 7 June 2016, the trial court set the permanent
plan for Mark as reunification with a secondary plan of guardianship. The trial court IN RE M.A.
found that respondent had obtained a one-bedroom home through Housing for New
Hope. DSS had assessed the home on 31 May 2016 and found it to be appropriate for
Mark. The trial court further found that respondent was making progress and was
not a safety risk to Mark during visits but that she still needed to complete the
parenting course and obtain sufficient income to meet the needs of her children. The
trial court allowed respondent unsupervised visitation with Mark with the possibility
of transitioning to overnight visits. In addition to respondent’s prior case plan
requirements, the trial court ordered respondent to obtain a domestic violence
assessment due to a history of domestic violence.
¶7 On 10 August 2016, Mark was placed in a foster home after the paternal great
grandmother indicated she could no longer care for him due to her health. On 8
September 2016, respondent was awarded overnight unsupervised visits on the
condition that the father not be present.
¶8 In a 2 May 2017 permanency-planning-review order, the trial court continued
the permanent plan of reunification but changed the secondary plan to adoption. The
trial court found that respondent completed a domestic violence assessment in
December 2016 which recommended mental health treatment and domestic violence
counseling. Respondent completed a mental health assessment on 28 February 2017,
and no treatment was recommended. However, DSS was concerned that respondent
underreported her domestic violence history. Respondent completed an addendum to IN RE M.A.
the initial assessment on 15 August 2017. However, the trial court found that
respondent “continued to minimize her domestic violence history and its impact on
her.”
¶9 After another hearing, the trial court subsequently entered a permanency-
planning-review order continuing the permanent plan of reunification with a
secondary plan of adoption. The trial court found that respondent had housing and
had been employed at the same company for the past eighteen months. However, the
trial court found that respondent’s participation in domestic violence counseling had
been “sporadic” and that respondent did not fully acknowledge the effects of her
domestic violence history, nor did she fully understand the reasons the trial court was
ordering her to engage in domestic violence counseling.
¶ 10 On 24 May 2018, DSS filed a motion to terminate respondent’s parental rights
to Mark alleging the grounds of neglect and willfully leaving the child in foster care
for more than twelve months without making reasonable progress to correct the
conditions that led to his removal from the home. See N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1)–(2)
(2019). DSS alleged that respondent failed to demonstrate a willingness and ability
to meet Mark’s needs due to respondent’s “delays in scheduling and attending
assessments and treatment, her sporadic attendance at treatment, incomplete
disclosures regarding problems and failure to utilize all visitation opportunities with
the child.” DSS further alleged that respondent “exhibit[ed] a pattern of behavior of IN RE M.A.
disengagement and lack of follow through” as she had “several older children for
whom she failed to engage in services in order to safely parent th[o]se children.”
¶ 11 Following a hearing on 20 and 23 July 2018, the trial court entered a
permanency-planning-review order on 28 August 2018 changing the permanent plan
to adoption with a secondary plan of guardianship. The trial court found that
although respondent had stable housing, she had yet to complete the Parenting
Capacity Assessment that was ordered in October 2017 which would address
respondent’s understanding of the impact of her domestic violence and her ability to
keep Mark and herself safe. The trial court further found that respondent missed a
permanency planning review meeting and failed to provide an explanation, and that
respondent was not at her home when the social worker conducted a pop-in visit
during Mark’s unsupervised visitation. The trial court found that it is not possible for
Mark to return to respondent’s care within the next six months because she “has not
completed her court ordered services, especially the Parenting Capacity Assessment,
. . . and her sporadic attendance of domestic violence counseling.”
¶ 12 The trial court conducted a termination-of-parental-rights hearing on 15
August, 9 and 15 October, 14 November, and 6 and 11 December 2019. On 27
February 2020, the trial court entered an order concluding that respondent’s parental
rights were subject to termination on the grounds of neglect and willful failure to
make reasonable progress to correct the conditions that led to Mark’s removal from IN RE M.A.
the home. The trial court further concluded that termination of respondent’s parental
rights was in Mark’s best interests. Accordingly, the trial court terminated
respondent’s parental rights. Respondent appealed.
II. Analysis
¶ 13 On appeal, respondent contends the trial court erred by adjudicating grounds
for termination of her parental rights under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1) and (2).
Because only one ground is necessary to terminate parental rights, we only address
respondent’s arguments regarding the ground of neglect. See In re A.R.A., 373 N.C.
190, 194 (2019).
¶ 14 We review a trial court’s adjudication “to determine whether the findings are
supported by clear, cogent and convincing evidence and the findings support the
conclusions of law.” In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. 101, 111 (1984). Unchallenged
findings of fact “are deemed supported by competent evidence and are binding on
appeal.” In re T.N.H., 372 N.C. 403, 407 (2019). “Moreover, we review only those
findings necessary to support the trial court’s determination that grounds existed to
terminate respondent’s parental rights.” Id. “The trial court’s conclusions of law are
reviewable de novo on appeal.” In re J.O.D., 374 N.C. 797, 801 (2020).
¶ 15 A trial court may terminate parental rights when it concludes the parent has
neglected the juvenile within the meaning of N.C.G.S. § 7B-101. N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1111(a)(1). A neglected juvenile is one “whose parent, guardian, custodian, or IN RE M.A.
caretaker does not provide proper care, supervision, or discipline; . . . or who lives in
an environment injurious to the juvenile’s welfare.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-101(15) (2019). In
some circumstances, a trial court may terminate a parent’s rights based on neglect
that is currently occurring at the time of the termination hearing. See, e.g., In re
K.C.T., 375 N.C. 592, 599–600 (2020) (“[T]his Court has recognized that the neglect
ground can support termination . . . if a parent is presently neglecting their child by
abandonment.”). However, for other forms of neglect, the fact that “a child has not
been in the custody of the parent for a significant period of time prior to the
termination hearing” would make “requiring the petitioner in such circumstances to
show that the child is currently neglected by the parent . . . impossible.” In re N.D.A.,
373 N.C. 71, 80 (2019) (quoting In re L.O.K., 174 N.C. App. 426, 435 (2005)). In this
situation, “evidence of neglect by a parent prior to losing custody of a child—including
an adjudication of such neglect—is admissible in subsequent proceedings to
terminate parental rights[,]” but “[t]he trial court must also consider any evidence of
changed conditions in light of the evidence of prior neglect and the probability of a
repetition of neglect.” In re Ballard, 311 N.C. 708, 715 (1984). After weighing this
evidence, the trial court may find the neglect ground if it concludes the evidence
demonstrates “a likelihood of future neglect by the parent.” In re R.L.D., 375 N.C.
838, 841 (2020) (quoting In re D.L.W., 368 N.C. 835, 843 (2016)). Thus, even in the
absence of current neglect, the trial court may adjudicate neglect as a ground for IN RE M.A.
termination based upon its consideration of any evidence of past neglect and its
determination that there is a likelihood of future neglect if the child is returned to
the parent. In re R.L.D., 375 N.C. at 841 n.3.
¶ 16 Respondent acknowledges that Mark was previously adjudicated to be a
neglected juvenile but challenges the trial court’s finding as to the likelihood of a
repetition of neglect.
A. Challenged Findings of Fact
¶ 17 Respondent first challenges the following findings of fact:
11. That at the time of this termination hearing, the Petitioner demonstrated by and through the evidence presented that conditions rising to the level of neglect existed during the pendency of the termination action in that the child lived in an environment injurious and that the parents did not provide proper care or supervision in that there continued to be unstable housing, unresolved issues of domestic violence, the father’s abandonment and issues surrounding the parent’s willingness and ability to provide proper supervision and care in the home.
....
64. The [c]ourt is aware that there has not been any reporting of any incidents of domestic violence since adjudication, but the [c]ourt is concerned that the mother has continued to underreport her history of domestic violence. Dr. Harris-Britt did state that the mother did not demonstrate an understanding of the skills she may have learned in her domestic violence counseling. The [c]ourt finds that the mother was unable to articulate the skills she learned in her domestic violence counseling with KKJ Services as testified to in this hearing.
65. The [c]ourt acknowledges the reasons [Mark] was IN RE M.A.
neglected in the underlying adjudication and disposition; however, the [c]ourt must assess risk and harm. This [c]ourt does not believe that the mother could protect herself or [Mark] from being in a situation of domestic violence or being able to protect [Mark] if she found herself in that situation. The [c]ourt finds that the mother has yet to progress with her understanding of domestic violence and how it could impact her and what she would need to do to protect herself and [Mark].
66. The [c]ourt also finds that the reason that [Mark] was removed was because of instability of housing. The [c]ourt looks at how differently the mother’s housing status has changed from when [Mark] entered in the custody of DSS. At the time this case was adjudicated, the mother resided at Urban Ministries. The mother was able to locate a one- bedroom apartment and resided there for about three years. However, the mother moved in April of 2019 after having stable housing for a good period to move to a studio apartment with a co-worker where she is not on the lease. The mother reports that she moved to be closer to a better school; however, her housing situation remains unstable. The mother did not communicate to DSS that she had moved until September of 2019 when she requested that DSS look at her home so she could have overnight supervised visits. When [DSS] inquired as to who stayed with the mother, she did not provide a name of who stayed with her. It was not only until the hearing, that the mother revealed that she was staying with a roommate and the name of the roommate was given. Apparently, the mother’s roommate is a male co-worker.
68. The [c]ourt wonders where the visits were occurring during the time period where the mother was staying at her new residence that had not been approved for overnight weekend visits. The mother would have known that it was important to have been in place at the apartment that was approved for her visits so that the IN RE M.A.
social worker could bring back to the [c]ourt information about how the visits were going. During this same timeframe, the mother was requesting drop off and pick up of [Mark] at various public places but not the residence that was approved for her visits.
70. The [c]ourt finds that the fact that the mother was having unsupervised overnight weekend visits made her unmotivated in addressing the concerns of the court. The mother was ordered to complete the PCA in November of 2017 and it was not completed until November of 2018. The mother did not tell social worker Dearing that she had moved in April of 2019; the mother requested an assessment of her “new” home, approximately five months after she moved. The [c]ourt is baffled as to why the mother would not tell the social worker she had moved.
71. The [c]ourt finds that the mother has been working, but the [c]ourt still has concerns as to whether she can maintain her own household with her own efforts. The [c]ourt also finds that the mother has had the type of visitation she has had for a good period, but the court still finds that: 1) she still does not have stable housing and that she continues to struggle in maintaining a safe and functioning home for [Mark]; 2) the [c]ourt also is concerned because Dr. April Harris-Britt has made recommendations for an ACTT team and intensive mental health services along with her having domestic violence counseling and the mother still has yet focused and address[ed] the core issues of domestic violence about which the [c]ourt remains concerned. The [c]ourt is dubious of the mother’s participation for services with KKJ Services and whether the mother’s participation with this program will decrease the likelihood that [Mark] is returned to conditions resulting in his neglect given her lack of insight and her high level of distrust.
72. The [c]ourt also gives great weight to how long [Mark] has been in the care of DSS since 2015. He has been in the IN RE M.A.
care of DSS for most of his life. The mother has had ample times to address these issues that continue to pose a risk if [Mark] were returned to her care. The mother lives in a small apartment with a man and pays half the rent and not paying the utilities. The [c]ourt does not know whether [Mark] was kept safe or properly supervised and cared for during these overnight visits. When the social worker would go to the residence that was approved for her visits for unannounced pop-in visits, the mother and [Mark] were not there. The [c]ourt does not know what, if anything, [Mark] was exposed to and the mother knew that pop-in visits were required by . . . DSS.
74. The [c]ourt finds that there is a likelihood of repetition of neglect if the juvenile was returned to the home of the Respondents[3] based upon the findings of fact herein and the underlying permanency planning orders relied upon and incorporated herein.
75. Respondents’ failure to adequately and timely address the issues that led to the removal of the juvenile from the home constitutes neglect. That failure to adequately and timely address the neglectful behaviors, renders the Respondents incapable of providing adequate care and supervision of the juvenile. The probability that the neglect will be repeated and said incapability will continue in the future is high given the failure of the Respondents to address and alleviate the issues.
76. The Respondent Mother has demonstrated a settled pattern of neglect of the juvenile, and this pattern is likely to continue into the foreseeable future. The [c]ourt finds there is a reasonable probability that such neglect would be continued and repeated if the juvenile was to be returned to the care, custody, or control of the Respondents.
3 Although M.A.’s father was a respondent in this case, he is not party to this appeal. IN RE M.A.
81. The [c]ourt finds that, as of the time of the termination hearing, the Respondent Mother has not made reasonable progress under the circumstances to correct the conditions that led to the juvenile’s removal in that while she did maintain housing for a period of time, she moved without notifying the social worker during a time when she was being allowed unsupervised overnight visitations. There were periods of time when the social worker could not complete any pop-in visits to observe and monitor these visits. The mother stopped having drop-offs and pickups at her known residence. She then relocated to an apartment residence with an undisclosed male roommate and no lease. She failed to cooperate with the mental health recommendations. She did not participate in domestic violence treatment to the satisfaction of this [c]ourt. She failed to comp[l]ete the Parenting Capacity Assessment until a year after it was ordered and then failed to demonstrate the willingness and ability to comply with the recommendations from that assessment. These last two services were ordered by this [c]ourt in order to remedy the conditions which led to the juvenile’s adjudication, namely [the] mother’s homelessness and housing instability and the contributions [of] her history of Domestic Violence which the [c]ourt found was critical in the neglect of this juvenile. The Respondent Mother willfully failed and refused to substantially complete the services as ordered by the [c]ourt in a reasonable manner and timeframe.[4]
¶ 18 Respondent raises no specific evidentiary challenges to these findings but
“disputes” them generally. After reviewing the record, including the testimony from
the termination hearing and the unchallenged findings of fact, we hold the challenged
4 Although respondent challenges finding of fact 81 in her argument regarding grounds for termination under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2), the finding is also relevant to support the ground of neglect, so we address it here. IN RE M.A.
findings are supported by competent evidence in the record. First, the social worker
testified at the termination hearing regarding respondent’s progress on her case plan
over the four years that Mark had been in DSS custody, including testimony
regarding respondent’s housing situation, her participation in domestic violence
treatment, and her visitations with Mark. The social worker testified that respondent
no longer had stable housing and did not inform DSS that she had relocated until five
months after she had moved, had not completed domestic violence treatment as
recommended by her case plan, and was not always present at her home when the
social worker attempted random pop-in visits during several of respondent’s
unsupervised visitation periods. The social worker also testified that respondent
delayed in completing some services, including taking one year to complete the
Parenting Capacity Assessment, which respondent was ordered to complete to
address respondent’s domestic violence issues.
¶ 19 Furthermore, the psychologist who conducted the Parenting Capacity
Assessment testified at the termination hearing that respondent had “extremely
limited insight into how her own behaviors had impacted her children, why they were
in care[,]” and that respondent’s “inability to recognize or acknowledge the really
important events that have happened for her as well as for her children will impact
her ability to . . . benefit from services” and “ultimately will impact her ability to
provide a safe and nurturing appropriate home for [Mark].” The Parenting Capacity IN RE M.A.
Assessment, which was admitted into evidence at the termination hearing, stated
that respondent “continues to display an unwillingness to accept accountability and
a continuous lack of consistency in completing the actions necessary to meet the
requirements of the court for reunification.” The assessment also stated that,
although respondent participated in domestic violence classes, “she did not
demonstrate or verbalize understanding of the skills she may have received in [those]
classes.”
¶ 20 Finally, the trial court found in other unchallenged findings that respondent
moved to a studio apartment without informing DSS and was unable to provide a
lease to the apartment nor the name of the roommate that lived with her. As a result,
DSS was not able to approve respondent’s residence for overnight visitations. The
trial court also found that respondent had not provided any documentation to DSS
showing that she was participating in mental health counseling, as recommended by
her domestic violence assessment, and that respondent informed the social worker
that she was receiving domestic violence counseling at KKJ, where she “participates
in support group sessions where the participants discuss outcomes for domestic
violence.” The trial court further found that although respondent was present at her
home during some of DSS’s pop-in visits during her visitations with Mark, there were
at least ten times where respondent was not at her home with Mark. Because there
is substantial evidence in the record to support the challenged findings, including IN RE M.A.
testimony from the termination hearing and other unchallenged findings, we reject
respondent’s general challenge to the trial court’s findings of fact.
¶ 21 Respondent also argues that findings of fact 64 and 65, which relate to
respondent’s domestic violence issues, are mere speculation by the trial court and
based on “pure conjecture.”5 “The [trial] court has the responsibility of making all
reasonable inferences from the evidence presented.” In re N.P., 374 N.C. 61, 65 (2020).
“Such inferences, however, cannot rest on conjecture or surmise. This is necessarily
so because an inference is a permissible conclusion drawn by reason from a premise
established by proof.” In re K.L.T., 374 N.C. 826, 843 (2020) (cleaned up) (quoting
Sowers v. Marley, 235 N.C. 607, 609 (1952)).
¶ 22 We conclude the trial court’s inferences in findings of fact 64 and 65 are not
based merely on conjecture. The trial court could reasonably infer from the evidence
presented that respondent would not be able to protect herself or Mark from being in
a domestic violence situation or to protect Mark if she found herself in that situation.
In the termination order, the trial court acknowledged that there had not been any
reports of incidents of domestic violence since the adjudication in 2015. However, the
trial court expressed concern that respondent was underreporting her domestic
violence history. The trial court also found that respondent was unable to articulate
5 Respondent also challenges finding of fact 68 for the same reasons, however, that
finding is not necessary to support the ground of neglect. IN RE M.A.
the skills she learned in her domestic violence counseling and that she had not
progressed with her understanding of domestic violence, how it could impact both her
and Mark, and what she would need to do to protect herself and Mark. At the
termination hearing, the psychologist that conducted respondent’s Parenting
Capacity Assessment testified that respondent was “extremely limited in her ability
and willingness to share information about her domestic violence history” and
“oftentimes” would underreport that information. The psychologist also testified that
respondent’s “inability to recognize or acknowledge” her history would impact her
ability to benefit from services and ultimately impact her ability to provide a safe and
nurturing home for Mark. The trial court could reasonably infer from this evidence
that respondent would not be able to utilize the learned skills in order to protect
herself and Mark from a domestic violence situation.
¶ 23 Respondent also “disputes the findings that she had failed to obtain stable
housing.” She contends that one move in over three years “is hardly unstable” and
that the only issue with her housing “seemed to be that DSS had not had time to
investigate her new residence or her new roommate.” We disagree.
¶ 24 The evidence and findings support the trial court’s conclusion that at the time
of the termination hearing, respondent did not have stable housing. The trial court
found that respondent had obtained stable housing for three years while she was
residing in the one-bedroom home she had been renting that DSS found to be IN RE M.A.
appropriate for Mark. However, around April of 2019, respondent moved to a studio
apartment that she shared with a male coworker where she was not named on the
lease. The trial court found that respondent did not inform DSS of the move until five
months later when she requested a home assessment for overnight visits, that
respondent was not forthcoming about the move when questioned by the social
worker, and that respondent failed to provide a name for her roommate until the
termination hearing. Based on these findings, the trial court found that although
respondent had obtained stable housing “for a good period[,]” at the time of the
termination hearing “her housing situation remain[ed] unstable.”
¶ 25 Although one relocation in a period of three years does not necessarily indicate
instability, respondent moved from an approved one-bedroom home where she was
the only tenant named on the lease to a shared studio apartment where she was not
named as a tenant on the lease, and thus she has no legal right to remain in the home.
Respondent testified at the termination hearing that she split the rent with her
roommate but that the roommate paid for the utilities. Respondent also testified that
she had moved to the apartment “several months ago” but she did not know the exact
date and that she was “planning on finding a two-bedroom apartment or a house.”
Therefore, we conclude the trial court’s findings that respondent did not have stable
housing at the time of the termination hearing are sufficiently supported.
B. Repetition of Neglect IN RE M.A.
¶ 26 Respondent next argues the trial court erred in determining there was a
likelihood of future neglect. Citing N.C.G.S. § 7B-903.1(c), respondent contends that
the trial court’s finding of a probability of future neglect is inconsistent with its
determination that she continued to have unsupervised visits for the three years
leading up to the termination hearing.
¶ 27 Subsection 7B-901.3(c) provides that
[i]f a juvenile is removed from the home and placed in the custody or placement responsibility of a county department of social services, the director shall not allow unsupervised visitation with or return physical custody of the juvenile to the parent, guardian, custodian, or caretaker without a hearing at which the court finds that the juvenile will receive proper care and supervision in a safe home.
N.C.G.S. § 7B-903.1(c) (2019). The Juvenile Code defines a “[s]afe home” as “[a] home
in which the juvenile is not at substantial risk of physical or emotional abuse or
neglect.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-101(19).
¶ 28 Respondent argues that because the trial court did not change her
unsupervised visitation during the four-month period in which the termination
hearing was held, “the court must have determined that [respondent] had continued
to provide a safe home free of neglect.” She contends that although the trial court did
not specifically find in the termination order that respondent had provided a safe
home free of neglect for Mark, it “implicitly reached those conclusions when it
continued to allow unsupervised visits.” Therefore, respondent contends that the trial IN RE M.A.
court’s finding of a probability of neglect was “irreconcilably inconsistent” with
allowing continued unsupervised visits. She further argues that even if the evidence
could support neglect, allowing respondent to continue to exercise unsupervised
visitation was “internally inconsistent” with a finding of a probability of future
neglect. Respondent’s arguments are misplaced.
¶ 29 Pursuant to Rule 58 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, “a
judgment is entered when it is reduced to writing, signed by the judge, and filed with
the clerk of court.” N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 58 (2019). Additionally, “a trial court’s oral
findings are subject to change before the final written order is entered.” In re A.U.D.,
373 N.C. 3, 9–10 (2019). Thus, even assuming the trial court had determined that
respondent provided a safe home during the termination hearing, the trial court’s
finding was subject to change until the final order was entered. Because the
termination order does not continue respondent’s unsupervised visitation, and in fact
restricts respondent to supervised visitation, the trial court did not simultaneously
find that respondent could provide a safe home for Mark and that there was a
likelihood of repetition of neglect. Similarly, respondent’s assertion that the trial
court’s findings are “internally inconsistent” is without merit. The trial court did not
allow respondent to continue to exercise unsupervised visitation in the termination
order in which it found a probability of future neglect.
¶ 30 Moreover, the fact that respondent was previously approved for unsupervised IN RE M.A.
overnight visitation at a prior address did not preclude the trial court from later
finding a likelihood of repetition of neglect when respondent’s circumstances changed.
At the time of the termination hearing, respondent was no longer residing at her
approved one-bedroom home but was sharing a studio apartment with an unknown
roommate, was not listed on the lease as a tenant, and was not paying utilities for
the apartment. Respondent failed to inform DSS of the move for five months despite
continuing to exercise her unsupervised overnight visitation. Therefore, we reject
respondent’s arguments.
¶ 31 Finally, respondent argues the evidence presented at the termination hearing
did not support the trial court’s finding of a probability of future neglect. We disagree.
¶ 32 “A parent’s failure to make progress in completing a case plan is indicative of
a likelihood of future neglect.” In re M.A., 374 N.C. 865, 870 (2020) (quoting In re
M.J.S.M., 257 N.C. App. 633, 637 (2018)). However, “[a]s this Court has previously
noted, a parent’s compliance with his or her case plan does not preclude a finding of
neglect.” In re J.J.H., 376 N.C. 161, 185 (2020) (citing In re D.W.P., 373 N.C. 327,
339–40 (2020) (noting the respondent’s progress in satisfying the requirements of her
case plan while upholding the trial court’s determination that there was a likelihood
that the neglect would be repeated in the future because the respondent had failed
“to recognize and break patterns of abuse that put her children at risk”)); see also In
re Y.Y.E.T., 205 N.C. App. 120, 131 (explaining that a “case plan is not just a check IN RE M.A.
list” and that “parents must demonstrate acknowledgement and understanding of
why the juvenile entered DSS custody as well as changed behaviors”), disc. review
denied, 364 N.C. 434 (2010). Although respondent had made some progress on the
requirements of her case plan, she had not addressed the conditions that resulted in
Mark’s placement in DSS custody.
¶ 33 The trial court found that Mark was removed from respondent’s care and
adjudicated to be a neglected juvenile primarily due to respondent’s unstable housing
and history of domestic violence. The trial court also found that conditions rising to
the level of neglect existed during the pendency of the termination action due to
respondent’s continued unstable housing and unresolved issues of domestic violence.
Respondent had over four years to address the conditions that led to Mark’s removal
but failed to do so. Although respondent attended some domestic violence counseling,
the trial court found that she “did not participate in domestic violence treatment to
[its] satisfaction” and that she did not demonstrate an understanding of her domestic
violence issues, how they impacted her and Mark, and how to protect herself and
Mark in a domestic violence situation. The findings also show that although
respondent had obtained stable housing for a period of three years, at the time of the
termination hearing respondent was sharing a studio apartment with a male
coworker and was not on the apartment lease as a tenant. Respondent was not
forthcoming about her move and did not inform DSS of the move or request an IN RE M.A.
assessment of her new home until five months after she moved despite continuing to
exercise her unsupervised visitation. The trial court also found that respondent
“failed to comp[l]ete the Parenting Capacity Assessment until a year after it was
ordered and then failed to demonstrate the willingness and ability to comply with the
recommendations from that assessment.” Finally, the trial court found that
respondent’s failure to adequately and timely address the issues that led to Mark’s
removal from her care constitutes neglect.
¶ 34 We hold the evidence and findings demonstrate that Mark is likely to be
neglected again if returned to respondent’s care due to her lack of stable housing and
unresolved domestic violence issues and that they support the trial court’s ultimate
finding that there is a likelihood of repetition of neglect. See In re M.A., 374 N.C. at
870 (holding that, although the respondent claimed to have made reasonable progress
in addressing elements of his case plan, the trial court’s findings regarding the
respondent’s failure to adequately address the issue of domestic violence, which was
the primary reason that the children had been removed from the home, were,
“standing alone, sufficient to support a determination that there was a likelihood of
future neglect”). As a result, the trial court did not err by determining that grounds
existed under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1) to terminate respondent’s parental rights.
Respondent does not challenge the trial court’s dispositional determination that
termination of her parental rights was in Mark’s best interests. See N.C.G.S. § 7B- IN RE M.A.
1110(a) (2019). Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order terminating respondent’s
parental rights.
AFFIRMED.