In Re: Lynch

2025 V.I. 14

• Court: Supreme Court of The Virgin Islands
• Decided: June 24, 2025
• Docket: SCT-CIV-2024-0001
• Status: Published

Opinion

For Publication

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS

IN RE: PETER JAMES LYNCH, ESQ ) S. Ct. Civ. No. 2024-0001 Appellant ) Re: Super. Ct. Civ. No. 704/2019 (STT) ) ) ROBERT RUTKOWSKI, MEGAN ) SHERIDAN, CHRIS SIEGRIST, AND ) JULIA SIEGRIST. ) Plaintiffs, ) ) Vv ) ) JABARI BLASH and YVETTE BLASH ) ) Defendants )

On Appeal from the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands Division of St. Thomas & St. John Superior Court Judge: Hon. Carol Thomas-Jacobs

Considered: November 12, 2024 Filed: June 24, 2025

BEFORE RHYS 8S. HODGE, Chief Justice; MARIA M. CABRET, Associate Justice; and IVE ARLINGTON SWAN, Associate Justice

APPEARANCE

Peter James Lynch, Esq Fuller & Lynch Advocacy Group, PLLC St. Thomas, U.S.V.I Attorney for Appellant

OPINION OF THE COURT

SWAN, Associate Justice In re: Lynch 2025 VI 14 S. Ct. Civ. No. 2024-0001 Opinion of the Court Page 2 of 10

ql Appellant Peter James Lynch, Esq., appeals from the Superior Court’s December 6, 2023

order denying his June 20, 2023 motion titled “Payment of Claim for Attorney’s Fees and Expenses

from Settlement Funds Held in the Registry of the Court.” (J.A. at 1). For the reasons explicated

below, we affirm the lower court’s order denying Attorney Lynch’s motion

I. BACKGROUND

q2 On December 16, 2019, Chris and Julia Siegrist entered into an ‘“Attorney-Client

Representation and Contingency Fee Agreement” with Appellant Peter James Lynch, Esq. (J.A

at 43-49). Attorney Lynch agreed to represent the Siegrists in two matters before the Superior

Court of the Virgin Islands: one against Jabari Blash, in an action for damages arising out of a

motor vehicle accident, and one against the Government of the Virgin Islands et al. (J.A. at 43)

Article I of the Agreement provided for Attorney Lynch’s contingency fees in anticipation of

various outcomes, including a fee in the amount of 40% of gross recovery realized and collected

in the instance of a settlement reached after the discovery stage of the lawsuit. (J.A. at 43-44)

Articles I and II further provided for the payment of any and all of Attorney Lynch’s costs and

expenses from the gross recovery after payment of attorney’s fees. (J.A. at 44). Article VII

declared that Attorney Lynch was granted all charging liens, among other liens, upon any sum

recovered by way of settlement, as well as liens for services rendered and costs expended should

he be discharged or withdraw from the case for any reason prior to the conclusion of the case

(J.A. at 46). Attorney Lynch signed the Agreement on December 6, 2019 and the Siegrists both

signed the Agreement and initialed each article in the agreement on December 16, 2019

43 On May 23, 2022, Attorney Lynch filed with the Superior Court an unopposed emergency

motion to withdraw from representation of Christopher Siegrist and Julia Siegrist pursuant to

Virgin Islands Rule of Civil Procedure 6-5. (J.A. at 15). Attorney Lynch claimed that Defendants In re: Lynch 2025 VI 14 S. Ct. Civ. No. 2024-0001 Opinion of the Court Page 3 of 10

Jabari and Yvette Blash had offered a settlement that the Siegrists found acceptable but the

Siegrists had refused to agree to the settlement because they objected to Attorney Lynch’s fees

(J.A. at 17.) On May 25, 2022, the Blashes filed a response to Attorney Lynch’s motion stating

that they had no objection and offering to deposit the settlement funds into the court registry after

the Siegrists dismissed their claims. (J.A. at 29). The court issued two orders on May 31, 2022,

one granting Attorney Lynch’s motion to withdraw and one approving the Blashes’ plan to deposit

settlement funds into the court registry. (J.A. at 32, 33)

q4 The next relevant development in the matter occurred on January 4, 2023, when the Blashes

filed with the court a notice of settlement, notifying the court that the parties had agreed to a

settlement. (J.A. at 39). The Siegrists subsequently filed pro se a stipulation for dismissal on

February 13, 2023, requesting that the matter be dismissed with prejudice, with each party bearing

its own costs and fees, and that the agreed-upon total settlement amount of $8,200.70 be disbursed

to the Siegrists from the court registry, into which the funds had been deposited on June 9, 2022

(Document not included in J.A.). The court issued an order the following day, February 14, 2023,

granting the stipulation and dismissing the matter with prejudice. (Document not included in J.A.)

On the same date, Attorney Lynch filed a notice of claim against settlement funds held in the

registry of the Superior Court. (J.A. at 40). Attorney Lynch argued that his contingency fee

agreement with the Siegrists entitled him to 40% of the $8,200.70 agreed upon by the parties, as

well as costs incurred; he therefore claimed fees of $3,280.27 and costs of $297.50. (J.A. at 40,

41). The Siegrists responded on February 17, 2023 with a pro se filing denying Attorney Lynch’s

entitlement to any fees, claiming abandonment of the representation by him, and various other

charges. To support their claims, they included voluminous exhibits, confirming email In re: Lynch 2025 VI 14 S. Ct. Civ. No. 2024-0001 Opinion of the Court Page 4 of 10

communications between themselves and Attorney Lynch. (Document not included in J.A.). The

court failed to take any action on either Attorney Lynch’s notice or the Siegrists’ response

q5 In May of 2023, the Superior Court judge who had been handling the case up to that point,

the Honorable Renée Gumbs-Carty, completed her judicial term and was succeeded by the

Honorable Carol Thomas-Jacobs, who assumed control of the case. On June 20, 2023, Attorney

Lynch renewed his request for fees in a motion for payment of claim for attorney’s fees and

expenses from settlement funds held in the registry of the Superior Court. (J.A. at 53). The court

held a status conference on December 5, 2023, at which the court informed Attorney Lynch that

the settlement funds had been withdrawn in full from the court registry and that the court therefore

no longer had jurisdiction over the funds, (J.A. at 59). Attorney Lynch objected, asserting that he

had properly filed his February 14, 2023 notice of claim against the settlement funds, and that the

court had wrongly allowed the funds to be withdrawn. The court responded that the fee dispute

was a “completely different matter” between Attorney Lynch and the Siegrists that should be

addressed in a separate lawsuit. (J.A. at 65-68). The court entered an order on December 6, 2023

denying Attorney Lynch’s motion. Attorney Lynch timely filed a notice of appeal on January 2,

2024, followed by a corrective first amended notice of appeal on June 6, 2024. (J.A. at 1, 7)

II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

96 Before this Court can determine the merits of an appeal, we must first establish whether

we have jurisdiction over the matter. The Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands “shall have

jurisdiction over all appeals arising from final judgments, final decrees or final orders of the

Superior Court”. V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 4, § 32(a). A “trial court’s grant or denial of attorney’s fees

is a final judgment.” Vf. Gov't Hosps. & Health Facilities Corp. v. Gov't of the V.1, 50 V.1. 276,

279 (V.I. 2008). Accordingly, the trial court’s December 6, 2023 order denying Attorney Lynch’s In re: Lynch 2025 VI 14 S. Ct. Civ, No. 2024-0001 Opinion of the Court Page 5 of 10

motion for payment of fees is a final judgment for the purposes of this Court’s jurisdiction. We

exercise plenary review over trial courts’ application of law. Brathwaite v. People, 67 V.1. 609,

613 (V.I. 2017). We also exercise plenary review over matters concerning trial courts’ exercise of

subject matter jurisdiction. Judi’s of St. Croix Car Rental v. Weston, 49 V.1. 396, 399 (V.I. 2008)

III. DISCUSSION

A. This Jurisdiction Should Recognize Attorneys’ Charging Liens

97 Attorney Lynch’s notice and subsequent motion requesting that the Superior Court

distribute a portion of the Siegrists’ settlement funds to Attorney Lynch in payment of attorney’s

fees and costs are assertions of an attorney’s charging lien, which, as Attorney Lynch observes in

his appellate brief, is not recognized in this jurisdiction’s laws or by its courts. However, Attorney

Lynch relies upon a recent opinion, Go Fast Charters, LLC v. Texaco Caribbean, Inc., which held,

subsequent to performing a Banks analysis, that the recognition of attorneys’ charging liens is the

best rule for this jurisdiction. 78 V.I. 24, 49-50 (V.I. Super. Ct. 2023). Upon review, we agree

q8 In its 2011 decision in Banks v, Int'l Rental & Leasing Corp, this Court directed V.I. courts

to perform a three-prong analysis in determining Virgin Islands common law. 55 V.I. 967 (V.I

2011). Courts must evaluate “‘(1) whether any Virgin Islands courts have previously adopted a

particular rule; (2) the position taken by a majority of courts from other jurisdictions; and (3) most

importantly, which approach represents the soundest rule for the Virgin Islands.’” Simon v

Joseph, 59 V.1. 611, 623 (V.I. 2013) (citing Matthew v. Herman, 56 V.1. 674, 680-81) (V.I. 2012)

qo On the issue of attorneys’ charging liens, the court in Go Fast Charters observed that

Virgin Islands courts had not previously adopted a particular rule. 78 V.I. at 40-41. The court

therefore proceeded to perform an exhaustive Banks analysis on the positions taken by courts in

other jurisdictions. The court’s research revealed that nearly all other jurisdictions recognize an In re: Lynch 2025 VI 14 S. Ct. Civ. No. 2024-0001 Opinion of the Court Page 6 of 10

attorney’s charging lien: thirty-two jurisdictions recognize the right by statute, thirteen recognize

it as a right through common law, three recognize it by both, and two recognize it through contract

law. Only Maine and Guam have left the issue unsettled. The court was unable to locate any

information on attorney’s liens in the jurisdictions of the Northern Marianas or American Samoa

Only Puerto Rico does not recognize an attorney’s charging lien. Go Fast Charters, 78 V.1. at 43

47 & nn.125-131. This Court will accept the scrupulousness and accuracy of the trial court’s

research on this prong of the Banks test and sees no need to replicate it. Accordingly, the Court

observes that the vast majority of jurisdictions recognize a right to attorneys’ charging liens by

either statute or common law, with approximately two-thirds recognizing it by statute and one

fourth recognizing it through common law. This factor therefore weighs heavily in favor of

recognizing such a right in our own jurisdiction

q!0 Having discovered that this jurisdiction has no settled rule regarding attorneys’ charging

liens and that nearly all other jurisdictions recognize such liens through statute or common law, it

is now incumbent upon this Court to determine the approach that represents the soundest rule for

our jurisdiction. Upon consideration, we agree with the Superior Court, Go Fast Charters, 78 V.1

at 49-50, and hold that this jurisdiction should recognize attorneys’ charging liens. Charging liens

can be powerful aids in broadening the availability of representation to penurious claimants with

valid claims. As Section 43 of the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers expounds

in comment (d) on the justification of charging liens

[C]harging liens can secure proper payment for lawyers without the coercive effects of a retaining lien. If the client were given the disputed sum, the money might be dissipated before the lawyer could secure a remedy. Especially when the client has no other assets and the lawyer is receiving a contingent fee, the charging lien gives the lawyer important assurance that the fee and disbursements will actually be paid It thus makes it easier for people to secure competent representation when they have small means and meritorious claims Inve: Lynch 2025 V1 14 S. Ct. Civ. No. 2024-0001 Opinion of the Court Page 7 of 10

Attorneys within this territory are just as entitled to payment for their work as those in any other

jurisdiction, and their livelihoods, along with those of all their employees, depend upon the relative

surety of being paid when they win cases for their clients. Without the assurance of charging liens

in contingency fee matters, many attorneys will simply be too risk-averse to take on low-income

clients. Recognizing charging liens would consequently be beneficial for both attorneys and

litigants of meager means. Thus, upon review of the three factor Banks test as applied to the

present issue, we hold, as the Superior Court did, 78 V.I. at 49-50, that the best rule for this

jurisdiction to adopt is a recognition of attorneys’ charging liens

ql Given that two-thirds of U.S. jurisdictions recognize the right to charging liens by statute,

it would seem reasonable to accept the same as the preferred method of recognition in our own

jurisdiction. However, we see no reason to wait for the legislature to consider such an issue which

has, to our knowledge, never been raised before that body. Thirteen jurisdictions recognize the

right to charging liens through common law alone, and three more through both common law and

statute. This fact confirms that there exists sufficient precedent to hold that we, too, should

recognize the right through common law now, rather than waiting for the legislature to address it

We will therefore adopt attorneys’ rights of recognition of charging liens as part of our common

law, with the exception that attorneys’ charging liens are not to supersede or to take priority over

other parties’ statutory liens or rights to the recovery or to the judgment proceeds or funds, when

a statute explicitly and unambiguously grants a third party priority to the recovery or to the

judgment proceeds or funds, as in the case of the Workers’ Compensation Trust Fund established

by Title 24 of the Virgin Islands Code.' We do not here intend to make charging liens a guaranteed

E grudeers? ecompensntion eases fi which the Government has paid an injured worker out of the Workers Compensation Trust Fund present a salient example of priority statutory claims. In such cases, if the worker is to In re: Lynch 2025 VI 14 S. Ct. Civ. No. 2024-0001 Opinion of the Court Page 8 of 10

method of recovery, but rather a lawfully recognized method in preference of attorneys’ deserved

recompense in recognition of the financial risks of taking on certain representation that is

subordinated to statutorily-recognized priority claims

B. Attorney Lynch did not have the Right to Intervene by Filing his Notice of Charging Lien or his Motion for Payment

12 Although Attorney Lynch represented his clients, the Siegrists, as parties to the underlying

case in this matter from its original filing in 2019, he deliberately removed himself from the matter

by filing his emergency motion to withdraw on May 23, 2022. His removal from the matter was

effected by the May 31, 2024 court order granting his motion. Accordingly, to reenter the case

after that date, Attorney Lynch would have needed to act as an intervener

pursue civil action against a third party after receiving workers’ compensation and secures a monetary award against such party, Section 263 of Title 24 of the Virgin Islands Code unambiguously states that the expenses incurred by the Government through the Workers’ Compensation Trust Fund are to be paid out of the award first, before other distributions such as attorneys’ fees may be allotted

The injured workman or employee or his beneficiaries may not institute any action, nor may compromise any right of action they may have against the third person responsible for the damages, unless the Administrator is a party to the action or agrees to the compromise, but the failure to join the Administrator shall not deprive the courts of jurisdiction over the claim or otherwise result in dismissal of the claim, so long as the injured worker or employee acknowledges that all sums due the Government Insurance Fund are secured by any recovery

No compromise between the injured workman or employee, or his beneficiaries in case of death, and the third person responsible shall be valid or effective in law unless the expenses incurred by the Government Insurance Fund in the case are first paid. No judgment shall be entered in actions of this nature and no compromise whatsoever as to the rights of parties to said actions shall he approved, without making express reserve of the rights of the Government Insurance Fund to reimbursement of all expenses incurred

24 V.LC. § 263. In such instances as workers’ compensation cases, therefore, where priority of liens is statutorily determined in Virgin Islands law, statutory rights shall supersede case law precedent. More succinctly, common-law recognition of the right to attorneys’ charging fees shall not supersede or in any way refute such statutory determinations of priority. In cases like the one presently before this Court, however, no overriding statutory preference exists to bar attorneys from asserting priority claims via charging liens In re: Lynch 2025 VI 14 S. Ct. Civ. No. 2024-0001 Opinion of the Court Page 9 of 10

{13 Intervention as of right in the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands is governed by Virgin

Islands Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2), which states that

On timely motion, the court must permit anyone to intervene who ... claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action, and is so situated that disposing of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the movant's ability to protect its interest, unless existing parties adequately represent that interest

This Court has previously held that, when ruling on a motion to intervene under this Rule of Civil

Procedure, trial courts “must determine whether the applicant has established that ‘(1) the

application for intervention is timely; (2) the applicant has a sufficient interest in the litigation; (3)

the interest may be affected or impaired, as a practical matter by the disposition of the action; and

(4) the interest is not adequately represented by an existing party in the litigation.’” Jn the Matter

of Q.G., 60 V.1. 654, 661 (V.I. 2014) (citing Anthony v. Indep. Ins. Advisors, Inc., 56 V.1. 516, 526

(V.1. 2012)

ql!4 Here, Attorney Lynch wholly failed to apply for intervention, not only in a timely manner,

but at any time. The only documents reflected on the record as being filed by Attorney Lynch

after his successful May 23, 2022 motion to withdraw are his February 14, 2023 notice of claim

and his June 20, 2023 motion for payment of claim for attorney’s fees. Neither filing makes any

mention of intervention or follows the requirements for motions to intervene delineated in V.I. R

Civ. P. 24(c) Even were we to somehow stretch our interpretation unnecessarily broadly and find

that either his February 14, 2023 notice or his June 20, 2023 motion constituted a motion to

intervene, neither one could be treated as timely, as both were filed after the Siegrists filed their

stipulation of dismissal on February 13, 2023, effectively closing the matter pursuant to V.I. R

Civ. P. 41(a)(1)-(2)). However, we simply rule upon the facts before us, and in this case Attorney

Lynch provides no evidence that he ever filed a motion to intervene. He therefore had no standing In re: Lynch 2025 VI 14 S. Ct. Civ. No. 2024-0001 Opinion of the Court Page 10 of 10

to file his notice of claim or his motion for payment of claim, nor should the lower court have

called a status conference to rule on his motion. Nevertheless, to the extent that the lower court

denied Attorney Lynch’s motion, we affirm its decision, albeit on different grounds

IV. CONCLUSION

qiS5 Having conducted a Banks analysis on the issue, we find that this jurisdiction should

recognize, as a matter of Virgin Islands common law, the right to attorneys’ charging liens, as

described in Section 43 of the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers. In the instant

matter, however, we hold that Attorney Lynch had no standing to pursue a charging lien, as he was

no longer affiliated with the case when he filed his notice of claim, nor had he properly filed a

motion to intervene. Accordingly, we affirm the Superior Court’s December 6, 2023 order denying

Attorney Lynch’s June 20, 2023 “Motion for Payment of Claim for Attorney’s Fees and Expenses

from Settlement Funds Held in the Registry of the Court.”

Dated this 24" day of June, 2025

BY THE COURT A

/ IVE a Mbonrg SWAN Associate Justice

ATTEST VERONICA J. HANDY, ESQ Clerk of the Court

| | ‘ahs By 6”; al Kt Hy \ peputy terk II

Date i Myo p (] Odd HODGE, C.J., with whom CABRET, J. joins, concurring in part.

¶ 16 I agree with and join all parts of the principal opinion except for footnote 1, which not only

analyzes an entirely unrelated issue of attorney liens in workers’ compensation cases, but does so

in a manner that is entirely inconsistent with the recent decision of this Court in Gov’t of the V.I.

v. George, 2025 VI 6. Because footnote 1 is not necessary to the result of this case, it is merely

dictum and does not in any way alter or cast doubt on our George decision. See Walters v. Walters,

60 V.I. 768, 777 n.11 (V.I. 2014) (“[W]e have repeatedly held that dicta are not binding.”) (quoting

Lander v. Schundler, 168 F.3d 92, 98 n.6 (3d Cir. 1999)).

DATED this 24th day of June, 2025.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Rhys S. Hodge RHYS S. HODGE Chief Justice ATTEST:

VERONICA J. HANDY, ESQ. Clerk of the Court

By: /s/ Jahkyda Coakley Deputy Clerk II

Dated: June 24, 2025