MATIAS MALIG, AS TRUSTEE FOR Case No. 19-cv-02690-HSG THE MALIG FAMILY TRUST, Plaintiff, ADMINISTRATIVE MOTIONS TO v. Re: Dkt. Nos. 167, 184, 187, 189 LYFT, INC., et al., Defendants. Pending before the Court are four motions to seal filed by the parties related to Plaintiff’s motion for relief from a discovery order, Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings, and Plaintiff’s motion for class certification. See Dkt. Nos. 167, 184, 187, 189. For the reasons detailed below, the Court GRANTS two motions and DENIES two motions. Courts generally apply a “compelling reasons” standard when considering motions to seal documents. Pintos v. Pac. Creditors Ass’n, 605 F.3d 665, 678 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Kamakana v.City & Cty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006)). “This standard derives from the common law right ‘to inspect and copy public records and documents, including judicial records and documents.’” Id. (quoting Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1178). “[A] strong presumption in favor of access is the starting point.” Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1178 (quotations omitted). To overcome this strong presumption, the party seeking to seal a judicial record attached to a dispositive motion must “articulate compelling reasons supported by specific factual findings that outweigh the general history of access and the public policies favoring disclosure, such as the public interest in understanding the judicial process” and “significant public events.” Id. at 1178–79 (quotations disclosure and justify sealing court records exist when such ‘court files might have become a vehicle for improper purposes,’ such as the use of records to gratify private spite, promote public scandal, circulate libelous statements, or release trade secrets.” Id. at 1179 (quoting Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978)). “The mere fact that the production of records may lead to a litigant’s embarrassment, incrimination, or exposure to further litigation will not, without more, compel the court to seal its records.” Id. Records attached to nondispositive motions must meet the lower “good cause” standard of Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as such records “are often unrelated, or only tangentially related, to the underlying cause of action.” See Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179–80 (quotations omitted). This requires a “particularized showing” that “specific prejudice or harm will result” if the information is disclosed. Phillips ex rel. Estates of Byrd v. Gen. Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1210–11 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c). “Broad allegations of harm, unsubstantiated by specific examples of articulated reasoning” will not suffice. Beckman Indus., Inc. v. Int’l Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 470, 476 (9th Cir. 1992) (quotation omitted). Because the parties seek to seal materials related to a motion for judgment on the pleadings and a motion for class certification, which are more than tangentially related to the underlying causes of action, the Court applies the compelling reasons standard. The Court will apply the lower good cause standard for documents related to the motion for relief from the Magistrate Judge’s discovery order. As detailed in the table below, the majority of the materials Defendants seek to seal are internal business documents. Defendants assert that “Lyft treats the details of the information it requests to maintain under seal as confidential and sensitive material, and the public disclosure of this information would cause competitive harm to Lyft.” Dkt. No. 186 ¶ 5; see also Dkt. Nos. 175 ¶ 6, 187 at 2, 189 at 2-3. However, not all information maintained as confidential in the normal course of business merits sealing. The Court must “balance[] the competing interests of the public and the party who seeks to keep certain judicial records secret.” Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179 inspection” to ensure that its records are not used “as sources of business information that might harm a litigant’s competitive standing.” Nixon v. Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. at 598. In this vein, the Ninth Circuit has recognized that compelling reasons can warrant sealing trade secrets, which “may consist of any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is used in one’s business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it.” In re Electronic Arts, Inc., 298 Fed. Appx. 568, 569 (9th Cir. 2008) (directing the District Court to seal the defendant’s pricing terms, royalty rates, and guaranteed minimum payment terms in a licensing agreement). To the extent Defendants argue that sealing the information “would permit the Lyft Defendants to maintain the confidentiality of the information that Lyft Defendants have designated as CONFIDENTIAL or HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL,” the Court repeats that a designation of confidentiality is not sufficient to establish that a document is sealable. See Dkt. Nos. 175 at 5, 186 ¶ 4; Civ. L. R. 79-5(d)(1)(A). The parties seek to seal portions of the Plaintiff’s motion for relief from Magistrate Judge Beeler’s Discovery Order because they reflect information from documents already filed under seal: the Joint Letter Brief, Exhibits B, D, E, and 1 to the Joint Letter Brief, and the Discovery Order. See Dkt. No. 167 at 3; see also Dkt. Nos. 161, 162. Judge Beeler previously concluded that these underlying materials warranted sealing under the Local Rules. See Dkt. No. 161. Defendants also argue that the current portions sought to be sealed contain “confidential and sensitive” information, public disclosure of which “would cause competitive harm to Lyft.” Dkt. No. 175 at 2. The Court finds good cause exists to seal the parties’ proposed redactions. See, e.g., Teradata Corp. et al., v. SAP SE, et al., No. 18-cv-03670-WHO, 2019 WL 5698057, at *1 n.1 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2019) (granting administrative motion to seal portions of the motion for relief that reference information already sealed by the magistrate judge). The sealing requests related to the motion for judgment on the pleadings, Dkt. Nos. 184 and 187, concern statistical information Defendants allege is derived from confidential rider reports and “could reveal proprietary details regarding Lyft’s operations, the number of rides taken on the platform, and details relating to insurance incidents.” Dkt. Nos. 186 ¶ 5, 187 at 2. statistics. No details of any individual rider or incident can be inferred, nor is there operational information beyond the total number of alleged sexual assaults, a relevant issue in this case. As already noted, “[t]he mere fact that the production of records may lead to a litigant’s embarrassment, incrimination, or exposure to further litigation will not, without more, compel the court to seal its records.” Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179. In contrast, the information sought to be sealed relating to the motion for class certification is the sort of non-public information that could be used by a third party to gain a competitive advantage. See Dkt. No. 189. As Defendants explain, the requested redaction of Exhibit 3 to the Grant Declaration is “tailored to include only statistics regarding the method of acquisition of riders and rate of ‘churn’ (or turnover)” that competitors could use to Defendants’ detriment, such as by leveraging the information to poach Defendants’ drivers. Id. at 2-3. Defendants also ask to seal th
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MATIAS MALIG, AS TRUSTEE FOR Case No. 19-cv-02690-HSG THE MALIG FAMILY TRUST, Plaintiff, ADMINISTRATIVE MOTIONS TO v. Re: Dkt. Nos. 167, 184, 187, 189 LYFT, INC., et al., Defendants. Pending before the Court are four motions to seal filed by the parties related to Plaintiff’s motion for relief from a discovery order, Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings, and Plaintiff’s motion for class certification. See Dkt. Nos. 167, 184, 187, 189. For the reasons detailed below, the Court GRANTS two motions and DENIES two motions. Courts generally apply a “compelling reasons” standard when considering motions to seal documents. Pintos v. Pac. Creditors Ass’n, 605 F.3d 665, 678 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Kamakana v.City & Cty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006)). “This standard derives from the common law right ‘to inspect and copy public records and documents, including judicial records and documents.’” Id. (quoting Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1178). “[A] strong presumption in favor of access is the starting point.” Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1178 (quotations omitted). To overcome this strong presumption, the party seeking to seal a judicial record attached to a dispositive motion must “articulate compelling reasons supported by specific factual findings that outweigh the general history of access and the public policies favoring disclosure, such as the public interest in understanding the judicial process” and “significant public events.” Id. at 1178–79 (quotations disclosure and justify sealing court records exist when such ‘court files might have become a vehicle for improper purposes,’ such as the use of records to gratify private spite, promote public scandal, circulate libelous statements, or release trade secrets.” Id. at 1179 (quoting Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978)). “The mere fact that the production of records may lead to a litigant’s embarrassment, incrimination, or exposure to further litigation will not, without more, compel the court to seal its records.” Id. Records attached to nondispositive motions must meet the lower “good cause” standard of Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as such records “are often unrelated, or only tangentially related, to the underlying cause of action.” See Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179–80 (quotations omitted). This requires a “particularized showing” that “specific prejudice or harm will result” if the information is disclosed. Phillips ex rel. Estates of Byrd v. Gen. Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1210–11 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c). “Broad allegations of harm, unsubstantiated by specific examples of articulated reasoning” will not suffice. Beckman Indus., Inc. v. Int’l Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 470, 476 (9th Cir. 1992) (quotation omitted). Because the parties seek to seal materials related to a motion for judgment on the pleadings and a motion for class certification, which are more than tangentially related to the underlying causes of action, the Court applies the compelling reasons standard. The Court will apply the lower good cause standard for documents related to the motion for relief from the Magistrate Judge’s discovery order. As detailed in the table below, the majority of the materials Defendants seek to seal are internal business documents. Defendants assert that “Lyft treats the details of the information it requests to maintain under seal as confidential and sensitive material, and the public disclosure of this information would cause competitive harm to Lyft.” Dkt. No. 186 ¶ 5; see also Dkt. Nos. 175 ¶ 6, 187 at 2, 189 at 2-3. However, not all information maintained as confidential in the normal course of business merits sealing. The Court must “balance[] the competing interests of the public and the party who seeks to keep certain judicial records secret.” Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179 inspection” to ensure that its records are not used “as sources of business information that might harm a litigant’s competitive standing.” Nixon v. Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. at 598. In this vein, the Ninth Circuit has recognized that compelling reasons can warrant sealing trade secrets, which “may consist of any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is used in one’s business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it.” In re Electronic Arts, Inc., 298 Fed. Appx. 568, 569 (9th Cir. 2008) (directing the District Court to seal the defendant’s pricing terms, royalty rates, and guaranteed minimum payment terms in a licensing agreement). To the extent Defendants argue that sealing the information “would permit the Lyft Defendants to maintain the confidentiality of the information that Lyft Defendants have designated as CONFIDENTIAL or HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL,” the Court repeats that a designation of confidentiality is not sufficient to establish that a document is sealable. See Dkt. Nos. 175 at 5, 186 ¶ 4; Civ. L. R. 79-5(d)(1)(A). The parties seek to seal portions of the Plaintiff’s motion for relief from Magistrate Judge Beeler’s Discovery Order because they reflect information from documents already filed under seal: the Joint Letter Brief, Exhibits B, D, E, and 1 to the Joint Letter Brief, and the Discovery Order. See Dkt. No. 167 at 3; see also Dkt. Nos. 161, 162. Judge Beeler previously concluded that these underlying materials warranted sealing under the Local Rules. See Dkt. No. 161. Defendants also argue that the current portions sought to be sealed contain “confidential and sensitive” information, public disclosure of which “would cause competitive harm to Lyft.” Dkt. No. 175 at 2. The Court finds good cause exists to seal the parties’ proposed redactions. See, e.g., Teradata Corp. et al., v. SAP SE, et al., No. 18-cv-03670-WHO, 2019 WL 5698057, at *1 n.1 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2019) (granting administrative motion to seal portions of the motion for relief that reference information already sealed by the magistrate judge). The sealing requests related to the motion for judgment on the pleadings, Dkt. Nos. 184 and 187, concern statistical information Defendants allege is derived from confidential rider reports and “could reveal proprietary details regarding Lyft’s operations, the number of rides taken on the platform, and details relating to insurance incidents.” Dkt. Nos. 186 ¶ 5, 187 at 2. statistics. No details of any individual rider or incident can be inferred, nor is there operational information beyond the total number of alleged sexual assaults, a relevant issue in this case. As already noted, “[t]he mere fact that the production of records may lead to a litigant’s embarrassment, incrimination, or exposure to further litigation will not, without more, compel the court to seal its records.” Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179. In contrast, the information sought to be sealed relating to the motion for class certification is the sort of non-public information that could be used by a third party to gain a competitive advantage. See Dkt. No. 189. As Defendants explain, the requested redaction of Exhibit 3 to the Grant Declaration is “tailored to include only statistics regarding the method of acquisition of riders and rate of ‘churn’ (or turnover)” that competitors could use to Defendants’ detriment, such as by leveraging the information to poach Defendants’ drivers. Id. at 2-3. Defendants also ask to seal the financial analysis attached to an investor’s declaration. See id. at 3. This is a much more tailored redaction than originally requested. See Dkt. Nos. 134, 178 at 3. The Court agrees that this narrow request protects detailed analyses and calculations, including “confidential trading practices and research techniques,” that if revealed could be used to the investor’s competitive disadvantage. See Dkt. No. 189 at 3. Docket No. Public / Document Portion(s) Sought to Ruling (Sealed) be Sealed Dkt. No. 167 – GRANTED Dkt. No. 168 / (Dkt. Plaintiff’s Motion for Excerpts (see Dkt. GRANTED No. 167-3) Relief from Order of Nos. 167 and 167-3) As explained above, Magistrate Judge the identified portions contain information from documents previously ordered sealed and the Court finds good cause to seal that information here. Dkt. No. 168-1 / (Dkt. [Proposed] Order Excerpts (see Dkt. GRANTED No. 167-5) Granting Motion for Nos. 167 and 167-5) As explained above, Relief from Order of the identified portions Magistrate Judge contain information from documents sealed and the Court finds good cause to seal that information here. Dkt. No. 184 – DENIED Dkt. No. 159 / (Dkt. Plaintiff’s Opposition Excerpts (see Dkt. DENIED No. 184-4) to Defendants’ No. 184) As explained above, Motion for Judgment Defendants have not on the Pleadings established a compelling reason that overrides the presumption of public access. Dkt. No. 159-1 / (Dkt. Declaration of Jeffrey Excerpts (see Dkt. DENIED No. 184-6) C.Block in Support No. 184) As explained above, of Plaintiff’s Defendants have not Opposition to established a Defendants’ Motion compelling reason for Judgment on the that overrides the Pleadings presumption of public access. Dkt. No. 187 – DENIED Dkt. No. 170 / (Dkt. Defendants’ Reply in Excerpts (see Dkt. DENIED No. 187-4) Support of Motion for No. 187) As explained above, Judgment on the Defendants have not Pleadings established a compelling reason that overrides the presumption of public access. Dkt. No. 189 – GRANTED Dkt. No. 118-3 / (Dkt. Exhibit 3 to the Portion of page 22 GRANTED No. 189-4) Declaration of Meryn The portions sought Grant in Support of to be sealed contain Defendants’ confidential Opposition to proprietary business Plaintiff’s Motion for information that does Class Certification not directly pertain to the alleged misrepresentations in this action and, if publicly released, could be used to Defendants’ competitive disadvantage. Dkt. No. 135-2 / (Dkt. Exhibit 24 to the Pages 32-72 in their GRANTED I Declaration of Meryn to be sealed contain Grant in Support of confidential 2 Defendants’ proprietary business Opposition to information, 3 Plaintiff's Motion for including detailed Class Certification investment strategies, 4 that if publicly 5 released could be used to the investor’s 6 competitive disadvantage. 7 Wl. CONCLUSION 8 The Court GRANTS the motion to seal as to docket numbers 167 and 189 and DENIES it 9 as to docket numbers 184 and 187. The Court DIRECTS the parties to file revised public 10 versions of all documents for which the proposed sealing has been denied within seven days of 11 this order. Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 79-5(f)(1), documents filed under seal as to which the 12 administrative motions are granted will remain under seal.
13 IT IS SO ORDERED. 14 6 Dated: 3/31/2022 15 MU ] Wh □ 16 HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR. United States District Judge = 17
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