In re L.V. CA4/2

• Court: California Court of Appeal
• Decided: February 24, 2026
• Docket: E086611
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

Filed 2/24/26 In re L.V. CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re L.V., A Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

THE PEOPLE, E086611 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super.Ct.No. DLRI2200013) v. OPINION L.V.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Mark Petersen, Judge.

Affirmed.

Costen Ruiz Law; and Jesse Ruiz for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General,

Arlene A. Sevidal, Robin Urbanski and Anastasia Sagorsky, Deputy Attorneys General,

for Plaintiff and Respondent.

1 I.

INTRODUCTION

This appeal concerns a juvenile court transfer hearing under subdivision (a) of

Welfare and Institutions Code section 707.1 About two weeks before his 17th birthday,

defendant and appellant L.V. (L.V.), robbed a high school friend for his cash and put a

handgun directly to his head and fired. The gun malfunctioned. L.V. cleared the jam and

fired at his friend as he fled, striking him in the shoulder. A juvenile wardship petition

(§ 602) was filed charging L.V. with attempted first degree murder (Pen. Code,

§§ 664/187, subd. (a)), robbery (Pen. Code, § 211), and assault with a semiautomatic

firearm attempted murder (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (b)), along with firearm and great

bodily injury enhancements. The juvenile court granted the People’s motion to transfer

the matter from juvenile court to a court of criminal jurisdiction (adult criminal court).

L.V. appealed, contending there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s

order transferring the matter to adult criminal court. We find substantial evidence

supports the juvenile court’s findings and affirm the order.

1 All future statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise stated.

2 II.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Current Wardship Petition2

On August 17, 2024, at around 5:50 p.m., L.V. robbed and shot M.G., a “close

friend” of about three years that he knew from high school. M.G. informed Riverside

Police Department detectives that L.V. had invited M.G. over so they could smoke. M.G.

then went to L.V.’s house in Riverside. The two had been hanging out together every day

for the past two or three weeks.

While smoking marijuana at L.V.’s home, L.V. showed M.G. two handguns and

said he had robbed someone for one of them. M.G. recognized one of the guns as one

that L.V. normally carried. L.V. asked M.G. if he was carrying a gun, and M.G. said he

was, in the Louis Vuitton crossbody bag he had with him. M.G. claimed that this was not

true, but M.G. said it because he wanted to get out of there and wanted to leave. M.G.

had been told that L.V. was no longer “gang banging,” but once he saw the handguns, he

believed this was false and that L.V. was still involved in gang life. According to M.G.,

L.V. had a Riverside bell tattooed on his hand and was possibly a member of a street gang

known as “ ‘Wyld Life.’ ”

M.G. eventually said he was leaving. L.V. insisted on walking him home as L.V.

had in the past, despite M.G. stating he did not want him to walk him home. M.G. had

also felt in the past that L.V. had been trying to “set him up,” for instance by walking in

2 The factual background is taken from the probation and police reports.

3 the opposite direction of their stated destination. When they left L.V.’s house, L.V.

carried the two handguns in his pockets.

As they walked towards M.G.’s home, M.G.’s iPhone fell out of his crossbody

bag, and L.V. started confronting him about the fact that he did not have a handgun as he

had claimed. L.V. put a gun to M.G.’s head, making direct contact, and removed his

crossbody bag, which contained $600 in cash. L.V. pulled the trigger, and M.G. heard a

click, indicating the gun had malfunctioned. L.V. said, “ ‘You know me and the

Edgemont Homies.’ ” M.G. told L.V. he was going to tell L.V.’s mother about this. L.V.

responded that they were not friends, and he was going to “ ‘smoke’ ” him. M.G. headed

off, and L.V. started firing on him, shooting two or three times. M.G. ran towards a park

but fell. At that point, people started helping him.

A witness who wished to remain anonymous told officers he was outside his home

around 5:45 p.m. when he saw two males, one Caucasian and one African American,

arguing on the street. The white male was holding a black handgun, and shortly

thereafter, he heard two loud noises. About five minutes later, he saw two bullet casings

in the street. Another witness reported hearing two “fireworks” go off. He then looked

out his front door and saw a tall thin blonde male wearing all dark clothes running past.

Officers reviewed surveillance video footage captured by a Ring camera on a

nearby garage. The video showed a black male walking calmly with a white male

dressed in dark clothes at 5:38 p.m. At 5:42 p.m., the footage showed the two running in

opposite directions on Dwight Avenue. An additional witness saw M.G. running towards

4 her, bleeding from his back and right shoulder. Detectives at the hospital observed that

M.G.’s right shoulder was bandaged. The injury was through from where the bullet

struck him in the back of his shoulder to where it exited in the front. Officers at the scene

noted that M.G.’s jacket had entry and exit holes on its right shoulder and found two

.40 caliber casings on Dwight Avenue between Linden and Minnesota Streets.

On August 19, 2024, a section 602 was filed charging L.V. with attempted first

degree murder (Pen. Code, §§ 664/187, subd. (a); count 1), robbery (Pen. Code, § 211;

count 2), assault with a semiautomatic firearm (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (b); count 3). As

to counts 1 and 2, it was alleged that L.V. personally and intentionally discharged a

firearm causing great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 12022.53, subd. (d)). As to count 3, it

was alleged that L.V. personally inflicted great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 12022.7,

subd. (a)) and that he personally used a firearm (Pen. Code, § 12022.5, subd. (a)).

B. L.V.’s Criminal History and Conduct in Juvenile Hall

On July 29, 2022, when L.V. was 14 years old, police observed him and two others

in a vehicle that was emitting smoke and a strong odor of marijuana. The car contained a

nitrous oxide tank, and deflated balloons were scattered throughout the vehicle. Officers

found a black backpack in the car which contained a handgun with an unloaded 15-round

magazine, a plastic bag containing over 260 grams of marijuana, and a black wallet

decorated with anime characters. All of the vehicle’s occupants denied ownership of the

backpack. The gun had been reported stolen out of Riverside exactly one week earlier.

Officers spoke with each of the vehicle’s occupants individually, and one of them said the

5 backpack belonged to L.V. Police later spoke with L.V.’s mother, J.V., who confirmed

that he carried a black backpack and had a black anime wallet.

On August 1, 2022, an initial petition was filed alleging L.V. possessed a loaded

firearm in a vehicle (Pen. Code, § 25850, subd. (c)(2)) and that he was a minor in

possession of a firearm (Pen. Code, § 29610).

On September 6, 2022, L.V. admitted the possession of a firearm charge and was

placed on informal probation (§ 725, subd. (a)) under various terms and conditions.

On November 20, 2022, L.V. visited his grandfather and had taken a nap in his

room. Almost a week later, the grandfather went to clean his gun and discovered it was

missing from his room. L.V. and his mother had been the grandfather’s only recent

visitors. When the grandfather contacted L.V.’s mother, she admitted L.V. had taken the

firearm. L.V. did not report this incident to his probation officer.

On December 8, 2022, L.V. was arrested for felony grand theft of a firearm

(Pen. Code, § 487, subd. (d)(2)).

On December 19, 2022, the People filed a petition to revoke L.V.’s probation on

the following grounds: 18 unexcused absences from school, positive drug test results for

marijuana, and the new arrest for allegedly stealing his grandfather’s gun.

On March 6, 2023, L.V.’s grant of informal probation was terminated as

“unsuccessful.”

On January 11, 2024, L.V., accompanied by three others, grabbed several cell

phones from a T-Mobile store in West Covina, then fled in a vehicle. Police officers

6 pursued the vehicle on the freeway at speeds over 100 miles per hour until the car exited

the freeway and stopped after running out of gas. The occupants fled on foot, and L.V.

was detained.

On March 6, 2024, a petition was filed in Los Angeles County alleging L.V.

committed one count of felony organized retail theft (Pen. Code, § 490.4, subd. (a)).

On April 16, 2024, L.V. admitted the allegation. The matter was transferred to

Riverside County on May 1, 2024. On that date, L.V. was declared a ward of the court

and placed on formal probation with various terms and conditions.

On the evening of May 18, 2024, police responded to a home in the city of

Riverside which appeared to have been extensively ransacked. The items stolen were

watches, jewelry, firearms, and other items worth over $150,000. Police obtained

Instagram records for a Wyld Lyfe gang member named “Big Ace,” which revealed a

group chat with other Wyld Lyfe members. The chat contained videos of a gun and Louis

Vuitton wallet that the homeowners identified as their property stolen during the burglary.

“Big Ace” wrote in the chat that “[he] and hh jusk smack a mansion.” L.V.’s monikers

included “Hot Head” and “Baby Madass.” L.V. sent a photo of the wallet to the chat and

offered it for sale, boasted about getting away with $10,000, and referred to himself as a

“flocker,” meaning a burglar. Police officers searched L.V.’s residence and located a

Louis Vuitton purse and wallet in his closet that the homeowners identified as their stolen

property.

7 The alleged current shooting incident occurred about three months later on

August 17, 2024, while L.V. was still on formal probation.

On January 8, 2025, a new petition was filed alleging that on May 16, 2024, L.V.

committed burglary of an inhabited dwelling (Pen. Code, § 459). Three additional counts

alleged felony grand theft of various firearms (Pen. Code, § 487, subd. (d)(2)), namely a

Amadeo Rossi .357 revolver and two 12-gauge shotguns. The petition also alleged that

L.V. had committed the offenses for the benefit of the Wyld Life Society street gang

(Pen. Code, § 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(B)), and as to the theft counts, the petition alleged the

stolen items were grand thefts involving firearms (Pen. Code, § 1192.7, subd. (c)(26)).

During his detention in juvenile hall, which had begun on August 20, 2024, L.V.

had been involved in four physical fights with other minors. In two of those incidents, he

had been determined to have been the aggressor, while in another he was determined not

the aggressor, and in another, the altercation was deemed mutual combat.

C. The Transfer Hearing

On the same day the current petition was filed, August 19, 2024, the People filed a

motion to transfer L.V.’s case to a court of criminal jurisdiction (§ 707, subd. (a)(1)).

On June 9, 2025, the juvenile court held a contested transfer hearing. The juvenile

court took judicial notice of L.V.’s entire juvenile court case file and had read and

considered the probation officer’s report filed October 17, 2024, and the briefs filed by

both parties. In addition, the court heard testimony from L.V.’s supervising probation

8 officer, Probation Officer O.E., who wrote both the probation report and a Memorandum

to the Juvenile Court filed on February 10, 2025.

O.E. opined L.V. should remain in juvenile court. His opinion remained

unchanged from the time he wrote the report filed in October 2024 to when he authored

the memorandum filed in February 2025. O.E. explained initial factor for transferring a

minor to a court of criminal jurisdiction under section 707, subdivision (a), which is the

degree of criminal sophistication demonstrated by the attempted murder incident. O.E.

concluded that this factor weighed in favor of transfer of the matter to criminal court.

The second factor, whether L.V. could be rehabilitated before juvenile court jurisdiction

expired, weighed against transfer, according to O.E. He based this opinion on the fact

that during L.V.’s “short period of time in regards to wardship as of recent,” his “overall

performance was good,” and “[a]side from those four physical altercations,” his behavior

in juvenile hall was satisfactory. He further opined that since L.V. was “on task” in

completing the obligations assigned by the court and “doing well in other areas of his

life,” these points weighed against transfer.

O.E.’s opinion did not change despite the fact L.V. was placed on probation on

May 1, 2024, and ordered to obey all laws as a term of his probation, yet he committed

the residential burglary offense 15 days later on May 16, 2024, the attempted murder

occurred during his probationary period, L.V. violated other terms of his probation by

associating with disapproved persons, testing positive for marijuana, possessing firearms,

and associating with those who possessed them, and all during the first three months of

9 his wardship. O.E.’s opinion was also not changed by L.V.’s performance during his

prior grant of probation, which had been terminated as unsuccessful due to excessive

school absences, testing positive for marijuana, and the theft of a firearm.

As to the third factor, L.V.’s prior delinquency history, O.E. opined that this factor

also weighed against transfer. According to O.E., despite a “pattern of possession of

firearms,” his apparent ease in obtaining guns, and “escalation” between his first offense

and that of the most recent petitions, the “short” nine-month period of overall wardship

and the fact that the shooting was his first known violent offense were mitigating factors.

As to the fourth factor, the success of previous attempts by the juvenile court to

rehabilitate L.V., O.E. opined that this factor also weighed against transfer. He based this

on the fact that L.V. had enrolled in a victim awareness class, tested negative for drugs,

and completed some community service hours, which were mitigating factors he deemed

not outweighed by the aggravating factor of L.V.’s current offenses. As to the final factor,

the circumstances and gravity of the offense, O.E. opined that this factor weighed in favor

of transfer to a court of criminal jurisdiction. In sum, based on consideration of all the

factors, O.E. concluded L.V. should remain in juvenile court.

The juvenile court thereafter heard arguments by both parties. After taking the

matter under submission, the court issued its written ruling on July 14, 2025, granting the

motion to transfer L.V. to a court of criminal jurisdiction. The court had “considered the

evidence presented by counsel, including the probation officer’s reports filed October 17,

2024, and February 10, 2025, briefs filed by both parties, People’s Exhibit # 1, as well as

10 oral argument by both counsel,” plus the petition and other documentation as the court

had previously noted at the hearing and the testimony of O.E. The court noted that L.V.

was “just over 16 years and 11 months of age at the time of the offense” and that the

offenses alleged were listed in section 707, subdivision (b). The court found the People

had shown by clear and convincing evidence that L.V. should be transferred to criminal

court, based on the totality of the circumstances, and upon evaluation of the five factors

detailed in section 707, subdivision (a)(3), criteria (A) through (E). The court noted that

the statute required the court to find by clear and convincing evidence that the minor was

not amenable to rehabilitation while under the juvenile court’s jurisdiction, and then

analyzed each of the five factors. L.V. thereafter timely appealed.

III.

DISCUSSION

L.V. contends the juvenile court erred in transferring the matter to adult criminal

court because there was insufficient evidence to support any of the five factors the

juvenile court must consider to transfer a minor to adult criminal court under section 707,

subdivision (a). He believes that because his probation officer opined that he should

remain under juvenile jurisdiction, and since the juvenile court did not agree, it

disregarded the law and its transfer order therefore must be reversed.

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

Section 707 sets forth the procedures for transferring an individual who committed

a crime as a minor from juvenile court to adult criminal court. “It provides that whenever

11 a minor aged 16 years or older is alleged to have committed a felony, the prosecutor may

move ‘to transfer the minor from juvenile court to a court of criminal jurisdiction.’ ” (In

re Miguel R. (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 152, 164 (Miguel R.), citing § 707, subd. (a)(1).)

The motion must be made prior to the attachment of jeopardy. After the motion is filed,

the probation department prepares “a report on the behavioral patterns and social history

of the minor.” (§ 707, subd. (a)(1).)

“The Legislature amended section 707 in 2023 and 2024. Effective January 1,

2023, Assembly Bill [No.] 2361 amended section 707[, subdivision] (a)(3) by adding the

following italicized language: ‘Following submission and consideration of the report,

and of any other relevant evidence that the petitioner or the minor may wish to submit,

the juvenile court shall decide whether the minor should be transferred to a court of

criminal jurisdiction. In order to find that the minor should be transferred to a court of

criminal jurisdiction, the court shall find by clear and convincing evidence that the minor

is not amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. In

making its decision, the court shall consider the criteria specified in subparagraphs (A) to

(E), inclusive. If the court orders a transfer of jurisdiction, the court shall recite the basis

for its decision in an order entered upon the minutes, which shall include the reasons

supporting the court’s finding that the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation while

under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.’ ” (Miguel R., supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at

p. 164; see In re S.S. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 1277, 1294 (S.S.) [explaining that the

“ ‘recite the basis for its decision’ ” requirement means the juvenile court “should

12 ‘explicitly “articulate its evaluative process” by detailing “how it weighed the evidence”

and by “identify[ing] the specific facts which persuaded the court” to reach its decision’

whether to transfer minor to a court of criminal jurisdiction”]; ibid. [noting that the

juvenile court’s articulation of its evaluative process, like its analysis, “should focus on

minor’s amenability to rehabilitation”].)

Accordingly, Assembly Bill No. 2361 (2021-2022, Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2022,

ch. 330) amended the procedure for transferring a case to adult criminal court in three

ways: (1) it raised the prosecution’s burden of proof to clear and convincing evidence,

(2) it made amenability to rehabilitation while under jurisdiction of the juvenile court

“the ultimate question for the court to decide,” and (3) it required the juvenile court to

state the reasons supporting a finding that the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation. (In

re E.P. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 409, 416. (E.P.))

The five statutory criteria listed in subparagraphs (A) through (E) of section 707,

subdivision (a)(3) were not amended by Assembly Bill No. 2361. (See Stats. 2022,

ch. 330, § 1.) Those criteria are: (1) “[t]he degree of criminal sophistication exhibited by

the minor”; (2) “[w]hether the minor can be rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the

juvenile court’s jurisdiction”; (3) “[t]he minor’s previous delinquent history”;

(4) “[s]uccess of previous attempts by the juvenile court to rehabilitate the minor”; and

(5) “[t]he circumstances and gravity of the offense alleged in the petition to have been

committed by the minor.” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(A)-(E).) The statute sets forth a

nonexhaustive list of relevant factors for the court to consider with respect to each of the

13 five criteria. (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(A)(ii), (B)(ii), (C)(ii), (D)(ii), (E)(ii).) These criteria

“are based on the premise that the minor did, in fact, commit the offense.” (People v.

Superior Court (Jones) (1998) 18 Cal.4th 667, 682 (Jones); Kevin P. v. Superior Court

(2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 173, 189 (Kevin P.).) The ultimate determination of whether “the

minor is not amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court”

(§ 707, subd. (a)(3)) is not the same as the second criterion, which calls for consideration

of “[w]hether the minor can be rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the juvenile court’s

jurisdiction” (id., subd. (a)(3)(B)(i)). (See Miguel R., supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 166.)

“Effective January 1, 2024, Senate Bill [No.] 545 [(2023-2024 Reg. Sess.)]

amended section 707 to require that with respect to each of th[e] five criteria the juvenile

court ‘shall give weight to any relevant factor,’ including the specific factors listed as

relevant to each criterion. [Citation.] The previous version of the statute made

consideration of those factors discretionary, not mandatory.” (Miguel R., supra, 100

Cal.App.5th at pp. 164-165.) Senate Bill No. 545 further amended section 707 to specify

additional factors that must be considered in determining whether the People have carried

their burden of proof to transfer a juvenile to adult criminal court. (See § 707,

subd. (a)(3)(A).) Specifically, Senate Bill No. 545 amended the factors the court must

weigh in evaluating a minor’s criminal sophistication to include “the existence of

childhood trauma; the minor’s involvement in the child welfare or foster care system; and

the status of the minor as a victim of human trafficking, sexual abuse, or sexual battery.”

(§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(A)(ii).) It also amended the factors the court must weigh in

14 evaluating the circumstances and gravity of the offense to include “evidence offered that

indicates that the person against whom the minor is accused of committing an offense

trafficked, sexually abused, or sexually battered the minor.” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(E)(iii).)

The bill’s author explained that the 2024 amendments to section 707 “ ‘will reduce

arbitrary determinations surrounding the transfer of juveniles to adult court by

establishing that the court’s decision to transfer a juvenile must be based on sufficient

evidence. Rehabilitation is the way forward, and that includes giving juveniles who have

made a mistake the opportunity to create a new future as they prepare to reenter our

society as adults.’ ” (Assem. Off. of Chief Clerk, 3d reading analysis of Assem. Bill

No. 2361 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) as amended Mar. 31, 2022, p. 1; see S.S., supra, 89

Cal.App.5th at pp. 1285-1286.)

The Legislature also recently changed the law as to the length of time a person can

remain under the juvenile court’s jurisdiction. Previously, the juvenile court retained

jurisdiction over a person until they reached age 25, or for a period of two years from the

date of their commitment to a secure youth treatment facility, whichever occurred later.

(See former § 607, subds. (a)-(c).) Effective September 13, 2023, Senate Bill No. 135

(2023-2024 Reg. Sess.) permits the juvenile court to “retain jurisdiction over a person

who is 25 years of age or older for a period not to exceed two years from the date of

disposition.” (§ 607, subd. (d); see Stats. 2023, ch. 190, § 12.)

“We review the juvenile court’s ruling on a transfer motion for abuse of discretion.

[Citation.] ‘The abuse of discretion standard is not a unified standard; the deference it

15 calls for varies according to the aspect of a trial court’s ruling under review. The trial

court’s findings of fact are reviewed for substantial evidence, its conclusions of law are

reviewed de novo, and its application of the law to the facts is reversible only if arbitrary

and capricious.’ [Citation.] The juvenile court’s findings with respect to each of

section 707’s five criteria are findings of fact reviewed for substantial evidence.

[Citation.] In conducting a substantial evidence review, we draw all reasonable

inferences in support of the court’s findings.” (Miguel R., supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at

p. 165.)

“Likewise, we review for substantial evidence the juvenile court’s ultimate finding

‘that the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the

juvenile court.’ [Citation.] Because the juvenile court must make that finding by clear

and convincing evidence, we ‘determine whether the record, viewed as a whole, contains

substantial evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could have made the finding of

high probability demanded by’ the clear and convincing evidence standard.” (Miguel R.,

supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 165; see People v. Brown (2014) 59 Cal.4th 86, 105 [the

substantial evidence standard requires the reviewing court to examine the whole record in

the light most favorable to the challenged order or judgment to determine whether it

discloses evidence that is reasonable, credible and of solid value].)

“ ‘The standard of proof known as clear and convincing evidence demands a

degree of certainty greater than that involved with the preponderance standard, but less

than what is required by the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.’ [Citations.]

16 ‘ “Clear and convincing” evidence requires a finding of high probability.’ [Citations.]

Courts have also described the standard ‘as requiring that the evidence be “ ‘so clear as to

leave no substantial doubt’; ‘sufficiently strong to command the unhesitating assent of

every reasonable mind.’ ” ’ ” (S.S., supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 1286.)

B. Analysis

We are unpersuaded by L.V.’s contention that the juvenile court’s transfer order is

not supported by substantial evidence. As noted, ante, in deciding whether transfer was

proper, the court was required to evaluate the five criteria set forth in subdivision (a) of

section 707. (Miguel R., supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 167.) Assembly Bill No. 2361’s

amendments to section 707 were intended to “refocus” the juvenile court’s assessment

and require “[t]he analysis of the five criteria set forth in the statute [to] be focused

through the lens of amenability to rehabilitation.” (S.S., supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at

p. 1288.) Applying these factors, the ultimate question was whether the People

demonstrated, by clear and convincing evidence, that L.V. was “not amenable to

rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3);

Miguel R., supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 166.) The weight to be given each of the five

criteria is within the juvenile court’s discretion. (D.C. v. Superior Court (2021) 71

Cal.App.5th 441, 445 (D.C.); see E.P., supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 417 [the court has the

discretion to conclude that one or more of the five factors predominate so as to determine

the result, even though some or all of the other factors might point to a different result].)

17 Indeed, in making the “ultimate finding” regarding amenability, the plain language

of the statute requires the juvenile court to “consider the criteria specified in

subparagraphs (A) to (E), inclusive.” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3).) “Thus, according to the

statute’s plain language, the court is required to consider each of the five listed criteria in

determining whether the prosecution has carried its burden of proof to transfer a juvenile

to criminal court.” (Miguel R., supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 166.) In other words, the

statute unambiguously provides that the evaluation of the five specified criteria is the

means by which the juvenile court reaches the ultimate determination of whether the

minor is not amenable to rehabilitation; amenability is not itself a separate factual finding

that supplants the findings regarding the specified criteria.

Next, we consider whether substantial evidence supports the findings in the

juvenile court’s transfer order, which was issued after the court heard testimony from a

number L.V.’s supervising probation officer, and considered various other materials

submitted by the parties and the probation officer. In making this determination, we

accept all evidence that supports the successful party and draw all reasonable inferences

to uphold the challenged order. (Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. Franchise Tax Bd. (2015) 237

Cal.App.4th 193, 213.) “It is not our role to reweigh the evidence, redetermine the

credibility of the witnesses, or resolve conflicts in the testimony, and we will not disturb

the judgment if there is evidence to support it.” (Ibid.) In applying the substantial

evidence standard, we do not review the evidence to determine if there is substantial

evidence to support L.V.’s position, but only to see if substantial evidence exists to

18 support the challenged order. Thus, we only look at the evidence offered in the People’s

favor and determine if it was sufficient to support the juvenile court’s findings as to each

of the five statutory criteria. (See Pope v. Babick (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1245.) If

the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings, the opinion of the

reviewing court that the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a

contrary finding does not warrant reversal for insufficient evidence. (People v. Kraft

(2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1054.) “As with all substantial evidence challenges, an appellant

challenging [a finding of fact] for insufficient evidence must lay out the evidence

favorable to the other side and show why it is lacking. Failure to do so is fatal. A

reviewing court will not independently review the record to make up for appellant’s

failure to carry his burden.” (Defend the Bay v. City of Irvine (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th

1261, 1266 (Defend the Bay).)

Here, the record reflects that the juvenile court evaluated each of the five statutory

criteria and, based on that analysis, determined that transfer of the matter to a court of

criminal jurisdiction was proper because L.V. would not have been (and currently was

not) amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. No

further finding regarding amenability was required. To the extent L.V. suggests

otherwise, we disagree.

As we next explain, substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s transfer

order.

19 1. Criminal Sophistication

The first statutory criterion is “[t]he degree of criminal sophistication exhibited by

the minor.” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(A)(i).) When evaluating this criterion, “the juvenile

court shall give weight to any relevant factor, including, but not limited to, the minor’s

age, maturity, intellectual capacity, and physical, mental, and emotional health at the time

of the alleged offense; the minor’s impetuosity or failure to appreciate risks and

consequences of criminal behavior; the effect of familial, adult, or peer pressure on the

minor’s actions; the effect of the minor’s family and community environment; the

existence of childhood trauma; the minor’s involvement in the child welfare or foster care

system; and the status of the minor as a victim of human trafficking, sexual abuse, or

sexual battery on the minor’s criminal sophistication.” (Id., subd. (a)(3)(A)(ii).)

The juvenile court “consider[s] the whole picture, that is, all the evidence that

might bear on the minor’s criminal sophistication, including any criminal sophistication

manifested in the present crime.” (Jones, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 683-684; Kevin P.,

supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 192.) Criminal sophistication can be shown with facts

demonstrating an “ ‘ability to appreciate the risks and consequences of [one’s] criminal

behavior’ and [one’s] awareness ‘of the wrongfulness . . . of [one’s] conduct.’ ” (Kevin

P., at p. 193.) Positive factors such as “normal cognitive functioning” or intelligence by

itself “do not affirmatively demonstrate criminal sophistication.” (Ibid.) But they can

support finding this criterion “weighs in favor of transfer to the extent [the positive

factors] fail to mitigate other evidence that does affirmatively demonstrate criminal

20 sophistication.” (Ibid.; see In re J.S. (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 205, 214 (J.S.) [“There was

little to no indication [the minor] suffered from any intellectual deficits. While in

custody, [the minor] was able to finish high school and had taken college level courses”].)

Prior to assessing the five factors, the juvenile court noted L.V. was 16 years,

11 months, and 17 days old at the time of the current offenses and that he was “14 days

shy of turning 17 years of age.” The court further pointed out that L.V. was 17 years, and

nine months of age, at the time of the transfer hearing. In assessing the criminal

sophistication criterion, the juvenile court explained as follows: “The probation officer

stated in his report that the minor’s displayed a lack of human compassion and proper

decision-making skills. It was noted that the minor would have killed the victim should

there not have been an issue with the gun when he initially attempted to fire it. The

boldness and severity of the minor’s actions and disrespect for the law are viewed as

criminally sophisticated by the probation officer. [O.E.] testified he was solid in his

opinion that this particular criteria weighed in favor of transfer to adult court. [¶] There

was not much cross-examination as to this criteria. The court does note that when the

gun misfired on the first attempt, the minor did not give up or cease his activity. The

minor took whatever actions were necessary to clear or fix the misfire, and then attempt

to shoot the victim again. The minor was successful in getting two shots off—after the

misfire—striking the victim one time. This shows the court that the minor was intent on

shooting the victim, that this did not represent an accidental shooting, and that the minor

had the clear intent of wanting to physically harm the victim.” The court agreed with

21 L.V.’s probation officer O.E. and concluded by stating: “Based on all of the above, the

court finds the evidence does support a finding that the minor knew what he was doing,

participated willingly, had knowledge of the plan and implementation of the plan. The

minor certainly knew the victim and took advantage of a position of trust to unknowingly

rob the victim, steal his cross-body bag, and then attempt to shoot the victim. The minor

made a clear and conscious choice to engage in these actions. The minor’s actions did

not appear to be impulsive or reactive, rather they were intentional and pre-planned.”

L.V. argues there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding

that he showed criminal sophistication. As support for his position, L.V. claims he was

16 years of age, “an age at which adolescents typically acted with impulsivity, emotional

reactivity, and limited appreciation of long-term consequences.” He also claims

“Nothing in the record showed that L.V. engaged in advance planning or deliberate

preparation. The evidence showed a sudden conflict between two teenagers who had

been spending time together in the weeks leading up to the incident. This context

supported an inference of immature, emotionally driven behavior rather than adult-like

strategic thinking.”

We are unpersuaded, as L.V. simply cites certain defense evidence in support of

his position and based thereon, makes arguments more appropriately directed to a trier of

fact than to an appellate court. In a substantial evidence challenge, an appellant cannot

carry his burden on appeal by merely rearguing the “facts” and/or reasserting his position

at trial. Instead, the appellant must lay out the evidence favorable to the other side and

22 show why it is lacking. L.V.’s failure to do so here is fatal to his claim. (Defend the Bay,

supra, 119 Cal.App.4th at p. 1266.) It is not our role to independently review the record

to make up for L.V.’s failure to carry his burden. (Ibid.)

In any event, we have reviewed the record and find that it includes substantial

evidence supporting the challenged finding. L.V. insisted on walking M.G. home against

his protests, left the house with two guns in his pockets, at least one of which was loaded,

and immediately robbed M.G. upon realizing he was not armed. Taking M.G.’s money

and putting a gun to his head and firing was not a “sudden conflict” between the two but

a robbery and attempted murder by someone M.G. considered a friend. The gun’s

malfunction did not cause L.V. to reconsider shooting M.G. but instead L.V. coolly

overcame the jam and decided to fire at M.G. as he was fleeing. L.V.’s actions show not

just a commitment to killing M.G., but a recommitment to that intent. (See J.S., supra,

105 Cal.App.5th at p. 214 [minor’s deliberate violent conduct, which had progressed

from robbery to robbery with a knife to murder with a knife, denial of any involvement in

the murder, and attempts to conceal evidence reflected criminal sophistication]; Kevin P.,

supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 194 [a minor’s attempts to avoid detection, including setting

fire to a body and an apartment, “constitute[d] substantial evidence of a certain degree of

criminal sophistication”].) There is no evidence to suggest L.V.’s actions were the result

of peer pressure, a stressful situation, or reflexive, as he claims.

In addition, among other things, there was evidence showing that L.V. was

attending school, had earned a “B” in Expressive Writing and “C” in English, and there

23 were no issues reported while attending school in juvenile hall. While L.V. had an active

Individualized Education Plan dated May 3, 2024, for 290 Specific Learning Disability

and 280 Other Health Impairment, L.V. had no physical or mental health issues and there

was no evidence that L.V. was a victim of human trafficking, sexual abuse, or sexual

battery. L.V. also had no significant maturity issues other than being a typical 16 year-

old, and did not act impulsively in connection with the currently charged offenses.

Further, there was evidence that L.V.’s criminal behaviors (which included a pattern of

gang-related offenses and violence) were deliberate and calculated and of increasing

seriousness (or escalation), and that L.V. understood the consequences of his criminal

behavior and gang involvement. And, as noted above, the record reflects that the juvenile

court considered the relevant factors in determining that the criminal sophistication

criterion weighed in favor of transferring the matter to adult criminal court. To the extent

L.V. requests that we conduct an independent review of the record and make our own

determinations as to the weight of the evidence, he misconstrues and/or misapplies the

substantial evidence standard of review and we decline to do so. (Defend the Bay, supra,

119 Cal.App.4th at p. 1266.)

2. Rehabilitation Prior to Expiration of Juvenile Court's Jurisdiction

The second statutory criterion is “[w]hether the minor can be rehabilitated prior to

the expiration of the juvenile court's jurisdiction.” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(B)(i).) In

evaluating this criterion, the court must consider “the minor’s potential to grow and

mature.” (Id., subd. (a)(3)(B)(ii).) The focus “is whether there is enough time to

24 rehabilitate the minor while the minor is still eligible to remain under juvenile court

jurisdiction.” (Miguel R., supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 166.)

The parties may introduce expert testimony specifically addressing “the

availability of treatment programs in the juvenile court system and the amenability of the

minor to those programs.” (J.N. v. Superior Court (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 706, 721

(J.N.).) Expert witnesses can provide “guidance” for the juvenile court in making its

determination, and expert opinion testimony “that the minor can be treated by those

facilities is entitled to great weight in the court’s ultimate determination.” (Jimmy H. v.

Superior Court (1970) 3 Cal.3d 709, 714-715.) However, the “decision rests in the sound

discretion of the juvenile court,” and an expert opinion that a minor is amenable to

treatment “is not conclusive.” (Id. at p. 715; see J.S., supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 212

[juvenile court was not bound by defense expert’s testimony and opinion that minor

“could be timely rehabilitated”]; J.N., at pp. 721-722 [“ ‘In those cases where the juvenile

court might decide treatment as a juvenile would be in the minor’s best interest, the court

could still find the minor “unfit if those experts testified that rehabilitation might require

treatment beyond the date of his mandatory discharge’ ”].)

In assessing the rehabilitation criterion, the juvenile court began its analysis by

noting “At the time of the alleged offense, the minor was 17. Here, the minor will turn

18 on August 31, 2025—approximately six weeks from the date of this ruling.

Jurisdiction of the juvenile court would expire between the age of 23 or 25, based upon

the maximum confinement time set at the time of the dispositional hearing. As a result,

25 the court would lose jurisdiction on either August 31, 2030, August 31, 2032. Therefore,

the court would have approximately five to seven years within which to work with the

minor and provide rehabilitative services.” After the juvenile court explained the

probation officer agreed that L.V. had violated the terms of his probation by committing a

burglary in May 2024, just 15 days after he was placed on wardship, and committing the

instant offenses in August 2024, the court reviewed L.V.’s juvenile delinquency history

and noted it had concerns about Probation Officer O.E.’s opinion L.V. could be

rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the juvenile court jurisdiction.

The juvenile court explained as follows: “First, it should be noted that the minor

requested termination of formal probation in 2023, as unsuccessful. The minor was not

interested in completing probation successfully, despite having approximately 3 more

months available to him to complete probation. Further, one year later on March 6, 2024,

the minor was charged in another petition. Then, after having been declared ward of the

court on May 1, 2024, engaged in yet more delinquent behavior fifteen (15) days later on

May 16, 2025, with more egregious conduct than the prior two petitions. [¶] It is

apparent from the four petitions that the minor has no regard for living a law-abiding

lifestyle. Further, the minor has no regard for rules imposed by the court, and has shown

a complete disregard for following terms and conditions imposed by the court, and

supervised through probation. [¶] As to this criteria, the court does not believe the minor

can be rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction. The minor

has been given multiple opportunities to comply with court orders on prior occasions, and

26 has failed to follow simple terms on each occasion. The minor continues to engage in

criminal conduct, with each offense involving more serious conduct and behavior than

before. Both the first and last offense involves firearms. The last offense involved the

alleged shooting of another human being.” Based on L.V.’s prior conduct while on

probation, the court did not believe “sufficient time exists to provide” L.V. with

“successful rehabilitative services such that [L.V.] would benefit and become law

abiding.” The court noted that from August 1, 2022 to August 19, 2024, L.V. had shown

“no progress at all in becoming law-abiding,” but rather, his behavior had become

“progressively worse as he [had] repeatedly engaged in criminal conduct and defied court

orders and probation attempts to help [L.V.] be successful.”

L.V. argues the juvenile court erred in discounting the probation officer’s

“professional assessment” and substituting its own conclusion without evidentiary

support. He claims that he had “made meaningful progress” and had behaved well in

juvenile hall.

As an initial matter, we note insofar as the probation officer was testifying as an

expert, “the juvenile court was not required to credit the testimony of the [ ] expert [or

otherwise weigh evidence regarding the rehabilitation criterion in the way L.V.

preferred]. As trier of fact, it was free to discredit such testimony.” (J.S., supra, 105

Cal.App.5th at p. 212; see In re Alejandro G. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 472, 480

(Alejandro G.) [the fact that the court’s finding conflicted with two experts’ opinions did

not show a lack of substantial evidence because the court is not obligated to adopt the

27 experts’ opinions].) And the court did not abuse its discretion by relying on other

evidence in the record, including L.V.’s prior conduct while receiving probationary

services. Furthermore, the court acted well within its discretion to reject the probation

officer’s positive assessment of this factor, considering the multiple fights L.V. had in

juvenile hall and his ongoing and worsening criminal conduct. We find substantial

evidence supports the challenged finding as to the rehabilitation criterion.

3. Previous Delinquent History

The third statutory criterion directs the juvenile court to consider the “minor’s

previous delinquent history” and, when doing so, to “give weight to any relevant factor,

including, but not limited to, the seriousness of the minor’s previous delinquent history

and the effect of the minor’s family and community environment and childhood trauma

on the minor’s previous delinquent behavior.” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(C)(i)-(ii).) Juvenile

courts enjoy “broad discretion to consider all evidence relevant to this inherently case-by-

case determination,” including all forms of delinquent behavior. (D.C., supra, 71

Cal.App.5th at p. 455; see id. at p. 456 [the juvenile court considered the minor’s

“behavior documented in his school records”]; J.S., supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at pp. 214-

215 [the juvenile court considered the minor’s “ ‘significant school delinquency’ history

starting in the seventh grade, including poor behavior, suspensions, and multiple attempts

by school officials to rehabilitate [the minor]”].)

In evaluating this criterion, the juvenile court stated: “[T]he court finds that the

minor does have a prior documented, formal delinquent history with the juvenile court.

28 As discussed above, the minor has had a total of four separate, distinct petitions filed

involving a variety of alleged offenses and criminal conduct, ranging from firearms

possession, retail theft, residential burglary and attempted murder.” Disagreeing with

Probation Officer O.E.’s assessment of this criteria, the court further explained: “Even

the probation officer states in his written report, that ‘. . .[t]here is a pattern of possessing

firearms that stands out when looking at [L.V.]’s prior delinquent history.’ The probation

officer goes on to state the minor’s high degree of criminal sophistication. Interestingly,

probation opines that the minor should remain under juvenile court jurisdiction. The

court does not agree with the probation officer’s assessment that the minor’s compliance

with probation was good. Clearly, the minor was unsuccessful on formal probation and

allegedly committed delinquent acts while as a ward of the court. This cannot be stated

as ‘good’ compliance. [¶] Based on the prior documented delinquent history, the court

would find, as to this criteria that transfer would be appropriate, despite the probation

officer’s statement to the contrary.”

L.V. points to the probation officer’s testimony concerning the attempted murder

being his first known act of violence and L.V.’s compliant behavior in a structured

setting, and suggests the court improperly relied on the number of L.V.’s petitions rather

than considering the “seriousness of [his] history in context.” Noting he “completed only

six months of 725 probation beginning in 2022 and spent only three months under

wardship before the August 2024 petition was filed” and that “[t]hese nine months

represented the only structured periods in which he received juvenile court intervention,”

29 he also asserts that the court did not give “proper consideration to the limited nature of

this supervision when evaluating his delinquent history.” L.V. points to the probation

officer’s testimony concerning L.V.’s behavior in juvenile hall, no evidence suggesting

“prior documented pattern of organized criminal behavior” or criminal sophistication, and

“peer and relational dynamics that shaped these events.” We are unpersuaded by L.V.’s

arguments. As we have explained, in a substantial evidence challenge, an appellant

cannot carry his burden on appeal by merely rearguing the evidence and/or reasserting his

position at trial. Instead, the appellant must lay out the evidence favorable to the other

side and show why it is lacking. L.V.’s failure to do so here is fatal to his claim. (Defend

the Bay, supra, 119 Cal.App.4th at p. 1266.)

In any event, there is ample evidence in the record supporting the juvenile court’s

determination that the previous delinquent history criterion weighs in favor of transfer.

L.V. ignores the evidence in the record showing his extensive delinquent history, which

encompasses a person’s criminal or antisocial behavior that occurred before they reached

the age of majority (i.e., 18 years old). (See D.C., supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at pp. 445-446,

450-451, 453, 455-456 [delinquent history may include conduct that occurred after the

offense related to the transfer hearing, as well as conduct in school records even if that

conduct did not result in a delinquency petition].) In addition to the four wardship

petitions, L.V.’s delinquent history includes possession of a handgun and 260 grams of

marijuana when L.V. was 14 years old. The handgun had been reported stolen exactly

one week earlier. L.V. also stole a gun from his grandfather in November 2022. When

30 the grandfather contacted L.V.’s mother, she admitted L.V. had taken the firearm. L.V.

did not report this incident to his probation officer. Furthermore, while on probation, L.V.

had 18 unexcused absences from school, positive drug test results for marijuana, the

arrest for stealing his grandfather’s gun, and continuing to engage in a gang lifestyle. In

March 2023, L.V.’s grant of probation was terminated as “unsuccessful.” Then in

January 2024, L.V., accompanied by three others, grabbed several cell phones from a T-

Mobile store, then fled in a vehicle and was charged with felony organized retail theft. In

May 2024, L.V., along with others, stole watches, jewelry, firearms, and other items

worth over $150,000. L.V. then boasted about getting away with $10,000, and referred to

himself as a “flocker,” meaning a burglar on social media. The current shooting incident

occurred about three months later on August 17, 2024, while L.V. was still on probation.

Moreover, during his detention in juvenile hall, which had begun on August 20, 2024,

L.V. had been involved in four physical fights with other minors. In two of those

incidents, he had been determined to have been the aggressor, while in another he was

determined not the aggressor, and in another, the altercation was deemed mutual combat.

In short, substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s findings as to the previous

delinquent history criterion.

31 4. Previous Attempts at Rehabilitation

The fourth criterion requires the juvenile court to consider whether the “[s]uccess

of previous attempts by the juvenile court to rehabilitate the minor” weighed in favor of

transfer. (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(D)(i).) When evaluating this criterion, the juvenile court

must “give weight to any relevant factor, including, but not limited to, the adequacy of

the services previously provided to address the minor’s needs.” (Id., subd. (a)(3)(D)(ii).)

In assessing this criterion, after noting the current petition was L.V.’s third matter

before the juvenile court and L.V.’s chronological history, the court stated: “[T]he minor

has shown he cannot be successful on probationary terms. First, he was unsuccessfully

terminated from formal probation after three months. The minor did not ask to remain on

probation in order to achieve a successful closure after the six month term would have

expired. Further, after being declared a ward of the court on May 1, 2024, the minor

allegedly committed a residential burglary on May 16, 2024, just 15 days later. Although

the petition was not filed on that matter until January 8, 2025, the minor’s criminal

conduct occurred within days of being granted wardship. Then, on August 17, 2024,

90 days after the residential burglary, the minor allegedly was involved in the attempted

murder case. [¶] This minor has no regard for the law, court orders, or probation terms.

Clearly, the minor has no regard for any order and has shown a complete disregard for the

law and court orders.” The court found that “[t]he ‘success’ of prior rehabilitative efforts

has been non-existent” and that L.V. had made “minimal to no effort” to prior services

offered. The court thus disagreed with the probation officer’s recommendation to allow

32 L.V. to remain under juvenile jurisdiction and found the recommendation to be “without

merit or justification.” The court believed, as to this specific criteria, “transfer is

appropriate.”

On appeal, L.V. does not specifically argue there was any evidence showing that

the previous attempts to rehabilitate him were successful. Instead, he points to Probation

Officer O.E.’s testimony that during his wardship, he had attended school and earned

passing grades, became sober, made progress in completing community service hours,

and attended his court-ordered victim awareness program. He argues there was no

evidence he had received trauma-informed counseling, behavioral therapy, or long-term

substance abuse treatment and “[t]he court’s conclusion that rehabilitation had failed

ignored the statutory requirement to consider whether prior services had been sufficient.”

Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that this criterion

weighed in favor of transfer to a court of criminal jurisdiction. The record reflects that

L.V. engaged in a pattern of delinquent behavior between the ages of 14 and 16, some of

which, such as the organized thefts and residential burglary, was gang related. As a

consequence of his behavior, L.V. was placed on informal and formal probation, which he

failed to complete. As part of his probation, L.V. was prohibited from using controlled

substances, possessing firearms, violating the law, and not knowingly having direct or

indirect contact with anyone disapproved by parent or probation officer and ordered to

complete counseling and community service. Although the record does not include

evidence as to the specific services offered to L.V. to address his needs, the record

33 supports the juvenile court’s finding that previous attempts at rehabilitation had not been

successful. The record discloses that L.V. violated the terms of his probation multiple

times, including possessing firearms and continuing to violate the law by committing new

offenses.

On this record, the juvenile court could reasonably find that, despite L.V.’s

placement on both informal and formal probation, he had no willingness or ability to

improve his behavior based on his continued poor conduct, including his failure to

disassociate with the Wyld Lyfe street gang and his continued commission of crimes that

were escalating in severity, including the attempted murder of M.G. The juvenile court

was not required to accept the probation officer’s opinion that L.V. was making good

progress while in juvenile hall. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in

disagreeing with the probation officer’s opinion and instead relying on the other evidence

before it. (See J.S., supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 212 [trial court is not bound by an

expert’s testimony and opinion]; Alejandro G., supra, 205 Cal.App.4th at p. 480 [court

not obligated to adopt experts’ opinions].)

5. Circumstances and Gravity of Alleged Offenses

The fifth and final criterion, the circumstances and gravity of the offense (§ 707,

subd. (a)(3)(E)(i)), “focuses on the offense ‘ “alleged in the petition” ’ [citation], and like

the other statutory criteria, it is ‘based on the premise that the minor did, in fact, commit

the offense.’ [Citation.] But the allegation that a minor committed a serious offense,

including murder, does not ‘automatically require a finding of unfitness.’ ” (Kevin P.,

34 supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 189, italics omitted.) When evaluating this criterion, the

juvenile court must give weight to any relevant factor, including evidence that, while not

justifying or excusing the crime, tends to lessen its magnitude, including, but not limited

to, “the actual behavior of the person, the mental state of the person, the person’s degree

of involvement in the crime, the level of harm actually caused by the person, and the

person’s mental and emotional development.” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(E)(ii); Kevin P.,

supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 189.)

In assessing this criterion, the juvenile court stated: “The probation officer

describes the minor’s actions as being serious and callous in nature. It is well

documented that the minor initially attempted to fire the gun while it was placed against

the victims head, but that a malfunction in the firearm prevented the victim from being

shot at close range. The minor then attempted and succeeded in firing the weapon two

more times. The victim was struck once while attempting to flee. [¶] Here, probation

recommends a transfer to adult court is appropriate. The People and the court agree.”

L.V. claims that “nothing in the record established that L.V. set out with an intent

to inflict lethal harm,” and that the court “inferred adult level intent and deliberation from

the mere fact that the offense involved a firearm.” He further asserts that the court was

“obligated to examine whether [his] conduct reflected impulsivity, panic, immaturity, or

susceptibility to outside influence” but failed to address those factors, as well as factors

relating to peer and familial relationships or dynamics and his amenability to

rehabilitation before and after the alleged offenses.

35 We reject L.V.’s suggestion that the evidence he cites prevented the juvenile court

from finding that this criterion weighed in favor of transfer to a court of criminal

jurisdiction. (See Kevin P., supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at pp. 189-190 [rejecting similar

claim, explaining that the minor failed to “offer any authority for the proposition that

expert testimony—or any other evidence beyond that bearing on what happened during

the crime—is required to evaluate this criterion”]; Alejandro G., supra, 205 Cal.App.4th

at p. 480 [court not obligated to adopt experts’ opinions].) The record reflects that the

juvenile court considered the relevant factors, and substantial evidence supports the

court’s determination that the circumstances and gravity of the offenses weighed heavily

in favor of transfer to a court of criminal jurisdiction. (See C.S. v. Superior Court (2018)

29 Cal.App.5th 1009, 1033-1034 [substantial evidence supported the juvenile’s court’s

findings as to the circumstances and gravity of the offenses criterion because there was

evidence that the minor personally and actively participated in an unprovoked gang-

related attack, kicked and punched the victim, and stomped on the victim’s head and

killed him after the other attackers fled].)

6. Amenability to Treatment as a Juvenile

As noted, ante, a recent amendment to section 707 requires the juvenile court to

make an “ultimate” finding that the minor “is not amenable to rehabilitation while under

the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3); see Miguel R., supra, 100

Cal.App.5th at pp. 164, 167.) The court must consider all five enumerated factors and

36 state its reasons for finding the minor to be unamenable to rehabilitation while under the

jurisdiction of the juvenile court. (§ 707, subd. (a)(3).)

At the conclusion of its written transfer order, the court explained: “After

reviewing and considering all reports, evidence and criteria pursuant to

WIC 707(a)(3)(A-E), the court has determined that the People have met their burden by

clear and convincing evidence to have this court order a transfer to a court of criminal

jurisdiction. The evidence at the hearing does establish that the minor should be

transferred. The actions of the minor were premeditated and show sophistication by the

minor. The court does believe that this minor is not amenable to rehabilitative efforts or

services. The court has reviewed the minor’s treatment needs—many of them listed on

the probation officer’s report page 25—and determines that insufficient time exists to

provide these services. [¶] Whether the court has until age 23 or 25, there simply is

insufficient time to address the numerous needs of this youth. The minor has engaged in

a horrendous act and has shown no remorse for his actions. The minor has shown an

inability to comply with court orders on numerous occasions, as well as a complete sense

of apathy toward the completion of any probation services.”

In short, because substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s findings as to

each of the five statutory criteria, there is no basis to reverse the court’s “ultimate”

finding that the People satisfied their burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence

that L.V. was not amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile

courts. Accordingly, we will affirm the transfer order.

37 IV.

DISPOSITION

The juvenile court’s order transferring this matter to a court of criminal

jurisdiction is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS CODRINGTON J. We concur:

RAMIREZ P. J.

MILLER J.