In re: Luis Ortega Figueroa and Digna Rizo Rocha

Opinion

1 IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO 2

3 IN RE: 4 LUIS ORTEGA FIGUEROA CASE NO. 08-08769 BKT 5

6 DIGNA RIZO ROCHA Chapter 13

7 XXX-XX-7415 8 XXX-XX-2764

9 FILED & ENTERED ON 02/17/2011 10 Debtors

12 DECISION AND ORDER 13 This proceeding is before the Court upon the Debtors’ motion for summary judgment [Dkt. 14 No. 95], and General Electric Capital of Puerto Rico’s (“GECC”) opposition to the Debtor’s motion 15 16 for summary judgment [Dkt. No. 100]. 17 I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 18 The Debtors filed a voluntary petition under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. 19 20 §§ 101 et. seq., on December 22, 2008. On February 4, 2009, GECC submitted a proof of claim with 21 two security agreements and a financing statement attached, all of which purporting to secure the 22 debt owed to GECC by the Debtors. One of the security agreements refers to a “2000 Manitex Boom 23 24 Crane, Model number 2592” (“the crane”), and the other refers to a truck which has apparently been 25 damaged and returned to GECC. Only the financing statement, which describes the crane as the sole

collateral securing the Debtors’ obligation to GECC, was filed with the Department of State.

1 1 II. LEGAL DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS: 2 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), made applicable in bankruptcy by Federal Rule 3 of Bankruptcy Procedure 7056, summary judgment is available “if the pleadings, depositions, 4 5 answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there 6 is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 7 matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corporation v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) (citing 8 9 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986)). As to issues on which the movant, at 10 trial, would be compelled to carry the burden of proof, it must identify those portions of the 11 12 pleadings which it believes demonstrates that there is no genuine issue of material fact. In re 13 Edgardo Ryan Rijos & Julia E. Cruz Nieves v. Banco Bilbao Vizcaya & Citibank (In re Rijos), 263 14 B.R. 382, 388 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2001). A fact is deemed "material" if it potentially could affect the 15 16 outcome of the suit. Cortes-Irizarry v. Corporación Insular, 111 F.3d 184, 187 (1st Cir. 1997). 17 Moreover, there will only be a "genuine" or "trial worthy" issue as to such a "material fact," "if a 18 reasonable fact-finder, examining the evidence and drawing all reasonable inferences helpful to the 19 party resisting summary judgment, could resolve the dispute in that party's favor." Id. The Court 20 must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. In re Rijos, 263 B.R. 382, 21 at 388. Therefore, summary judgment is “inappropriate if inferences are necessary for the judgment 22 23 and those inferences are not mandated by the record.” Id. 24 In this case, there are no material facts in dispute, the financing agreement included in the 25 opposition to summary judgment clearly indicates that the crane is the only collateral securing the

debt in question. [P. 18 - Dkt. No. 100]. Therefore, the Court hereby orders the parties to stipulate to

2 1 || an agreed value for the crane, and inform the Court at the Confirmation hearing set for 02/24/11, 0 an evidentiary hearing will be scheduled to determine the same.

4 SO ORDERED. 5 San Juan, Puerto Rico this 17 day of February, 2011. 6

9 U.S. Bankruptcy Judge 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25