2025 IL App (1st) 240984-U FIRST DISTRICT, SIXTH DIVISION February 21, 2025
Nos. 1-24-0984, 1-24-1035, & 1-24-1146 (cons.)
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). _____________________________________________________________________________
IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT _____________________________________________________________________________
In re L.P., a minor ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of ) Cook County, Illinois (The People of the State of Illinois, ) Juvenile Justice and ) Child Protection Department, Petitioner-Appellee, ) Child Protection Division. ) v. ) No. 16 JA 00630 ) Raquel V. and Ery P., ) Honorable ) Shannon P. O’Malley, Respondents-Appellants). ) Judge Presiding.
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JUSTICE GAMRATH delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Hyman and C.A. Walker concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: Trial court’s private guardianship order is (1) affirmed in part where the disposition order entered seven years prior was not void and, therefore, not subject to collateral attack and (2) reversed and remanded for modification of a more reasonable visitation with minor.
¶2 Respondents Raquel V. and Ery P. appeal from the trial court’s April 25, 2024, private
guardianship order appointing minor L.P.’s foster mother of eight years as her private guardian Nos. 1-24-0984, 1-24-1035, 1-24-1146 (cons.)
and ordering a minimum of one unsupervised visit with respondents per month. 1 Rather than
challenging the trial court’s finding that guardianship is in L.P’s best interest, respondents argue
that the disposition order entered seven years prior is void because it lacks certain statutory
language outlined in section 2-27 of the Juvenile Court Act (Act) (705 ILCS 405/2-27 (West
2016)). Alternatively, respondents ask that we remand for modification of the private
guardianship order to provide for additional visitation with L.P. We affirm in part and reverse
and remand for modification of visitation.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 L.P. was born to respondents on July 27, 2016. The very next day L.P was placed in
protective custody due to Raquel’s open DCFS case involving her son D.R. from a prior
relationship. On August 1, 2016, the State filed a petition for adjudication of wardship and
motion for temporary custody of L.P., alleging neglect due to an injurious environment and
abuse due to substantial risk of physical injury. 705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b), (2)(ii) (West 2016). The
petition alleged Raquel had “one prior indicated report for cuts, bruises, welts, abrasions and oral
injuries” for D.R., “who is in DCFS custody with findings of abuse and neglect having been
entered.” Raquel’s reunification services were ongoing, and Ery was “assessed to need parenting
services, mental health and substance abuse assessments.” The trial court granted the State’s
petition and granted temporary custody with the right of placement to the DCFS Guardianship
Administrator. L.P. was placed in the care of her maternal great aunt Jennifer, where she has
remained ever since.
1 We consolidated Ery and Raquel’s appeals (case Nos. 1-24-0984 and 1-24-1146) along with Ery’s duplicate appeal (case No. 1-24-1035).
-2- Nos. 1-24-0984, 1-24-1035, 1-24-1146 (cons.)
¶5 On May 1, 2017, L.P. was adjudicated neglected due to an injurious environment under a
theory of anticipatory neglect based on Raquel’s failure to make progress in services in D.R.’s
case and Ery’s need for services. On September 27, 2017, the court held a dispositional and
permanency hearing for L.P. Respondents were present and represented by counsel. Caseworker
Yesenia Alatorre recommended L.P. be made a ward of the court and placed in the guardianship
of the DCFS Guardian Administrator while respondents continued reunification services.
Immediately following the hearing, the trial court entered a standardized disposition order
(placement) adjudging L.P. a ward of the court. The court checked certain boxes on the
preprinted form, finding respondents “unable for some reason other than financial circumstances
to care for, protect, train, or discipline the minor” and that it was in the “best interest of the minor
to remove the minor from the custody of the parents ***. ” The court also entered a permanency
goal of return home within 12 months.
¶6 Respondents continued reunification services and consistently visited L.P. However, two
incidents during unsupervised visits at their home resulted in the temporary suspension of
visitation. The first was a March 2020 verbal altercation between Raquel and Jennifer, which
occurred when Jennifer arrived to check on L.P. after receiving a call reporting screams coming
from respondents’ home. The second was an October 2020 domestic violence incident between
Raquel and her brother. After an almost three-month break from all visitation, supervised visits
were reinstated in January 2021 and continued to be supervised through April 2024.
¶7 On May 11, 2021, the trial court referred the case to the Cook County Juvenile Court
Clinic (CCJCC) to help determine the appropriate permanency goal, as the court was considering
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terminating respondents’ parental rights. The October 7, 2021 CCJCC report 2 outlines
respondents’ involvement with DCFS, the 2020 incidents that led to suspended visitation, and
respondents’ progress towards reunification. The evaluator concluded that there was a low to
moderate likelihood that respondents, as a couple, would make gains necessary for L.P. to return
home, depending on what additional services were offered to the family.
¶8 On October 7, 2022, the trial court changed the permanency goal to private guardianship
given that L.P. “has been in this home for six years and sees her foster parent as her mom and
wishes to remain in the home. Parents are engaged in services and it is in [L.P.’s] best interest for
the foster parent to be her guardian.” Even after the change of permanency goal, DCFS
continued to monitor and evaluate the respondents. A May 3, 2023 DCFS Permanency Hearing
Report acknowledges that clinical staffings on June 16, 2022, and September 27, 2022, found
return home was the “fittest goal.” However, DCFS was now recommending guardianship
because L.P. “stated that she preferred to stay in her current home ***” and “[t]he court
considered it to be in [L.P.’s] best interest *** since she has been living there for nearly 7 years,
and she views the foster parents as her primary parents.”
¶9 On December 7, 2023, DCFS filed a “Petition to Appoint a Guardian of the Person of the
Minor,” requesting Jennifer be appointed L.P.’s guardian. A private guardianship hearing was
held on April 25, 2024. 3 At this point, respondents had completed all recommended services
2 The October 7, 2021 CCJCC report is the only exhibit that was admitted at the private guardianship hearing. 3 On December 11, 2023, Ery filed a “Motion to Change the Permanency Goal to Return Home or in the Alternative to Return the Minor to the Care of [Ery P.] Under an Order of Protection.” That motion was still pending at the time of the private guardianship hearing. However, the trial court clarified that the parties were “going to move forward on the ‘Petition to Appoint Guardian [of] the Person of The Minor.’ ” On the same day as the hearing, Raquel filed a motion to change permanency goal to return home.
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except for child/parent psychotherapy, which was discontinued after the October 2020 domestic
violence incident. Raquel completed a domestic violence program, individual therapy, couples
therapy, and medication monitoring. Ery completed individual and couples therapy. Caseworker
Marelinne Carrillo-Acosta acknowledged that DCFS found return home to be the “fittest goal” in
September 2022. However, after it was “clinically staffed *** again,” DCFS recommended a
goal change to guardianship based on “what [L.P.] was reporting at that time.”
¶ 10 Carrillo-Acosta testified that she was assigned to L.P.’s case two years ago. She
explained that L.P. has lived in a safe home with Jennifer, her husband, and their two sons, since
she was five days old. L.P. refers to her foster parents as “mom” and “dad,” and for at least the
last two years, L.P. expressed her desire to live with Jennifer full time and for Jennifer to become
her guardian. Carillo-Acosta recommended Jennifer be appointed L.P.’s guardian and the case be
closed, since L.P. has been in the home for nearly eight years, “[i]t is what she reports wanting,”
and she is “very bonded to both foster parents.” L.P. is also bonded with respondents with whom
she has enjoyed supervised visits of no less than one visit per month. Carillo-Acosta
acknowledged that one hour is not enough time for them to be together. In Carillo-Acosta’s
opinion, it would be in L.P.’s best interest to have more than one hour of visitation with
respondents per month. However, she acknowledged that the “authority for that time is going to
be with the foster parent.”
¶ 11 Jennifer testified that she plans on allowing one, one-hour visit per month, supervised by
her husband. This includes visits with L.P.’s two younger siblings in respondents’ care. She
indicated a willingness to expand visits if that is what L.P. wants, but it had not yet occurred.
Jennifer testified that she considers L.P. to be one of her own children and affirmed her desire to
become L.P.’s legal guardian. Jennifer acknowledged that it is “important for [L.P.] to maintain a
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relationship with her biological mom[,] dad,” and siblings, and she is open to providing time for
phone and Facetime calls and inviting respondents to school events.
¶ 12 Jennifer acknowledged the “tension” between herself and Raquel. For example, in
December 2023, Raquel “start[ed] acting aggressively [and] making threats” when Jennifer tried
sitting closer to Raquel and L.P. during a visit. After this, Jennifer was uncomfortable
supervising visits and she “change[d] her mind” about a previous agreement for two-hour visits
twice a month. Her husband is the only one that can supervise, and he is only available for one
hour per month. There was another incident where Raquel told L.P. not to call her foster parents
“mom” and “dad” because respondents “were the real parents.” Following this incident, L.P.
“mentioned she doesn’t want unsupervised visits.”
¶ 13 Ery testified that L.P. never told him that she was uncomfortable being in his presence
alone and that L.P.’s younger sister is very bonded to L.P. and wants to see her more. Raquel
acknowledged that while she was not a good mother in the past, the services she completed
“changed [her] life.” Now, she can control her emotions, spends time with her kids, and has a
good relationship with her husband. Raquel worries that Jennifer is “not going to allow [her] to
see [L.P.]” if the case is closed. L.P. told Raquel that she could not live with Raquel right now
because her “mother” is taking care of her and bought her two dogs.
¶ 14 On April 25, 2024, the trial court entered a private guardianship order, finding it in L.P.’s
best interest to terminate wardship, appoint Jennifer as L.P.’s guardian, and close the case. The
court noted the 2022 goal change and that “after all these years, services have been completed.”
However, there have been no unsupervised visits with respondents since October 2020; L.P.’s
foster parents provide a loving home, where she has lived since she was five days old; L.P. calls
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her foster parents “mom” and “dad”; and she “has expressed *** she wants to be with the foster
parent.”
¶ 15 The court acknowledged that “visits [are] a little limited. Perhaps in the future *** they
can expand the visits.” The trial court ordered Jennifer to provide “reasonable visitation *** with
a minimum of one visit each month” and to “arrange for visits with the child’s siblings.” The
visits are to be unsupervised, “unless [Jennifer] determine[s] supervision is necessary for the
safety or protection of the child.” Jennifer can cancel any individual visit if they would be
“harmful or inappropriate,” and if the visits are helpful to L.P., Jennifer should consider “the
number or alteration,” given her testimony that “she would allow more than one hour visitation”
if there was a special event or family function. Respondents appeal.
¶ 16 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 17 Respondents ask us to (1) vacate the 2024 private guardianship order because the
September 2017 disposition order, which set guardianship in motion, is “void” for failing to
include a specific written finding under section 2-27 of the Act and (2) remand for modification
of the order to provide respondents with more frequent and longer visitation with L.P. The Cook
County Public Guardian (Public Guardian), the Cook County State’s Attorney, and DCFS
(Appellees) ask us to affirm.
¶ 18 A. Untimely Appeal of the 2017 Disposition Order
¶ 19 Appellees argue we lack jurisdiction to consider respondents’ challenge to the disposition
order entered on September 27, 2017, as respondents failed to appeal the order within 30 days of
its entry. They also argue the doctrines of forfeiture and laches bar review.
¶ 20 It is obvious respondents missed the 30-day window in which to appeal the 2017
disposition order. They don’t even mention the order in their 2024 notices of appeal.
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Nonetheless, they argue the 2017 order is void so it may be challenged at anytime. Specifically,
respondents argue the 2017 order is void because the court failed to comply with section 2-27 of
the Act and, therefore, the court was “without authority to proceed to guardianship” for L.P. in
2024.
¶ 21 Section 2-27 provides that after a minor has been adjudicated a ward of the court, the
court may “at this hearing and at any later point” place a minor with a relative or nonrelative as
legal custodian or guardian, with a probation officer or other agency, or with a private guardian.
705 ILCS 405/2-27(1) (West 2016). The court may do this if it “determines and puts in writing
the factual basis supporting the determination of whether the parents *** of a minor adjudged a
ward of the court are unfit or are unable, for some reason other than financial circumstances
alone, to care for, protect, train or discipline the minor ***, and that the health, safety, and best
interest of the minor will be jeopardized if the minor remains in the custody of the minor’s
parents ***.” Id. Respondents maintain that the absence of a written finding that L.P.’s “health,
safety, and best interest *** will be jeopardized” if she remains in respondents’ custody, renders
the disposition order void and, thus, requires vacatur of the 2024 private guardianship order.
¶ 22 Not so. The 2017 disposition order is void only if the circuit court lacked jurisdiction
over the parties or the subject matter. LVNV Funding, LLC v. Trice, 2015 IL 116129, ¶ 48 (citing
Steinbrecher v. Steinbrecher, 197 Ill. 2d 514, 530-31 (2001)). Respondents do not allege the
absence of either subject matter or personal jurisdiction. Rather, relying on In re D.W., 214 Ill.
2d 289, 309 (2005), they maintain that dispositional orders that “are not authorized by statute”
and “overstep the statutory limits” are “void and must be vacated.” However, the 2017 order is
not an order unauthorized by statute or beyond the statutory limits of the court’s authority. At
most, the order is erroneous for the court’s failure to include a certain written factual finding, but
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this does not make it void or subject to collateral attack. In re M.W., 232 Ill. 2d 408, 414-15
(2009) (citing People v. Davis, 156 Ill. 2d 149, 156 (1993)) (an order entered without subject
matter or personal jurisdiction is void and may be attacked at any time, but an order entered in
error by a court with jurisdiction is merely voidable and not subject to collateral attack).
¶ 23 Indeed, the Supreme Court has made clear that “the failure to comply with a statutory
requirement or prerequisite does not negate the circuit court’s subject matter jurisdiction or
constitute a nonwaivable condition precedent to the circuit court’s jurisdiction.” See LVNV
Funding, LLC, 2015 IL 116129, ¶ 32; see also In re G.F.H., 315 Ill. App. 3d 711, 716 (2000)
(“That a court acts beyond its statutory authority in a particular case does not mean that the court
lacks jurisdiction over the type of proceeding involved” (emphasis in original)). Therefore, the
court’s alleged failure to include a specific written finding in the disposition order under section
2-27 is not a jurisdictional defect that gives respondents a limitless timeframe by which to appeal
the 2017 order.
¶ 24 What’s more, respondents have forfeited their challenge to the 2017 order by not raising
their arguments in the circuit court. See Mabry v. Boler, 2012 IL App (1st) 111464, ¶ 24
(arguments not raised in the circuit court are forfeited on appeal). Their claim is also barred by
laches due to their unreasonable delay seeking relief, which prejudiced L.P.
¶ 25 In re Jamari R., 2017 IL App (1st) 160850, is on point. In Jamari R., the biological father
appealed from a March 2016 order terminating his parental rights. Like respondents, he
challenged the November 2007 adjudicatory and September 2008 disposition orders for the first
time on appeal. The court held his challenge to these orders was barred by laches due to his lack
of diligence in challenging the orders despite participating in the termination proceedings and
having the benefit of counsel. Id. ¶¶ 62, 65. The court also found prejudice to the minor, as he
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“has been in a stable family relationship for more than two years, which continues to be
disrupted by these proceedings.” Id. ¶¶ 63-64.
¶ 26 Respondents’ lack of due diligence is even more apparent here: they were involved and
represented by counsel from the beginning, yet waited seven years to challenge the disposition
order in any respect. Although a more favorable goal of return home was initially entered, the
basis upon which respondents now challenge the disposition order existed on its face when it was
entered. We also find that it would be extremely prejudicial to disrupt L.P.’s safe, stable home
life where she has lived her entire life, especially after her case has been closed and she has been
given a sense of permanency after eight years. See Rodriguez v. Koschny¸ 57 Ill. App. 3d 355,
362 (1978) (finding prejudice to minor, as he lived with his adoptive parents since he was a little
more than a week old); In re Adoption of Miller, 106 Ill. App. 3d 1025, 1033 (1982) (“it would
be extremely prejudicial to the stability of the family life [the minor] has enjoyed to permit the
natural father to wait almost two years after he learned of the adoption to attack it”). Thus, even
if we had jurisdiction to review the 2017 order, we would find respondents’ claim forfeited and
barred by laches.
¶ 27 Because respondents do not make any other arguments pertaining to the appointment of
Jennifer as L.P.’s legal guardian, we affirm the private guardianship order entered on April 25,
2024, as the manifest weight of the evidence in the record amply supports the circuit court’s
conclusion. Nonetheless, we reverse and remand for further proceedings, as we disagree that the
limited visitation provision set forth in the order is reasonable or in L.P.’s best interest.
¶ 28 B. Reasonable Visitation
¶ 29 “ ‘Guardianship of the person’ of a minor means the duty and authority to act in the best
interests of the minor, subject to residual parental rights and responsibilities ***,” including
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“reasonable visitation (which may be limited by the court in the best interests of the minor ***).”
705 ILCS 405/1-3(8)(b), (13) (West 2022). We will reverse a trial court’s disposition regarding
visitation “only if the court’s findings are against the manifest weight of the evidence ***.” In re
Davon H., 2015 IL App (1st) 150926, ¶ 81. Such is the case here, as the court’s findings for
imposing minimal visitation and leaving it purely within Jennifer’s control is unreasonable and
arbitrary.
¶ 30 We recognize the court did not limit respondents’ visitation to once a month. But once a
month is all that Jennifer needs to do to comply. The visitation provision also leaves it solely
within Jennifer’s control to withhold unsupervised visitation if she deems it necessary for the
safety or protection of L.P. and to cancel individual visits if appropriate. Certainly, we agree
Jennifer should not subject L.P. to endangerment during visits. But she should not be the sole
arbiter in unilaterally changing unsupervised visitation to supervised or determining the length of
each visit.
¶ 31 The record shows Jennifer’s preference is to limit visits to an hour, albeit she indicated a
willingness to provide more time for school or special events and depending on L.P.’s wishes.
The record also shows tension between Jennifer and Raquel that could curtail the frequency, as it
has in the past. L.P. should not be deprived of forming a stronger bond with respondents and her
siblings because of their adult strife.
¶ 32 Carillo-Acosta’s opinion and the 2023 evaluations and reports all favor increased visits.
They are the most objective evidence in the record. Carillo-Acosta, in particular, testified that
one visit a month is insufficient to foster a bond between L.P. and her biological parents and
siblings. She also testified L.P. would suffer no harm from longer and more frequent visits. In
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fact, she believed they would be in L.P.’s best interest. Even the court left open the possibility of
more frequent and longer visits and encouraged the parties to expand them.
¶ 33 L.P. is over eight years old and has lived with Jennifer for virtually her whole life.
Respondents have worked to meet the parenting goals set by DCFS in order to maintain a safe
environment for L.P. and other children. L.P.’s best interest is paramount in this proceeding, but
respondents have rights too that should not be exercised solely at the whim of Jennifer. Although
a guardian has the statutory authority and duty to act in the child’s best interest, including the
reasonable visitation, under the facts of this case, we conclude the court’s visitation schedule is
against the manifest weight of the evidence. We remand for the court to be provided with an
update on visits as well as L.P.’s preference, safety and welfare, need for permanence, sense of
attachments, and all other factors relevant to ensuring L.P.’s well-being and imposing a more
reasonable parenting plan to encourage and foster contact between respondents and their child.
See 705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05).
¶ 34 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 35 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s private guardianship order
appointing Jennifer as L.P.’s guardian and reverse and remand for the circuit court to impose a
more reasonable visitation schedule.
¶ 36 Affirmed in part, reversed and remanded in part.
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