In Re Louisiana-Pacific Corp. Derivative Litigation

705 A.2d 238, 1997 Del. Ch. LEXIS 63, 1997 WL 240975
CourtCourt of Chancery of Delaware
DecidedMay 2, 1997
DocketCivil Action 14322
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 705 A.2d 238 (In Re Louisiana-Pacific Corp. Derivative Litigation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Chancery of Delaware primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Louisiana-Pacific Corp. Derivative Litigation, 705 A.2d 238, 1997 Del. Ch. LEXIS 63, 1997 WL 240975 (Del. Ct. App. 1997).

Opinion

ALLEN, Chancellor.

Following the April 17, 1997 hearing on the fairness and adequacy of a proposed settlement of this derivative lawsuit, the court ruled that the terms of the settlement were fair and reasonable and that the settlement would be approved. The gist of the complaint was that the defendants, who constituted the senior officers and board of Louisiana-Pacific Corporation,had violated their fiduciary duty of care in permitting the operations of the corporation to be such as to give rise to substantial liabilities for violation of applicable laws and regulations governing the environmental impacts of industrial or commercial activities. In response to the enforcement actions taken by various governmental actors and to various shareholder litigation, including this suit, the board of directors caused the chief executive officer of the company to be replaced, and instigated other changes in board operation. These changes were sufficient in the judgment of this court to justify the dismissal of this suit and the award of reasonable attorney’s fees.

What remains for decision is the language of the judgment to be entered.

The parties have agreed to a form of judgment that includes a paragraph that is in substance a release. The “release” reaches all claims belonging (in simplified terms) to the corporation or any of its shareholders that arise or could arise out of the facts alleged. Excluded from the effect of this “judgment/release” is an identified shareholders action under the federal securities acts presently pending in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon. Other than this identified action, it is the express purpose of the language of the “release” paragraph of the proposed judgment to preclude future litigation by any Louisiana-Pacific shareholder of any claim possibly held by such person which arises out of the facts alleged in the complaint.

Following the hearing, the question whether a release of the type agreed to could be entered by the court was taken under advisement.

The question can be approached from a couple of perspectives, but most fundamental is the question whether this court has a sufficient jurisdictional predicate with respect to absent individuals to enter a judgment that would, according to its terms, determine their rights and preclude assertion of any future claims against the defendant arising out of the same facts or transaction as those that give rise to this case. This is precisely what the express language of the “release” paragraph purports to do.

The proposed judgment purports to affect the rights of all Louisiana-Pacific shareholders. The circumstances in which a state court — which does not enjoy the benefit of nationwide service of process — may effectively bind the interests of absent parties is, of course, a topic that has given rise to some of the monuments of federal jurisprudence. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 24 L.Ed. 565 (1877); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945); and Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 97 S.Ct. 2569, 53 L.Ed.2d 683 (1977) are only the most obvious. Certainly in some actions, of a type that were formerly classified as in rem or even quasi in rem, the legal presence of property in the forum state together with the doctrine of virtual representation, are *240 sufficient to bind absent interest holders, so long as constitutionally adequate notice and opportunity to be heard are afforded to such persons. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950) (establishing what constitutes adequate notice to meet due process requirements sufficient to bind absent cestu que trust); Hynson v. Drummond Coal Co., Del. Ch., 601 A.2d 570 (1991) (holding, in a class action suit, that owning stock in a corporation creates a sufficient nexus, between a nonresident shareholder and the jurisdiction of incoiporation to bind him to a judicial determination of rights that attach to that stock (e.g. does this class of stock have a right to vote), including the right to hold fiduciaries to account providing that notice and opportunity to be heard are provided). Nationwide class actions in state courts are another example of instances in which the interests of an absent party may be constitutionally affected by a state court judgment. What makes binding absent parties in class actions constitutionally acceptable is either that: (1) under the provisions of Chancery Court Rule 23(b)(3), absent class members, in effect, elect not to opt-out of the class and thus can be said effectively to consent to the foreign court exercising jurisdiction over their'property (See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811, 105 S.Ct. 2965, 2974, 86 L.Ed.2d 628 (1985))(holding that an absent member of a Subsection 23(b)(3) class can be bound by the results of litigation about which that member was notified and given an opportunity to be heard), or (2) that under Rule 23(b)(1) or (2) the close identity of interests of the absent class members with those of the members before the court and satisfaction of the Subsection 23(a) criteria are sufficient to satisfy due process of law, so long as notice and opportunity to appear are afforded. While this second proposition is certainly contestable, for the law to hold otherwise would, I suppose, be to make a talisman of physical presence in an age of global business and digitized information. Thus, in all events, there are circumstances where a state may constitutionally affect the interests of absent individuals.

But where, as here, (1) no party to the litigation shares the property interest of the absentee that is to be affected by the “release”, (2) the absentees have not been afforded an opportunity to opt out of the litigation, and (3) in all events, they are to receive directly no consideration in exchange for the “release” of their rights, it seems most elementary that the court would be unauthorized to release the property of the absentees. Items (1) and (3) would independently require that result.

Indeed, I who in expressing the opinion of Hynson v. Drummond Coal Company, expressed an aggressive albeit, I believe sound, theory of state court jurisdiction to affect rights of non-residents shareholders, am at a loss to understand how it might be concluded that the court has the constitutional power effectively to “release”, adjudicate as settled, or otherwise bar, claims belonging to the absentee shareholders under these circumstances. Were this a class action, at least the theory of virtual representation would be present and the settlement would presumably include some consideration flowing to the class members, which if adequate would justify a release.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
705 A.2d 238, 1997 Del. Ch. LEXIS 63, 1997 WL 240975, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-louisiana-pacific-corp-derivative-litigation-delch-1997.