In re Locker

30 F. Supp. 642, 1939 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1852
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedNovember 25, 1939
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 30 F. Supp. 642 (In re Locker) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re Locker, 30 F. Supp. 642, 1939 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1852 (S.D.N.Y. 1939).

Opinion

CONGER, District Judge.

This is a motion to vacate an ex parte stay of a suit brought in the Municipal Court against the bankrupt and one Julius Locker to recover damages for personal injuries sustained as the result of the allegedly negligent operation of an automobile owned by the bankrupt and operated by Julius Locker. Undoubtedly under Section 63, sub. a (7), of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C.A. § 103, sub. a(7), a discharge in bankruptcy will be a bar to the collection of any judgment that might be recovered in the State Court action.

It is clear that under Section 11 of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C.A. § 29, after there has been an adjudication of bankruptcy, as in this case, this Court may exercise its discretion with respect to granting or refusing stays upon claims from which bankruptcy would be a discharge. See In re Lesser, D.C., 100 F. 433; In re Mercedes Import Co., 2 Cir., 166 F. 427; McLeod v. Mills, 29 Ga.App. 87, 113 S.E. 699, 49 A.B.R. 55.

In the present instance it is stated that if the State Court action is allowed to proceed to judgment, this will permit the operation of Section 94-b of the Vehicle and Traffic Law of the State of New York, which provides for the suspension of an operator’s license until a judgment against the operator “is satisfied or discharged except ,by a discharge in bankruptcy.” Through this Statute, the State of New York has enunciated its policy with respect to the financial responsibility of those whom it permits to operate motor vehicles upon its highways (see Munz v. Harnett, D.C., 6 F.Supp. 158), and, in my judgment, the discretion of this Court should be exercised with the idea of making that policy effective.

The motion is granted. Settle order on notice.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
30 F. Supp. 642, 1939 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1852, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-locker-nysd-1939.