In re L.N.H.

• Court: Supreme Court of North Carolina
• Decided: November 4, 2022
• Docket: 393PA20
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA

2022-NCSC-109 No. 393PA20

Filed 4 November 2022 IN THE MATTER OF L.N.H.

Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 from a unanimous, unpublished decision

of the Court of Appeals, 272 N.C. App. 695, 2020 WL 4462550 (2020), reversing in

part, vacating in part, and remanding the trial court’s order entered on 23 August

2019 by Judge Marcus A. Shields in District Court, Guilford County. Heard in the

Supreme Court on 23 May 2022 in session in the Old Burke County Courthouse in

the City of Morganton pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-10(a).

Mercedes O. Chut, for appellant Guilford County Department of Health and Human Services.

Matthew D. Wunsche, for appellant Guardian ad Litem.

Jeffrey L. Miller, for appellant respondent-mother.

BERGER, Justice.

¶1 Appellant Guilford County Department of Health and Human Services (DSS)

appeals from a decision of the Court of Appeals which reversed in part and vacated

in part the trial court’s adjudications of abuse, neglect, and dependency, as well as

the disposition and permanency planning order in the matter of L.N.H. In re L.N.H.,

272 N.C. App. 695, 2020 WL 4462550 (2020) (unpublished). DSS filed a petition for

discretionary review on September 8, 2020. Respondent-mother filed a conditional IN RE L.N.H.

2022-NCSC-109

Opinion of the Court

petition for discretionary review on September 28, 2020. We allowed both petitions

on December 14, 2021.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

¶2 Lea1 was born in February 2019. On May 7, 2019, DSS began an investigation

after receiving a report regarding Lea’s hospitalization. The report alleged that

respondent-mother punched Lea in the chest, sprayed a green liquid on Lea, waved

a lighter near Lea’s face, and burned Lea’s feet with a lighter. The report also alleged

that Lea was subsequently left outside on the porch unattended. Respondent-mother

was arrested and charged with felony child abuse inflicting serious injury and held

in the Guilford County Jail under a $500,000.00 bond. Medical records obtained by

DSS from the hospital confirmed that Lea suffered burns to her feet.

¶3 Social worker Jerin Elliot interviewed respondent-mother in jail on May 8,

2019. Consistent with her statement to another social worker on the day of the

incident, respondent-mother told Elliott that she did not remember the events leading

to Lea’s hospitalization; she only remembered that she had put the child to bed, drank

alcohol, and then went to sleep. Respondent-mother admitted she suffered from

depression and had not been taking her medication. She further identified Bruce

Rutledge as Lea’s father, but she did not have his contact information. Elliott’s

1 Pseudonyms are used in this opinion to protect the juvenile’s identity and for ease of reading. IN RE L.N.H.

investigation further revealed that respondent-mother told her mother that when Lea

was taken to the hospital for treatment, respondent-mother thought the child was

still in the home.

¶4 On May 8, 2019, Lea’s maternal great-grandmother and other family members

informed DSS that they would be willing to take care of Lea; however, no home study

had been completed when the petition was filed. Lea’s family members also identified

respondent-father as the child’s father and stated that he had been in and out of

prison and had active warrants against him.2

¶5 On May 9, 2019, DSS obtained nonsecure custody of Lea after filing a petition

alleging that Lea was abused, neglected, and dependent.

¶6 On July 31, 2019, the trial court held an adjudication, disposition, and

permanency planning hearing. At the hearing, Elliot testified about the investigation.

When asked if DSS had received a report regarding the family, respondent-mother

objected to testimony concerning the report on hearsay grounds. DSS argued the

report was not being offered for the truth of the allegations set forth in the report,

but to show why DSS became involved with the family. The trial court overruled the

objection and allowed Elliot to testify.

2 Respondent-father was subsequently located and served. He submitted to DNA testing which confirmed that he was Lea’s biological father. However, at the time the petition was filed, paternity had not been established. The trial court ordered that reunification efforts with respondent-father should continue and that he should have visitation with the child. IN RE L.N.H.

¶7 Later, Elliot testified that DSS had received medical records regarding Lea’s

injuries. The trial court took judicial notice of a medical records exhibit, which the

court had admitted in a previous nonsecure custody hearing without objection.3 The

medical records detailed how Lea was transferred to the hospital. The summary

stated, “[Lea] is a 2 month old female . . . who was transferred from [a different]

hospital where she was initially brought . . . by [Lea’s] neighbors who witnessed

[respondent-]mother abusing [Lea] physically.” The medical records further

contained a History of Present Illness section, which stated, “the neighbors saw

[respondent-]mother burning [Lea]’s feet with [a] cigarette light[er], punching her in

the abdomen and spraying her face with Windex.”

¶8 On August 23, 2019, the trial court adjudicated Lea an abused, neglected, and

dependent juvenile. The trial court found that Lea had sustained injuries related to

respondent-mother “punching [her] in the chest, allowing green liquid to be placed

across [her] face, and allowing [her] to sustain serious burns to her feet, as [a result

of respondent-] mother being under the influence of alcohol, based upon her own

admission.” The trial court also determined that Lea was left outside on the steps of

the home after sustaining these injuries.

¶9 The trial court ordered that legal and physical custody remain with DSS, but

3 At oral argument, respondent-mother’s counsel conceded that respondent-mother was represented by counsel at the hearing in which these medical records were originally admitted. IN RE L.N.H.

that custody be transferred to Lea’s relatives once they complied with certain

requirements. The court also found that reunification with respondent-mother would

be unsuccessful and ordered DSS to cease reunification efforts with her. Respondent-

mother’s visitation rights with Lea were terminated.

¶ 10 Respondent-mother appealed. On August 4, 2020, the Court of Appeals held

that respondent-mother was denied a fair hearing and the trial court erred in

adjudicating Lea an abused, neglected, and dependent juvenile. In re L.N.H., 272

N.C. App. 695, 2020 WL 4462550, at *6. Specifically, the Court of Appeals determined

that respondent-mother’s counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to object

to the admission of Lea’s medical records and that the trial court improperly

considered Elliot’s testimony regarding the neighbors’ report as substantive evidence.

Id. at *5–6. Further, the Court of Appeals reversed the adjudication of dependency,

stating that “the trial court erroneously based its adjudication of dependency on

conditions existing at the time the petition was filed instead of the time of the

adjudication.” Id. at *7. As a result, the Court of Appeals vacated the disposition and

permanency planning order and remanded the case to the trial court. Id.

¶ 11 On September 8, 2020, DSS filed a petition for discretionary review under

N.C.G.S. § 7A-31(c). On September 28, 2020, respondent-mother filed a conditional

petition for discretionary review in response. This court allowed both petitions on

December 14, 2021, and the matter was heard on May 23, 2022. IN RE L.N.H.

II. Analysis

¶ 12 First, we address the argument by DSS that the Court of Appeals erred in

determining that the trial court improperly admitted and considered witness reports

of abuse contained in Lea’s medical records.

¶ 13 “In order to preserve an issue for appellate review, a party must have

presented to the trial court a timely request, objection, or motion, stating the specific

grounds for the ruling the party desired the court to make if the specific grounds were

not apparent from the context.” N.C. R. App. P. 10(a)(1) (2021); see also, In re E.D.,

372 N.C. 111, 116, 827 S.E.2d 450, 454 (2019). As this Court has stated, “a

respondent’s failure to object to the trial court’s taking judicial notice of underlying

juvenile case files waives appellate review of the issue.” In re A.C., 378 N.C. 377,

2021-NCSC-91, ¶ 17 (cleaned up).

¶ 14 Here, the trial court took judicial notice of the medical records previously

admitted without objection at a May 10, 2019 hearing on nonsecure custody in which

respondent-mother was represented by counsel. When counsel for DSS offered the

medical records for admission there, the following exchange occurred:

[DEPARTMENT COUNSEL]: Your Honor, I’m not going to introduce an extensive amount of medical records; however, previously admitted into evidence on May 10th, 2019, are a portion of the medical records. Since those have already been admitted into evidence, I would ask at this time that you take judicial notice of those.

THE COURT: Any objection? IN RE L.N.H.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: No objection, Your Honor.

[RESPONDENT-MOTHER’S COUNSEL]: No objection, already in evidence.

THE COURT: All right. So admitted. The Court will take judicial notice.

¶ 15 The medical records included reports that Lea had been brought to the hospital

by her neighbors after the neighbors witnessed respondent-mother burn Lea’s feet

with a cigarette lighter, punch Lea in the abdomen, and spray Lea in the face with

Windex. Elliot also provided testimony regarding the reports that respondent-mother

burned Lea’s feet and left her on the porch. As this Court stated in In re A.C., the

failure to object to the trial court taking judicial notice of such records waives

appellate review of the issue. Id. Thus, respondent-mother’s failure to object waives

appellate review.

¶ 16 DSS next argues that the Court of Appeals erred in determining that

respondent-mother received ineffective assistance when counsel did not object to

admission of the medical records.

¶ 17 A party alleging ineffective assistance of counsel “must show that counsel’s

performance was deficient and the deficiency was so serious as to deprive [the party]

of a fair hearing.” In re B.B., 381 N.C. 343, 2022-NCSC-67, ¶ 39 (quoting In re G.G.M.,

337 N.C. 29, 2021-NCSC-25, ¶ 35). In order to show deprivation of a fair hearing, the

party “must prove that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, IN RE L.N.H.

there would have been a different result in the proceedings.” Id. (emphasis omitted).

“[I]f a reviewing court can determine at the outset that there is no reasonable

probability that in the absence of counsel’s alleged errors the result of the proceeding

would have been different, then the court need not determine whether counsel’s

performance was actually deficient.” State v. Braswell, 312 N.C. 553, 563, 324 S.E.2d

241, 249 (1985).

¶ 18 There is “a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the range of

reasonable professional assistance.” State v. Roache, 358 N.C. 243, 280, 595 S.E.2d

381, 406 (2004) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984)).

“Counsel is given wide latitude in matters of strategy, and the burden to show that

counsel’s performance fell short of the required standard is a heavy one for [a party]

to bear.” State v. Fletcher, 354 N.C. 455, 482, 555 S.E.2d 534, 551 (2001); see also

State v. Goss, 361 N.C. 610, 623, 651 S.E.2d 867, 875 (2007) (“This Court indulges the

presumption that trial counsel’s representation is within the boundaries of acceptable

professional conduct, giving counsel wide latitude in matters of strategy.” (cleaned

up)).

¶ 19 Here, counsel for respondent-mother objected to admission of Elliot’s testimony

regarding the report to DSS about Lea’s injuries. The trial court overruled the

objection and allowed Elliot’s testimony. Elliot testified:

A report was received alleging that on May 7th, 2019, [Lea], who at the time was reported as an unidentified child IN RE L.N.H.

weighing 11 pounds, was transported to the emergency room after being assaulted by [respondent-mother]. [Respondent-mother] was observed punching the minor child in the chest area. [Respondent-mother] spray[ed] unknown green liquid in [Lea]’s face, then pulled out a lighter and swiped the flame of the lighter across [Lea]’s face. [Respondent-mother] was seen burning [Lea]’s feet with the lighter. [Respondent-mother] then laid [Lea] on the steps of the porch. [Lea] was then taken from [respondent-]mother by observers, and law enforcement was called.

¶ 20 Subsequently, DSS requested the trial court to take judicial notice of Lea’s

medical records and stated that the medical records were “previously admitted into

evidence on May 10, 2019.” Counsel for respondent-mother was asked if there was

any objection to the court taking judicial notice and responded, “[n]o objection,

already in evidence.”

¶ 21 These medical records contained the same information about the source of

Lea’s injuries as testified to by Elliot:

[Lea] is a 2 month old female . . . who was . . . initially brought . . . by [Lea]’s neighbor who witnessed [respondent- ]mother abusing [Lea] physically. Per report, [respondent- ]mother was burning [Lea]’s feet with [a] cigarette light[er], punching her in the abdomen and spraying her face with Windex. She has <1% TBSA partial thickness burns to the soles of her feet.

¶ 22 The record reflects that respondent-mother’s counsel stated that he expressed

no objection to the trial court's decision to take judicial notice of the relevant medical

records and that he declined to exercise his right to object because those records were IN RE L.N.H.

“already in evidence.” Thus, in this case, unlike in many other cases, the record

contains an explanation for the failure of respondent-mother’s counsel to lodge the

objection that respondent-mother now claims should have been made. In addition,

we note that neither this Court nor the Court of Appeals has directly addressed the

issue of whether a trial court is entitled to judicially notice evidence that has

previously been admitted into evidence at a hearing held for the purpose of

determining whether a juvenile should continue in non-secure custody at a

subsequent adjudication hearing, with reasonable arguments in support of and in

opposition to the admissibility of this evidence having been advanced in the parties’

briefs before this Court. For that set of circumstances, we are unable to conclude that

respondent-mother’s counsel’s conduct was “unreasonable” given “prevailing

professional norms.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. As a result, we hold that

respondent-mother’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim lacks merit.

¶ 23 DSS next contends that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court’s

adjudication of dependency because the trial court did not consider post-petition

evidence.

¶ 24 “The adjudicatory hearing shall be a judicial process designed to adjudicate the

existence or nonexistence of any of the conditions alleged in a petition.” N.C.G.S. §

7B-802 (2021).

Unlike in the dispositional stage, where the trial court’s primary consideration is the best interest of the child and IN RE L.N.H.

any evidence which is competent and relevant to a showing of the best interest of that child must be heard and considered by the trial court, evidence in the adjudicatory hearing is limited to a determination of the items alleged in the petition.

In re A.B., 179 N.C. App. 605, 609, 635 S.E.2d 11, 14 (2006) (cleaned up). Thus, the

conditions underlying determination of whether a juvenile is an abused, neglected, or

dependent juvenile are fixed at the time of the filing of the petition. This inquiry

focuses on the status of the child at the time the petition is filed, not the post-petition

actions of a party.

¶ 25 Here, the Court of Appeals held that “[t]he trial court erroneously based its

adjudication of dependency on conditions existing at the time the petition was filed

instead of the time of the adjudication.” In re L.N.H., at *7. The Court of Appeals

determined that the trial court erred in adjudicating Lea as dependent because “the

trial court failed to make specific findings with respect to Lea’s father’s ability to

provide or arrange care for her,” and because respondent-mother’s family members

presented themselves as placement alternatives. Id. at *7.

¶ 26 This holding does not follow the plain language of N.C.G.S. § 7B-802. At the

time the petition was filed, respondent-father’s whereabouts were unknown and

paternity had not been established. Further, there were no alternative placements

available for Lea because home studies had not been completed. Thus, although

relatives had been identified as potential alternative placements at the time the IN RE L.N.H.

petition was filed, no acceptable relative placements were available.

¶ 27 The trial court correctly found that, at the time the petition was filed,

“[respondent-]mother did not provide any other alternative[] placements with family

members who presented themselves to the department, [and respondent-]mother was

unable to provide any information as it related to [respondent-father], who at the

time, his location was unknown and the means to communicate with him remained

unknown.”

¶ 28 For these reasons, the trial court did not err in adjudicating Lea a dependent

juvenile.

¶ 29 Finally, respondent-mother contends that the trial court erred by eliminating

reunification efforts as an initial disposition following adjudication. At the time of

the hearing in this case, N.C.G.S. § 7B-906.2(b) provided that

[a]t any permanency planning hearing, the court shall adopt concurrent permanent plans and shall identify the primary plan and secondary plan. Reunification shall remain a primary or secondary plan unless the court made written findings under [N.C.G.S. §] 7B-901(c) or makes written findings that reunification efforts clearly would be unsuccessful or would be inconsistent with the juvenile’s health or safety.

(emphasis added). In this case, the trial court ordered DSS to cease reunification

efforts with respondent-mother as part of the initial dispositional hearing. As a

result, the trial court was required to make written findings under N.C.G.S. § 7B-

901(c) before eliminating reunification as a primary or secondary plan. See In re J.M., IN RE L.N.H.

255 N.C. App. 483, 499, 804 S.E.2d 830, 840–41 (2017) (holding, that “because the

trial court ceased reunification efforts in an order entered following an initial

disposition hearing, N.C.G.S. § 7B-901(c) was necessarily implicated.”), disc. rev.

improvidently allowed, 371 N.C. 132, 813 S.E.2d 847 (2018).

¶ 30 At the time of the hearing in this case, N.C.G.S. § 7B-901(c) provided that

[i]f the disposition order places a juvenile in the custody of a county department of social services, the court shall direct that reasonable efforts for reunification as defined in [N.C.G.S. §] 7B-101 shall not be required if the court makes written findings of fact pertaining to any of the following, unless the court concludes that there is compelling evidence warranting continued reunification efforts:

(1) A court of competent jurisdiction determines or has determined that aggravated circumstances exist because the parent has committed or encouraged the commission of, or allowed the continuation of, any of the following upon the juvenile:

a. Sexual abuse.

b. Chronic physical or emotional abuse.

c. Torture.

d. Abandonment.

e. Chronic or toxic exposure to alcohol or controlled substances that causes impairment of or addiction in the juvenile.

f. Any other act, practice, or conduct that increased the enormity or added to the injurious consequences of the abuse or neglect. IN RE L.N.H.

(2) A court of competent jurisdiction terminates or has terminated involuntarily the parental rights of the parent to another child of the parent.

(3) A court of competent jurisdiction determines or has determined that (i) the parent has committed murder or voluntary manslaughter of another child of the parent; (ii) has aided, abetted, attempted, conspired, or solicited to commit murder or voluntary manslaughter of the child or another child of the parent; (iii) has committed a felony assault resulting in serious bodily injury to the child or another child of the parent; (iv) has committed sexual abuse against the child or another child of the parent; or (v) has been required to register as a sex offender on any government-administered registry.

Thus, before eliminating reunification efforts with respondent-mother, the trial court

in this case was required to make written findings pertaining to one of the

circumstances listed above. See J.M., 255 N.C. App. at 500, 804 S.E.2d at 841.

¶ 31 In its order, the trial court found that “[r]eunification efforts with the mother

would be clearly unsuccessful and inconsistent with the juvenile[’s] health and safety”

and that “[t]here are aggravating circumstances that exist as it relates to the mother

and juvenile, whereas the mother’s conduct caused serious injuries to the juvenile.”

Although the trial court did not specifically cite N.C.G.S. § 7B-901(c), its reference to

“aggravating circumstances” is sufficient to invoke that statutory provision. See In

re A.P.W., 378 N.C. 405, 2021-NCSC-93, ¶ 20 (noting that “[t]he trial court’s written

findings must address the statute’s concerns but need not quote its exact language”)

(quoting In re L.M.T., 367 N.C. 165, 168, 752 S.E.2d 453, 455 (2013)). Thus, the IN RE L.N.H.

question before this Court on review is

limited to whether there is competent evidence in the record to support the findings of fact and whether the findings of fact support the conclusions of law. The trial court’s findings of fact are conclusive on appeal if supported by any competent evidence. Uncontested findings are binding on appeal. The trial court’s dispositional choices— including the decision to eliminate reunification from the permanent plan—are reviewed for abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s ruling is so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.

Id., ¶ 14–15 (cleaned up). Given that respondent-mother has challenged the

sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s finding of aggravated

circumstances under N.C.G.S. § 7B-901(c), we review those findings to determine if

they were supported by competent evidence. See In re B.C.T., 265 N.C. App. 176,

186–87, 828 S.E.2d 50, 57 (2019).

¶ 32 As an initial matter, the trial court’s mere declaration that “there are

aggravating circumstances that exist,” without explaining what those circumstances

are, is not sufficient to constitute a valid finding for purposes of N.C.G.S. § 7B-901(c).

Cf., In re A.W., 377 N.C. 238, 2021-NSCS-44, ¶ 31–32 (holding that there was

sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding that the parent’s conduct with

respect to the juvenile “increase[d] the enormity and add[ed] to the consequences of

the neglect of [the juvenile] where the parents had “consistently worked together to

conceal” the abuse and neglect that had led to the death of the juvenile’s sister given IN RE L.N.H.

that “there is no means by which [the trial court] can address what caused the death

of [the sister] and thereby [e]nsure the safety of [the juvenile]”). Although the trial

court noted that “[respondent-]mother’s misconduct caused serious injuries to the

juvenile,” the evidence presented in this case cannot support a finding of any of the

aggravated circumstances listed in N.C.G.S. § 7B-901(c)(1)a–e.

¶ 33 In apparent recognition of this fact, DSS relies on N.C.G.S. § 7B-901(c)(1)f,

which permits the trial court to cease reunification efforts if it makes written findings

of “[a]ny other act, practice, or conduct” on the part of the respondent-parent “that

increased the enormity or added to the injurious consequences of the abuse or

neglect.” DSS contends that the trial court’s findings show that Lea sustained severe

burns on the soles of her feet while in respondent-mother’s care, that respondent-

mother recalled drinking alcohol before Lea was injured while lacking any memory

of hurting Lea, that Lea was left alone on the front porch of respondent-mother’s

house, and that Lea’s injuries were severe enough to require hospitalization for two

days and continued medical treatment for several weeks thereafter, so that

“[respondent-mother’s] conduct and actions toward Lea on 7 May 2019 ‘increased the

enormity’ and ‘added to the injurious consequences’ of evidence supporting the court’s

adjudications of abuse and neglect within the meaning of [N.C.G.S. §] 7B-901(c)(1)f.”

¶ 34 The fundamental defect in DSS’s argument is that it relies upon evidence

necessary to support the trial court’s adjudication of abuse and neglect to show the IN RE L.N.H.

existence of conduct that exacerbated the consequences of that abuse and neglect. In

other words, although DSS argues that respondent-mother’s conduct in burning Lea’s

feet and leaving her on the porch increased the enormity and added to the injurious

consequences of burning Lea’s feet and leaving her on the porch, N.C.G.S. § 7B-

901(c)(1)f requires a showing of the existence of “any other act, practice, or conduct,”

which seems to us to require that the evidence in aggravation involve something in

addition to the facts that rise to the initial adjudication of abuse and/or neglect. See

A.W., ¶ 32; see also In re C.L.K., 2022 WL 4841743, 2022-NCCOA-661, ¶ 14

(unpublished) (concluding that the trial court’s extensive findings of fact

demonstrated how the respondent-mother’s conduct “increased the enormity or added

to the injurious consequences of the abuse [and] neglect” of her children, with the

trial court having found that the respondent-mother continued to allow her boyfriend

to live in the house for months despite knowledge that he was sexually abusing one

of her children and that respondent-mother was failing to provide appropriate care

for her daughter despite awareness of her daughter’s extensive medical needs). As a

result, since the allegation that respondent-mother burned Lea’s feet and left her on

the porch cannot serve as conduct that “increase[ed] the enormity” or “add[ed] to the

injurious consequences” of that conduct, the evidence does not support a

determination that any of the aggravating factors specified in N.C.G.S. § 7B-901(c)(1)

exist in this case. IN RE L.N.H.

¶ 35 On the other hand, we do believe that there is sufficient evidence in the record

to support a determination by the trial court that reunification efforts were not

required pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-901(c)(3)(iii), which allows the cessation of

reunification efforts in an initial dispositional order in the event that the parent “has

committed a felony assault resulting in serious bodily injury to the child[.]” As noted

above, following the events that led to Lea’s removal from respondent-mother’s

custody, respondent-mother was arrested and charged with felony child abuse

inflicting serious injury. In our view, the record developed before the trial court

contains ample evidence that tends, if believed, to show that respondent-mother’s

actions in burning Lea’s feet involved the commission of a felonious assault upon the

child that resulted in serious bodily injury. Although the trial court did not make the

findings necessary to permit the cessation of reunification efforts with respondent-

mother based upon N.C.G.S. § 7B-901(c)(3)(iii), it certainly could have done so had it

chosen to make such a determination. As a result, we vacate that portion of the trial

court’s order ceasing reunification efforts with respondent-mother based on a finding

the existence of aggravated circumstances and remand to the trial court with

instructions to enter appropriate findings addressing the issue of whether efforts to

reunify respondent-mother with Lea should be ceased pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-

901(c). See In re L.R.L.B., 377 N.C. 311, 2021-NCSC-49, ¶ 38 (remanding to the trial

court where it failed to make written findings as required by N.C.G.S. § 7B- IN RE L.N.H.

906.2(d)(3)).

III. Conclusion

¶ 36 For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the trial court did not err in

adjudicating the child abused, neglected, and dependent, and did not err in

eliminating reunification efforts with respondent-mother. We also hold that

respondent-mother’s counsel provided effective assistance. We reverse the decision

of the Court of Appeals and remand for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.