In re: L.N.B.

• Court: Court of Appeals of North Carolina
• Decided: May 20, 2026
• Docket: 25-669
• Status: Unpublished
• Author: Judge Tom Murry

Opinion

An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. COA25-669

Filed 20 May 2026

Wilkes County, No. 22JA000031-960

IN THE MATTER OF: L.N.B.

Appeal by Respondent Mother and Respondent Father from orders entered 25

September 2024 by Judge Laura B. Luffman, and 14 February 2024 and 27 January

2025 by Judge William F. Brooks in Wilkes County District Court. Heard in the Court

of Appeals 12 March 2026.

Round 2 Legal, by Ashley A. Crowder, for Respondents–Appellants Mother and Father.

The Law Office of Erika Leigh Hamby, PLLC, by Erika Leigh Hamby, for Petitioner–Appellee Wilkes County Department of Social Services.

Administrative Office of the Courts, by N.C. Guardian ad Litem Staff Attorney Brittany T. McKinney, for Appellee Guardian ad litem.

MURRY, Judge.

Respondents appeal from the trial court’s 14 February 2024 and 24 September

2024 permanency-planning orders eliminating reunification as a permanent plan for IN RE: L.N.B.

Opinion of the Court

their minor child, L.N.B. (Lauren).1 They also appeal from the trial court’s 27 January

2025 permanency-planning order and the denial of their Rule 60 motion to re-open

the evidence. See N.C. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). For the reasons below, this Court (1) denies

Respondents’ petition for writ of certiorari (PWC), (2) grants in part and denies in

part Petitioner’s motion to dismiss Respondents’ appeal, (3) affirms the trial court’s

27 January 2025 order, and (4) affirms the trial court’s denial of Respondents’ Rule

60 motion.

I. Background

Mother gave birth to Lauren in October 2021 while she and Father were

married and living together. In January 2022, the Wilkes County Department of

Social Services (DSS) received a hospital report indicating that Lauren had “a large

bruise . . . [or] hematoma under her tongue, and there was no reported cause of the

injury.” Upon further investigation, DSS found that Respondents had been Lauren’s

sole caretakers at the time of the injury and ensured that the child’s grandmother

would stay with Respondents to supervise Lauren’s care following discharge from the

hospital. At a follow-up appointment two weeks later, Lauren’s skeletal survey scans

revealed two rib fractures that Respondents could not explain. Due to these injuries,

DSS placed Lauren in her grandparents’ custody and required them to supervise

1 In accordance with North Carolina Rule of Appellate Procedure 42(b), we refer to the minor child by a pseudonym to protect her identity. See N.C. R. App. P. 42(b).

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Respondents’ care of Lauren at all times. Three weeks later, DSS received another

report of “serious physical injury” to Lauren, this time “a broken arm with no

explanation as to how the injury occurred.” Unable to ensure Lauren’s safety in her

grandparents’ custody, DSS filed a petition on 18 February 2022 alleging that Lauren

was an abused and neglected juvenile under N.C.G.S. § 7B-101. That same day, the

trial court entered an order granting DSS nonsecure custody of Lauren. The trial

court set a follow-up hearing date for 21 February 2022, after which it granted DSS

continued custody of Lauren.

The trial court conducted adjudication and disposition hearings on 7 October

and 9 December 2022, at which it heard testimony from Mother, medical providers

who had examined Lauren, and the DSS social worker assigned to the case. Mother

testified to Father’s caring for Lauren around the time Mother discovered the

hematoma on Lauren’s tongue and lack of movement in Lauren’s broken arm. Mother

claimed not to have noticed the deformity on Lauren’s tongue or any redness or

bruising on Lauren’s arm until a doctor informed her of the hematoma at Lauren’s

primary care appointment. Following the hearing, the trial court adjudicated Lauren

an abused and neglected juvenile and maintained DSS custody of her. The trial court

found that Mother “refus[ed] to acknowledge that the minor child needs protection

from . . . Father” despite Mother’s knowledge that “if . . . she did not injure the . . .

child, then she must know that . . . Father caused the injuries.” The trial court also

found that returning Lauren to Respondents’ care would be contrary to her best

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interests. The trial court maintained Lauren in DSS custody, instructed Respondents

to comply with a DSS family-services case plan that included parenting classes and

mental-health treatment, and ordered a primary plan of reunification.

Respondents still could not provide a medically acceptable explanation for

Lauren’s injuries at a 13 March 2023 permanency-planning hearing. At a 23 October

2023 permanency-planning hearing, the DSS social worker testified to Lauren’s

placement in the custody of her maternal aunt and uncle since April 2022 and to her

thriving in their care. She described Lauren as happy, bonded with the family,

developmentally on track or advanced, and no longer requiring medical feeding

supports following a successful swallow study. After the hearing, the trial court

maintained a primary plan of reunification with a secondary plan of custody with an

approved caregiver.

On 23 May 2024, Father filed a Rule 59 motion for a new trial, alleging newly

discovered evidence consisting of a “medical opinion report” that was allegedly

“necessary for determining the truth about [Lauren’s] injuries and the proper

disposition of this case.” The motion urged the trial court to grant reunification based

on this “new evidence.” Father also filed a Rule 60 motion requesting relief from the

trial court’s judgment and consideration of the medical opinion report. 2

2 Although Respondents claim on appeal that the trial court denied both motions, they fail to include copies of the trial court’s orders denying these motions in the record on appeal. Thus, we cannot review their appeal of the purported denials. See N.C. R. App. P. 9(a)(h).

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At an 18 November 2024 permanency-planning hearing, the DSS social worker

testified that Lauren had resided with her maternal aunt and uncle for over two years

and that she was enrolled in preschool, developmentally on track or advanced, and

medically stable. She further testified that Respondents continued to deny

responsibility for Lauren’s injuries and maintain that they resulted from an

unsubstantiated genetic condition, despite acknowledging that they were Lauren’s

sole caregivers at the time of her injuries. Lauren’s guardian ad litem (GAL)

presented a court report recommending guardianship with Lauren’s maternal aunt

and uncle as a permanent plan.

Following the hearing, the trial court entered a permanency-planning order on

27 January 2025. The trial court found that Respondents continued to assert that

Lauren’s injuries resulted from a genetic condition and that Mother maintained her

ignorance of the cause of the injuries. Concluding that Respondents had acted

inconsistently with their constitutionally protected parental rights, the trial court

eliminated reunification as a permanent plan and granted guardianship of Lauren to

her maternal aunt and uncle. On 28 February 2025, Respondents filed notice of

appeal from the 9 December 2022 adjudication order,3 the 27 January 2025

permanency-planning order, “all other permanency[-]planning orders entered . . .

3 Because Respondents do not contest the 9 December 2022 order in their brief on appeal, we do not address it in our review. See N.C. R. App. P. 28(b)(6).

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between 9 December 2022 and 27 January 2025,” and the denial of their post-trial

motions.

II. Jurisdiction

Respondents appeal from the trial court’s 14 February 2024, 24 September

2024, and 27 January 2025 permanency-planning orders eliminating reunification as

Lauren’s permanent plan, as well as from the denial of their Rule 60 motion to re-

open the evidence. See N.C. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). At the outset, we must determine

whether to grant Respondents’ PWC to consider their otherwise untimely appeal from

the challenged 2024 orders. See N.C. R. App. P. 21(a); N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001. Our

Supreme Court has “establishe[d] a two-factor test to assess whether certiorari

review by an appellate court is appropriate.” Cryan v. Nat’l Council of YMCAs of the

U.S., 384 N.C. 569, 572 (2023). A party seeking certiorari review must show (1) either

“merit or that error was probably committed below” and (2) that “extraordinary

circumstances” “justify” appellate review. Id. (quotations omitted). Extraordinary

circumstances “require a showing of substantial harm, considerable waste of judicial

resources, or wide-reaching issues of justice and liberty at stake.” Id. at 572–73.

(Citation modified.) Respondents fail to demonstrate merit or probable error. Upon

careful consideration, we deny Respondents’ PWC , and thus consider only their

arguments for which they have timely filed notice of appeal.

Aside from the portions of Respondents’ appeal that we dismiss as untimely

filed, this Court has jurisdiction to consider Respondents’ appeal from the three

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challenged permanency-planning orders because they “eliminat[e] reunification . . .

as a permanent plan” for Lauren, N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a)(5), and has jurisdiction to

review the trial court’s denial of Respondents’ Rule 60 motion because it is the “final

judgment of a district court in a civil action.” Id. § 7A-27(b)(2).

III. Analysis

Respondents argue that the trial court erred by eliminating reunification as a

permanent plan in the 14 February 2024, 25 September 2024, and 27 January 2025

permanency-planning orders and by denying their Rule 60 motion to “re-open the

evidence regarding adjudication.” See N.C. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). They also contest the

Petitioners’ motion to dismiss their appeal as untimely. For the reasons below, we (1)

deny Respondents’ PWC, (2) grants in part and denies in part Petitioner’s motion to

dismiss Respondents’ appeal, (3) affirms the trial court’s 27 January 2025 order, and

(4) affirms the trial court’s denial of Respondents’ Rule 60 motion.

A. Motion to Dismiss

Petitioners move to dismiss Respondents’ appeal from the trial court’s 14

February 2024, 24 September 2024, and 27 January 2025 permanency-planning

orders for Respondents’ failure to file timely notice of appeal.4 In a juvenile matter, a

4 Petitioners also move to dismiss Respondents’ appeal from the trial court’s 9 December 2022 order and from “all other permanency[-]planning orders entered in this matter between 9 December 2022 and 27 January 2025.” Because Respondents specifically argue on appeal solely from the 14

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party must file notice of appeal from a trial court’s order “that changes legal custody

of a juvenile . . . within 30 days after entry and service of the order.” N.C.G.S.

§ 7B-1001(b) (2025). The “parent who is a party” may only do so if the “order . . .

eliminat[es] reunification . . . as a permanent plan” and he or she (1) “[h]as preserved

the right to appeal the order in writing within 30 days after [its] entry and service,”

(2) a termination “petition or motion has not been filed within 65 days of entry and

service” of the order, and (3) a “notice of appeal of the order . . . is filed within 30 days

after” those 65 days have elapsed. Id. § 7B-1001(a)(5)(a)(1)–(3).

Here, Respondents filed notice of appeal on 28 February 2025 from the 9

December 2022 adjudication order, the 27 January 2025 permanency-planning order,

the denial of their Rule 60 motion, and “[a]ll other permanency[-]planning orders

entered in this matter between 9 December 2022 and 27 January 2025.” The DSS

attorney served Respondents with the 24 September 2024 order on 1 October 2024.

Respondents did not file notice of appeal within thirty days of entry and service of

that order. Because Respondents failed to timely file their notice of appeal within

thirty days of entry and service of the 24 September 2024 and 14 February 2024

orders, we grant Petitioners’ motion to dismiss Respondents’ appeal from these

February 2024, 24 September 2024, and 27 January 2025 orders, we limit our review to these orders. See NC. R. App. P. 28(b)(6).

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orders.5

B. Sufficiency of Findings

But Respondents did timely file notice of appeal within thirty days of the 27

January 2025 permanency-planning order under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001. They argue

that the trial court failed to make sufficient findings in the 27 January 2025 order

under N.C.G.S. § 7B-101 and N.C.G.S. § 7B-906 and that competent evidence did not

support its findings. We disagree and thus affirm the trial court’s 27 January 2025

order.

We review orders that cease reunification efforts to determine “whether . . .

competent evidence . . . support[s] the [trial court’s] findings and whether the findings

support the conclusions of law.” In re A.P.W., 378 N.C. 405, 410 (2021). The trial

court’s findings of fact are “conclusive on appeal if . . . evidence . . . support[s] them,

even though the evidence might sustain findings to the contrary.” Adams v. Tessener,

354 N.C. 57, 63 (2001) (quotation omitted). Unchallenged findings of fact bind us on

appeal. Koufman v. Koufman, 330 N.C. 93, 97 (1991). We review the trial court’s

“dispositional choice[ ] . . . to eliminate reunification from the permanent plan . . . for

abuse of discretion.” A.P.W., 378 N.C. at 410 (quotation omitted).

At each permanency-planning hearing, a trial court must find “whether . . .

5 Respondents also fail to include a copy of the 14 February 2024 order in the record on appeal, merely attaching the order in an appendix to their brief. We base our review “solely upon the record on appeal,” which must “contain . . . a copy of the . . . order . . . from which appeal is taken.” N.C. R. App. P. 9(a)(h). Thus, even if Respondents had timely noticed appeal from this order, their failure to include it in the record deems it unpreserved for review.

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[DSS] reunification efforts . . . were reasonable” and must “make written findings

about [DSS] efforts . . . toward the primary permanent plan and any secondary

permanent plans” “[u]nless reunification efforts were previously ceased.” N.C.G.S.

§ 7B-906.2(c). The trial court must “consider information from the parents, the

juvenile, . . . the guardian ad litem, and any other person or agency that will aid in

the court’s review.” Id. § 7B-906.1(c) (italics added). Respondents claim that the trial

court “prevented” them from “presenting certain information” at the hearing in

violation of N.C.G.S. § 7B-906.1(c) and failed to consider “any testimony in support of

reunification.” Instead, Respondents argue that “there is no indication that the [trial]

court gave any consideration at all to anything other than the reports and

recommendations of Wilkes County DSS and the Guardian ad Litem.”

But the record indicates that the trial court considered Mother’s testimony in

making its findings. In the 27 January 2025 order, the trial court states that it “heard

the evidence” from the permanency-planning hearing, “including the testimony” of

Mother and Mother’s aunt. Mother testified to making progress on her DSS case plan

and to participating regularly in visitation with Lauren. She also testified to “hav[ing]

no idea” how Lauren received the injuries that had caused her removal from

Respondents’ care, to disbelieving that Father caused the injuries, and to desiring to

live with Father if Lauren were to return to their custody. The trial court found that

Mother “continues to indicate she has ‘no idea’ how the child was injured[,] and . . .

she does not believe that . . . Father caused the injuries.” This unchallenged finding

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reflects the trial court’s consideration of Mother’s testimony in reaching the decision

to cease reunification efforts. Because the trial court carefully and thoughtfully

considered the evidence in making its findings, we hold that it did not abuse its

discretion in reaching them.

Respondents further assert that DSS failed to make “reasonable efforts”

towards reunification and instigated “a systematic move towards setting conditions

for the minor child to never return home to her parents” despite Respondents’

“substantial if not full compliance” with their case plans. Respondents thus challenge

the trial court’s finding that DSS “made reasonable efforts to reunite[ ] the minor

child with her mother” as unsupported by the evidence. Our Supreme Court has

emphasized that a DSS “case plan is not just a checklist” and that reunification

requires parents to “demonstrate acknowledgement and understanding of why the

juvenile entered DSS custody[,] as well as changed behaviors.” In re R.L.R., 381 N.C.

863, 875 (2022) (quotation omitted). Here, Respondents continually refused to provide

any medically reasonable explanation for Lauren’s injuries or to acknowledge the

harmful conditions that caused her removal from their care. This consistent failure

to “demonstrate acknowledgement and understanding” of the reasons for Lauren’s

injuries and removal curtailed any reasonable efforts DSS could make towards

reunification. Id. Despite this, DSS provided and coordinated services to aid in

Respondents’ reunification efforts, including parenting classes, substance-abuse and

mental-health assessments, and consistent contact with caseworkers. Thus, we reject

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Respondents’ argument and hold that competent evidence supports the trial court’s

finding that DSS made reasonable efforts towards reunification.

C. Denial of Rule 60 Motion

Finally, Respondents argue that the trial court abused its discretion by

denying their Rule 60(b)(6) motion to reopen the evidence regarding adjudication. A

trial court may grant a party’s Rule 60(b) motion for relief from a final judgment or

order for reasons including mistake, newly discovered evidence unavailable at the

time of trial, or “[a]ny other reason justifying relief from the operation of the

judgment.” N.C. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). We review a trial court’s denial of a Rule 60(b)

motion solely for abuse of discretion. See In re E.H., 227 N.C. App. 525, 530 (2013).

Because Respondents failed to include a copy of the trial court’s order denying their

Rule 60(b) motion in the record on appeal, we cannot review their appeal from that

order. See N.C. R. App. P. 9(a)(h). Accordingly, we dismiss Respondents’ appeal from

the denial of their Rule 60(b)(6) motion.

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons discussed above, this Court (1) denies Respondents’ PWC, (2)

grants in part and denies in part Petitioner’s motion to dismiss, (3) affirms the trial

court’s 27 January 2025 permanency-planning order, and (4) affirms the trial court’s

denial of Respondents’ Rule 60(b)(6) motion.

AFFIRMED IN PART; GRANTED IN PART; DENIED IN PART.

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Judges GORE and FREEMAN concur.

Report per Rule 30(e).

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