In re: L.M.C.

Opinions

Opinion

An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. COA25-692

Filed 4 March 2026

Haywood County, No. 24JA000059-430

IN THE MATTER OF: L.M.C.

Appeal by Respondent-Father from orders entered 21 January 2025 and 19

March 2025 by Judge Justin B. Greene in Haywood County District Court. Heard in

the Court of Appeals 11 February 2026.

Attorney Richard Croutharmel, for the respondent-appellant father.

Parent Defender Annick Lenoir-Peek, by Senior Assistant Parent Defender J. Lee Gilliam, for the respondent-appellant father.

Attorney Rachel J. Hawes, for the petitioner-appellee Haywood County Health and Human Services Agency.

Attorney Brittany T. McKinney, for the petitioner-appellee Guardian ad Litem.

STADING, Judge.

Respondent-Father (“Father”) appeals from the trial court’s orders that

adjudicated L.M.C. (“Lainey”)1 and J.F.P. (“Jessica”)2 as abused and neglected

juveniles; placed the minor children in the custody of the Haywood County Health

1 We use pseudonyms to protect the identities of the minor children. N.C. R. App. P. 42(b). 2 J.F.P. is not a party to this appeal.

Opinion of the Court

and Human Services Agency (the “Agency”); ceased reunification efforts with Father;

and suspended Father’s contact with Lainey. On appeal, Father asserts the trial

court committed error by giving the Agency authority to consent to the prescription

of psychotropic medications for Lainey because it failed to render sufficient findings

in accordance with N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-505.1(c)(1) (2023). In response, the Agency

and the Guardian Ad Litem (the “GAL”) jointly moved this Court to dismiss Father’s

appeal on the basis that it is moot. See N.C. R. App. P. 37. After careful

consideration, we deny the joint motion to dismiss and affirm the trial court’s orders.

I. Background

The record tends to show that from 2023 through 2024, the Agency received

several reports concerning Father, Respondent-Mother,3 and Lainey. On 2 August

2023, the Agency learned, among other things, that child protective services (“CPS”)

had been working with the respondent-parents “due to the home being so full of trash

it could not be entered.” The next day, several social workers from the Agency and

Chief Matt Boger of the Maggie Valley Police Department visited the home. Father

reported the home had been without hot water for a long time, resulting in the minor

children bathing at their grandmother’s home. The Agency closed its case in October

2023, as neither child made troubling disclosures and the home was in adequate

3 Respondent-Mother is not a party to this appeal.

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condition.4

A little less than a year later, on 20 June 2024, the Agency obtained non-secure

custody of Lainey at 11:26 p.m. after receiving several reports from CPS within less

than twenty-four hours. The Agency received the first report at 1:29 a.m., which

stated Lainey “was picked up at her grandmother’s home . . . by . . . Jacob Rich . . .

and driven to West Virginia.” Jacob drove Lainey to the Blue Field Police Department

(the “BFPD”), where she disclosed that Father had been sexually assaulting her.

Father arrived at the police station at 9:15 a.m. At 10:40 a.m., the Agency received

the second report, alleging Jacob had abducted Lainey. However, the first and second

reports were “screened out” for various reasons.

The Agency received a third report from CPS at 3:05 p.m., which stated that

Lainey “had been abducted by a . . . man and taken to another state[.]” The

subsequent report also alleged that Father refused “to cooperate with follow-up

services” and refused to allow Lainey “to undergo a Forensic Interview and Child

Medical Examination.” A few hours later, at 5:15 p.m., CPS provided the fourth

report, noting that Father had been messaging other men on an application known

4 In addition to the matters discussed in the body of this opinion, the Agency’s petition maintained

that on 26 August 2019, Father notified the Haywood County Sheriff’s Office that Lainey “had disclosed to her teacher that her ‘Papaw Bobby’ had held her down and touched her private area.” Several days later, Lainey received a Child Medical Exam and “disclosed that her Paternal Step- Grandfather . . . had digitally penetrated her five or six times.” The paternal grandfather was later charged and convicted of indecent liberties with a child. Several years later, after the adjudication hearing in 2024, the trial court found that Father also had been sexually abusing Lainey during this time.

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as “Just Talk.” The report alleged that Father had messaged a man named Carlos to

set up sexual encounters between Carlos and Lainey. At this time, Chief Boger

similarly reported to the Agency his concern that Father “was trafficking [Lainey] for

sex.”

That same day, 20 June 2024, the Agency filed a petition, alleging that Lainey

and Jessica were abused, neglected, and dependent juveniles. The Agency later filed

an amended petition on 5 September 2024. After considering the parties’ arguments,

the trial court entered an order on 21 January 2025, adjudicating the minor children

as abused and neglected juveniles:

75. [Lainey] is an Abused juvenile, as defined by N.C.G.S. 7B-101(1), for all the reasons stated above, and due to the Respondent Parents’ committing, permitting, or encouraging the commission of a sex or pornography offense by, with, or upon the juvenile in violation of the criminal law, and willful failure to see to her medical needs, putting her at substantial risk of serious physical injury by other than accidental means.

76. [Jessica] is an Abused juvenile, as defined by N.C.G.S. 7B-101(1), for all the reasons stated above, and due to her Legal Custodians’ willful failure to see to her medical needs, putting her at substantial risk of serious physical injury by other than accidental means.

77. [Lainey] and [Jessica] are Neglected juveniles, as defined by N.C.G.S. 7B-101(1), for all the reasons stated above, and as their Respondent Parents and Legal Custodians do not provide proper care, supervision, or discipline, has not provided or arranged for the provision of necessary medical care, and has created or allowed to be created a living environment that is injurious to the juveniles’ welfare[.]

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The trial court found Lainey had engaged in a relationship “with a thirty-six

. . . year old male name Carlos who she met on a social media website,” and that

Father knew about the relationship with Carlos and “allowed [Lainey] to continue to

talk to him.” The trial court also found that Father and Carlos shared “sexually

explicit” and “extremely graphic” messages concerning Lainey, including messages

discussing sexual encounters. Moreover, the trial court found that upon searching

Father’s home, the Maggie Valley Police Department discovered seven cell phones.

Those cell phones contained “sexual content between [Lainey] and Carlos” and “were

very disturbing in nature.”

The trial court also found that: Jacob, the man who drove Lainey to West

Virginia and the BFPD, was thirty-four years old and was Lainey’s boyfriend;

Respondent-Mother knew of the relationship between Lainey and Jacob; Respondent-

Mother told Jacob that Lainey “was twenty . . . years old”; Jacob brought Lainey to

West Virginia on the day in question to live with him; Respondent-Mother knew of

Jacob’s plan to move Lainey to West Virginia; Lainey told Jacob that Father had been

sexually assaulting her; Lainey went to West Virginia with Jacob “to escape that

sexual abuse” by Father; Jacob brought Lainey to the BFPD thereafter to make a

report; the BFPD retrieved Lainey from Jacob’s home once they discovered “that she

was thirteen . . . years old”; and upon Lainey’s return to North Carolina, the Agency

“removed both children” from Father’s care. Finally, the trial court found that Lainey

“was sexually abused by” Father.

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On 19 March 2025, the trial court entered a disposition order. The trial court

ordered, inter alia, that:

1. It is in the best interests of [Lainey] that custody is placed and remains with the Haywood County Health and Human Services Agency, with placement in the Agency’s discretion as permitted by N.C.G.S. 7B-101, et[] seq., to provide or arrange for foster care or other placement, and with the authority to authorize necessary medical, dental, psychological and psychiatric services for the juvenile, with all authority granted by N.C.G.S. 7B-903.1 and N.C.G.S. 7B-505.1.

a. The Haywood County Health and Human Services Agency shall have authority to participate in and obtain and release information regarding the juvenile’s Individualized Education Plan and 504 Plan.

b. The Haywood County Health and Human Services Agency has the authority to consent to psychotropic medications prescribed to [Lainey] by her medical providers.

Father appealed the trial court’s orders on 1 April 2025.

II. Motion to Dismiss

The Agency and the Guardian ad Litem (the “Parties”) assert that Father’s

appeal from the 19 March 2025 order should be dismissed as moot because he

consented to the provision of psychotropic medications to Lainey.

“Like ‘standing,’ ‘mootness is another subset of the justiciability doctrine.”

McAdoo v. Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill, 225 N.C. App. 50, 52, 52, 736 S.E.2d 811, 815,

815 (2013) (cleaned up); Anderson v. N.C. State Bd. of Elections, 248 N.C. App. 1, 5,

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788 S.E.2d 179, 183 (2016) (citation modified). “A case is considered moot when a

determination is sought on a matter which, when rendered, cannot have any practical

effect on the existing controversy. Typically, courts will not entertain such cases

because it is not the responsibility of courts to decide abstract propositions of law.”

McAdoo, 225 N.C. App. at 52, 736 S.E.2d at 815; Roberts v. Madison Cnty. Realtors

Ass’n, 344 N.C. 394, 398–99, 474 S.E.2d 783, 787 (1996).

Here, Father’s proposed issue is appropriate for judicial resolution since he

asks us to answer a question pertaining to a live controversy—i.e., whether the trial

court should have made findings that the prescription of psychotropic medications

was in Lainey’s best interests under subsection 7B-505.1(c)(1). Anderson, 248 N.C.

App. at 5, 788 S.E.2d at 183. Although the parties’ arguments are persuasive with

respect to the substantive merits of Father’s appeal, we fail to see how answering this

question amounts to deciding an abstract proposition of law. See id. We therefore

deny the Parties’ joint motion to dismiss.

III. Analysis

Father asserts the trial court erred by concluding that the Agency possessed

the authority to consent to the prescription of psychotropic medication for Lainey.

Father maintains that he did not authorize the Agency to provide such treatment,

and absent findings that such treatment is in the best interests of Lainey, the trial

court committed error. On the other hand, the Parties argue that Father himself

consented to the provision of psychotropic medications to Lainey at the disposition

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hearing, which satisfied the statutory requirements of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-

505.1(c)(1).

A. Standard of Review

“The Juvenile Code divides abuse, neglect, and dependency proceedings into

two main phases: adjudicatory and dispositional. At the adjudicatory phase, the

Department of Social Services must show by clear and convincing evidence that a

juvenile qualifies as abused, neglected, or dependent as defined by the Juvenile

Code.” In re L.L., 386 N.C. 706, 712, 909 S.E.2d 151, 157 (2024) (cleaned up). And

“at the dispositional phase, the court’s task is to design an appropriate plan to meet

the needs of the juvenile and to achieve the objectives of the State in exercising

jurisdiction.” Id. (cleaned up).

Ordinarily, “the trial court’s dispositional choices . . . are reviewed only for

abuse of discretion, as those decisions are based upon the trial court’s assessment of

the child’s best interests.” In re L.R.L.B., 377 N.C. 311, 315, 857 S.E.2d 105, 111

(2021). But “when an appellant argues the trial court failed to follow a statutory

mandate, the error is preserved, and the issue is a question of law and reviewed de

novo.” In re J.C.-B., 276 N.C. App. at 192, 856 S.E.2d at 892. “Under a de novo

review, the court considers the matter anew and freely substitutes its own judgment

for that of the [trial court].” In re T.M.L., 377 N.C. 369, 375, 856 S.E.2d 787, 790

(2021) (cleaned up).

B. Authorization to Consent

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Section 7B-505.1 provides the procedures pertaining to the provision of medical

care for juveniles placed in nonsecure custody of a department of social services. N.C.

Gen. Stat. § 7B-505.1. Relevant here, subsection 7B-505.1(c)(1) requires the director

of a department of social services to obtain authorization from the juvenile’s parent,

guardian, or custodian before the director can consent to the prescription of

psychotropic medications:

(c) The director shall obtain authorization from the juvenile’s parent, guardian, or custodian to consent to all care or treatment not covered by subsection (a) or (b) of this section, except that the court may authorize the director to provide consent after a hearing at which the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the care, treatment, or evaluation requested is in the juvenile’s best interest. Care and treatment covered by this subsection includes:

(1) Prescriptions for psychotropic medications.

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-505.1(c)(1) (citation modified). That said, the statute provides

an exception to parental authorization: the trial “court may authorize the director to

provide consent after a hearing at which the court finds by clear and convincing

evidence that the care, treatment, or evaluation requested is in the juvenile’s best

interest.” Id. § 7B-505.1(c).

Chapter 7B defines “director” as “the director of the department of social

services in the county in which the juvenile resides or is found, or the director’s

representative as authorized in G.S. 108A-14.” Id. § 7B-101(10) (2023) (citation

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modified). Turning to section 108A-14, the director of a department of social services5

may delegate the authority to act as his representative to his staff members:

The director may delegate to one or more members of his staff the authority to act as his representative. The director may limit the delegated authority of his representative to specific tasks or areas of expertise. The director may designate, subject to the approval of the Commissioner of Labor, additional personnel outside his staff to issue youth employment certificates.

Id. § 108A-14(b) (2023); In re G.B.G., 297 N.C. App. 772, 778, 913 S.E.2d 249, 255

(2025); In re D.D.F., 187 N.C. App. 388, 393, 654 S.E.2d 1, 4 (2007); In re Dj.L., 184

N.C. App. 76, 79, 646 S.E.2d 134, 137 (2007). This includes the “statutory duty to

investigate any reports of abuse, neglect, or dependency of a juvenile and to take

appropriate action . . . .” In re N.X.A., 254 N.C. App. 670, 675, 803 S.E.2d 244, 247

5 “In 2012, the North Carolina General Assembly enacted legislation that provided counties with new

options for how they can organize and govern some local human services agencies, including local health departments and departments of social services.” UNC School of Government, North Carolina Public Health Law: Consolidated Human Services Agencies (CHSAs), https://www.sog.unc.edu/ resources/microsites/north-carolina-public-health-law/consolidated-human-services-agencies-chsas. After this law was passed, the Haywood County Board of Commissioners ultimately determined that it was in the best interest of the County to combine the existing health department and social services department as a consolidated human services agency. Id. “A consolidated human services agency (CHSA) is a single-county agency that provides local public health services and/or social services to county residents.” Jill D. Moore & Kristi Nickodem, What is a consolidated human services agency (CHSA)?, https://www.sog.unc.edu/resources/faqs/what-consolidated-human-services-agency-chsa; see also N.C. Gen. Stat. §153A-77(b) (2023). “In a county with a consolidated human services agency, the county manager must appoint a consolidated human services director who in turn assumes all of the powers and duties of a social services director.” Aimee N. Wall, County and Municipal Government in North Carolina 675, https://www.sog.unc.edu/sites/www.sog.unc.edu/files/CMG%2039_SocialServices .pdf. Furthermore, “the consolidated human services director may delegate some or all of these powers and duties to another person, but the consolidated director retains the ultimate responsibility for ensuring that all obligations and functions involving social services programs and policies are carried out.” Id. Similarly, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 153A-77(e) provides: “Except as otherwise provided by law, the human services director or the director’s designee shall have the same powers and duties as a social services director . . . .”

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(2017).

Father maintains he did not authorize the Agency to prescribe psychotropic

medications to Lainey. He thus argues the trial court committed error by granting

the Agency authority to consent to this care and treatment without rendering

findings supported by clear and convincing evidence that the medication was in

Lainey’s best interests. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-505.1(c). Although the order does

not contain such findings, a close reading of the transcript reveals that Father had

previously provided authorization to a social worker with the Agency in 2024. See id.

Indeed, Social Worker Stokes testified to the fact that in August 2024, Lainey’s

medication management provider recommended Lainey take medications for her

depression and anxiety. Ms. Stokes added that she emailed Father, asking for

approval of Lainey’s medication. Finally, Ms. Stokes noted that Father responded to

her email and Lainey received the prescriptions. Shortly thereafter on direct

examination, Father conceded to receiving the email from Ms. Stokes and stated that

he “gave [her] permission to do that.” And on cross-examination, Father was asked:

Q. -- you had an email exchange with [Ms. Stokes] on November the 6th of 2024?

A. Yes, ma’am. She asked . . . me about the medicine, if [Lainey] could take that medicine. And I said, “Yes, if the doctor, you know, is, you know, wants her to take it, she needs it. She can. She’s allowed to take it, you know.” I give her permission.

Although the record does not explicitly state Ms. Stokes is an authorized

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representative for the director of the Agency, precedent demonstrates that a social

worker assigned to a case qualifies as an authorized representative under section

108A-14—even if a juvenile petition does not explicitly state as such—since the

statutory duties assigned to a director of a department of social services are “executed

by the caseworkers.” In re D.D.F., 187 N.C. App. 388, 393, 654 S.E.2d 1, 4 (2007).

For example, in In re D.D.F., the father asserted that the trial court lacked

subject matter jurisdiction over the case since the social worker assigned to the

matter failed to explicitly state she was an authorized representative for the director

in the juvenile petition. Id. at 389, 654 S.E.2d at 2. A prior panel of this Court noted:

In light of the role of social services caseworkers as specifically designated by statute, where the record demonstrates that a DSS caseworker is assigned to the child’s case and there is no indication whatsoever that the caseworker was not an “authorized representative” of the director or that she was acting outside of her authority, the DSS caseworker is an “authorized representative” of the director for purposes of filing a petition under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-403. See N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 7B-101(10), - 403(a), 108A-14(a)(11), (b).

Id. at 393, 654 S.E.2d at 4.

The Court determined that the social worker “was assigned” to the juvenile’s

case “at its inception,” and was charged with taking necessary investigatory duties,

including filing the juvenile petition. Id. It also noted, “the petition and record before

the trial court clearly demonstrate[d] the petitioning caseworker’s status and [the

father] ha[d] never raised any question as to the caseworker’s authority to file a

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petition for adjudication.” Id. The Court thus held:

Therefore, based upon the statutory duties assigned to the DSS director, which are executed by the caseworkers, [the social worker] was an “authorized representative” of the director who could verify a petition pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-403. The fact that the petition did not explicitly state that she was an “authorized representative” of the director does not create a jurisdictional defect. See N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 7B-101(10), -403(a), -108A-14(a)(11).

Id.; see also, e.g., In re Dj.L., 184 N.C. App. at 80, 646 S.E.2d at 137.

Here, Social Worker Stokes testified to serving as Lainey’s foster care social

worker for the entire time Lainey was in the Agency’s custody. Like the social worker

in D.D.F., Ms. Stokes was charged with taking the necessary steps pertaining to

Lainey’s medical care while in nonsecure custody of the Agency. See In re D.D.F., 187

N.C. App. at 393, 654 S.E.2d at 4; see also N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-505.1. Further,

nothing in the record indicates “that the caseworker was not an authorized

representative of the director or that she was acting outside of her authority.” D.D.F.,

187 N.C. App. at 393, 654 S.E.2d at 4. And like In re Dj.L., Father has never argued,

and does not now argue, that Ms. Stokes is not an authorized representative of the

Director or that she exceeded the scope of her authority by accepting Father’s

authorization to consent to the prescription of psychotropic medication. See In re

Dj.L, 184 N.C. App. at 80, 646 S.E.2d at 137. As in D.D.F., Ms. Stokes qualifies as

an “authorized representative” of the director. 187 N.C. App. at 393, 654 S.E.2d at 4.

Although this case does not deal with the filing of a juvenile petition like In re

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D.D.F. and In re Dj.L, the same logic applies since receiving authorization from a

parent to consent to medical treatment is a duty of the director of a department of

social services—just like the filing of a juvenile petition. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-

403 (2023) (“Receipt of reports; filing of petition”); see also § 7B-505.1 (“Consent for

medical care for a juvenile placed in nonsecure custody of a department of social

services.”). Thus, as in In re D.F.F. and In re Dj.L, the fact that the record does not

explicitly state Ms. Stokes is an authorized representative for the Agency does not

change the outcome of this Court’s analysis.

Accordingly, we hold the trial court did not err by determining the Agency

possessed the authority to consent to the prescription of psychopathic medication for

Lainey in light of Father’s written authorization. Father’s argument is overruled.

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons above, the trial court did not err by failing to make findings in

accordance with N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-505.1(c). The record adequately demonstrates

that Father authorized a representative for the director of the Agency to consent to

the prescription of psychotropic medications for Lainey.

AFFIRMED.

Judges COLLINS and WOOD concur.

Report per Rule 30(e).

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