An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA25-692
Filed 4 March 2026
Haywood County, No. 24JA000059-430
IN THE MATTER OF: L.M.C.
Appeal by Respondent-Father from orders entered 21 January 2025 and 19
March 2025 by Judge Justin B. Greene in Haywood County District Court. Heard in
the Court of Appeals 11 February 2026.
Attorney Richard Croutharmel, for the respondent-appellant father.
Parent Defender Annick Lenoir-Peek, by Senior Assistant Parent Defender J. Lee Gilliam, for the respondent-appellant father.
Attorney Rachel J. Hawes, for the petitioner-appellee Haywood County Health and Human Services Agency.
Attorney Brittany T. McKinney, for the petitioner-appellee Guardian ad Litem.
STADING, Judge.
Respondent-Father (“Father”) appeals from the trial court’s orders that
adjudicated L.M.C. (“Lainey”)1 and J.F.P. (“Jessica”)2 as abused and neglected
juveniles; placed the minor children in the custody of the Haywood County Health
1 We use pseudonyms to protect the identities of the minor children. N.C. R. App. P. 42(b). 2 J.F.P. is not a party to this appeal. IN RE: L.M.C.
Opinion of the Court
and Human Services Agency (the “Agency”); ceased reunification efforts with Father;
and suspended Father’s contact with Lainey. On appeal, Father asserts the trial
court committed error by giving the Agency authority to consent to the prescription
of psychotropic medications for Lainey because it failed to render sufficient findings
in accordance with N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-505.1(c)(1) (2023). In response, the Agency
and the Guardian Ad Litem (the “GAL”) jointly moved this Court to dismiss Father’s
appeal on the basis that it is moot. See N.C. R. App. P. 37. After careful
consideration, we deny the joint motion to dismiss and affirm the trial court’s orders.
I. Background
The record tends to show that from 2023 through 2024, the Agency received
several reports concerning Father, Respondent-Mother,3 and Lainey. On 2 August
2023, the Agency learned, among other things, that child protective services (“CPS”)
had been working with the respondent-parents “due to the home being so full of trash
it could not be entered.” The next day, several social workers from the Agency and
Chief Matt Boger of the Maggie Valley Police Department visited the home. Father
reported the home had been without hot water for a long time, resulting in the minor
children bathing at their grandmother’s home. The Agency closed its case in October
2023, as neither child made troubling disclosures and the home was in adequate
3 Respondent-Mother is not a party to this appeal.
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condition.4
A little less than a year later, on 20 June 2024, the Agency obtained non-secure
custody of Lainey at 11:26 p.m. after receiving several reports from CPS within less
than twenty-four hours. The Agency received the first report at 1:29 a.m., which
stated Lainey “was picked up at her grandmother’s home . . . by . . . Jacob Rich . . .
and driven to West Virginia.” Jacob drove Lainey to the Blue Field Police Department
(the “BFPD”), where she disclosed that Father had been sexually assaulting her.
Father arrived at the police station at 9:15 a.m. At 10:40 a.m., the Agency received
the second report, alleging Jacob had abducted Lainey. However, the first and second
reports were “screened out” for various reasons.
The Agency received a third report from CPS at 3:05 p.m., which stated that
Lainey “had been abducted by a . . . man and taken to another state[.]” The
subsequent report also alleged that Father refused “to cooperate with follow-up
services” and refused to allow Lainey “to undergo a Forensic Interview and Child
Medical Examination.” A few hours later, at 5:15 p.m., CPS provided the fourth
report, noting that Father had been messaging other men on an application known
4 In addition to the matters discussed in the body of this opinion, the Agency’s petition maintained
that on 26 August 2019, Father notified the Haywood County Sheriff’s Office that Lainey “had disclosed to her teacher that her ‘Papaw Bobby’ had held her down and touched her private area.” Several days later, Lainey received a Child Medical Exam and “disclosed that her Paternal Step- Grandfather . . . had digitally penetrated her five or six times.” The paternal grandfather was later charged and convicted of indecent liberties with a child. Several years later, after the adjudication hearing in 2024, the trial court found that Father also had been sexually abusing Lainey during this time.
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as “Just Talk.” The report alleged that Father had messaged a man named Carlos to
set up sexual encounters between Carlos and Lainey. At this time, Chief Boger
similarly reported to the Agency his concern that Father “was trafficking [Lainey] for
sex.”
That same day, 20 June 2024, the Agency filed a petition, alleging that Lainey
and Jessica were abused, neglected, and dependent juveniles. The Agency later filed
an amended petition on 5 September 2024. After considering the parties’ arguments,
the trial court entered an order on 21 January 2025, adjudicating the minor children
as abused and neglected juveniles:
75. [Lainey] is an Abused juvenile, as defined by N.C.G.S. 7B-101(1), for all the reasons stated above, and due to the Respondent Parents’ committing, permitting, or encouraging the commission of a sex or pornography offense by, with, or upon the juvenile in violation of the criminal law, and willful failure to see to her medical needs, putting her at substantial risk of serious physical injury by other than accidental means.
76. [Jessica] is an Abused juvenile, as defined by N.C.G.S. 7B-101(1), for all the reasons stated above, and due to her Legal Custodians’ willful failure to see to her medical needs, putting her at substantial risk of serious physical injury by other than accidental means.
77. [Lainey] and [Jessica] are Neglected juveniles, as defined by N.C.G.S. 7B-101(1), for all the reasons stated above, and as their Respondent Parents and Legal Custodians do not provide proper care, supervision, or discipline, has not provided or arranged for the provision of necessary medical care, and has created or allowed to be created a living environment that is injurious to the juveniles’ welfare[.]
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The trial court found Lainey had engaged in a relationship “with a thirty-six
. . . year old male name Carlos who she met on a social media website,” and that
Father knew about the relationship with Carlos and “allowed [Lainey] to continue to
talk to him.” The trial court also found that Father and Carlos shared “sexually
explicit” and “extremely graphic” messages concerning Lainey, including messages
discussing sexual encounters. Moreover, the trial court found that upon searching
Father’s home, the Maggie Valley Police Department discovered seven cell phones.
Those cell phones contained “sexual content between [Lainey] and Carlos” and “were
very disturbing in nature.”
The trial court also found that: Jacob, the man who drove Lainey to West
Virginia and the BFPD, was thirty-four years old and was Lainey’s boyfriend;
Respondent-Mother knew of the relationship between Lainey and Jacob; Respondent-
Mother told Jacob that Lainey “was twenty . . . years old”; Jacob brought Lainey to
West Virginia on the day in question to live with him; Respondent-Mother knew of
Jacob’s plan to move Lainey to West Virginia; Lainey told Jacob that Father had been
sexually assaulting her; Lainey went to West Virginia with Jacob “to escape that
sexual abuse” by Father; Jacob brought Lainey to the BFPD thereafter to make a
report; the BFPD retrieved Lainey from Jacob’s home once they discovered “that she
was thirteen . . . years old”; and upon Lainey’s return to North Carolina, the Agency
“removed both children” from Father’s care. Finally, the trial court found that Lainey
“was sexually abused by” Father.
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On 19 March 2025, the trial court entered a disposition order. The trial court
ordered, inter alia, that:
1. It is in the best interests of [Lainey] that custody is placed and remains with the Haywood County Health and Human Services Agency, with placement in the Agency’s discretion as permitted by N.C.G.S. 7B-101, et[] seq., to provide or arrange for foster care or other placement, and with the authority to authorize necessary medical, dental, psychological and psychiatric services for the juvenile, with all authority granted by N.C.G.S. 7B-903.1 and N.C.G.S. 7B-505.1.
a. The Haywood County Health and Human Services Agency shall have authority to participate in and obtain and release information regarding the juvenile’s Individualized Education Plan and 504 Plan.
b. The Haywood County Health and Human Services Agency has the authority to consent to psychotropic medications prescribed to [Lainey] by her medical providers.
Father appealed the trial court’s orders on 1 April 2025.
II. Motion to Dismiss
The Agency and the Guardian ad Litem (the “Parties”) assert that Father’s
appeal from the 19 March 2025 order should be dismissed as moot because he
consented to the provision of psychotropic medications to Lainey.
“Like ‘standing,’ ‘mootness is another subset of the justiciability doctrine.”
McAdoo v. Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill, 225 N.C. App. 50, 52, 52, 736 S.E.2d 811, 815,
815 (2013) (cleaned up); Anderson v. N.C. State Bd. of Elections, 248 N.C. App. 1, 5,
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788 S.E.2d 179, 183 (2016) (citation modified). “A case is considered moot when a
determination is sought on a matter which, when rendered, cannot have any practical
effect on the existing controversy. Typically, courts will not entertain such cases
because it is not the responsibility of courts to decide abstract propositions of law.”
McAdoo, 225 N.C. App. at 52, 736 S.E.2d at 815; Roberts v. Madison Cnty. Realtors
Ass’n, 344 N.C. 394, 398–99, 474 S.E.2d 783, 787 (1996).
Here, Father’s proposed issue is appropriate for judicial resolution since he
asks us to answer a question pertaining to a live controversy—i.e., whether the trial
court should have made findings that the prescription of psychotropic medications
was in Lainey’s best interests under subsection 7B-505.1(c)(1). Anderson, 248 N.C.
App. at 5, 788 S.E.2d at 183. Although the parties’ arguments are persuasive with
respect to the substantive merits of Father’s appeal, we fail to see how answering this
question amounts to deciding an abstract proposition of law. See id. We therefore
deny the Parties’ joint motion to dismiss.
III. Analysis
Father asserts the trial court erred by concluding that the Agency possessed
the authority to consent to the prescription of psychotropic medication for Lainey.
Father maintains that he did not authorize the Agency to provide such treatment,
and absent findings that such treatment is in the best interests of Lainey, the trial
court committed error. On the other hand, the Parties argue that Father himself
consented to the provision of psychotropic medications to Lainey at the disposition
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hearing, which satisfied the statutory requirements of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-
505.1(c)(1).
A. Standard of Review
“The Juvenile Code divides abuse, neglect, and dependency proceedings into
two main phases: adjudicatory and dispositional. At the adjudicatory phase, the
Department of Social Services must show by clear and convincing evidence that a
juvenile qualifies as abused, neglected, or dependent as defined by the Juvenile
Code.” In re L.L., 386 N.C. 706, 712, 909 S.E.2d 151, 157 (2024) (cleaned up). And
“at the dispositional phase, the court’s task is to design an appropriate plan to meet
the needs of the juvenile and to achieve the objectives of the State in exercising
jurisdiction.” Id. (cleaned up).
Ordinarily, “the trial court’s dispositional choices . . . are reviewed only for
abuse of discretion, as those decisions are based upon the trial court’s assessment of
the child’s best interests.” In re L.R.L.B., 377 N.C. 311, 315, 857 S.E.2d 105, 111
(2021). But “when an appellant argues the trial court failed to follow a statutory
mandate, the error is preserved, and the issue is a question of law and reviewed de
novo.” In re J.C.-B., 276 N.C. App. at 192, 856 S.E.2d at 892. “Under a de novo
review, the court considers the matter anew and freely substitutes its own judgment
for that of the [trial court].” In re T.M.L., 377 N.C. 369, 375, 856 S.E.2d 787, 790
(2021) (cleaned up).
B. Authorization to Consent
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Section 7B-505.1 provides the procedures pertaining to the provision of medical
care for juveniles placed in nonsecure custody of a department of social services. N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 7B-505.1. Relevant here, subsection 7B-505.1(c)(1) requires the director
of a department of social services to obtain authorization from the juvenile’s parent,
guardian, or custodian before the director can consent to the prescription of
psychotropic medications:
(c) The director shall obtain authorization from the juvenile’s parent, guardian, or custodian to consent to all care or treatment not covered by subsection (a) or (b) of this section, except that the court may authorize the director to provide consent after a hearing at which the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the care, treatment, or evaluation requested is in the juvenile’s best interest. Care and treatment covered by this subsection includes:
(1) Prescriptions for psychotropic medications.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-505.1(c)(1) (citation modified). That said, the statute provides
an exception to parental authorization: the trial “court may authorize the director to
provide consent after a hearing at which the court finds by clear and convincing
evidence that the care, treatment, or evaluation requested is in the juvenile’s best
interest.” Id. § 7B-505.1(c).
Chapter 7B defines “director” as “the director of the department of social
services in the county in which the juvenile resides or is found, or the director’s
representative as authorized in G.S. 108A-14.” Id. § 7B-101(10) (2023) (citation
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modified). Turning to section 108A-14, the director of a department of social services5
may delegate the authority to act as his representative to his staff members:
The director may delegate to one or more members of his staff the authority to act as his representative. The director may limit the delegated authority of his representative to specific tasks or areas of expertise. The director may designate, subject to the approval of the Commissioner of Labor, additional personnel outside his staff to issue youth employment certificates.
Id. § 108A-14(b) (2023); In re G.B.G., 297 N.C. App. 772, 778, 913 S.E.2d 249, 255
(2025); In re D.D.F., 187 N.C. App. 388, 393, 654 S.E.2d 1, 4 (2007); In re Dj.L., 184
N.C. App. 76, 79, 646 S.E.2d 134, 137 (2007). This includes the “statutory duty to
investigate any reports of abuse, neglect, or dependency of a juvenile and to take
appropriate action . . . .” In re N.X.A., 254 N.C. App. 670, 675, 803 S.E.2d 244, 247
5 “In 2012, the North Carolina General Assembly enacted legislation that provided counties with new
options for how they can organize and govern some local human services agencies, including local health departments and departments of social services.” UNC School of Government, North Carolina Public Health Law: Consolidated Human Services Agencies (CHSAs), https://www.sog.unc.edu/ resources/microsites/north-carolina-public-health-law/consolidated-human-services-agencies-chsas. After this law was passed, the Haywood County Board of Commissioners ultimately determined that it was in the best interest of the County to combine the existing health department and social services department as a consolidated human services agency. Id. “A consolidated human services agency (CHSA) is a single-county agency that provides local public health services and/or social services to county residents.” Jill D. Moore & Kristi Nickodem, What is a consolidated human services agency (CHSA)?, https://www.sog.unc.edu/resources/faqs/what-consolidated-human-services-agency-chsa; see also N.C. Gen. Stat. §153A-77(b) (2023). “In a county with a consolidated human services agency, the county manager must appoint a consolidated human services director who in turn assumes all of the powers and duties of a social services director.” Aimee N. Wall, County and Municipal Government in North Carolina 675, https://www.sog.unc.edu/sites/www.sog.unc.edu/files/CMG%2039_SocialServices .pdf. Furthermore, “the consolidated human services director may delegate some or all of these powers and duties to another person, but the consolidated director retains the ultimate responsibility for ensuring that all obligations and functions involving social services programs and policies are carried out.” Id. Similarly, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 153A-77(e) provides: “Except as otherwise provided by law, the human services director or the director’s designee shall have the same powers and duties as a social services director . . . .”
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(2017).
Father maintains he did not authorize the Agency to prescribe psychotropic
medications to Lainey. He thus argues the trial court committed error by granting
the Agency authority to consent to this care and treatment without rendering
findings supported by clear and convincing evidence that the medication was in
Lainey’s best interests. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-505.1(c). Although the order does
not contain such findings, a close reading of the transcript reveals that Father had
previously provided authorization to a social worker with the Agency in 2024. See id.
Indeed, Social Worker Stokes testified to the fact that in August 2024, Lainey’s
medication management provider recommended Lainey take medications for her
depression and anxiety. Ms. Stokes added that she emailed Father, asking for
approval of Lainey’s medication. Finally, Ms. Stokes noted that Father responded to
her email and Lainey received the prescriptions. Shortly thereafter on direct
examination, Father conceded to receiving the email from Ms. Stokes and stated that
he “gave [her] permission to do that.” And on cross-examination, Father was asked:
Q. -- you had an email exchange with [Ms. Stokes] on November the 6th of 2024?
A. Yes, ma’am. She asked . . . me about the medicine, if [Lainey] could take that medicine. And I said, “Yes, if the doctor, you know, is, you know, wants her to take it, she needs it. She can. She’s allowed to take it, you know.” I give her permission.
Although the record does not explicitly state Ms. Stokes is an authorized
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representative for the director of the Agency, precedent demonstrates that a social
worker assigned to a case qualifies as an authorized representative under section
108A-14—even if a juvenile petition does not explicitly state as such—since the
statutory duties assigned to a director of a department of social services are “executed
by the caseworkers.” In re D.D.F., 187 N.C. App. 388, 393, 654 S.E.2d 1, 4 (2007).
For example, in In re D.D.F., the father asserted that the trial court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction over the case since the social worker assigned to the
matter failed to explicitly state she was an authorized representative for the director
in the juvenile petition. Id. at 389, 654 S.E.2d at 2. A prior panel of this Court noted:
In light of the role of social services caseworkers as specifically designated by statute, where the record demonstrates that a DSS caseworker is assigned to the child’s case and there is no indication whatsoever that the caseworker was not an “authorized representative” of the director or that she was acting outside of her authority, the DSS caseworker is an “authorized representative” of the director for purposes of filing a petition under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-403. See N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 7B-101(10), - 403(a), 108A-14(a)(11), (b).
Id. at 393, 654 S.E.2d at 4.
The Court determined that the social worker “was assigned” to the juvenile’s
case “at its inception,” and was charged with taking necessary investigatory duties,
including filing the juvenile petition. Id. It also noted, “the petition and record before
the trial court clearly demonstrate[d] the petitioning caseworker’s status and [the
father] ha[d] never raised any question as to the caseworker’s authority to file a
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petition for adjudication.” Id. The Court thus held:
Therefore, based upon the statutory duties assigned to the DSS director, which are executed by the caseworkers, [the social worker] was an “authorized representative” of the director who could verify a petition pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-403. The fact that the petition did not explicitly state that she was an “authorized representative” of the director does not create a jurisdictional defect. See N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 7B-101(10), -403(a), -108A-14(a)(11).
Id.; see also, e.g., In re Dj.L., 184 N.C. App. at 80, 646 S.E.2d at 137.
Here, Social Worker Stokes testified to serving as Lainey’s foster care social
worker for the entire time Lainey was in the Agency’s custody. Like the social worker
in D.D.F., Ms. Stokes was charged with taking the necessary steps pertaining to
Lainey’s medical care while in nonsecure custody of the Agency. See In re D.D.F., 187
N.C. App. at 393, 654 S.E.2d at 4; see also N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-505.1. Further,
nothing in the record indicates “that the caseworker was not an authorized
representative of the director or that she was acting outside of her authority.” D.D.F.,
187 N.C. App. at 393, 654 S.E.2d at 4. And like In re Dj.L., Father has never argued,
and does not now argue, that Ms. Stokes is not an authorized representative of the
Director or that she exceeded the scope of her authority by accepting Father’s
authorization to consent to the prescription of psychotropic medication. See In re
Dj.L, 184 N.C. App. at 80, 646 S.E.2d at 137. As in D.D.F., Ms. Stokes qualifies as
an “authorized representative” of the director. 187 N.C. App. at 393, 654 S.E.2d at 4.
Although this case does not deal with the filing of a juvenile petition like In re
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D.D.F. and In re Dj.L, the same logic applies since receiving authorization from a
parent to consent to medical treatment is a duty of the director of a department of
social services—just like the filing of a juvenile petition. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-
403 (2023) (“Receipt of reports; filing of petition”); see also § 7B-505.1 (“Consent for
medical care for a juvenile placed in nonsecure custody of a department of social
services.”). Thus, as in In re D.F.F. and In re Dj.L, the fact that the record does not
explicitly state Ms. Stokes is an authorized representative for the Agency does not
change the outcome of this Court’s analysis.
Accordingly, we hold the trial court did not err by determining the Agency
possessed the authority to consent to the prescription of psychopathic medication for
Lainey in light of Father’s written authorization. Father’s argument is overruled.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons above, the trial court did not err by failing to make findings in
accordance with N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-505.1(c). The record adequately demonstrates
that Father authorized a representative for the director of the Agency to consent to
the prescription of psychotropic medications for Lainey.
AFFIRMED.
Judges COLLINS and WOOD concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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