In re L.L.
Opinion
An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
NO. COA14-365 NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed: 15 July 2014
IN THE MATTER OF: Orange County No. 11 JA 1 L.L.
Appeal by respondent from order entered 20 December 2013 by
Judge Beverly Scarlett in Orange County District Court. Heard
in the Court of Appeals 30 June 2013.
Michael N. Tousey for guardian ad litem.
Mary McCullers Reece for respondent-appellant mother.
HUNTER, JR., Robert N., Judge.
Respondent, mother of juvenile L.L. (“Larry”), appeals from
an order styled “Custody Order 7B-911 N.C.G.S. Chapter 50”
entered by the district court on remand from our decision in In
re L.L., ___ N.C. App. ___, 749 S.E.2d 113, 2013 N.C. App. LEXIS
873 (2013) (unpublished) (“L.L. II”). We affirm.
This is respondent’s third appeal in this cause. In In re
L.L., ___ N.C. App. ___, 734 S.E.2d 140, 2012 N.C. App. LEXIS -2- 1241 (2012) (unpublished) (“L.L. I”), she appealed from a
permanency planning order that awarded legal and physical
custody of Larry to his father. Because the order lacked the
finding required by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-907(b)(1) (2013) as to
whether it was possible to return Larry to respondent’s home
immediately or within the next six months, we reversed and
remanded to the district court for a new permanency planning
hearing.1 L.L. I, 2012 N.C. App. LEXIS 1241, at *10.
In L.L. II, respondent appealed from the order entered on
remand from L.L. I. In this order, entered 23 January 2013, the
district court not only granted custody to Larry’s father but
also closed the juvenile case and converted the proceeding to a
civil custody action under Chapter 50 of our General Statutes.
See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-911 (2013). Although respondent again
claimed the order lacked the necessary permanency planning
finding under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-907(b)(1), we deemed the
court’s findings sufficient and “accordingly affirm[ed] this
portion of the order.” L.L. II, 2013 N.C. App. LEXIS 873, at
*3. However, we vacated the portion of the order transferring
the case from juvenile court to civil custody court, due to the
court’s failure to make the statutorily required finding
1 We also remanded for entry of a proper visitation plan. L.L. I, 2012 N.C. App. LEXIS 1241, at *10. -3- “‘[t]hat there is not a need for continued State intervention on
behalf of the juvenile through a juvenile court proceeding[.]’”
Id. at *4 (quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-911(c)(2)(a) (2011)).
“Absent . . . any finding which addresses the need for continued
State intervention on behalf of the juvenile[,]” we concluded,
“the order of transfer must be vacated and the matter remanded
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.” Id.
Following our decision in L.L. II, respondent filed a
motion to modify visitation and noticed the matter for hearing
on 19 December 2013. At the hearing the parties described their
difficulty in agreeing upon a mutually convenient time for
respondent’s visitation with Larry. After stating its belief
that “[this] is a Chapter 50 issue[,]” the court announced,
“This case is definitely going to Chapter 50. I am finding that
as of the date of the last order from DSS court that was
appealed to the Court of Appeals, that there has not been any
need for further State intervention.” The court denied
respondent’s motion to modify visitation in an order entered 10
January 2014.
In its “Custody Order 7B-911 N.C.G.S. Chapter 50[,]” the
district court acknowledged this Court’s mandate in L.L. II,
repeated the findings of fact made in its 23 January 2013 order, -4- and added an additional finding that, “[p]ursuant to North
Carolina General Statute 7B-911(c)(2), there is no longer a need
for state intervention in this matter and this matter is
properly converted to a Chapter 50 case.” The court again
decreed that custody of Larry would be granted to his father and
that “[t]his matter shall be closed to further court review and
be converted to a Chapter 50 case pursuant to N.C.G.S. 7B-911.”
It directed the clerk of court to “assign a CVD file number for
this matter” and to “treat this order as the initiation of a
civil custody action[.]”
Respondent now claims that the district “court erred by
entering a permanency planning remand order” without providing
notice to the parties as required by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-906.1
(2013). She notes that she “did not calendar the matter for
permanency planning hearing or for a remand hearing on the issue
of transferring jurisdiction to Chapter 50 court” when she
noticed her motion to modify visitation for hearing on 19
December 2013. Therefore, respondent contends, “the issues
relating to permanency planning, including transfer of the case,
were not properly before the trial court.”
The guardian ad litem (“GAL”) has moved to dismiss
respondent’s appeal, claiming that the “Custody Order 7B-911 -5- N.C.G.S. Chapter 50” is not appealable. In her statement of
grounds for appellate review, see N.C. R. App. P. 28(b)(4),
respondent asserts a right of appeal under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-
1001(a)(4) (2013), inasmuch as the order “changes legal custody
of a juvenile.” She suggests that the district court
“replace[d] the permanency planning orders remanded by this
Court on 6 November 2013 and 20 August 2013” and that,
therefore, “the effect of the current appealed order is to
change the child’s legal custody and cease review in the
juvenile court.”
We agree with the GAL that the order entered sub judice did
not effect a change in Larry’s custody, which remained with his
father. Nonetheless, we believe it is subject to appeal—either
as an order “which in effect determines the [juvenile] action
and prevents a judgment from which appeal might be taken[,]”
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1001(a)(2), or as a civil custody
determination under Chapter 50. See N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 7B-
911(b), 50-19.1 (2013). Therefore, we deny the GAL’s motion to
dismiss.
We find no merit to respondent’s claim that she was denied
notice of a permanency planning hearing under N.C. Gen. Stat. §
7B-906.1(b). Our ruling in L.L. II affirmed the portion of the -6- district court’s 23 January 2013 order awarding custody to
Larry’s father. We vacated the order only insofar as it
converted the juvenile case to a civil custody action under N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 7B-911. Though we remanded for further fact-
finding under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-911(c)(2)(a), our mandate did
not require the district court to hold a new hearing on the
issue. Moreover, we find no indication that the court intended
to revisit Larry’s permanent plan or its transfer decision at
the 19 December 2013 hearing noticed by respondent on her motion
to modify visitation. While the court reiterated its intention
to transfer the case from juvenile to civil court, it did so in
the course of explaining its ruling on respondent’s motion.
Because the hearing in question was not a “subsequent permanency
planning” hearing under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-906.1, the
statute’s notice provisions did not apply.
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