In Re Lincoln

144 B.R. 498, 1992 Bankr. LEXIS 2356, 1992 WL 218847
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, D. Montana
DecidedSeptember 8, 1992
Docket15-60467
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 144 B.R. 498 (In Re Lincoln) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Montana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Lincoln, 144 B.R. 498, 1992 Bankr. LEXIS 2356, 1992 WL 218847 (Mont. 1992).

Opinion

ORDER

JOHN L. PETERSON, Bankruptcy Judge.

After due notice hearing was held at Great Falls on August 18, 1992, on the Motion For Relief From The Automatic Stay And Request For Setoff filed August 5, 1992, by the Farmers Home Administration (“FmHA”). The Debtors filed an objection on August 14,1992, and appeared at *500 the hearing in opposition to the motion. FmHA was represented at the hearing in support of its motion. Testimony of Debt- or Joseph M. Lincoln and FmHA’s Roger Smith was heard, and several exhibits were admitted into evidence. At the close of the hearing this Court granted each party five (5) days to file simultaneous briefs, and took the matter under advisement. The briefs having now been filed, this Court deems this matter submitted and ripe for decision.

At issue in this case is whether to grant FmHA a setoff of government funds due the Debtors under Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) contracts, for payment against a pre-petition debt due FmHA by the Debtors. For the reasons set forth below, this Court denies the motion and request for setoff.

The Debtors filed a voluntary Chapter 12 Petition on April 17, 1992. The Statement and Schedules were filed May 7, 1992. FmHA is listed at Schedule D as a secured creditor for farm loans secured by a second lien on the Debtors’ real estate and a first lien on chattels. The amount of FmHA’s claim is scheduled as $543,972 with $453,-414 of the claim unsecured. Another scheduled secured creditor is Farm Credit Services (“FCS”), with a secured claim listed in the sum of $253,796.

FmHA filed a Proof of Claim on July 27, 1992, asserting a secured claim in the sum of $477,240.01. The FmHA claim arises from a series of initial, subsequent, rescheduled, or consolidated loans to the Debtors beginning in 1981 through 1986. The Debtors executed mortgages to FmHA for these loans on their real property, crops, vehicles, equipment, livestock, and brands. FmHA asserts its secured status based upon these mortgages. However, FmHA’s mortgages acknowledge that the Debtors’ real property is subject to the prior recorded mortgages of FCS. FmHA therefore argues in its brief and motion that secured status for its claim arises out of its right to setoff against the Debtors’ CRP contract payments described below pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 553 and this Court’s holding in In re Mohar, 140 B.R. 273, 280, 10 MontB.R. 501, 513 (Bankr. Mont.1992).

FCS filed three (3) Proofs of Claim on July 24, 1992, which claim a total secured claim in the sum of $248,183.44. This debt arises from notes and mortgages executed by the Debtors to FCS or its predecessor, the Federal Land Bank of Spokane, in 1968, 1975, and 1977. The mortgages were duly recorded in the respective years. A provision in each of the FCS mortgages provides that, in addition to the Debtors’ real estate, the Debtors granted FCS all leases, permits, licenses or privileges then held or later issued to the Debtors by the United States of America or any department or agency thereof. This clause bears upon the issue discussed below of the relative priority positions of FmHA and FCS against the Debtor’s CRP contract payments.

No objections to claims have been filed in this case under F.R.B.P. 3007 or 3012. Therefore, the Proofs of claim constitute prima facie evidence of the validity and amount of the claims. In re Vanden Bos, 9 Mont.B.R. 419, 421 (Bankr.Mont.1991). The Proofs of Claim show that FCS’s liens against the Debtors’ real property have priority over FmHA’s lien on real property.

In Schedule D under “Executory Contracts” the Debtor lists the “U.S. Department of Agriculture, Hill County ASCS,” as the other party to an CRP contracts on approximately 913 acres at $40 per acre. Exhibits E, F, G, H, I, and J, admitted into evidence without objection, consist of several ten-year CRP contracts entered into by the Debtors beginning in 1987, 1988, and 1991. The parties agree that the total annual CRP payments under these contracts is $41,450 until 1997 when the first contract expires. The parties also agree that the total future payments to be received under the CRP contracts in which the Debtors have an interest is $280,140.

Joseph Lincoln testified that the Debtors are in default on the FCS loans, and that the Debtors need the CRP contract payments to pay both the FCS loans and the FmHA loans. Lincoln testified that the *501 majority of the Debtor’s farm income is from the CRP contracts. This evidence is uncontroverted. It is also undisputed that the Debtors are in default on the FmHA debt, as shown by Exhibits L and M, which are notices of acceleration.

The evidence shows that FmHA proceeded to request an administrative offset against the Debtors’ CRP contract payments in March of 1992. The Debtors requested an appeal of the administrative offset in April of 1992, shown by Exhibit 1.

In spite of the appeal, FmHA proceeded to request administrative offset on April 17, 1992, which is the date the Debtors filed their Chapter 12 Petition. The parties dispute the effect of FmHA’s request for administrative offset in Exhibit B. However, this Court notes that the Debtors have not filed a motion for sanctions under 11 U.S.C. § 362(h), and offered no evidence of damages suffered or expenses incurred as a result of FmHA’s letter on the petition date. Thus, as in Mohar, the most this Court could conclude is that if the setoff is granted to FmHA, then the CRP contract payments must be turned over to the Debtors. 140 B.R. at 276, 280, 10 MontB.R. at 505, 513.

The Debtors urge the Court in their brief to re-examine the rule of setoffs fashioned in Mohar, 140 B.R. at 276-280, 10 Mont. B.R. at 505-513. This Court rejects that request. Mohar sets forth the rule on setoffs as follows:

In re Rahn, 7 Mont.B.R. 162, 163 (Bankr.Mont.1989) states:
Section 553 provides, in pertinent part, that the filing of a bankruptcy:.
“does not affect any right of a creditor to offset a mutual debt owing by such creditor to the debtor that arose before the commencement of this case under this title against a claim of such creditor against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case,
* * * )t
As a general rule, § 553 allows a creditor the same right of setoff which existed prior to bankruptcy. However, the right of setoff is neither automatic or self-executing, nor is it mandatory.
In re IML Freight, Inc., 65 B.R. 788, 792 (Bankr.Utah 1986); In re Sandman, 5 Mont.B.R. 76, 78 (Bankr.Mont.1987). Whether a setoff is allowed or disallowed ultimately rests on the sound discretion of the Bankruptcy Court. 4 Collier on Bankruptcy, § 553.02, at 553-10 to 553-11. Sandman, supra at 78.

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Bluebook (online)
144 B.R. 498, 1992 Bankr. LEXIS 2356, 1992 WL 218847, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-lincoln-mtb-1992.