[Cite as In re L.G., 2026-Ohio-414.]
COURT OF APPEALS STARK COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
IN THE MATTER OF: L.G. Case No. (DOB: 12-5-18) 2025CA00115
(Michael G., Appellant) and
IN THE MATTER OF: M.G. Case No. (DOB: 5-16-21) 2025CA00116
(Michael G., Appellant) Opinion & Judgment Entry
Appeals from the Court of Common Pleas of Stark County, Family Court Division, Case Nos. 2024JCV00452 and 2024JCV00453
Judgment: Affirmed
Date of Judgment: February 9, 2026
BEFORE: William B. Hoffman; Kevin W. Popham; David M. Gormley, Judges
APPEARANCES: D. Coleman Bond, Canton, Ohio, for Appellant Michael G.; Brandon J. Waltenbaugh, Canton, Ohio, for Appellee Stark County Job & Family Services
Gormley, J.
{¶1} Appellant Michael G. challenges the judgment of the Stark County Family
Court awarding permanent custody of his daughters, L.G. and M.G., to Stark County Job
& Family Services (the “Agency”). Michael contends that the evidence presented at the
permanent-custody hearing did not support the trial court’s finding that his children could
not and should not be returned to him within a reasonable time, and he challenges the
trial court’s determination that awarding permanent custody to the Agency was in L.G. and M.G.’s best interests. The trial court also violated his right to counsel, Michael
argues, when one of the Agency’s case workers spoke with him outside the presence of
his lawyer, and then that case worker talked about that conversation at the permanent-
custody hearing. For the reasons explained below, we affirm the judgment of the trial
court.
The Key Facts
{¶2} A lengthy history exists between the Agency and Sarah S., who is the
mother of both L.G. and M.G. Michael is the purported father of L.G., and he is the
established father of M.G.
{¶3} In 2021, the Agency filed its first complaints concerning the care of L.G. and
M.G. due to issues tied to their mother’s use of drugs as well as the instability of her
housing. The Agency at that time also voiced its concerns regarding Michael’s use of
illegal drugs. Though the 2021 case ended with the girls being returned to the custody of
their mother Sarah, Michael’s failure to complete some parts of his case plan — including
the directive that he acknowledge paternity for L.G. or undergo genetic testing to establish
that child’s paternity — led the Agency to caution the girls’ mother against permitting
Michael to participate in unsupervised visits with them.
{¶4} In early 2024, the Agency received reports that Sarah was again abusing
illegal drugs, was residing at a homeless shelter, and was associating with known drug
users. After trying without success to assist Sarah outside of a formal court proceeding,
the Agency in May 2024 filed its second round of complaints claiming that L.G. and M.G.
were dependent and neglected. Those complaints again primarily focused on Sarah’s
substance-use issues and her housing instability, but the Agency also listed Michael’s homelessness as a concern. Just before those 2024 complaints were filed, the Agency
discovered that the girls were in the physical custody of the foster family that had cared
for them during the pendency of the 2021 case.
{¶5} The trial court granted the Agency’s request to take immediate custody of
L.G. and M.G. pending a shelter-care hearing to be held the following day. Michael later
agreed to a finding of dependency at an adjudicatory hearing held in July 2024, and the
trial court then awarded temporary custody of the children to the Agency. The Agency
formally placed the girls with the same foster family from the 2021 case.
{¶6} Next, the Agency created a case plan that was approved and adopted by
the trial court to aid in Michael’s anticipated reunification with his children. That case plan
called for Michael to undergo a substance-use assessment and follow any resulting
recommendations, submit to random drug tests to verify that he was not using illegal
drugs, acknowledge or establish paternity for L.G., maintain his current employment, and
find stable housing.
{¶7} A review hearing held in November 2024 indicated that Michael was
engaged in substance-use treatment and had been compliant with his drug screens. The
trial court noted, though, that Michael had tested positive for marijuana use, was refusing
to establish paternity for L.G. because he did not want to pay child support, and had still
not secured independent housing. The court maintained the conditions as they existed
at the time of the review hearing, leaving L.G. and M.G. in the care of their foster family
and ordering Michael to continue making progress on his case plan. The next review
hearing was scheduled for April 2025. {¶8} In January 2025, Michael — according to his later testimony at the
permanent-custody hearing as well as the testimony of an Agency case worker —
informed that case worker that, because he had no outside support and because of his
financial situation, he was unable to properly care for L.G. and M.G. He expressed during
that conversation that it would be in the girls’ best interest to stay with their foster family.
Michael stated, too, that he was not interested in having any additional services added to
his case plan because he could not afford the cost of participating in them. The Agency’s
case worker testified at the June 2025 permanent-custody hearing that she learned
approximately one week before that hearing that Michael had by then changed his
position and did want to retain custody of his children.
{¶9} In March 2025, the Agency filed a motion asking the court to grant
permanent custody of L.G. and M.G. to the Agency, alleging — among other things —
that those children could not be placed with Michael within a reasonable time and that
awarding permanent custody of them to the Agency was in their best interests.
{¶10} Though Michael had obtained a two-bedroom apartment by the time the
April review hearing was held, the court noted then that he had missed 15 drug tests, had
tested positive for marijuana use, and was only “somewhat” visiting with the girls. The
trial court again maintained L.G. and M.G.’s placement with their foster family, ordered
Michael to continue working on his case plan, and set the permanent-custody hearing for
June 2025.
{¶11} After considering the evidence presented at that latter hearing, the trial court
awarded permanent custody of the girls to the Agency. Michael now appeals. The Trial Court Did Not Err by Granting Permanent Custody of L.G. and M.G. to the Agency
{¶12} In his first assignment of error, Michael argues that the Agency failed to
establish both that there were grounds for permanent custody and that an award of
permanent custody to the Agency was in L.G. and M.G.’s best interests. Because Michael
combines a sufficiency-of-the-evidence argument with a manifest-weight argument, we
will attempt to address his concerns related to each issue as we understand them from
his brief.
{¶13} The Supreme Court of Ohio has explained that the appropriate appellate
standard of review of a trial court’s permanent-custody decision is a manifest-weight
review or a sufficiency-of-the-evidence review (or both), depending on the nature of the
arguments presented by the parties. In re Z.C., 2023-Ohio-4703, ¶ 11. Though they are
sometimes, as here, lumped together in a single argument, those two concepts are “‘both
quantitatively and qualitatively different.’” Id. at ¶ 13, quoting Eastley v. Volkman, 2012-
Ohio-2179, ¶ 10.
{¶14} Under a manifest-weight review, an appellate court must “weigh the
evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of the witnesses, and
determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the finder of fact clearly lost its
way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the judgment must be
reversed and a new trial ordered.” Id. at ¶ 14. Our review of a sufficiency-of-the-evidence
challenge, on the other hand, “is generally limited to considering whether sufficient
credible evidence exists to support the juvenile court’s determination.” In re D.P., 2020-
Ohio-6663, ¶ 13 (12th Dist.). {¶15} A trial court “may grant permanent custody of a child to a movant if the court
determines . . . by clear and convincing evidence, that it is in the best interest of the child
to grant permanent custody of the child to the agency” and that any one of the five factors
enumerated in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) through (e) applies. R.C. 2151.414(B)(1). R.C.
2151.414(B), therefore, “establishes a two-pronged analysis.” In re K.H., 2025-Ohio-21,
¶ 30 (5th Dist.). “In practice, the trial court will usually determine whether one of the . . .
circumstances delineated in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) through [(e)] is present before
proceeding to a determination regarding the best interest of the child.” Id.
{¶16} Clear and convincing evidence is evidence that “‘will produce in the mind of
the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established.’” Id.
at ¶ 26, quoting Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469 (1954), paragraph three of the
syllabus. “‘Where the proof required must be clear and convincing, a reviewing court will
examine the record to determine whether the trier of facts had sufficient evidence before
it to satisfy the requisite degree of proof.’” In re Z.C., 2023-Ohio-4703, at ¶ 8, quoting
State v. Schiebel, 55 Ohio St.3d 71, 74 (1990).
A. The Record Supports the Trial Court’s R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) Finding
{¶17} R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) lists five scenarios, any one of which can serve as a
prerequisite for a trial court’s consideration of a permanent-custody request. “As long as
one of these factors is present, then the first prong of the test is satisfied.” In re A.S.,
2024-Ohio-2099, ¶ 36 (5th Dist.). The trial court here relied on R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a),
which applies when the “child is not abandoned . . . and the child cannot be placed with
either of the child’s parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with the
child’s parents.” {¶18} To determine, under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a), whether a child cannot be
placed with a parent, a court must look to R.C. 2151.414(E). That section in turn lists 16
possible scenarios, any one of which can support a trial court’s finding that a child cannot
be placed with either parent. “The existence of one factor alone will support a finding that
the child cannot be placed with the parent within a reasonable time.” In re A.W., 2024-
Ohio-5791, ¶ 19 (5th Dist.).
{¶19} The trial court in this case found that R.C. 2151.414(E)(1) was the factor
supporting a finding that L.G. and M.G. cannot be placed with their father, and Michael
now challenges that determination. That statutory provision tells us that a child cannot
be returned to a parent within a reasonable time when “[f]ollowing the placement of the
child outside the child’s home and notwithstanding reasonable case planning and diligent
efforts by the agency to assist the parents to remedy the problems that initially caused
the child to be placed outside the home, the parent has failed continuously and repeatedly
to substantially remedy the conditions causing the child to be placed outside the child’s
home.”
{¶20} A court must consider “all relevant evidence” when determining if a child
cannot or should not be placed with a parent within a reasonable period of time. R.C.
2151.414(E); In re J.G.S., 2019-Ohio-802, ¶ 27 (1st Dist.) (“Under R.C. 2151.414, the
court is required to look at all relevant evidence, including a parent’s pattern of conduct.”);
In re Stephens, 2002-Ohio-3057, ¶ 27 (7th Dist.) (“To further the interests of the children,
the court must consider any evidence available to it, including a parent's pattern of
conduct. Some of the most reliable evidence for the court to consider is the past history
of the children and the parents.”). {¶21} The concerns underlying the Agency’s 2024 involvement, though initially
focused on Sarah’s conduct because both L.G. and M.G. were in her custody then,
included Michael’s homelessness. Michael’s case plan was designed to address that
concern by requiring him to complete a substance-use assessment, to participate in
random drug tests, to maintain his employment, and to obtain housing. Michael was also
directed to establish paternity for L.G. The Agency’s case worker later testified that to
assist Michael in completing those case-plan steps, that worker was willing to provide bus
passes, meet with him to administer the drug tests, offer case-management services, and
meet with Michael every month to answer any questions from him.
{¶22} The trial court heard testimony at the permanent-custody hearing that
Michael was inconsistent with drug testing throughout the life of the case and had missed
23 drug-testing appointments. While the Agency’s case worker testified at the hearing
that she did not suspect that Michael was using illegal drugs, the trial court noted in its
judgment entry that missed drug screens are presumed to be positive results. And though
Michael testified that his inconsistent attendance at drug-testing appointments resulted
from the high cost of transportation, the Agency’s case worker testified that to assist
Michael in completing his case plan, she had offered to provide bus passes or meet
elsewhere with him for the drug tests. That case worker testified, too, that Michael had
failed to establish paternity for L.G. by the time that the permanent-custody hearing was
held despite Michael having been ordered to establish paternity both in the 2021 case
and in the present case. Michael testified that his failure to establish paternity was due
in part to transportation issues as well as his efforts to save money so that he could secure
appropriate housing where he could live with the girls. {¶23} On his housing situation, Michael testified at the hearing that in December
2024, he had obtained a two-bedroom apartment and that his girlfriend was living there
with him. In support of her opinion that Michael had not sufficiently remedied the
conditions causing L.G. and M.G. to be placed outside of his care despite securing that
apartment, the case worker expressed concerns about Michael’s girlfriend’s drug use and
her prior involvement with the Agency regarding the care of her own children. The case
worker answered “yes” to the trial court’s question about whether Michael’s choice to live
“with a girlfriend with drug concerns and concerns regarding history with children
services” could adversely affect the stability of his housing. Michael testified that he was
willing to make his girlfriend move out of his apartment if that was a prerequisite for
reunifying with his children.
{¶24} Finally, the Agency’s case worker testified that around January 2025,
Michael told her that he was financially unable to care for the girls and that it would be in
their best interests to remain with their foster family. That Agency staffer also testified
that the Agency would have likely added parenting classes to Michael’s case plan once
he had obtained stable housing, but no effort was made to amend the case plan because
Michael stated that he could not pay the cost to participate in those classes.
{¶25} As for Michael’s perspective on his January 2025 remark about the girls’
best interests, he explained at the permanent-custody hearing that he believed at the time
that even if the foster family were granted legal custody of the girls, he would still retain
his parental rights. Michael stated in unequivocal terms during his permanent-custody-
hearing testimony that he did not want his parental rights to be terminated. {¶26} After weighing all of these matters and after examining the full record from
the hearing, we find that the trial court’s conclusion on the first prong of the two-part
permanent-custody test was correct: Clear and convincing evidence in the record
supports a finding that Michael — despite reasonable case-planning services from the
Agency — failed to remedy the conditions causing L.G. and M.G. to be placed outside of
Michael’s care. Michael has refused since 2021 to establish paternity for L.G. because
he does not want to pay additional child support. While Michael had obtained a two-
bedroom apartment, the trial court noted in its permanent-custody judgment entry that
Michael was residing there with an individual who had a history of children’s services
involvement, did not have custody of her own children, and had recently been released
from community-control supervision for some criminal charges. Michael himself
acknowledged that he was “having a hard time” financially, and he testified at the hearing
that he could not afford childcare for the girls. And though he testified that he did not want
his parental rights terminated, Michael offered no testimony to support his claim that he
is now able to afford to care for L.G. and M.G.
{¶27} We conclude, too, that the trial court’s R.C. 2151.414(E) finding was not
against the manifest weight of the evidence. Michael does not identify any evidentiary
conflict that he believes the trial court lost its way in resolving, and in fact the testimony
presented at the hearing by the Agency’s case worker was largely consistent with
Michael’s own testimony. Both witnesses acknowledged that Michael was struggling
financially, had missed several drug tests, had obtained a two-bedroom apartment where
he was living with his girlfriend, and had failed to establish paternity for L.G. {¶28} Michael did not deny that he made the January 2025 statement to the
Agency’s case worker regarding his then-existing opinion on permanent custody. Michael
also did not challenge the case worker’s concerns regarding his live-in girlfriend, instead
claiming that she would be “gone tomorrow” if necessary. And despite his argument that
the trial court impermissibly “cherry picked” only those facts presented by the Agency’s
case worker that reflected poorly on Michael, the trial court, as the trier of fact, was indeed
permitted to “believe all, part[,] or none of the testimony of any witness” who appeared
before it. State v. Vogelsong, 2025-Ohio-5107, ¶ 33 (5th Dist.).
{¶29} In support of his contrary view that the trial court’s finding was wrong,
Michael contends that the trial court was limited to considering only the issue of his
housing instability in reaching its R.C. 2151.414(E) conclusion because that was the only
condition that the Agency initially identified in connection with Michael that prompted the
initial removal of the two girls. The trial court therefore erred, he argues, by considering
other evidence — testimony about his girlfriend living in his apartment and his lack of
interest in completing additional case-plan services — unrelated to Michael’s housing
situation. Michael argues, too, that evidence regarding his case-plan completion entitled
him to a finding that his children could be returned to him within a reasonable time.
{¶30} Our court has previously explained, however, that “a finding under R.C.
2151.414(E) is not exclusive to the concerns raised at the time of the initial removal.” In
re J.S., 2017-Ohio-4104, ¶ 34 (5th Dist.). As explained above, R.C. 2151.414(E) requires
a trial court to consider all relevant evidence in reaching its conclusion under that statutory
provision. Though Michael had obtained an apartment, the trial court properly considered testimony about the possible impact of his girlfriend’s presence on the stability of that
housing.
{¶31} Nor did the trial court err by considering Michael’s statement to the Agency’s
case worker that he did not have any interest in completing additional case-plan services
because he could not afford to pay for them. We do not view the trial court’s factual
acknowledgement of that statement as “penalizing” Michael for failing to complete a
service that was never added to his case plan. Instead, we view the trial court’s reference
to that testimony as a proper reflection of the fact that the trial court was permitted to
consider all relevant evidence about Michael’s financial circumstances and how those
circumstances might affect his ability to provide a stable home for his children.
{¶32} Further, completing the objectives of his case plan would not automatically
have entitled Michael to reunification with L.G. and M.G. In re A.F., 2022-Ohio-3753, ¶
46 (5th Dist.) (“A parent’s successful completion of the terms of a case plan is not
dispositive on the issue of reunification . . . the case plan is simply a means to a goal, but
not the goal itself.”); In re E.B., 2010-Ohio-1122, ¶ 30 (12th Dist.) (“it is well-settled that
the completion of case plan services alone does not equate to, or necessitate a finding
that the parents have substantially remedied the conditions that caused the removal of
the child from the home”).
{¶33} The trial court therefore did not err by concluding that Michael had failed to
substantially remedy the conditions causing L.G. and M.G. to be removed from his care
and finding that the girls could not be returned to Michael within a reasonable time. B. Granting Permanent Custody of L.G. and M.G. to the Agency is in Their Best Interests
{¶34} Michael argues here that the trial court’s findings related to L.G. and M.G.’s
best interests do not correlate with the factors set forth in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1).
{¶35} In determining whether granting permanent custody of a child to an agency
is in that child’s best interest, the trial court must consider all relevant factors, including,
but not limited to, the ones listed in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1). Those statutory factors include
the child’s interactions and relationships with the child’s family members and other
persons who may significantly affect the child, the wishes of the child (with due regard to
the maturity of the child), the custodial history of the child, and the child’s need for a legally
secure placement and whether that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of
permanent custody to the agency.
{¶36} While the trial court must consider all of the factors in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1),
the court is required to consider, too, any other evidence available to it when deciding
whether permanent custody is in a child’s best interest. In re Schaefer, 2006-Ohio-5513,
¶ 56 (“The court must consider all of the elements in R.C. 2151.414(D) as well as other
relevant factors.”); In re Stephens, 2002-Ohio-3057, at ¶ 27 (7th Dist.) (“To further the
interests of the children, the court must consider any evidence available to it” when
“determining whether permanent custody is in the children’s best interests”). R.C.
2151.414(D)(1) does not require a trial court to make specific findings on each factor listed
in that provision, nor does it require the court to include in its judgment entry a written
discussion of each factor. In re A.M., 2020-Ohio-5102, ¶ 31, 33 (“Consideration [of the
factors] is all the statute requires.”). {¶37} “A child’s best interests are served” when the child is placed in a permanent
situation that “fosters growth, stability, and security.” In re M.K., 2023-Ohio-3786, ¶ 36
(5th Dist.). “‘The discretion’” that the juvenile court enjoys in determining whether an order
of permanent custody is in the best interest of a child “‘should be accorded the utmost
respect, given the nature of the proceeding and the impact the court’s determination will
have on the lives of the parties concerned.’” Id., quoting In re E.H., 2022-Ohio-1682, ¶
101 (5th Dist.).
{¶38} The permanent-custody judgment entry demonstrates that the trial court did
properly consider the R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) factors. Michael appears to argue, though,
that the trial court was limited to considering only those factors enumerated in the statute.
Yet as explained above, the trial court was required to consider all relevant factors.
{¶39} Clear and convincing evidence supported the trial court’s conclusion that
the girls’ best interests would be served by granting permanent custody to the Agency.
According to the case worker’s testimony, though L.G. and M.G. had bonded with Michael
and though their father-child visits had gone smoothly, the girls were also bonded with
their foster parents and the foster parents’ two biological children, and L.G., M.G., and
the foster family were functioning well as a family unit. The case worker described the
foster parents as patient, loving, and attentive to L.G. and M.G.’s needs and testified that
the girls refer to their foster parents as “mom” and “dad.” The children had been placed
with the foster family for over one year when the prior case filed by the Agency had been
open, and that foster family continued to provide care for L.G. and M.G. on the weekends
even after that first case had been resolved. Michael himself acknowledged at the
permanent-custody hearing that his children do well with their foster family. {¶40} In addition, L.G. — who was six years old at the time of the final hearing in
the trial court — had received positive feedback from her kindergarten teachers, and the
case worker testified that L.G. would remain in that same school district if permanent
custody were awarded to the Agency. The trial court found that the foster family was
meeting L.G. and M.G.’s educational and medical needs, and the case worker testified
that the foster family was interested in adopting both girls.
{¶41} We find, too, clear and convincing evidence that, because of Michael’s
admitted financial struggles and because of the Agency’s concerns about the impact that
Michael’s girlfriend’s presence has on the stability of his housing, no safe and stable home
would be available to L.G. and M.G. absent a grant of permanent custody to the Agency.
The Agency’s case worker testified that the foster family could provide L.G. and M.G. with
the safety and security that they have been lacking in their lives since 2021. The guardian
ad litem also testified that a permanent-custody grant would be in L.G. and M.G.’s best
interests.
{¶42} The best-interest factors weigh in favor of the trial court’s decision to grant
permanent custody of L.G. and M.G. to the Agency. Because both prongs of the
permanent-custody test have been shown in this case, we find that the trial court properly
terminated Michael’s parental rights and appropriately placed the girls in the permanent
custody of the Agency. Michael’s first assignment of error is overruled.
The Trial Court Did Not Violate Michael’s Right to Counsel
{¶43} Michael argues in his second assignment of error that the trial court violated
his right to counsel by finding that his January 2025 conversation with the Agency’s case worker — in which he opined that it would be in his children’s best interests to be adopted
by their foster parents — “constituted an agreement as to permanent custody.”
{¶44} R.C. 2151.352 afforded Michael the right to representation by legal counsel
at L.G. and M.G.’s permanent-custody hearing, and that same provision entitled him to
appointed counsel if he could not afford to retain his own attorney. The trial court did in
fact appoint Michael’s current appellate counsel to represent him in the permanent-
custody proceeding, and Michael was represented by that attorney not only at the
permanent-custody hearing but also throughout the 13-month period before that hearing.
{¶45} Michael’s denial-of-the-right-to-counsel argument misses the mark. First,
nowhere in the trial court’s judgment entry did the court find, as Michael argues, that he
agreed to permanent custody. While the trial court acknowledged in its findings of facts
that Michael, during a January 2025 conversation with the case worker, “expressed to the
case worker that it was in the best interest of the children to be adopted by the foster
parents,” the court noted, too, that Michael “has had a recent change of heart.” And
Michael made clear at the permanent-custody hearing that he did not want his parental
rights to be terminated. The Agency’s case worker testified then, too, that Michael had
recently changed his position. Michael’s January 2025 out-of-court statement, in other
words, was not viewed by the trial court as some sort of unalterable expression of his
views about permanent custody, and the trial court heard and acknowledged the contrary
perspective that he had embraced by the time the permanent-custody hearing occurred.
{¶46} Second, Michael does not point to any authority supporting his view that he
was entitled to his counsel’s presence when he voluntarily engaged in an informal out-of-
court conversation with an Agency case worker. {¶47} The trial court did not err by considering Michael’s January 2025 statement
about permanent custody when the court was weighing whether L.G. and M.G. should be
returned to his care and whether doing so would be in their best interests. Michael’s
second assignment of error is overruled.
{¶48} For the reasons explained above, the judgments of the Family Court
Division of the Court of Common Pleas of Stark County are affirmed. Costs in both
appeals are to be paid by Appellant Michael G.
By: Gormley, J.;
Hoffman, P.J. and
Popham, J. concur.