[Cite as In re L.G., 2021-Ohio-1947.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT SCIOTO COUNTY
IN THE MATTER OF: :
L.G., : CASE NO. 20CA3928
Adjudicated Dependent Child. : DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
:
_________________________________________________________________
APPEARANCES:
George L. Davis, IV, Portsmouth, Ohio for appellant.1
David M. Huddleston, New Boston, Ohio, for appellee.
CIVIL CASE FROM COMMON PLEAS COURT, JUVENILE DIVISION DATE JOURNALIZED:6-4-21 ABELE, J.
{¶1} This is an appeal of a Scioto County Common Pleas Court,
Juvenile Division, judgment that granted Scioto County Children
Services (SCCS), appellee herein, permanent custody of L.G., the
biological child of mother A.G., appellant herein.
Appellant assigns one error for review:
“THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY GRANTING PERMANENT CUSTODY BECAUSE SUCH WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST
1 Different counsel represented appellant during the trial court proceedings. 2 SCIOTO, 20CA3928
WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.”
{¶2} Appellant is the natural mother of L.G., born August 7,
2008. On June 7, 2017, appellee filed a complaint and motion for
temporary emergency custody. The complaint alleged L.G., an eight-
year-old boy with severe autism spectrum disorder, to be a
dependent child. In particular, the complaint averred that,
because L.G. lacked adequate parental care due to his mother’s
mental or physical condition, the child’s condition or environment
warranted the agency to assume his guardianship.
{¶3} Apparently, a June 6, 2017 report and subsequent SCCS
home visit revealed that dirty diapers, food products, pizza boxes,
and trash littered appellant’s home. The complaint alleged
appellant to be disheveled, confused, and that she informed law
enforcement that “someone had invaded the house and did all the
damage, and that the NSA had bugged her house.” Officials also
found L.G., dressed in a diaper and food-covered t-shirt that he
had been wearing for at least two days.
{¶4} Law enforcement transported appellant to a mental health
facility for evaluation and involuntary hospitalization. An
investigation also revealed an extensive history with L.G. due to
his mother’s mental health issues and the child’s autism spectrum 3 SCIOTO, 20CA3928
disorder diagnosis. The child’s biological father lived out of
state, and L.G.’s maternal grandmother, who had cared for him in
the past, could not do so now.
{¶5} On June 7, 2017, the trial court issued an emergency care
order. SCCS then developed a case plan that appellant would need
to undertake to protect L.G: (1) complete a mental health
evaluation; (2) take all prescribed medications; (3) refrain from
self-adjusting her medications; (4) regularly meet with her medical
team; (5) keep her home clean, vacuum when necessary, wash dishes
daily and take out the garbage; and (6) send L.G. to school daily.
{¶6} Subsequently, appellee requested permanent custody of the
child. SCCS asserted that L.G. had been in its temporary custody
for more than 12 months out of a consecutive 22-month period.
Appellee further claimed that appellant has bi-polar disorder, a
history of discontinuing her medication, and that she can become
“paranoid and delusional.” SCCS also noted that it took custody of
the child by parental agreement three times, and on four other
occasions removed the child from his mother’s care. The motion
also stated that appellant had been involuntarily hospitalized for
several months, released in October 2017 to a group home, but
relapsed and was again hospitalized. 4 SCIOTO, 20CA3928
{¶7} The permanent custody motion further alleged that, after
appellant’s April 2018 release from the state hospital, she
increased her visits with L.G. After SCCS placed L.G. on an
“extended home visit” on December 19, 2018, a caseworker visited
appellant’s home on January 11, 2019 and observed a visibly
agitated L.G., who had been sent home from school due to his
disruptive behavior. The caseworker further observed that home
conditions “were becoming a concern.”
{¶8} On January 23, 2019, appellant called the caseworker to
accuse her of stealing appellant’s purse. After the caseworker
visited appellant’s home and searched for her purse, they found the
purse under a chair cushion. However, appellant’s home was in
“disarray, with dirty clothes piled up, dirty dishes all over, and
a broken-down bed frame in the dining room.” Appellant blamed L.G.
for the mess and said that she heard the voice of a “creeper” who
tells L.G. to tear up papers and throw them on the floor.
Appellant also accused the caseworker of stealing her keys.
{¶9} Due to L.G.’s behavior, SCCS transferred him to a
different school. However, the new school reported that L.G.’s
outbursts had become very aggressive and caused concern for staff
safety. Meanwhile, appellant called SCCS’s hotline to report about 5 SCIOTO, 20CA3928
SCCS stalking her.
{¶10} The permanent custody motion further alleged that a
caseworker and supervisor visited appellant’s home on March 1, 2019
and discovered deteriorated mental condition and home conditions,
and that L.G. exhibited aggressive behavior. Consequently, SCCS
removed L.G. from appellant’s home and, because of no other
available placement, returned him to a home that specializes in
children with autism spectrum disorder. The permanent custody
motion also alleged appellant’s inability to remain stable, to
provide specialized care that L.G. requires, the absence of any
area relatives who could provide for L.G., and the disruptions
caused by repeated removals.
{¶11} On November 26, 2019, the trial court held a hearing to
consider appellee’s request for permanent custody. Because L.G.’s
biological father (E.I.) appeared for only the second time during
the proceedings, the trial court appointed counsel for E.I. and
continued the hearing.
{¶12} On January 28, 2020, SCCS, appellant, appellant’s
counsel, E.I., E.I.’s counsel and the guardian ad litem (GAL)
appeared at the permanent custody hearing. E.I. testified that he
also has bi-polar disorder, a “lack of experience with autistic 6 SCIOTO, 20CA3928
children,” and that he had not seen L.G. since he was four-years-
old. E.I. testified that “with her being bipolar that there are
mood swings and even if I have custody of him, I don’t think I
would be any better than her and I think that we’re detrimental to
his autism getting better. So I’d rather give him to somebody * *
* that can take care of him the way he’s supposed to be.” E.I.
agreed to terminate his parental rights and further opined that
L.G. should not be returned to appellant. E.I. testified that
L.G.’s placement [with the specialized foster home] means that he
is “getting help on his autism and our intervening is going to hurt
him.”
{¶13} SCCS Caseworker Naomi Kinsel testified that SCCS has been
involved with L.G. since 2010, when they first removed him from
appellant’s care through parental agreement. SCCS removed L.G.
again in October 2011, and returned him to appellant in September
2012. SCCS removed L.G. once again by parental agreement in
February 2013 and August 2014. Kinsel, who became the caseworker
in 2014, testified that because appellant was “not taking her
medications as prescribed and so, he was removed from the home
again so that she could get herself together again. Get the home
cleaned up, get back on her meds, get back on track.”
{¶14} Caseworker Kinsel explained that in January 2015, 7 SCIOTO, 20CA3928
appellant’s mother, V.G., assumed L.G.’s legal custody for
approximately six months. However, there “was an incident at the
home. [V.G.] couldn’t manage [L.G.’s] behavior. I believe that was
the time that he had gotten out of the house. He had run away
toward a neighbor’s house. There was a pool. He was going
straight for the pool and we removed him then. * * * [V.G.]
reported that she could no longer manage [L.G.].” Thus, SCCS
removed L.G. from V.G.’s custody in July 2015. In October 2015,
SCCS returned L.G. to appellant.
{¶15} Caseworker Kinsel further testified that the current case
began in June 2017 when SCCS received a call regarding L.G.’s
living conditions. Initially, SCCS attempted to work with
appellant to keep L.G. with her, but when appellant was
hospitalized SCCS removed L.G. Appellant had been hospitalized
from June 2017 until her release to a group home in October 2017.
However, within a month appellant returned to the state hospital
and remained there until April 2018.
{¶16} After appellant secured appropriate housing, SCCS
permitted visits with L.G. and also administered a December 2018
trial placement. Approximately one month later, appellant’s mental
condition and living conditions again began to deteriorate.
Caseworker Kinsel testified that, after appellant accused her of 8 SCIOTO, 20CA3928
stealing her purse, Kinsel visited appellant’s home to help her
search for the purse and observed the deteriorating living
conditions. Kinsel also testified that L.G. began to have problems
in school “acting out in the classroom,” and the agency transferred
him to another school. Kinsel again visited appellant’s home at
the end of February and found it “in disarray. There were dirty
clothes piling up in the bathroom. Dirty dishes all over, cups
needed to be thrown away. The bedframe had been moved to the
dining room. It had been broken down and there was a mattress that
was also moved on there. [Appellant] also reported to me that day
that her keys were missing and she knew that I had them. And, I
did not * * * have any of her keys.” Apparently, appellant blamed
L.G. for the condition of the home. Further, appellant informed
Kinsel that she had “a creeper in the house, either in the house or
outside of the house, that was telling [L.G.] to do these things. *
* * [S]he said that she heard the voices tell [L.G.] to tear up the
paper in the house.” On March 1, 2019, SCCS removed L.G. and
returned him to the special needs home in which he had been placed
in 2017. Kinsel explained that L.G. does well at the special needs
home and that L.G. is nonverbal. “He can say some words
sporadically,” and understands prompts but cannot have a
conversation. The foster family is “willing to keep him in their 9 SCIOTO, 20CA3928
home. I’m not sure if they would ever adopt him or not, but they
certainly don’t want him placed anywhere else. They want him to
stay with them.”
{¶17} Caseworker Kinsel further testified that, during
appellant’s visit with her son at McDonald’s, appellant acted in a
condescending manner and filed a complaint that alleged that Kinsel
controlled L.G. via radio control. Appellant also accused Kinsel
of assaulting her and L.G. with a taser, and that SCCS used remote
devices to control appellant and L.G. Kinsel also recalled one
visit when appellant told her that someone had broken into her
home, manipulated her with medications and raped her. Appellant
also told Kinsel that neighbors sift through her trash and that
SCCS stalks her. Kinsel did acknowledge that appellant and L.G.
have a strong parental bond, and that appellant is affectionate
with L.G.
{¶18} On April 7, 2020, the permanent custody hearing continued
and GAL Robert Johnson testified. Johnson stated that he met with
L.G. at least once at his mother’s home, once at his foster
family’s home and that he had met with appellant several times.
Johnson had concerns about appellant’s “ability to distinguish
reality from what I think are delusions, paranoid delusions.”
Johnson testified about experiences with appellant in which she 10 SCIOTO, 20CA3928
believes that others manipulate and control both her and L.G.
{¶19} V.G., appellant’s mother, testified that, after she lived
in North Carolina for two years, she returned to the area in
September 2019. She last observed L.G. at the visit with
appellant at McDonald’s and he seemed subdued and “zombiish.” V.G.
testified that she returned to Scioto County because of North
Carolina’s high cost of living and that she also knew that
appellant did not have custody of L.G.: “if I came back and she
[appellant] was overwhelmed because an autistic child is more
difficult to handle than a normal child. You have to have eyes on
them continually and I thought I could help her out a little bit,
give her a break now and then so she could rest or something.”
V.G. stated that she believed L.G. could be placed with appellant
and that she is “there for her to fall back on if she needs me.”
{¶20} Dustin Kesler, Case Manager at Ascend Counseling and
Recovery, served as L.G.’s personal aide from October 2014 to
February 2016. Kesler testified that L.G. is in a better mood when
with his grandmother and appellant than when he is in foster care.
{¶21} Appellant testified that she did her best to raise L.G.
and to provide for his needs. Since SCCS removed L.G., there “have
been a lot of home invasions, um, and toxins and their air. . .” 11 SCIOTO, 20CA3928
When asked if her house is in better condition, she replied, “I
don’t think anything’s really changed. We improved the heating
units and there have been more violations to the home.” On cross
examination, appellant testified about Caseworker Kinsel coming
into her first grade classroom and:
there was a manipulation in the classroom and the nineteen eighties government had issued, um, radio remote controls for children that were malbehaved. * * * IT was a new thing being passed around to all the classrooms, um, the state government was experimenting, um, privately, and um, anyway, Naomi, or whatever her name is, had left one of those little radio remote controls in the classroom and, um, one of these social workers had re-entered our classroom at some point with the malbehaved substitute teacher, used the radio, um, and, uh, infected my ear. At that same time a couple of malbehaved, older brunettes screamed at a high-pitch and ruined by inner ears, um, and uh, my inner brain. Um, so, that affected my memory, my focus and attention while we’re eating, um, it affected my inner calculator. I couldn’t do math problems in my head. I had to use paper. Um, and it also got to be a disability where I couldn’t use inter-brain mental communication or praying. I had a hard time mentally focusing. Um, and so, at that point the government did recall all of those radio control gadgets. Um, they had them recalled. They were illegal that year and just within a few months of being issued.
{¶22} Appellant went on to explain that during her pregnancy,
she received an “iron bomb” that poisoned her three times with
toxins “by Mr. Bowman or his associates.” Appellant also outlined
“home invasions” when “court-placed lawyers” “play dirty and they
do invade homes.” Further, appellant testified that when L.G. 12 SCIOTO, 20CA3928
comes for an extended stay, a “listening device or microphone, um,
to tell, the voice on there told [L.G.] to tear up some paper and
[L.G.] continued to tear up paper. * * * Someone was actually,
destroying this (inaudible) baby and putting his mother through a
lot of pain.” Appellant also described her neighbors: “the next
door neighbor is a cold blooded, thieving, uh, murderer. Two doors
down is a drug dealing murderer. Three doors down is a cold
blooded freak. Across the way in the other, in the other is a coal
black thug, criminal killer. I mean, it’s a daily process.”
Appellant also claimed that Naomi (a caseworker),
has been breaking through that lock, those locks, and have introduced, um, her presence in my house and has caused a mass hysteria in the neighborhood, among other social workers have done the same thing. Um, many people have invaded my home. People want to harm lovely young women that have no male around. It’s common. * * * This is nothing new.
{¶23} Appellant described a summer 2018 incident that occurred
after the court discharged her from the state hospital. Appellant
stated that she observed an SCCS employee or foster parent strike
her child, foster parent grab her phone and purse, verbally abuse
appellant and her mother, but then state that “[i]t was all a
cover-up.” Appellant further alleged that during the McDonald’s
visit, SCCS tasered her. When L.G. visited appellant, she claimed
that he “was sedated” and both manipulated and assaulted. 13 SCIOTO, 20CA3928
Appellant did acknowledge, however, that she informed the foster
mother that she did not administer L.G.’s medications as
prescribed. Appellant testified that the reason she wants custody
is:
Love, education is a big issue. I think CPS has failed his education beyond, beyond, beyond what I was working with him on. So has ODE. I’m not sure what all the coordinated activities of them between MH or ODE and CPS and DD and TCC and SOMC, and, * * * LEE, and, um, I’m not sure what all the coordination events have been against someone that’s non-crime when professionals have prison sentences but it has been going on.
Also, appellant stated that the day before the hearing she heard
“three or four different” voices in her home.
{¶24} On April 27, 2020, the trial court (1) awarded SCCS
permanent custody of L.G.; (2) found that L.G. cannot be placed
with either parent, or should not be placed with either parent,
within a reasonable amount of time; and (3) determined that placing
L.G. in appellee’s permanent custody is in L.G.’s best interest.
The court further determined that the relationship between L.G. and
appellant is detrimental to the child, and that appellant’s mental
health disorder and struggle to differentiate “between reality and
delusion” prevents her from appropriately caring for her child.
Also, the court found that L.G. has been in appellee’s temporary
custody since June 7, 2017. Thus, the trial court granted 14 SCIOTO, 20CA3928
appellee’s request for L.G.’s permanent custody. This appeal
followed.
I.
{¶25} In her sole assignment of error, appellant asserts that
the trial court’s permanent custody decision is against the
manifest weight of the evidence. In particular, appellant argues
that: (1) she had been stable for at least six months before she
regained custody of L.G., (2) SCCS should have given her more time
than one month with L.G., and (3) she, in essence, has completed
the case plan requirements.
Permanent Custody Principles
{¶26} In general, a parent has a “fundamental liberty interest”
in the care, custody, and management of his or her child and an
“essential” and “basic civil right” to raise his or her children.
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d
599 (1982). A parent’s rights, however, are not absolute. In re
D.A., 113 Ohio St.3d 88, 2007-Ohio-1105, 862 N.E.2d 829, ¶ 11.
Rather, “ ‘it is plain that the natural rights of a parent * * *
are always subject to the ultimate welfare of the child, which is
the polestar or controlling principle to be observed.’ ” In re
Cunningham, 59 Ohio St.2d 100, 106, 391 N.E.2d 1034 (1979), quoting 15 SCIOTO, 20CA3928
In re R.J.C., 300 So.2d 54, 58 (Fla.App. 1974); accord In re B.S.,
4th Dist. Jackson No. 19CA6, 2019-Ohio-4143, ¶ 41.
Standard of Review
{¶27} A reviewing court generally will not disturb a trial
court’s permanent custody decision unless the decision is against
the manifest weight of the evidence. In re R.M., 2013-Ohio-3588,
997 N.E.2d 169, ¶ 53 (4th Dist.); In re T.J., 4th Dist. Highland
Nos. 15CA15 and 15CA16, 2016-Ohio-163, ¶ 25; In re I.W., 4th Dist.
Pike No. 19CA902, 2020-Ohio-3112, ¶ 18. When an appellate court
reviews whether a trial court’s permanent custody decision is
against the manifest weight of the evidence, the court “ ‘ weighs
the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the
credibility of the witnesses and determines whether in resolving
conflicts in the evidence, the [finder of fact] clearly lost its
way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the
[judgment] must be reversed and a new trial ordered.’ ” Eastley v.
Volkman, 132 Ohio St.3d 328, 2012-Ohio-2179, 972 N.E.2d 517, ¶ 20,
quoting Tewarson v. Simon, 141 Ohio App.3d 103, 115, 750 N.E.2d 176
(9th Dist.2001), quoting State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380,
387, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997), quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d
172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist.1983). 16 SCIOTO, 20CA3928
{¶28} In a permanent custody case, the ultimate question for a
reviewing court is “whether the juvenile court’s findings * * *
were supported by clear and convincing evidence.” In re K.H., 119
Ohio St.3d 538, 2008-Ohio-4825, 895 N.E.2d 809, ¶ 32. In
determining whether a trial court based its decision upon clear and
convincing evidence, “a reviewing court will examine the record to
determine whether the trier of facts had sufficient evidence before
it to satisfy the requisite degree of proof.” State v. Schiebel,
55 Ohio St.3d 71, 74, 564 N.E.2d 54 (1990). “Thus, if the children
services agency presented competent and credible evidence upon
which the trier of fact reasonably could have formed a firm belief
that permanent custody is warranted, then the court’s decision is
not against the manifest weight of the evidence.” R.M. at ¶ 55; In
re K.M., 4th Dist. Highland No. 20CA4 & 20CA6, 2020-Ohio-4476, ¶
38.
{¶29} When reviewing evidence under this standard, appellate
courts generally defer to a trial court’s determination of
credibility matters, which are crucial in these cases when a
written record may not adequately reflect a witness’s demeanor and
attitude. Eastley at ¶ 21; Davis v. Flickinger, 77 Ohio St.3d 415,
419, 674 N.E.2d 1159 (1997). A reviewing court should find a trial 17 SCIOTO, 20CA3928
court’s permanent custody decision against the manifest weight of
the evidence only in the “ ‘ exceptional case in which the evidence
weighs heavily against the decision.’ ” Id., quoting Martin at
175, 485 N.E.2d 717.
Statutory Framework
{¶30} A children services agency may obtain permanent custody
of a child by (1) requesting it in the abuse, neglect, or
dependency complaint under R.C. 2151.353, or (2) filing a motion
under R.C. 2151.413 after obtaining temporary custody. In this
case, appellee sought permanent custody of the child under a R.C.
2151.413 motion. When an agency files a R.C. 2151.413 permanent
custody motion, R.C. 2151.414 applies. R.C. 2151.414(A).
{¶31} R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) provides that a trial court may grant
a children services agency permanent custody of a child if the
court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the child’s
best interest would be served by the award of permanent custody,
and (2) any of the conditions in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a)-(e) apply.
{¶32} In the case sub judice, the trial court found that L.G.
has been in appellee’s temporary custody for more than 12 months of
a consecutive 22-month period. Thus, R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) 18 SCIOTO, 20CA3928
applies. Because appellant does not challenge the trial court’s
R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) finding, we do not address it.
{¶33} The trial court also thoroughly addressed R.C.
2151.414(D)’s best-interest framework. To determine the best
interest of a child at a hearing held pursuant to division (A) of
this section of the Revised Code, R.C. 4151.414(D)(1) instructs
courts to consider all relevant factors, including, but not limited
to:
(a) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child’s parents, siblings, relatives, foster caregivers and out-of-home providers, and any other person who may significantly affect the child;
(b) The wishes of the child, as expressed directly by the child or through the child’s guardian ad litem, with due regard for the maturity of the child;
(c) Custodial history of the child, including whether the child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies * * * for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-month period ending on or after March 18, 1999;
(d) The child’s need for a legally secure placement and whether that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of permanent custody to the agency;
(e) Whether any of the factors in divisions (E)(7) to (11) of this section apply in relation to the parents and child.
{¶34} Consequently, R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) requires a court “to
consider ‘all relevant factors,’ including five enumerated 19 SCIOTO, 20CA3928
statutory factors * * * No one element is given greater weight or
heightened significance.” In re C.F., 113 Ohio St.3d 73, 2007-
Ohio-1104, 862 N.E.2d 816, ¶ 57, citing In re Schaefer, 111 Ohio
St.3d 498, 2006-Ohio-5513, 857 N.E.2d 532, ¶ 6.
{¶35} In applying the R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) factors, the trial
court in the case at bar found that it is in the child’s best
interests to terminate appellant’s parental rights for the
following reasons:
{¶36} As for the R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a) “the interaction and
interrelationship of the child with the child’s parents, siblings,
relatives, foster care givers and out-of-home providers, and any
other person who may significantly affect the child,” the trial
court determined that appellant’s relationship with L.G. is
detrimental to the child. While the court readily acknowledged
appellant’s love for her son and her desire to love and care for
him, the court questioned appellant’s ability to care for her
child. The court stated that (1) the “testimony presented is
uncontroverted that [appellant] suffers from a mental health
disorder,” (2) appellant acknowledged that she did not administer
her son’s prescribed medications because she disagrees with them,
and (3) appellant believes that she knows more about her mental
health conditions than any of her physicians. The court concluded 20 SCIOTO, 20CA3928
that appellant’s bipolar disorder causes her to struggle “with
differentiating between reality and delusion” and “these delusions
will at times prevent [appellant] from appropriately caring for her
child.”
{¶37} The trial court also noted that L.G’s relationship with
his father is non-existent, a word used by L.G.’s father who admits
to not having seen L.G. since he was approximately four years old.
The court indicated that L.G.’s father testified that he recognizes
that he is not in a position to care for L.G. and that L.G. is
better served in the permanent custody of SCCS. Finally, the court
recognized that L.G. appears to be well-cared for and content in
his foster home, and although the foster family “may not wish to
adopt [L.G.], they do wish to keep him in their home.”
{¶38} As for the R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(b) “wishes of the child,”
the trial court indicated that it did not conduct an in-camera
interview due to “the child’s diagnosis of autism and testimony
from multiple witnesses that the child is non-verbal and severely
limited in his ability to communicate.” The court noted that
appellant also agreed that such an interview would be futile. The
court did, however, receive input concerning the child’s wishes
from the GAL report. 21 SCIOTO, 20CA3928
{¶39} For the R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(c) factor concerning the
child’s “custodial history,” the court determined that:
the child has been involved with or in the custody of CSB on multiple occasions since September 2010. He has been removed by parental agreement with CSB on multiple occasions; he has been placed in the temporary custody of the agency with legal custody ultimately being vested with his maternal grandmother; temporary custody has been awarded to CSB with custody of the child being returned to his mother; ultimately resulting in his removal in June 2017 and his temporary custody remaining with CSB.
{¶40} As for the R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(d) “need for a legally
secure permanent placement” and the ability to achieve placement
without a grant of permanent custody to the agency, the court
found:
[T]he Court has no doubt of the love of this mother for her child. However, it is abundantly clear that Ms. G[.....] cannot care for this child. It is clear from her own testimony that Ms. G[.....] suffers from frequent delusions. Ms. G[.....] has testified that she heard 3 or 4 voices telling her things as recently as the day before the hearing. She has testified that she has heard voices telling her son to do things. She rationalized [L.G.]’s behavior based on hearing these voices. On the one hand she displays delusions of grandeur as illustrated by her comments that [L.G.] ‘has acquired much more academic skill from her than any other teacher’ and that she ‘thinks she understands more about her mental health than any of her doctors can comprehend.’ But on the other, she displays paranoid delusions as evidenced by her statements that the government has placed radio devices in classrooms to control students; that she has been drugged and raped; that others have broken into her home on multiple occasions; and her focus on Ms. Kinsel and accusing Ms. Kinsel of stealing from her and assaulting her. The Court is of the opinion that 22 SCIOTO, 20CA3928
although Ms. G[.....] may not deliberately harm her child, it isn’t difficult to envision a time or occasion where her delusions cause her to act out toward her son. She has already withheld medication from him, because she did not think it necessary that he have it.
{¶41} Finally, concerning R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(e) and whether
any factor in divisions (E)(7) to (11) apply in relation to the
parents and to the child, the trial court found that R.C.
2151.414(E)(8) “may apply in that [appellant] has withheld medical
treatment, in the form of medication, from the child and not for
treatment by spiritual means through prayer alone or in accordance
with the tenets of a recognized religious body.” After a thorough
review of the testimony, the trial court determined that the
appellant’s parental rights termination is in the child’s best
interest.
{¶42} Appellant does not dispute L.G.’s temporary custody for
12 of 22 months, so we do not address it. However, appellant
contends that (1) the trial court erred in finding that permanent
custody is in the child’s best interest, (2) the trial court
“simply blamed mother’s mental health” and granted the permanent
custody motion without a meaningful analysis of the best interest
of the child factors, and (3) the “real obstacle between Appellant
and her son was Scioto County Children Services Board and an
irritated caseworker.” Further, appellant argues that although her 23 SCIOTO, 20CA3928
initial hospitalization and deplorable home conditions formed the
genesis of L.G.’s removal, at the time of the permanent custody
hearing she “was no longer institutionalized, was maintaining a
stable and cleaner home, and would have been able to care for her
son again if given the chance.”
{¶43} Our review of the record reveals the long-standing issues
in this case and SCCS multiple attempts to reunite this family. As
appellee points out, the child has been in SCCS’s care on seven
different occasions. After appellant’s hospitalization, SCCS
returned L.G. to appellant for an extended visit to determine
whether appellant could safely care for the child. However, the
child’s condition, appellant’s mental condition, and their living
conditions rapidly deteriorated. Moreover, L.G.’s caseworker and
the GAL testified about multiple instances of appellant’s inability
to distinguish reality from delusion. Finally, and sadly,
appellant’s own testimony supported the trial court’s conclusion
concerning appellant’s inability to distinguish reality from
delusion and to properly care for her child.
{¶44} Consequently, after our review, we agree with the trial
court’s conclusion that clear and convincing evidence supports the
finding that the child should not be placed with appellant. The
conditions that led to the child’s removal included appellant’s 24 SCIOTO, 20CA3928
serious mental health issues, appellant’s inability to maintain a
safe, stable, and permanent home, and appellant’s bipolar disorder
and hospitalization. SCCS became involved when L.G.’s safety was
in jeopardy and, although appellant’s condition improved
sufficiently to be released from hospitalization, she believed that
she knows more about her condition than her physicians, and that
she continues to suffer from multiple paranoid delusions. A
reading of appellant’s testimony reveals rambling and stark
examples of paranoia and delusions. Appellant accused SCCS staff
members, foster parents, and others of manipulating her, stealing
from her, and harming her and her son. See In re S.C., 9th Dist.
Summit No. 27676, 2015-Ohio-2623, ¶ 41 (mother’s delusions and
paranoia contributed to trial court granting permanent custody to
agency); In re D.G., __ N.E.3d __, 2021-Ohio-429 (1st Dist.), ¶ 19
(given extensive evidence of mother’s delusional behavior and
demonstrated impact on her ability to provide a stable and secure
environment for child, trial court’s decision to award permanent
custody affirmed).
{¶45} As the trial court and appellee both candidly agree,
appellant’s love for her son is unquestionable. However, we agree
with the trial court that clear and convincing evidence exists to
support the view that appellant’s chronic mental illness and 25 SCIOTO, 20CA3928
delusions render her unable to appropriately care for her son, and
to provide an adequate permanent home. Consequently, after our
review in the case sub judice, we agree with the trial court’s
conclusion that appellee adduced ample competent, credible clear
and convincing evidence to support the determination that a
permanent custody award is warranted and in the child’s best
{¶46} Accordingly, based upon the foregoing reasons, we
overrule appellant’s assignment of error and affirm the trial
court’s judgment.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
JUDGMENT ENTRY 26 SCIOTO, 20CA3928
It is ordered that the judgment be affirmed. Appellee shall
recover of appellant the costs herein taxed.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court
directing the Scioto County Common Pleas Court, Juvenile Division,
to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute that mandate
pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Smith, P.J. & Hess, J.: Concur in Judgment & Opinion
For the Court
BY:_____________________________ Peter B. Abele, Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with the clerk. 27 SCIOTO, 20CA3928
TOPICS & ISSUES
Permanent custody–trial court’s decision to award children services agency permanent custody of child not against the manifest weight of the evidence when mother’s chronic mental illness and delusions render her unable to care for her son.