NOTICE 2022 IL App (5th) 220255-U Decision filed 08/29/22. The NOTICE text of this decision may be This order was filed under changed or corrected prior to NOS. 5-22-0255, 5-22-0256, 5-22-0257 cons. Supreme Court Rule 23 and is he filing of a Petition for not precedent except in the Rehearing or the disposition of limited circumstances allowed he same. IN THE under Rule 23(e)(1).
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT ________________________________________________________________________
In re L.F., M.S., and M.F., Minors ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of (The People of the State of Illinois, ) Fayette County. ) Petitioner-Appellee, ) ) Nos. 19-JA-13, 19-JA-14, v. ) 19-JA-16 ) R.S., ) Honorable ) Allan F. Lolie Jr., Respondent-Appellant). ) Judge, presiding. ________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE CATES delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Boie and Justice Vaughan concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: Father waived any defect in personal jurisdiction by appearing and participating in the juvenile court proceedings. The trial court’s findings that Father was an unfit person, and that the termination of his parental rights was in the children’s best interest, were not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶2 Respondent, R.S. (Father), appeals the judgment of the circuit court of Fayette
County terminating his parental rights to his minor children, L.F., M.S., and M.F., claiming
the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction. Father additionally claims that the trial court’s
findings of unfitness and best interest were in error. For the following reasons, we affirm.
1 ¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 Respondent, R.S., is the biological father of M.F., born July 13, 2005, M.S., born
May 24, 2006, and L.F., born September 9, 2009. Father has not seen his children for
several years. In late February or early March of 2019, the children’s mother, B.F.
(Mother), who is not a party to this appeal, left her children with a relative and sought
substance abuse treatment in a facility in Chicago, Illinois. Mother, without completing
treatment, discharged herself from the facility a week after her arrival. She did not return
for her children. On May 7, 2019, the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS)
was contacted because the temporary caregiver did not have legal authority to assist the
children with medical treatment and could no longer provide care.
¶5 On May 16, 2019, the State filed juvenile petitions for each of the children alleging
that they were neglected based on being in an environment injurious to their welfare,
pursuant to the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Juvenile Court Act) (705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b)
(West 2018)), because of Mother’s conduct. The State’s petition averred that Mother left
her children with a relative and failed to return. The petition also stated that Mother was
reportedly homeless, she had a warrant for her arrest, and Mother had recently used
methamphetamines. The petition included Father but did not contain allegations related to
Father’s conduct.
¶6 The shelter care hearing was held after the juvenile petitions were filed. Father’s
exact whereabouts were unknown, and he did not appear for the hearing. The State
requested that the court enter a default judgment against both parents. The State informed
the court that temporary custody of the minor children was necessary because the 2 temporary caregiver had no legal authority to care for the children. The trial court found
that there was an immediate and urgent necessity, and it was in the best interests of the
children to grant shelter care. DCFS was given temporary custody and guardianship.
¶7 On July 16, 2019, a certificate of publication was filed indicating that Father, and
any other unknown fathers, had received notice by publication that juvenile petitions had
been filed by the State. The State did not file an affidavit stating that a diligent search for
Father had been performed, as required by section 2-16(2) of the Juvenile Court Act (705
ILCS 405/2-16(2) (West 2020)).
¶8 On August 15, 2019, the trial court entered an order of adjudication. Father did not
appear. Mother stipulated to the allegations in the juvenile petitions. The court found that
the children were neglected pursuant to section 2-3(1)(b) of the Juvenile Court Act (705
ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2018)) because Mother’s conduct created an injurious
environment to the children’s welfare.
¶9 On September 12, 2019, Lutheran Children and Family Services (LCFS) filed a
dispositional hearing report. The report included information that a search for Father had
been performed through the Statewide Automated Child Welfare Information System and
Father’s exact location was unknown. LCFS believed that Father may have lived in Las
Vegas, Nevada. The children were unaware of Father’s location.
¶ 10 That same day, the court held a dispositional hearing. Father did not appear for the
hearing. The State informed the court that Father lived in Las Vegas, Nevada, and he was
served by publication. The court entered an order of disposition which included that Father
was unable, for other than financial circumstances alone, and unwilling to care for, protect, 3 train, or discipline the minors. The court found that it was in the best interest of the minors
to remove them from the custody of their parents. Custody and guardianship were placed
with the DCFS Guardianship Administrator with authority to consent to required medical
and dental treatment. The permanency goal was for the children to return home in 12
months.
¶ 11 On July 9, 2020, the trial court held a permanency review hearing via video
conference and Father appeared pro se. Father did not raise any issues with regard to the
entry of the prior adjudication and dispositional orders. The court asked Father if he wished
to have counsel appointed and Father declined. The court rescheduled the hearing for a
status conference to determine whether a hearing was necessary to modify the permanency
goal.
¶ 12 Throughout the remainder of the proceedings in this case, Father appeared via the
court’s video conferencing system. The circuit clerk’s office emailed notices and pleadings
to Father at his request.
¶ 13 On October 8, 2020, a hearing was held on the State’s request to modify the
permanency goal to substitute care pending court determination of termination of parental
rights. Father appeared and objected. He claimed that the court had no authority over him
because the court’s authority was “from the public democracy” and Father was on the
“private side of the Republic.” The court explained to Father that he had to file a motion to
object to the proceedings in general. Father did not address the State’s request to modify
the permanency goal. The court entered an order with a permanency goal of substitute care
pending court determination of termination of parental rights. 4 ¶ 14 On April 29, 2021, the court held a status conference and the LCFS caseworker,
April Hosein-Reid, informed the court that she did not have Father’s contact information.
Father again appeared for the video status conference. The court asked Father to provide
Hosein-Reid with his phone number and Father complied. The court additionally addressed
Father’s behavior because he was calling the courthouse and yelling at the court clerks.
The court also admonished Father that he was required to cooperate with Hosein-Reid.
¶ 15 On June 23, 2021, the State filed petitions to terminate Father’s parental rights. The
State alleged that Father should be found unfit based on three grounds as outlined in the
Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2020)). The State claimed that Father failed to
maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to the minors’ welfare
(750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b) (West 2020)); Father failed to make reasonable efforts to correct the
conditions that were the basis for removing the children (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(i) (West
2020)); and Father failed to make reasonable progress toward the return of the minor within
nine months following the adjudication of neglect (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 2020)).
¶ 16 On December 2, 2021, the court held a fitness hearing via its teleconferencing
platform. Before the State could call its first witness, Father began arguing that the case
should be dismissed. The trial court muted Father and explained to him that the court had
subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction over Father. The court stated that
Father had previously appeared, had been informed regarding the juvenile petition, and
was present for the fitness hearing. The court found that Father submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the court. Before unmuting Father, the court admonished Father to be
respectful of the court and noted that Father had left a profane message with a court clerk. 5 Father was then allowed to make his argument that the case should be dismissed, as the
court lacked federal jurisdiction, the court was “not of the American,” and Father was
exempt from American law. The court denied Father’s oral motion to dismiss and stated
that it was not going to entertain Father’s “sovereign citizen nonsense.” The court then
muted Father so he could not speak, but could hear the proceedings.
¶ 17 The State called Jessica Holt as a witness. The court asked Father if he could hear
the witness and to answer by nodding his head. In response, Father gave the court the
middle finger on his video screen. The court then stated that Father was showing a “lack
of willingness to participate” and that he was “doing nothing to convince the Court that [he
was] a fit father.”
¶ 18 Holt testified that she was employed by LCFS and that she was assigned as the
caseworker from December of 2019 through November of 2020. Holt explained that LCFS
was unable to locate Father after performing multiple diligent searches. Father was located
after the children obtained Father’s contact information. Father did not visit the children or
request visitation while Holt was the caseworker. Holt had a conversation with Father over
the phone, but she never met him in person. A service plan had not been prepared for Father
while Holt was the caseworker because a new caseworker was reassigned to the case after
Father was located.
¶ 19 The State called April Hosein-Reid as its next witness. Hosein-Reid was assigned
as the caseworker after Holt, and remained the caseworker until October 2021. While
Hosein-Reid testified, the court indicated that Father was holding up “profanity-laced
notes” on the video conferencing screen. Hosein-Reid testified that she had contact with 6 Father on one occasion. During a hearing, Father had asked for his current caseworker’s
information and Hosein-Reid and Father exchanged contact information. Hosein-Reid
testified that she spoke to Father over the phone later that same day.
¶ 20 According to Hosein-Reid, Father was given a service plan which required him to
complete an assessment and parenting classes. Hosein-Reid researched service providers
near Glendale, Arizona, where Father claimed he lived. She sent Father a list of local
service providers, along with the service plan. LCFS had also offered Father transportation
and partial housing to travel to Illinois for a court hearing. Hosein-Reid testified that Father
began contacting the children through Facebook messenger in September 2021. Father did
not complete any of the services in his plan.
¶ 21 Father questioned Hosein-Reid and asked why he was not able to see his children.
She responded that the children initially refused to talk to Father. The court asked Father
to ask his next question and Father stated: “It don’t even matter. You all can go f*** each
other in the a***, for all I care at this point.” The court then muted Father and stated that
Father would not be allowed to ask further questions but would be allowed to listen to the
proceedings.
¶ 22 Jacquelyn Jones, a caseworker for LCFS, testified next. She had been the
caseworker for two months. Jones began by explaining that she had met with the children.
The court stopped her testimony because Father held up a sign that said “objection.” The
court unmuted Father who stated that he objected to “anything and everything you all are
saying.” Jones resumed her testimony after the court noted Father’s continuing objection
7 and again muted Father. Jones testified that she had attempted to contact Father and he
never returned her call. Jones never sent written correspondence to Father.
¶ 23 Jones testified that Father was required to complete an integrated assessment, along
with mental health and substance abuse assessments. He was also required to maintain
housing. Father had not completed any of the requirements. Although the court had
previously stated that Father was no longer allowed to ask questions, Father was given the
opportunity to cross-examine Jones. Instead of questioning Jones, the following statements
were made:
“FATHER: Would it even make a difference? THE COURT: It’s up to you. FATHER: All just going through your motions. Why don’t you get to it already because all I’m going to do is sue you all, in the end. I ain’t got no place for none of you all.”
The court then muted Father. After Jones testified, the State rested its case.
¶ 24 Father then testified at the fitness hearing. He understood that parents had to comply
with DCFS guidelines and assessments. Father claimed that there was no reason for him to
complete the assessments and blamed Mother for the children being in the care of DCFS.
He did not understand why he was not allowed to see his children. Father claimed that he
never received an opportunity to show that he was fighting for his children. He additionally
explained that he was unable to travel to see his children and be able to maintain his
employment. Father then stated, “I could care less what you are going to say or do right
now, at this point, because I already know what I got to do.”
¶ 25 After Father completed his testimony, the State argued that Father should be found
unfit because he had admitted that he refused to comply with the service plan “because he 8 wanted a reason to do so, because his children apparently were not enough of a reason.”
The State argued that refusing to do anything was worse than not showing up and the court
should find that Father had failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest in his
children’s welfare.
¶ 26 The guardian ad litem (GAL) agreed that the State had proven, by clear and
convincing evidence, that the parents had failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest,
concern, or responsibility regarding the welfare of their children. The GAL also believed
that the parents failed to make reasonable efforts or reasonable progress for the return of
the children. Specifically, Father had failed to show any responsibility for the children’s
welfare and never visited with his children during the two-year time period that the case
had been pending. The GAL believed that Father’s minimal activities with the children did
not demonstrate a reasonable effort or show interest and concern for the children by
engaging in “a few FaceTime messages, which were apparently referenced.” The GAL
argued that Father should be found unfit.
¶ 27 After the GAL’s argument, the trial court stated that it would take the matter under
advisement. The court asked Father for his mailing address to provide Father with a copy
of the court order. Father responded, “Yeah. You know what? You can just email it to me.
I live through myself. I don’t live anywhere else but through me.” The court noted that
Father refused to provide his mailing address and the order would be emailed.
¶ 28 On December 7, 2021, the court entered a written order regarding the fitness
determination. The order began by stating that Father had initially been in default and that
the orders of adjudication and disposition were not appealed. The court also noted that 9 Father repeatedly declined counsel throughout the proceedings. Father had been served
with the petition to terminate parental rights via email, at Father’s request. Father failed to
provide his address to the court and to the caseworkers. Father contested the court’s
jurisdiction in general at the beginning of the fitness hearing. The court indicated that
Father had not objected to being personally served or served through publication. The court
stated that, “Father subscribes to a version of the sovereign citizen movement and claims
to be a member of the Moorish Nation and not subject to Illinois law.” The court concluded
that Father had submitted himself to the court’s jurisdiction by appearing and participating
in the hearings.
¶ 29 The trial court’s order also noted that the State had alleged that Father failed to make
reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that were the basis for removal of the children
and that Father had failed to make reasonable progress toward the return of the children.
With regard to these allegations, the court found that the State failed to meet its burden of
proof on both of those grounds because it was not Father’s conduct that was the basis for
the initial removal of the children.
¶ 30 Nevertheless, the trial court did find that Father was unfit because he failed to
maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to the children’s
welfare pursuant to section 1(D)(b) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b) (West
2020)). The court indicated that Father had not visited the children and had not provided
support while the case was pending. Father refused to provide his home address in order
for a caseworker to inspect his living conditions. The court stated that for Father to be
awarded the children, Father should have complied with the assessments to determine 10 whether he was a danger to the children and should have allowed for a home inspection.
Father, instead, argued that he could not be forced to comply.
¶ 31 On January 17, 2022, Father emailed the court a request for counsel to be appointed.
Counsel was appointed to represent Father on January 27, 2022.
¶ 32 The best interest hearing was held on April 14, 2022. Tiana Shear, with LCFS,
testified first. The children had been placed in three separate traditional foster homes
because no family members were available to care for the children. The children attended
school in three different school districts and had not seen each other in months. M.S. and
her half-sister, who was not related to Father, were placed together. The oldest child, M.F.,
refused to see her siblings and wished to be adopted. The other two children did not want
to return to their parents. Each of the foster parents had expressed that they wished to adopt
the child in their care.
¶ 33 According to Shear, the children were “safe and happy” in their homes. M.F. was
having trouble in school. An individualized education plan (IEP) to address M.F.’s needs
was being developed. She was also referred for counseling. M.S. was having issues with
being disrespectful to her foster parents. L.F. was doing well in school and involved in
track.
¶ 34 Shear testified that Father had not met with the children in person during her
involvement with the case. LCFS would have arranged visitation for Father to meet with
his children, but Father never requested visitation. Father had been offered financial
support to travel to Illinois and he declined. Shear testified that Father contacted the
children over the phone and through Facebook. 11 ¶ 35 M.F.’s foster mother also testified. She confirmed that she was willing to adopt M.F.
and loved her. M.F.’s foster mother testified that she wanted to provide M.F. with stability
and a family. She was also financially able to care for M.F. The foster mother had a 12-
year-old daughter, who M.F. considered as a little sister. M.F. participated in reading, math,
and art programs outside of school. She additionally frequented the YMCA to play
basketball.
¶ 36 M.S.’s foster mother testified that she loved M.S. and wished to adopt her. When
M.S. moved in with her foster family, she was “very out of control.” Her foster mother
testified that she had addressed M.S.’s needs and was able to care for her and could provide
a sense of permanence. The foster mother also believed that she could financially take care
of M.S. She was the foster mother to four children, including M.S.’s half-sister, and she
had a 14-year-old son. The children all got along with each other, a majority of the time.
M.S. and her foster family were involved with the church.
¶ 37 L.F.’s foster mother testified that she loved L.F. and was willing to adopt her. She
testified that L.F. believed that she would eventually return to Father or Mother. L.F. had
frequent phone conversations with Father. Father would tell L.F. stories about when L.F.
was little and said that he wanted to see her. L.F.’s foster mother testified that she has an
eight-year-old daughter that considers L.F. to be her big sister. L.F. was doing well at
school and was involved in track, volleyball, and cheerleading.
¶ 38 Father also testified. He stated it had been seven years since he had last seen his
children. Father had not provided financial support for the children in nine years. Father
testified that he left Illinois after M.F. was born because “[Father] had trucks that came 12 after [him] to lynch [him].” Father claimed that the local sheriff told him to leave town for
his own safety and Father never returned. M.F. wanted Father to move back to Illinois, but
Father would not return because of the prior situation.
¶ 39 Father also testified that M.F. had been sexually assaulted and was upset with Father
for not doing anything about the incident. Father claimed that he had only recently learned
that M.F. was sexually assaulted. M.F. had also told Father that she did not believe he was
fighting to gain custody of her. Father had not spoken to M.F. or M.S. for several months
prior to the best interest hearing. Father testified that he spoke to L.F. frequently when she
was not busy with school. Father stated that he loved his children and believed that they
loved him. Father testified that he had two jobs and family support that would assist with
caring for the children.
¶ 40 Father additionally testified that he had not seen his children because his
caseworkers never set up visitation in person or through video conferencing. Father
claimed that LCFS never offered him financial assistance to return to Illinois. He
additionally claimed that he never completed assessments or services because he never
received a service plan.
¶ 41 Father testified that he had a disabled son in addition to his three children involved
in this case. His son was nine years old and lived in Springfield, Illinois. After Father was
asked if his son was in a medical facility, Father refused to answer. The court found that
Father was nonresponsive and refused to answer questions that the court deemed relevant.
Father started arguing with the court and then he was muted. No further questions were
13 asked by the State or the GAL. The court asked Father for his mailing address and Father
refused to answer. Witness testimony was then concluded.
¶ 42 The State then argued that it was in the best interest of the children to remain in their
foster homes. The children were in stable, loving, and caring homes. The foster parents
were addressing the children’s financial, spiritual, mental, and physical needs. Each foster
family wished to proceed with adoption.
¶ 43 Father’s counsel argued that Father was not listed in the juvenile petition as the
offending parent. Counsel argued that it was not in the children’s best interest to terminate
Father’s parental rights. The children had been placed in three different homes and never
saw each other. The two older children were struggling. Father had maintained contact with
L.F.
¶ 44 The GAL believed that the foster parents had done a remarkable job. The GAL
further believed that the State had met its burden of proving by a preponderance of the
evidence that it was in the best interests of the children to terminate Father’s parental rights.
The trial court took the matter under advisement.
¶ 45 On April 19, 2022, the trial court entered an order regarding the best interests of the
children. The order acknowledged that it was obligated to assess the best interest of each
child according to the statutory factors required by section 1-3(4.05) of the Juvenile Court
Act (705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05) (West 2020)). The court outlined the statutory factors and
applied those factors to the evidence presented for each child. The court additionally found
that Father had not made efforts to gain custody of the children while the case was pending.
The court also found that Father’s testimony was not credible when he testified that he 14 feared being lynched if he returned to Fayette County and alleged that LCFS did nothing
to help him. The order also noted that Father continually refused to provide his address to
the court. The trial court found that it was in the best interest of each child to terminate
Father’s parental rights. This appeal followed.
¶ 46 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 47 On appeal, Father claims that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over him
because the State failed to adhere to the affidavit procedure required for serving notice by
publication in juvenile proceedings. Father additionally claims that the trial court erred in
finding that Father was an unfit parent and finding that it was in the children’s best interest
to terminate Father’s parental rights.
¶ 48 A. Personal Jurisdiction
¶ 49 The legal question of whether the trial court obtained personal jurisdiction over the
respondent is reviewed de novo. In re Dar. C., 2011 IL 111083, ¶ 60. “If a court lacks
either subject matter jurisdiction over the matter or personal jurisdiction over the parties,
any order entered in the matter is void ab initio and, thus, may be attacked at any time.”
In re M.W., 232 Ill. 2d 408, 414 (2009).
¶ 50 A respondent may have personal jurisdiction imposed upon him by effective service
of a summons or he may consent to personal jurisdiction by his appearance. In re M.W.,
232 Ill. 2d at 408. Under section 2-15 of the Juvenile Court Act the clerk of the court shall
issue a summons to the minor’s legal guardian or custodian and to each person named as a
respondent when a juvenile petition is filed. 705 ILCS 405/2-15 (West 2018). Where the
15 respondent’s whereabouts are unknown, section 2-16 of the Juvenile Court Act allows for
service by publication. 705 ILCS 405/2-16 (West 2018).
¶ 51 For the State to proceed with notice by publication, a diligent inquiry of a
respondent’s current and last known address is required. 705 ILCS 405/2-16(2) (West
2018). If a respondent cannot be located after conducting a diligent inquiry, “petitioner’s
attorney shall file an affidavit at the office of the clerk of court in which the action is
pending showing that respondent on due inquiry cannot be found or is concealing his or
her whereabouts so that process cannot be served.” 705 ILCS 405/2-16(2) (West 2018).
Additionally, “the court may not enter any order or judgment against any person who
cannot be served with process other than by publication unless notice by publication is
given or unless that person appears.” (Emphasis added.) 705 ILCS 405/2-16(2) (West
2018). The State concedes that it failed to file an affidavit stating that a diligent search had
been performed pursuant to section 2-16(2) of the Juvenile Court Act. However, the State
argues that Father’s appearance resulted in a waiver of service of summons and the trial
court had personal jurisdiction over Father when he appeared.
¶ 52 According to section 2-15(7) of the Juvenile Court Act, the service of summons in
juvenile proceedings may be waived. Section 2-15(7) states as follows:
“The appearance of the minor’s legal guardian or custodian, or a person named as a respondent in a petition, in any proceeding under this Act shall constitute a waiver of service of summons and submission to the jurisdiction of the court, except that the filing of a motion authorized under Section 2- 301 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not constitute an appearance under this subsection. A copy of the summons and petition shall be provided to the person at the time of his appearance.” 705 ILCS 405/2-15(7) (West 2018).
16 ¶ 53 Father first appeared for a hearing on July 9, 2020, and failed to file a motion
challenging personal jurisdiction under section 2-301 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 735
ILCS 5/2-301 (West 2018). Father continued to appear and participate in the proceedings
thereafter.
¶ 54 Father claims, however, that he objected to the court’s jurisdiction during the
December 2, 2021, fitness hearing, and should be excused from following section 2-301
because he proceeded pro se. The arguments raised by Father on December 2, 2021,
however, failed to challenge personal jurisdiction for the State’s failure to fully comply
with the requirements for service by publication. We note that the trial court repeatedly
offered to appoint counsel and informed Father during the October 8, 2020, hearing, to file
a motion to object to the proceedings in general. Father initially refused counsel and failed
to file any motions. “Pro se litigants are presumed to have full knowledge of applicable
court rules and procedures, including procedural deadlines with respect to filing motions.”
Steinbrecher v. Steinbrecher, 197 Ill. 2d 514, 528 (2001).
¶ 55 We additionally note that Father repeatedly refused to provide the court with his
address. Father was provided with documents from the clerk of the court via email at
Father’s request. As such, Father’s receipt of the court documents and participation in the
court hearings indicates he consented to personal jurisdiction and waived this issue.
¶ 56 B. Termination of Parental Rights
¶ 57 Termination of parental rights proceedings are governed by the Juvenile Court Act
(705 ILCS 405/1-1 et seq. (West 2020)) and the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/0.01 et seq.
(West 2020)). Section 2-29 of the Juvenile Court Act provides a two-step process for the 17 involuntary termination of parental rights. 705 ILCS 405/2-29(2) (West 2020). First, the
trial court must find that the parent is unfit as defined in section 1(D) of the Adoption Act
(750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2020)) based on clear and convincing evidence. In re J.L., 236
Ill. 2d 329, 337 (2010). The trial court’s finding may be affirmed where evidence supports
a finding of unfitness on any of the grounds alleged by the State. In re C.W., 199 Ill. 2d
198, 217 (2002). After the court makes a finding of unfitness, the trial court then determines
whether the State has proven that it is in the child’s best interest to terminate parental rights
by a preponderance of the evidence. In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 347, 366 (2004).
¶ 58 1. Fitness Determination
¶ 59 The trial court concluded that Father was unfit because he failed to maintain a
reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to the child’s welfare (750 ILCS
50/1(D)(b) (West 2020)). A determination of unfitness involves factual findings and
credibility assessments, and the trial court’s factual findings will not be reversed unless
they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re M.J., 314 Ill. App. 3d 649, 655
(2000). A determination is against the manifest weight of the evidence if the opposite
conclusion is clearly evident. In re Gwynne P., 215 Ill. 2d 340, 354 (2005).
¶ 60 “In determining whether a parent showed reasonable concern, interest or
responsibility as to a child's welfare, we have to examine the parent’s conduct concerning
the child in the context of the circumstances in which that conduct occurred.” In re
Adoption of Syck, 138 Ill. 2d 255, 278 (1990). In evaluating Father’s conduct, the trial court
must focus on the reasonableness of his efforts and not on his success. In re E.O., 311 Ill.
App. 3d 720, 727 (2000). The court may consider evidence regarding the completion of 18 the service plan when determining whether Father had demonstrated interest, concern, or
responsibility. In re B'Yata I., 2013 IL App (2d) 130558, ¶ 35. “A parent need not be at
fault to be unfit.” In re E.O., 311 Ill. App. 3d at 727.
¶ 61 The trial court must also consider any circumstances that would have made it more
difficult for Father to visit, communicate with his children, or show interest in his
children’s well-being. In re E.O., 311 Ill. App. 3d at 727. “If personal visits with the child
are somehow impractical, letters, telephone calls, and gifts to the child or those caring for
the child may demonstrate a reasonable degree of concern, interest and responsibility,
depending upon the content, tone, and frequency of those contacts under the
circumstances.” In re Adoption of Syck, 138 Ill. 2d at 279.
¶ 62 Father argues that because he communicated with his children, attended court, and
maintained contact with his caseworkers, he demonstrated a reasonable degree of interest.
Father claims that in-person visits with his children would have been difficult or
impractical because he lives outside of Illinois.
¶ 63 Father had not seen his children in person for several years and he never requested
visitation with his children. Father was offered financial support for transportation
expenses to return to Illinois and he refused. Father began to contact his children through
Facebook messenger in September 2021, a couple months prior to the fitness hearing.
¶ 64 Although Father attended hearings, Father was frequently muted by the court during
court proceedings for his disrespectful behavior. During the fitness hearing, Father made
an obscene gesture into the camera and displayed “profanity-laced notes.” The court
admonished Father that his behavior was “doing nothing to convince the Court that [he 19 was] a fit father.” Father also refused to provide his mailing address to receive notices from
the court.
¶ 65 Father also failed to comply with his service plan. He was required to complete an
integrated assessment, along with mental health and substance abuse assessments, and
maintain housing. His caseworker, Hosein-Reid, provided Father with a list of service
providers near his home in Arizona and Father failed to participate. Over the course of the
case, Father interacted with caseworkers on only two occasions. His caseworker, Jones,
testified that she had never spoken to Father because he never returned her call. Father was
also guarded about his residence and failed to demonstrate that he was able to maintain
housing.
¶ 66 The evidence presented at the fitness hearing clearly and convincingly established
that Father failed to show a level of reasonable concern, interest, or responsibility as to the
children’s welfare. Considering all of the evidence, the trial court’s determination that
Father was unfit was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 67 2. Best Interest Determination
¶ 68 After the court determines whether a parent is unfit and their rights can be
terminated, the focus shifts to the child’s best interest and whether parental rights should
be terminated. In re S.K.B., 2015 IL App (1st) 151249, ¶ 48. “The parent’s interest in
maintaining the parent-child relationship must yield to the child’s interest in a stable, loving
home life.” In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d at 364. The trial court’s best interest determination will
not be disturbed unless it is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. In re R.L., 352
Ill. App. 3d 985, 1001 (2004). 20 ¶ 69 In making a best interest determination, section 1-3(4.05) of the Juvenile Court Act
requires a trial court to consider a number of statutory factors. 705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05)
(West 2020). “Additionally, a court may consider the nature and length of the child’s
relationship with his present caretaker and the effect that a change in placement would have
upon his emotional and psychological well-being.” In re Jaron Z., 348 Ill. App. 3d 239,
262 (2004).
¶ 70 Father testified that he loves his children. However, he had not seen his children in
seven years and had not provided them any financial support. Shear testified that the
children felt safe and happy in their foster homes. The children had also bonded with the
other children in the households. Each foster parent testified that they loved their foster
child and wished to adopt. And each foster parent had the financial ability to care for the
child in their care. M.F. wished to be adopted and the other two children did not want to
return to their parents.
¶ 71 M.F. and M.S. had exhibited some behavioral issues, but their foster parents were
addressing their needs and the children were improving. M.F.’s foster mother was
addressing her educational issues, as well, by moving forward with the IEP process. L.F.
was excelling in school and with her extracurricular activities.
¶ 72 Sufficient evidence was presented for the trial court to make its best interest
determination with regard to each child. Accordingly, we find that the trial court’s
determination that it was in the children’s best interest to terminate Father’s parental rights
was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
21 ¶ 73 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 74 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court of Fayette
County.
¶ 75 Affirmed.