NOTICE 2026 IL App (5th) 250906-U NOTICE Decision filed 03/18/26. The This order was filed under text of this decision may be NOS. 5-25-0906, 5-25-0907, 5-25-0908 cons. Supreme Court Rule 23 and is changed or corrected prior to the filing of a Petition for not precedent except in the
Rehearing or the disposition of IN THE limited circumstances allowed the same. under Rule 23(e)(1). APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________
In re LELAND S., COLT S., and CHASE S., Minors ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of (The People of the State of Illinois, ) Moultrie County. ) Petitioner-Appellee, ) ) v. ) Nos. 20-JA-12, 20-JA-13, ) 20-JA-14 Christopher S., ) ) Honorable Jeremy J. Richey, Respondent-Appellant). ) Judge, presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE SHOLAR delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Barberis and McHaney concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The judgment of the circuit court of Moultrie County that terminated the parental rights of the respondent father was not against the manifest weight of the evidence, and therefore, this court affirms the judgment.
¶2 In this consolidated appeal, the respondent, Christopher S. (Father), contends the circuit
court of Moultrie County erred when it entered an order that terminated Father’s parental rights to
the minor children, Leland S., who was born in July of 2017, and twin siblings Colt S. and Chase
S., who were born in November of 2019. Specifically, Father contends the trial court’s decision
that Father was unfit was against the manifest weight of the evidence. For the reasons that follow,
we affirm.
1 ¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 On December 16, 2020, the State filed petitions for adjudication of wardship in the
following three cases: 20-JA-12, 20-JA-13, and 20-JA-14. The first case involved Leland, and the
subsequent two involved, respectively, Colt and Chase. Because the pleadings that followed are
mostly identical, we will refer to the pleadings in 20-JA-12 unless otherwise noted, and we will
discuss the cases collectively wherever possible. The petitions alleged, with regard to each child,
that the child resided with Father and the children’s biological mother (Mother), who is not a party
to this appeal. We will refer to Mother in this disposition only when necessary for an understanding
of the trial court’s rulings in relation to Father’s appeal. The petitions further alleged that each
child was neglected in that (1) he resided in an environment that was injurious to his welfare and
that of his siblings because the environment exposed him “to missed medical and mental health
care appointments,” and (2) Father and Mother did “not provide adequate support and medical
care necessary for” his well-being and that of his siblings. The petitions alleged that it was in the
best interests of the boys to be adjudicated wards of the court, but that it was also in their best
interests to remain in the home with Father and Mother “so long as the parents cooperate with the
service plan developed by One Hope United, to assist and support the parents in dealing with the
medical needs of the” boys.
¶5 On March 24, 2021, a temporary custody order was entered, placing the boys in the care
of the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS). A shelter care report indicated
that on the previous day, Leland had been “found walking in his underwear near a park” and was
taken into protective custody by police. The report indicated that when DCFS followed up, they
found the condition of the home to be “dirty,” with “rotten food all over the floors,” and Leland
and Colt both to be dirty and bruised as well. Father was arrested for child endangerment.
2 ¶6 On August 10, 2021, an amended petition was filed as to Leland only. It alleged that Leland
was neglected as a result of inadequate supervision by Father and Mother. On August 16, 2021, an
adjudicatory order was entered, wherein the trial court found the boys to be neglected for the
reasons alleged in the petitions. The order found that the neglect was inflicted by Father and
Mother.
¶7 On November 8, 2021, a dispositional order was entered, wherein the trial court found that
Father and Mother were unable to care for the boys, and wherein the trial court made the boys
wards of the court. Guardianship and custody of the boys was placed with DCFS, with a
permanency goal of returning the boys home within 12 months. Father and Mother were
admonished to cooperate with DCFS and to comply with their service plans.
¶8 Although no permanency review hearing transcripts are present in the record on appeal,
seven permanency orders are present with file-stamped dates of April 27, 2022, October 26, 2022,
January 24, 2023, April 25, 2023, September 22, 2023, July 25, 2024, and July 2, 2025. In the
second and third of these seven orders, the trial court found that Father and Mother had made
reasonable and substantial efforts in the recommended services. However, the trial court found in
the other five orders that Father and Mother had not made reasonable and substantial efforts in the
recommended services. The trial court did not find, in any of the seven orders, that either parent
had made substantial progress in the recommended services.
¶9 On November 20, 2024, the State filed what was styled as a “motion seeking [a] finding of
unfitness and termination of parental rights of [Father and Mother].” The motion alleged that
Father and Mother were unfit because they had failed to (1) maintain a reasonable degree of
interest, concern, or responsibility for the welfare of the boys; (2) make reasonable efforts to
correct the conditions that were the basis for the removal of the boys during any of the four nine-
3 month periods at issue, specifically November 8, 2021, to August 8, 2022; August 8, 2022, to May
8, 2023; May 8, 2023, to January 8, 2024; and January 8, 2024, to October 8, 2024; and (3) make
reasonable progress toward the return of the boys during any of the aforementioned nine-month
periods.
¶ 10 A fitness hearing began on September 18, 2025. At the outset of the hearing, the State
asked the trial court to take judicial notice of the prior records of proceedings and orders entered
in each boy’s case, specifically the adjudicatory orders, dispositional orders, and all “orders that
were entered thereafter.” No parties objected, and the court stated that it would take said notice.
The State moved for admission of the curriculum vitae of Dr. Judy Osgood, and of the parenting
capacity assessment Dr. Osgood authored regarding Mother. Again, there was no objection, and
the exhibits were admitted. The parties further stipulated that Dr. Osgood was not available to
testify in person, and that her credentials and assessment were admitted instead of live testimony.
¶ 11 Of relevance to Father’s appeal, Dr. Osgood stated that the history she received indicated
that twins Colt and Chase were born prematurely, and that Colt “was given a synagis injection due
to being at high risk for [respiratory syncytial virus].” In March 2020, Colt was due for an
additional injection, but “the parents did not respond to 10 phone calls regarding [Colt’s] medical
needs,” even though Colt’s failure to get the injection “could lead to long term harm or death.” Dr.
Osgood noted that Chase had complex medical needs as well, “including AV valve heart defect,
pulmonary hypertension and hemihypertrophy,” and that “Chase requires a feeding tube,
tracheotomy and a ventilator.” Chase resided at a special-needs housing facility in Peoria. Dr.
Osgood also recounted the incident in which Leland was found wandering unsupervised in his
underwear near a park.
4 ¶ 12 The first witness to present live testimony was Father. He testified that he presently lived
with his mother in Lovington, Illinois, while awaiting the remodeling of his “new place.” He
testified that he presently saw Leland and Colt every Friday, and that he wanted “to go see Chase,”
but that although he had asked multiple caseworkers, multiple times, it had been “a continuous
runaround for the last two and a half years.” He testified that sometimes he was told he needed
supervision for such visits, and other times he was told he did not, and that “it’s very hard to stay
in touch with” agency workers about arranging visits with Chase at the special-needs housing
facility where Chase lives. When asked if he thought Chase would recognize him, Father testified,
“No, I don’t.” He agreed that he was probably a stranger to Chase. He testified that he was no
longer familiar with Chase’s medical needs, including related to an AV heart defect, but added
that he had told caseworkers that he would “be more than willing to retrain” with regard to those
needs. He testified that he understood that with regard to each of Chase’s medical conditions, it
was “absolutely vital that [he] follow through with regular medical checkups and appointments.”
With regard to caring for Chase’s extensive medical needs at home, Father testified that he believed
Chase would have “in-home nursing around the clock,” but conceded that he had not “arranged
for that” yet. He testified that he could not arrange it until he was able to visit Chase and talk to
his nurses more about it. He testified that he believed that once he moved into his new place, and
was “retrained” on Chase’s medical needs, it would be in Chase’s best interests to live with him.
¶ 13 Father testified that he was aware of the allegation that he struck Leland in the face in
March of 2024 but denied that he did so. He testified that Mother and Mother’s mother told Leland
to say Father hit Leland but again stated that it was not true. He conceded that he did not appeal
the DCFS indication that it was true. He testified that he did not believe appealing the finding
5 “would do [him] any good.” He testified that he was not aware of medical diagnoses or medications
for Leland or Colt, because he was “not kept in the loop of any of that.”
¶ 14 Father testified that he worked at CHI in Arthur, Illinois, building garage doors, and had
“been back there for almost two years.” He testified that he worked from “[f]ive to five, Monday
through Friday,” and did not work a second job. He testified that if he was given custody of the
boys, his mother would help take care of Leland and Colt while he was working, and that Chase
“would have to have the constant in-home nurse.” He testified that he and Mother did not speak
often, but that if he had custody of the boys, “it would have to be a more consistent thing to where
we could coparent on a more mature level than *** in the past.”
¶ 15 With regard to compliance with his service plans, Father testified that when asked to do
additional parenting education, he agreed to do so, but “was never told a date” to attend. He denied
that he received a referral to go to Cognition Works, or anywhere else. He testified that he
completed “a court-approved and DCFS-approved” online training course. When asked why he
did not complete it earlier in the case, he testified that he “was not made aware” that he needed to
do the training until his last court date.
¶ 16 On cross-examination, Father testified that he wanted to visit Chase on a weekend, so that
the visit would not disrupt his job and income, but that no caseworker had been available to
supervise him on a weekend visit. He testified that he was aware that he could not have an
unsupervised visit with Chase until he had “two full 24-hour shifts with Chase.” He testified that
he arranged his weekly visits with Leland and Colt through Becky Hoover of One Hope United.
He testified that the only visits he missed were those that were cancelled by Hoover, due to car
problems Hoover was having. Father further testified that prior to the indicated finding that he had
slapped Leland, Father had completed all “parenting classes and services that [he was] asked to
6 do,” and that it was only after the indicated finding that DCFS “added additional services.” He
testified that he had now completed all of those services and was currently enrolled in “anger
management counseling.” He thereafter stated that his first anger management counseling session
was held the day before the present hearing.
¶ 17 Father testified that on June 16, 2025, a “home safety check” was done at the trailer he
lived in at that time, and the trailer “was clean and appropriate and approved.” He testified that
although he had not seen Chase in two and a half years, he did “try to call weekly to check up on
him,” and added that he had “called last week” and been told that Chase “was doing good” overall.
He agreed that in the past two and a half years, he had “never sent Chase a birthday gift or
Christmas gift.” When asked why he had not sent gifts to Chase, Father testified, “I just have forgot
about it.”
¶ 18 Amanda Drummond testified that she was Mother’s mother, and the foster parent for
Leland and Colt. She denied Father’s accusation that she told Leland to claim that Father smacked
him. She testified that Leland told her that Father smacked him. She testified that she did not
observe any marks or bruises on Leland’s face, and that she contacted Leland’s caseworker.
Drummond testified that she was the parenting time supervisor for Mother’s visits with Leland
and Colt, which occurred every Sunday for two hours. She denied that she had ever heard Mother
tell Leland that Leland should say Father smacked Leland. She testified that her relationship with
Father was not “very great,” because when Father and Mother were together, Drummond was not
allowed to see the boys. She testified that Leland and Colt had lived with her since 2021, when
they were removed from the care of their parents. Drummond testified that she tried to visit Chase
“every other month,” but that due to Chase’s severe medical issues, it was often difficult, because
she did not want to take Leland and Colt to visit Chase when they were sick. She testified that she
7 believed Chase recognized her and the boys, and that he smiled at Leland and Colt when they
visited.
¶ 19 On cross-examination, when asked if Leland and Colt were “excited” about their visits with
Father, Drummond testified, “They were to an extent.” She added, “They were happy at the time,
but then after the visit, it was like they were ready to go home.” She testified that the boys told her
about having dinner with their paternal grandmother during the visits, but did not discuss the visits
other than that. She testified that the boys were happy to see her after the visits, and the boys never
asked for additional time with Father, or with Mother. When asked again about interactions
following visits with Father, Drummond testified that the boys did not really talk about Father or
the visit, although they would sometimes tell her they had gone bowling or to a restaurant.
¶ 20 Janessa Watson testified that she was a foster care case manager with One Hope United
and had been for three years. She testified that until one month prior to the hearing, she was “the
primary caseworker” for Leland, Colt, and Chase. With regard to Father’s testimony about his
difficulties visiting Chase, Watson testified that she offered “to meet him in Peoria twice in July”
to supervise visits, but Father told her “that he works Monday through Friday and wasn’t able to
go to the visit.” She testified that Father insisted the visits had to be on weekends, and testified that
although Hoover could supervise Father at the visits, that would involve a lot of overtime for
Hoover, which would have to be approved by “higher up departments.” She testified that Hoover
would also have to use her own vehicle for those visits.
¶ 21 Watson testified that to her knowledge, Father had not completed an anger management
course. She testified that he had not told her that he was engaging in counseling. She testified that
he also did not tell her about the birth of his daughter. When asked why the boys could not be
returned to Father once he moved out of his mother’s home, Watson testified that at present, “we
8 don’t have a home to inspect,” and added, “[w]e don’t have anywhere to see where he would be
able to care for these children, have enough room, have enough space.” She testified that although
Father “stated that he has a family member that is *** a certified nursing assistant,” that “is
different than a registered nurse.” She testified that she did not believe “the level of care that Chase
needs” could “be met with a certified nursing assistant rather than a registered nurse.”
¶ 22 Watson testified that she sent in an anger management referral for Father at Life Links, not
at the provider he testified he was receiving anger management counseling from, and that she was
surprised to learn he was not using the provider she referred. With regard to Father caring for
Chase, Watson testified, “I do think it would be incredibly difficult to manage a child who has a
trach, a ventilator, a feeding tube,” and that Chase required “around-the-clock care.” Watson
testified that Father had not provided her with a plan for how he could “integrate full-time nursing
care into his home with his other children present as well.” She testified that Chase was now
considered to be medically stable, and under the right circumstances could be discharged for home
living. Watson testified that she believed Drummond was willing to facilitate visits between Father
and Leland and Colt.
¶ 23 On cross-examination, Watson testified that she did not believe that Father had ever asked
her if someone other than Drummond could supervise visits with Leland and Colt, and Watson did
not know if Father had asked other caseworkers. She testified that when she took over the case in
January of 2025, she reviewed the case notes “to get a feel for the case,” and learned that Father
was supposed to be doing parenting classes again but refused. She testified that she was told that
Father had not engaged with Chase by phone call “for at least the last couple of months,” and
“hadn’t visited in over a year.” She thereafter agreed that it had been approximately two and a half
years since Father last saw Chase. Watson testified that during her time on the case, Father was
9 not “any closer to having the children returned home to him than he was at the start of the case.”
When asked what she based that opinion on, Watson testified that it was based on his failure to
complete anger management and parenting classes, and the fact that after four years, he was still
allowed only agency-supervised visits. She later clarified that Father originally completed
parenting classes but was re-referred after the indicated finding that he smacked Leland, and that
he did not complete the classes a second time. She agreed that it was the previous caseworker, not
Watson, who informed Father of the need to complete the services again.
¶ 24 Following Watson’s testimony, the hearing recessed for the day. When the hearing
continued on the following day, September 19, 2025, the parties presented argument. The trial
court thereafter stated that it found that the State had met its burden to prove, by clear and
convincing evidence, that both Mother and Father failed to make any reasonable progress in the
case. The court stated that it found Father’s testimony credible, but that the State nevertheless had
met its burden. The court additionally found that Father had failed to maintain a reasonable degree
of interest, concern, or responsibility for the welfare of Chase, who Father had not visited in over
two years, and toward whom Father had shown a “lack of appropriate attention at birthday and
Christmastime, no gifts, no cards, et cetera.” The court found that Father “[p]robably” could have
visited Chase on a weekday, although not each week, because Father had to work. The court stated
that “[a]t the very least, [Father] could have taken a personal day or a vacation day.” The court
added, “You’ve got to make the effort, and this father did not make the effort.” The court found,
however, that with regard to Leland and Colt, the State had not shown by clear and convincing
evidence that Father had failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or
responsibility for their welfare. The court further found that the State had not shown by clear and
10 convincing evidence that Father failed to make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that
were the basis for the removal of the boys during any of the nine-month periods at issue.
¶ 25 With regard to reasonable progress, the court agreed with the State that after four years,
“nothing has changed” and “[t]he parents just aren’t making any progress.” The court stated that
there was “just no evidence” that Father and Mother were taking the information they had learned
“and applying it in a way that could make a difference in the parenting in this situation.” The court
found that Father’s failure to appeal the indicated finding “show[ed] a lack of progress” as well.
The court acknowledged that Father and Mother both were “in some counseling at the moment,”
but stated that these efforts were “brand-new *** within the last couple weeks” and were “too
little, too late.” The court noted Father did not have adequate housing, and the court found it
“telling” that “when both parents are asked about their plan for how they’re going to deal with all
these children if they get them back, I would say their plan is not a plan.” The court described the
plans as too generalized, with “[n]o specific action plan how this is actually going to get done.”
The court stated this was particularly problematic in light of the boys’ extensive special needs,
especially with regard to Chase, and added, “if there’s ever a case that needed careful planning,
this is one of them.” The court stated that it agreed with the State that it was problematic that after
four years, both parents still were on supervised visits. The court further stated that the removal of
the boys from the home should have been “a wake-up call,” but that instead the parents had made
“no progress” toward the return of the boys.
¶ 26 On October 23, 2025, a best interests hearing was held. Because Father does not challenge
the best interests findings on appeal, we do not recount the testimony from that hearing. We do
note, however, that at the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found that the State had met its
burden of proving that it was in the best interests of the boys for the parental rights of Father and
11 Mother to be terminated. The court stated that it had considered all of the appropriate statutory
factors and thereafter discussed its reasoning. The court then stated, “Children need permanence.
These cases cannot go on forever.” The court added that Father and Mother had “been given more
than ample time, and that’s certainly not the only factor the court would consider, but they’ve had
more than ample time.” The court stated that it did not believe that Father or Mother would ever
“be able to fully take care of Chase’s needs.” On October 24, 2025, the trial court entered a written
order that was consistent with the court’s oral pronouncements. This timely appeal followed.
¶ 27 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 28 Parents have a fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and management of their
children. See, e.g., In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 347, 363 (2004). The involuntary termination of parental
rights under the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/1-1 et seq. (West 2024)) is a two-step
process. In re M.I., 2016 IL 120232, ¶ 20. The State must first prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the parent is unfit under any of the discrete and independent grounds listed in section
1(D) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2024)). M.I., 2016 IL 120232, ¶ 20; In re
C.W., 199 Ill. 2d 198, 217 (2002) (“the grounds set forth in section 1(D) each provide a discrete
basis for a finding of unfitness”). Although the State may rely on several grounds in its motion to
terminate parental rights, a finding adverse to the parent on any single ground is sufficient to
support a subsequent termination of parental rights. C.W., 199 Ill. 2d at 217. In other words, “only
one ground of unfitness need be proved to find a parent unfit.” In re J.P., 261 Ill. App. 3d 165, 174
(1994).
¶ 29 If the court finds that a parent is unfit, the matter proceeds to a second hearing, at which
the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it is in the best interests of the minor
children to terminate parental rights. D.T., 212 Ill. 2d at 352, 366. At this stage of the proceedings,
12 the court’s focus necessarily shifts to the best interests of the children and away from the rights of
the parent. In re P.S., 2021 IL App (5th) 210027, ¶ 30. “The parent’s interest in maintaining the
parent-child relationship must yield to the child’s interest in a stable, loving home life” (D.T., 212
Ill. 2d at 364), because a prompt, just, and final resolution of a child’s status, as opposed to having
that status remain in limbo, is in the child’s interests. In re D.L., 191 Ill. 2d 1, 13 (2000).
¶ 30 On appeal, this court accords great deference to the trial court’s decisions in termination
proceedings because the trial court is in a better position to observe witnesses and to judge their
credibility. In re Dal. D., 2017 IL App (4th) 160893, ¶ 53. This court does not reweigh the evidence
or reassess the credibility of witnesses. In re M.A., 325 Ill. App. 3d 387, 391 (2001). Unless the
trial court’s findings of parental unfitness or the child’s best interest are against the manifest weight
of the evidence, this court will not disturb the trial court’s findings. In re A.W., 231 Ill. 2d 92, 104
(2008). A finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence only if the opposite conclusion is
clearly apparent or the determination is unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence
presented. In re D.F., 201 Ill. 2d 476, 498 (2002).
¶ 31 In this case, the trial court found Father unfit as to all three boys due to Father’s failure to
make reasonable progress toward the return of the boys during any nine-month period following
the adjudication of neglect. See 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 2024). “Reasonable progress” is
judged by an objective standard focused on the goal of returning the child to the parent. In re D.D.,
309 Ill. App. 3d 581, 589 (2000). The “benchmark” for measuring reasonable progress
“encompasses the parent’s compliance with the service plans and the court’s directives, in light of
the condition which gave rise to the removal of the child, and in light of other conditions which
later become known and which would prevent the court from returning custody of the child to the
parent.” In re C.N., 196 Ill. 2d 181, 216-17 (2001). “At a minimum, reasonable progress requires
13 measurable or demonstrable movement toward the goal of reunification.” In re Daphnie E., 368
Ill. App. 3d 1052, 1067 (2006). A parent has made reasonable progress when the trial court, “in
the near future, will be able to order the child returned to parental custody.” (Emphasis in original.)
In re L.L.S., 218 Ill. App. 3d 444, 461 (1991).
¶ 32 On appeal, Father contends the trial court’s decision with regard to fitness was in error
because Father “was gainfully employed and maintained stable and safe home environments
throughout the nine-month periods alleged, and he was about to move to another suitable, larger
residence.” Father also contends that he “participated in all his scheduled visits with Leland and
Colt, and regularly tried to obtain the supervision required of him in order to visit Chase, only to
meet with delay and failures by the agency to work with him.” Father concludes that he “completed
training in the care of Chase and was willing to repeat it.”
¶ 33 However, as the State accurately notes, Watson testified that Father did not complete the
services required of him after the DCFS-indicated finding that Father struck Leland, and testified
that the previous caseworker told Watson that Father “refused” to complete the services. Father
admitted that he did not appeal the indicated finding but testified that, once he learned he was
required to perform additional services, he completed them. However, as the State points out, even
if Father’s testimony is credited, he did not complete the additional services prior to the end of the
four nine-month time periods at issue, and therefore his claim does not show reasonable progress
during the required time periods. The trial court apparently agreed, stating that although Father
and Mother both were “in some counseling at the moment,” these efforts were “brand-new ***
within the last couple weeks” and were “too little, too late.”
¶ 34 The State is also correct that all of the permanency orders found that Father did not make
reasonable progress, and that six of these seven orders encompass the four nine-month periods at
14 issue. In addition, Watson testified that during her time on the case, Father was not “any closer to
having the children returned home to him than he was at the start of the case,” an opinion Watson
based not only on Father’s failure to complete the additional services, but also on the fact that after
four years, Father was still allowed only agency-supervised visits. The trial court noted this
testimony and stated that it agreed with the State that it was problematic that after four years, both
parents still were on supervised visits. The court further stated that the removal of the boys from
the home should have been “a wake-up call,” but that instead the parents had made “no progress”
toward the return of the boys.
¶ 35 The evidence also showed that although Father expressed a desire to be reunited with the
boys, he did not have suitable housing at the time of the hearing, only plans to obtain it, and to
obtain care for the boys. The court noted this, and found it “telling” that “when both parents are
asked about their plan for how they’re going to deal with all these children if they get them back,
I would say their plan is not a plan.” The court described the plans as too generalized, with “[n]o
specific action plan how this is actually going to get done.” The court stated this was particularly
problematic in light of the boys’ extensive special needs, especially with regard to Chase, and
added, “if there’s ever a case that needed careful planning, this is one of them.” Indeed, Father
conceded in his testimony that Chase needed “in-home nursing around the clock,” but stated that
he had not “arranged for that” yet. Although he testified that he could not arrange it until he was
able to visit Chase and talk to his nurses more about it, he did not explain why he could not talk to
the nurses, or other facility staff, by phone to make such arrangements. He also conceded that he
would have to be fully retrained on Chase’s medical needs before Chase could be released to his
care.
15 ¶ 36 The evidence recounted above demonstrates, unequivocally, that “in the near future” the
trial court would not be able to order any of the boys returned to Father’s custody, and thus that
Father failed to make reasonable progress. See L.L.S., 218 Ill. App. 3d at 461. In reaching this
conclusion, we reiterate that the trial court was in the best position to judge the credibility of the
witnesses, including Father (see Dal. D., 2017 IL App (4th) 160893, ¶ 53), and that we will not
reweigh the evidence or reassess the credibility of those witnesses. M.A., 325 Ill. App. 3d at 391.
The opposite conclusion to that reached by the trial court in this case is not clearly apparent, and
the trial court’s determination is not unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence
presented; accordingly, the trial court’s finding is not against the manifest weight of the evidence
(see D.F., 201 Ill. 2d at 498), and we will not disturb it. A.W., 231 Ill. 2d at 104.
¶ 37 As explained above, “only one ground of unfitness need be proved to find a parent unfit.”
J.P., 261 Ill. App. 3d at 174. Because a parent may be found unfit if the State proves any one of
the statutory grounds for unfitness by clear and convincing evidence, we will affirm the trial court’s
decision if the evidence supports its finding as to any of the grounds. In re Baby Boy, 2025 IL App
(4th) 241427, ¶¶ 63-64. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s finding of unfitness on the basis
of Father’s failure to make reasonable progress toward the return of the boys. Father does not
contest the trial court’s decision regarding the best interests of the boys. Accordingly, we do not
address that decision.
¶ 38 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 39 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Moultrie County.
¶ 40 Affirmed.