In Re Leibowitz

147 B.R. 341, 1992 Bankr. LEXIS 1858, 1992 WL 347118
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. New York
DecidedNovember 20, 1992
Docket19-10524
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 147 B.R. 341 (In Re Leibowitz) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Leibowitz, 147 B.R. 341, 1992 Bankr. LEXIS 1858, 1992 WL 347118 (N.Y. 1992).

Opinion

HOWARD SCHWARTZBERG, Bankruptcy Judge.

The debtor in this Chapter 13 case counters the movant’s relief from a stay motion *343 with an application for a “strip-down” to deprive the movant of its secured status as a mechanic’s lienor and relegate it to an unsecured elaimholder not entitled to relief from the automatic stay.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. In August of 1990, the movant, Emigrant General Contracting Corp., gutted and rehabilitated the debtor’s residence in Yonkers, New York, and obtained and filed a mechanic’s lien against the premises on October 15, 1990, when the debtor failed to pay for the construction work.

2. In February of 1991, the movant commenced an action in state court against the debtor for foreclosure of the mechanic’s lien and money damages. On May 14, 1992, a jury in the state court rendered a verdict in favor of the movant and against the debtor. On June 2, 1992, a judgment in the sum of $21,535.50 was entered by the movant against the debtor in the Westches-ter County Clerk’s Office.

3. A foreclosure sale of the movant’s mechanic’s lien was scheduled for September 23, 1992.

4. On September 17, 1992, the debtor filed with this court his petition for relief under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code.

5. When the movant filed its mechanic’s lien against the debtor’s premises on October 15, 1990, there were two mortgages then recorded against the debtor’s premises. The first mortgage was in the sum of $64,497.78 in favor of the Dime Savings Bank of New York. The second mortgage was in favor of Morris DeLasho in the sum of $26,000.00 for a total of $90,497.78.

6. After the movant filed its mechanic’s lien on October 15, 1990, four additional liens were recorded against the debtor’s premises, including a third mortgage in favor of Morris DeLasho, recorded on May 20, 1991, in the sum of $34,000.00 and a fifth mortgage in favor of Morris DeLasho in the sum of $14,000.00.

7. The total of all the liens against the debtor’s property, including the movant’s mechanic’s lien, amounts to $174,666.85. 8. The debtor does not dispute the mov-ant’s appraiser’s testimony that the debt- or’s residence is worth, at most, between $85,000.00 and $90,000.00.

9. Hence, the first and second mortgages, aggregating $90,497.78 when the mov-ant filed its mechanic’s lien, exceed the appraised value of the debtor’s premises.

10. In light of the total encumbrances of $174,666.85 against the debtor’s premises, it may be concluded without dispute that the debtor lacks equity in his property.

11. The debtor has testified without contradiction that he expects to cure his mortgage defaults in his Chapter 13 plan. He has also testified that he proposes to pay his mortgagees in full in accordance with arrangements arrived at with his mortgagees. Therefore, if these facts are satisfied, an effective Chapter 13 rehabilitation is likely. In such case, the debtor’s residence will be necessary for an effective Chapter 13 rehabilitation.

12. In light of the foregoing, the mov-ant may not rely on 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2) for relief from the automatic stay. Therefore, the movant must look to 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) in order to obtain such relief.

DISCUSSION

Contrary to the usual scenario of attempting to prove a positive equity, this Chapter 13 debtor emphasizes his lack of equity as an affirmative defense to the movant’s motion for relief from the automatic stay pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(d). The debtor maintains that the movant is not the holder of a secured claim because two mortgages recorded prior to the filing of the movant’s mechanic’s lien exceeded the debtor’s equity in the premises. Therefore, the debtor seeks to apply 11 U.S.C. §§ 506(a) and (d) as an affirmative defense.

In order to invoke § 362(d)(1), the mov-ant must establish that cause exists for relief from the stay, including “the lack of adequate protection of an interest in property.” The debtor maintains that the mov-ant lacks any interest in his residence because the movant’s allowed mechanic’s lien is not a secured claim within the meaning *344 of 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) and is simply an unsecured claim which may be paid at the same rate other unsecured claims will be paid in the debtor’s Chapter 13 plan. The determination of secured claims is governed by 11 U.S.C. § 506(a), which provides as follows:

§ 506. Determination of secured status.
(a) An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in which the estate has an interest, or that is subject to setoff under section 553 of this title, is a secured claim to the extent of the value of such creditor’s interest in the estate’s interest in such property, or to the extent of the amount subject to setoff, as the case may be, and is an unsecured claim to the extent that the value of such creditor’s interest or the amount so subject to setoff is less than the amount of such allowed claim. Such value shall be determined in light of the purpose of the valuation and of the proposed disposition or use of such property, and in conjunction with any hearing on such disposition or use or on a plan affecting such creditor’s interest.

11 U.S.C. § 506(a).

Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 506(a), the entire amount of the movant’s mechanic’s lien is unsecured because the first and second mortgages on the debtor’s residence exceed the value of the property, leaving no unencumbered property value for the movant’s mechanic’s lien to attach.

Continuing with this “strip-down” process, the debtor then invokes 11 U.S.C. § 506(d) to void the movant’s mechanic’s lien. This section provides as follows:

(d) To the extent that a lien secures a claim against the debtor that is not an allowed secured claim, such lien is void....

11 U.S.C. § 506(d).

The Supreme Court has held that a debt- or may not employ the so-called “strip-down” process in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case to void the undersecured portion of a creditor’s lien. In re Dewsnup v. Timm (In re Dewsnup), — U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 773, 116 L.Ed.2d 903 (1992). However, the Second Circuit has held that the prohibition in the Dewsnup

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
147 B.R. 341, 1992 Bankr. LEXIS 1858, 1992 WL 347118, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-leibowitz-nysb-1992.