In re L.C.

2025 Ohio 193

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: January 24, 2025
• Docket: 2024-CA-47
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as In re L.C., 2025-Ohio-193.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT GREENE COUNTY

IN RE: L.C. : : : C.A. No. 2024-CA-47 : : Trial Court Case No. P0009180 : : (Appeal from Common Pleas Court- : Juvenile Division) : :

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OPINION

Rendered on January 24, 2025

L.M., Pro Se Appellant

R.C., Pro Se Appellee

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EPLEY, P.J.

{¶ 1} Father, pro se, appeals from a judgment of the Greene County Court of

Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, which overruled three motions related to the court’s

child support order and its enforcement. For the following reasons, the trial court’s

judgment will be affirmed. -2-

I. Facts and Procedural History

{¶ 2} In May 2013, Mother filed a complaint for paternity, alleging that Father was

the biological father of L.C., who was born in 2011. Mother sought genetic testing to

establish L.C.’s paternity. A magistrate granted the motion and set a final non-contested

hearing for paternity for October 1, 2013. Service was attempted on Father by certified

mail, but the documents were returned as unclaimed. Service was then sent by ordinary

mail.

{¶ 3} Mother was the sole witness at the October 1, 2013 hearing. Based on her

testimony, the magistrate orally ruled that Mother and Father were L.C.’s biological

parents, that Father would be added to L.C.’s birth certificate, and that Father would be

ordered to pay child support. Father arrived late for the hearing and learned of the

outcome.

{¶ 4} On October 28, 2013, the magistrate filed a written entry finding that Father

was the biological father of L.C. and ordered Father to pay child support. Father objected

to the magistrate’s decision and requested DNA testing. The trial court ordered Father

and L.C. to submit to genetic testing and set a hearing on the objections; it is unclear

whether DNA testing was ever performed. Nevertheless, at the hearing, Father indicated

that he was only challenging the amount of child support. In its January 29, 2014

judgment, the trial court adopted the magistrate’s decision except as to the amount of

child support, which it reduced to $479.28 per month, plus a two percent processing fee.

Father did not appeal the trial court’s judgment.

{¶ 5} Approximately nine years later, on February 23, 2023, the Greene County -3-

Child Support Enforcement Agency (CSEA) filed an Administrative Adjustment

Recommendation that Father’s child support be modified to $1,042.34 per month, which

it supported with a computation worksheet. The magistrate approved the modification,

and the trial court adopted the magistrate’s decision the same day. Father, who no

longer lived in Ohio, objected to the trial court’s judgment. He also moved for a decrease

in his child support obligation because, as of March 13, 2023, he was no longer employed.

The magistrate overruled Father’s objection as untimely but scheduled a hearing on his

motion to modify child support. Father claimed that the court lacked personal jurisdiction

over him and sought to appear by special appearance.

{¶ 6} In a May 18, 2023 decision, the magistrate concluded that the court had

personal jurisdiction over Father and denied Father’s motion to modify child support due

to Father’s failure to proceed with his case-in-chief at the hearing. Father filed belated

objections, which the trial court rejected as untimely.

{¶ 7} In July 2023, Father moved to dismiss the case, claiming that the trial court

lacked personal jurisdiction over him and that other errors had occurred. He also moved

to terminate child support and for legal custody of L.C. The complaint for legal custody

was transferred to Clark County, where Mother and L.C. resided.

{¶ 8} In August 2023, the trial court addressed Father’s motion for limited

appearance, his motions to dismiss, and other motions. The trial court rejected the

motions, finding that it had subject matter jurisdiction over the case and personal

jurisdiction over Father.

{¶ 9} Over the next several months, Father filed numerous motions, notices, and -4-

objections. He continued to challenge the court’s jurisdiction, claimed that judgments

entered after October 1, 2013 were void, asserted that his due process rights had been

violated, argued that he did not consent to acknowledgment of paternity and voluntary

payment of child support, and raised other alleged errors by the trial court. Father

repeatedly sought summary judgment on his arguments and the dismissal of the case.

The trial court overruled his motion, notices, and objections on October 20, 2023

(addressing Father’s September filings), December 7, 2023 (addressing Father’s

November 2, 2023 filings), and December 14, 2023 (addressing Father’s December 11,

2023 filings). Father did not appeal the trial court’s judgments.

{¶ 10} Sometime in late 2023, CSEA apparently made a determination that Father

was in default under a support order. In February 2024, CSEA notified Father that his

driver’s license could be suspended by the Bureau of Motor Vehicles (BMV) due to the

default. The notice indicated that he may be able to avoid the suspension of his license

by contacting CSEA by February 15. Father emailed CSEA on the morning of February

15, and the same day, CSEA responded that it had mailed him a modification application

to return. Father’s Ohio driver’s license was suspended by the BMV, effective February

23, 2024. In April 2024, CSEA sent financial institutions associated with Father a notice

that the monies and credits in the account were to be restricted until the institution

received either a withdrawal directive or an order to remove the access restriction.

CSEA also sent withdrawal notices for his arrearage of $6,258.69.

{¶ 11} On April 26, 2024, Father filed “objections to an administrative action” in the

trial court, attaching the asset restriction notices, withdrawal notices, and other -5-

documents. Approximately a month later, on May 28, 2024, Father filed a motion to

dismiss the case due to violations of his due process rights under the Fourteenth

Amendment to the United States Constitution. He indicated that he had filed objections

to the administrative action with the clerk of the juvenile court in December 2023 and

January 2024, but the documents had not been entered. Father further stated that CSEA

had initiated bank levies in December 2023 and January to May 2024 without his consent

and had not allowed a hearing on his objections. Finally, Father alleged that CSEA

suspended his driver’s license without allowing a poverty hearing. Contemporaneously

with his motion to dismiss, Father also filed Notices of Denial of Rights under Color of

Law, claiming violations of 18 U.S.C. 242, 28 U.S.C. 2071, 28 U.S.C. 2076, and/or 42

U.S.C. 1983 by various public employees allegedly involved in the case.

{¶ 12} On June 21, 2024, the trial court overruled Father’s April 26 and May 28,

2024 filings. First, the court found that a final child support order, which Father did not

appeal, had been entered in 2014, and thus Father’s motion to dismiss was untimely.

Second, the court stated that Father’s remedy regarding the account access restriction

and withdrawal directive was to object to CSEA’s actions by filing a written request for an

administrative hearing with CSEA. Finally, the court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction

“to hear Federal claims such as those alleged in [Father’s] pleadings.”

{¶ 13} Father appeals from the trial court’s June 21, 2024 judgment. Neither

Mother nor CSEA has filed a responsive brief.

II. Appellate Review

{¶ 14} In his appellate brief, Father provides seven “questions presented.” He -6-

raises: (1) did the juvenile court have jurisdiction; (2) was there a valid enforceable order;

(3) did CSEA follow its procedural guidelines in opening the case; (4) did CSEA establish

paternity; (5) did the juvenile court lack jurisdiction to hear federal claims; (6) do citizens

have equal rights under the law; and (7) can CSEA violate due process?

A. Res Judicata

{¶ 15} At the outset, we conclude that four of the issues that Father raises are

barred by res judicata. “Under the doctrine of res judicata, a party is barred from

asserting claims against a valid, final judgment that have been raised or could have been

raised on appeal.” Haddox v. Haddox, 2022-Ohio-3500, ¶ 49 (6th Dist.). “In short, the

doctrine of res judicata prevents us from considering arguments that could and should

have been raised during earlier appeals.” Thiery v. Thiery, 2024-Ohio-2936, ¶ 20 (2d

Dist.), citing Chepp v. Chepp, 2011-Ohio-4451, ¶ 15 (2d Dist.).

{¶ 16} In this case, the magistrate found that Father was the biological parent of

L.C. and ordered Father to pay child support. Father objected to the decision, claiming

that he had not received notice of the hearing before the magistrate and challenging

paternity. The trial court ordered genetic testing and set a hearing. Father appeared

for that hearing, provided an affidavit of income and expenses, and indicated that he was

only challenging the amount of child support. The trial court entered a final child support

order on January 29, 2014, the same day as the hearing. (The trial court and Father cite

to February 14, 2014 as the date of the judgment, but the record contains no judgment

on that date.) Father was served with the final judgment but did not appeal. Father also

did not appeal the trial court’s 2023 judgments concluding that it had both subject matter -7-

and personal jurisdiction. Consequently, Father is precluded from now challenging the

trial court’s personal jurisdiction over him, the validity of the child support order, CSEA’s

actions in initiating the case, and Father’s paternity of L.C. – all of which could have been

raised in a prior appeal.

{¶ 17} Even assuming that Father’s jurisdictional arguments were properly before

us, we would conclude that the trial court properly exercised jurisdiction. Father and

Mother were never married, and the trial court therefore had subject matter jurisdiction

over Mother’s complaint for paternity and child support. See R.C. 2151.23. Service on

Father by certified mail was unclaimed, and Father was served with Mother’s complaint

by ordinary mail in August 2013. Although the magistrate set the October 1, 2013

hearing prior to service, Father appeared (albeit belatedly) for that hearing. Father

subsequently filed an affidavit of income and expenses and appeared for the trial court’s

January 29, 2014 hearing on his objections to the magistrate’s decision. On this record,

Father’s voluntary participation after service waived any personal jurisdiction challenge.

The fact that Father later moved to another state did not deprive the trial court of continued

personal jurisdiction over him.

{¶ 18} Father’s first, second, third, and fourth “questions presented” are overruled.

B. Juvenile Court’s Jurisdiction over Federal Questions

{¶ 19} Father’s fifth, sixth, and seventh “questions presented” raise general

questions of federal law. Father, in essence, asserts that CSEA’s support enforcement

actions violated his due process rights, and he challenges the trial court’s determination

that it “lack[ed] jurisdiction to hear Federal claims such as those alleged in [Father’s] -8-

pleadings.”

{¶ 20} R.C. Chapter 3123 provides procedures for when a child support

enforcement agency identifies a default under a support order. The agency must

conduct an investigation and send a notice of default to the obligor. R.C. 3123.02; R.C.

3123.03. An obligor who receives a default notice may file a written request for an

administrative hearing with the child support agency regarding whether a mistake of fact

was made in the notice. R.C. 3123.04. If a timely request for a hearing is made, the

agency must conduct an administrative hearing within ten days. Id. After the agency

makes a determination, the obligor may file a written motion for a court hearing to

determine whether a mistake of fact still exists in the default notice. R.C. 3123.05. On

the other hand, if the obligator fails to make a timely request for an administrative hearing,

the default notice becomes a final and enforceable determination by the child support

agency that the obligor is in default under the support order and of the amount of the

arrearage owed as a result of the default. R.C. 3123.032; see Harris v. Omosule, 2010-

Ohio-1124, ¶ 9 (2d Dist.).

{¶ 21} If an agency’s determination of default becomes final and enforceable, the

agency must issue notices requiring withholding or deduction of income or assets of the

obligor. See R.C. 3123.06. If at least 90 days elapse after the final and enforceable

determination of default and the obligor has failed to pay at least 50 percent of the total

monthly obligation due through certain means, the agency may notify the obligor that a

notice will be sent to the registrar of motor vehicles. See R.C. 3123.55(B). R.C.

3123.55 “empowers the registrar of the bureau of motor vehicles to impose a suspension -9-

upon a holder of a driver’s license upon receiving notice from a child enforcement agency

that the holder is in default under a child support order.” State v. Walker, 2010-Ohio-

3043, ¶ 20 (5th Dist.).

{¶ 22} Father’s administrative action appears to challenge, on due process

grounds, the withdrawal directives for his financial accounts and the BMV’s suspension

of his driver’s license. However, Father’s attachments to those documents suggest that

Father did not follow the necessary procedures to request an administrative hearing

before CSEA regarding his alleged default and, consequently, it appears that no

administrative hearing was held. The notice of suspension from the BMV informed

Father how his license may be reinstated, but there is nothing in the record to demonstrate

that Father has satisfied his child support obligation and paid the reinstatement fee.

{¶ 23} In the absence of an administrative hearing under R.C. 3123.04, Father was

not entitled to a hearing before the trial court regarding CSEA’s default determination.

Further, under the statutory scheme, the trial court had no authority to order the CSEA to

reinstate Father’s driver’s license. See Harris at ¶ 11. Notably, Father does not dispute

CSEA’s finding that he is in default on his child support obligation. On the record before

us, the trial court properly overruled Father’s objections to an administrative action based

on the alleged denial of his right to due process.

{¶ 24} Father further challenges the trial court’s statement that it lacked jurisdiction

to hear his federal claims. Interpreted broadly, the trial court’s statement could suggest

that the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to address any due process arguments. To the

extent that the trial court intended such a broad interpretation, we disagree that juvenile -10-

courts cannot hear due process claims related to the proceedings before it. See In re

Hartmier, 2004-Ohio-5830 (2d Dist.) (declining to address constitutional challenges to

R.C. 3123.53 because the obligor failed to raise the issue in the juvenile court).

{¶ 25} However, upon reading the trial court’s entire judgment, we infer that the

trial court meant that it lacked authority to address Father’s specific claims, given how

they were raised in the trial court. As to his federal statutory claims against various public

employees, Father’s filing of notices of denial of rights under color of law was not the

appropriate method to raise those claims, even assuming that the juvenile court was the

appropriate venue to hear them.

{¶ 26} Father’s fifth, sixth, and seventh “questions presented” are overruled.

{¶ 27} Father’s challenges to the child support order began with the 2023 increase

in his support obligation. Nothing in this opinion precludes Father from seeking

modification of his child support obligation.

III. Conclusion

{¶ 28} The trial court’s judgment will be affirmed.

TUCKER, J. and HUFFMAN, J., concur.