Filed 5/26/21 In re L.C. CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re L.C., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, E076370
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super.Ct.No. J259666)
v. OPINION
C.C.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Annemarie G.
Pace, Judge. Affirmed.
Christine E. Johnson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.
Michelle D. Blakemore, County Counsel, and Svetlana Kauper, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
1 C.C. (Mother) appeals the juvenile court’s order terminating her parental rights as
to her son L.C.-W. (L.) and freeing him for adoption. Mother argues the court erred in
failing to apply the beneficial relationship exception to adoption.1 We conclude the
juvenile court did not err and affirm the order terminating Mother’s parental rights.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. INITIAL DETENTION AND PETITION
L. was born in September 2013 with DiGeorge syndrome (DGS), tetralogy of
Fallot, and absent pulmonary artery valve with congenital heart defects. DGS is a
condition associated with abnormal fetal development, an irregular 22nd chromosome,
learning disabilities and delays, psychiatric issues, hearing deficits, and heart defects. His
conditions required multiple medical appointments and procedures, including open heart
surgery. Mother severely medically neglected L., and repeatedly failed to follow through
with his medical appointments, including his open heart surgery. As a result, the San
Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS) detained L. on Apri1 2, 2015,
and placed him in a medically fragile foster care facility.
On April 6, 2015, CFS filed a Welfare and Institutions Code2 section 300 petition
on behalf of L. pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b) (failure to protect). The juvenile
court formally detained L. at the detention hearing the following day and maintained him
1B.W. (Father) is not a party to this appeal. In addition, this appeal does not involve Mother’s son E.C.-P. (E.), born in March 2015.
2 All future statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise stated.
2 in his medically fragile foster home. Mother was provided with supervised visits once a
week for one hour.
At the June 9, 2015 hearing, Mother admitted the allegations as amended in
mediation, and consented to the terms of her case plan, which required her to attend
therapy, a parenting class, and L.’s medical appointments. The court sustained L.’s
petition as amended, declared him a dependent of the court, and removed him from
parental custody. As to visitation, the court increased Mother’s supervised visits to twice
a week for one hour.
By October 2015, L. had improved considerably and did not require intensive
supervision. His medically fragile care facility reported that L. was ready for discharge.
The facility reported that Mother had attended all L.’s medical appointments and received
instructions on caring for L. Mother had also regularly visited L. and provided him with
appropriate care. Medical staff at the facility believed Mother was capable of providing
needed care to the child. Mother also completed her parenting education classes, and it
appeared she benefited from services. CFS thus requested L. be returned to Mother’s
care.
On October 29, 2015, the court approved L.’s return to Mother’s care upon his
discharge from the medical facility under family maintenance services.
B. SUBSEQUENT DETENTION AND PETITION
On approximately December 28, 2015, while in Mother’s care, L. sustained a head
injury, later identified as subdural hematoma, and was rushed to Loma Linda University
3 Medical Center (LLUMC) for treatment. An investigation revealed L.’s injury was
highly suspicious for non-accidental trauma and inconsistent with the story provided by
Mother. As a result, on January 5, 2016, a petition under sections 342 (subsequent) and
387 (supplemental) was filed on behalf of L. pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (a)
(serious physical harm), (b) (failure to protect), (e) (severe physical abuse (child under
five)), and (s) (supplemental petition for more restrictive placement).
CFS recommended the juvenile court sustain the petition, bypass reunification
services to Mother, and set a section 366.26 hearing. Mother gave varying accounts of
L.’s injuries and declined law enforcement’s requests to submit to polygraph tests. L.
had no bruising or contusion to support Mother’s explanation of how L. had sustained his
injury. CFS was concerned L. sustained a subdural hematoma and bilateral retinal
hemorrhages. Retinal hemorrhages are typically associated with shaken baby syndrome.
When Mother visited L. at the hospital, staff observed Mother to be “ ‘rough’ ” with L.
Mother was also described as “ ‘loud’ ” and delayed L.’s breakfast feeding until
11:00 a.m.
Following his discharge from the hospital on January 7, 2016, L. was placed back
in the medically fragile foster care facility and had to wear an orthotic helmet to avoid
further head injuries. L. had exhibited some developmental delays, such as not being
verbal at the age of two, using signs to get attention, and being below the standard range
in his age group for growth and weight.
4 By March 2016, following further investigation and consultation with medical
professionals, the forensic pediatrician continued to believe the large subdural hematoma
and retinal hemorrhages were non-accidental, inflicted injuries. The doctor opined
Mother’s description of a short fall off the bed was inconsistent with L.’s injuries and
believed L. suffered from shaken baby syndrome. Based on the forensic evidence, CFS
continued to recommend Mother’s services be bypassed and a section 366.26 hearing be
set. CFS was also concerned about Mother’s demeanor during supervised visits with L.
Staff at L.’s foster care facility reported that Mother was rude and cussed at staff. Staff
were also concerned about Mother and the maternal grandmother’s aggressive demeanor
at visits.
The contested jurisdictional/dispositional hearing was held on June 14, 16, and 21,
2016. The court admitted into evidence multiple CFS reports and attachments without
objection by any party. In relevant part, Mother testified that she had “a mutual bond”
with L. and was “ecstatic” when L. had been returned to her care. L.’s nurse from his
medical facility testified that Mother was “verbally stern” with L. and disrespectful to
staff. The nurse, however, had never seen Mother be inappropriate or abusive to L.
during her visits. She also observed L.’s sad reactions when Mother would leave visits.
She explained L. “would cry, go to the window, [and] hit the window [with his hands].”
On June 21, 2016, the juvenile court found some of the allegations in the petition
true and declared L. a dependent of the court. The court formally removed L. from
parental custody, denied the parents reunification services pursuant to section 361.5,
5 subdivisions (b)(5) and (6), and set a section 366.26 hearing. Mother was provided with
supervised visits.
On October 19, 2016, CFS recommended to continue the matter for 90 days in
order to match L. with an adoptive family. L. had another heart surgery scheduled and
remained at the medical facility, but overall, his health had improved. Mother continued
to visit L. weekly at the foster care facility, but struggled with boundaries. Despite being
informed she could not be present at L.’s doctor appointments due to inappropriate
behavior, Mother tried to convince staff to allow her to be present at L.’s medical
appointments. The social worker recommended reducing the visits to once a month with
authority to suspend the visits if Mother missed more than two visits or failed to comply
with the visitation rules. The court ultimately conditioned Mother’s visits on a
confirmation call 24 hours in advance.
C. PERMANENT PLAN
By January 17, 2017, CFS recommended maintaining L. in a permanent plan
living arrangement (PPLA) until an adoptive home could be identified for him. L.
continued to reside at the medical facility and continued to developmentally improve,
albeit he still exhibited some delays. L. was also awaiting a cardiac procedure. CFS
maintained L. could be placed in a concurrent adoptive home following his heart surgery.
By June 8, 2017, L. had been approved to transition from the medically fragile
facility to a special needs foster home. L., however, was still considered medically
fragile, attended services at the Inland Regional Center (IRC), and received speech
6 therapy. L. underwent an angioplasty surgery in February 2017 and was awaiting
placement of a heart catheter. CFS was looking for a concurrent home for L. through the
California Kids Connection program. CFS continued to recommend PPLA for L.
On July 17, 2017, Mother filed a section 388 petition seeking reunification
services based on purported new evidence which identified the person who had actually
caused L.’s injuries in December 2015. Following a contested section 388 hearing, the
court denied the petition.
On September 13, 2017, L. was placed in a special needs foster home with
Mr. and Mrs. M. L.’s developmental characteristics were consistent with autism
spectrum disorder and his “ ‘level of functioning [was] in the mild mental retarded
range.’ ” L.’s verbal skills were consistent with a “severe speech disorder.” However,
Mr. and Mrs. M. were excellent advocates of L.’s needs. L. preferred to be alone and
liked to be near Mrs. M.
On July 17, 2018, CFS recommended establishing a permanent plan of legal
guardianship for L. with Mr. and Mrs. M. The caregivers desired to provide permanency
for L. and continued to meet his daily needs and long-term educational goals. The
caregivers wanted L. “to keep up and learn as much as he can to be successful.” CFS
noted that L. had exhibited “great progress . . . in the six months he [had] been at [his
preschool].”
Mother continued to visit L. on a weekly basis with occasional absences. On
March 27, 2018, the maternal grandmother had attended the visit with Mother and
7 complained that L. called Mrs. M. “ ‘mom.’ ” The social worker believed this showed
L.’s attachment to his caregiver. Overall, Mother’s visits with L. went well and were
described as appropriate. During the visits, Mother played with toy cars, colored books,
or made paper planes with L. The visitation monitor reported that “[t]he [m]inor
transitioned well from bio to foster parent.”
By November 14, 2018, CFS recommended to maintain L. with Mr. and Mrs. M.
under legal guardianship. Although L. was developmentally delayed, he was friendly and
polite. In addition, his language skills were improving, and he spoke in two- to three-
word sentences. The caregivers continued to advocate for L.’s special needs, including
meeting with L.’s school when he was not placed in a correct classroom. L. was also
improving medically. He had attended a revision of his stents and continued to be
monitored by a cardiologist. In addition, L. participated in all of his caregivers’ family’s
activities. He enjoyed playing outside and in the park. Mrs. M., however, emphasized
that L. required constant supervision and he did not understand the concept of danger
while he was out in the community. As a result, Mrs. M. constantly made sure L.
remained close and safe at all times.
Mother’s participation in her visits with L. remained relatively consistent. She
cancelled visits on average once a month. Mother’s visits were appropriate; she played
with L. during her visits and there were no reported concerns. But Mother was upset L.
called Mrs. M. “ ‘ma-ma.’ ”
8 On November 14, 2018, the juvenile court ordered legal guardianship for L. with
Mr. and Mrs. M. Mother was provided with weekly supervised visits.
Ten months later, on September 11, 2019, Mrs. M. filed a section 388 petition for
modification seeking to adopt L. CFS recommended to grant the petition due to a strong
mutual attachment between L. and Mr. and Mrs. M. L. was placed in Mr. and Mrs. M.’s
home on September 13, 2017, when he was four years old. Over the years, Mr. and Mrs.
M. had developed a strong attachment to L., who was six years old at the time, and were
willing to provide him with a stable and secure home. Mr. and Mrs. M. had met all of
L.’s needs over the years and desired to provide “a more stable and permanent home . . . a
child deserve[s].” L. also had developed a strong bond to Mr. and Mrs. M. and had
integrated into the family and been received as a family member.
On November 7, 2019, the juvenile court granted the section 388 petition and set a
section 366.26 selection and implementation hearing.
L. continued to receive medical treatment and underwent a heart surgery in
November 2019 and March 2020. Mother continued to receive weekly supervised visits
at a neutral location. During the months of quarantine, Mother received weekly
supervised phone calls with L. which lasted between 40 minutes to one hour. Mother
usually could determine when L. lost focus and would end the call.
By January 4, 2021, CFS recommended to terminate parental rights and free L. for
adoption by Mr. and Mrs. M. CFS opined L. was adoptable. L. had developmental
delays for which he received therapy five times a week for four hours a day. Mr. and
9 Mrs. M. believed L. was very bright, communicative with a good sense of humor, and
had an excellent memory. When first presented to a stranger, L. appeared shy, but
became friendly and engaging with time. L. exhibited a healthy bond to his caregivers.
He called for his caregivers when he needed or wanted them and showed appropriate
affection. Mrs. M. admitted that she was initially hesitant to adopt L. due to being scared
about his heart condition, but over the years, she understood L. and all his needs.
Mother continued to participate in supervised weekly phone calls with L. Her
communication with L. was appropriate, and she inquired of L.’s daily activities and
plans for the holidays. When L. would lose focus, the phone call would end. Mother
generally ended the phone calls by saying she loved L. In response, L. customarily
replied, “ ‘I love you more[,] bye.’ ”
The contested section 366.26 hearing was held on January 4, 2021. Mother
testified that L. was removed at the age of two and a half years and that since then she
had consistently visited L. once a week with the exception being when L. was under legal
guardianship. During the visits, Mother played with L., read, learned, roamed around the
house, and participated in outdoor activities. Mother claimed that she attended “[e]very
doctor[’s] appointment . . . not in conflict with [her] job,” and that L. was excited to see
her and wanted to talk and know everything. She also stated that L. called her either
“Mom” or “Mama” and that he told her he loved her. Mother acknowledged that she had
never participated in any educational decisions for L. She believed L. enjoyed the visits
10 with her but admitted L. did not seek comfort from her on an occasion when he was
upset.
The court found Mother met the first prong of the parental bond exception of
maintaining regular visits and contacts with L. However, the court noted that L. had been
removed from Mother’s care for four and a half years and “the day-to-day parenting of
[L.] [had] been taking place by the other people for the vast majority of his life, and
certainly for the last three years.” Balancing between the bond and the child’s need for
permanency, the court found that the benefit “[the] adoption will provide for [L.]
outweighs the severing of the parental bond.” Accordingly, the court terminated parental
rights and freed the child for adoption. Mother timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Mother’s sole argument on appeal is that the juvenile court erroneously found that
the beneficial parental relationship exception did not apply. We disagree.
The Legislature prefers adoption where possible. (In re L.Y.L. (2002) 101
Cal.App.4th 942, 947.) Once the juvenile court finds a child is adoptable, the parent
bears the burden of proving one of the exceptions to terminating parental rights exists.
(In re Lorenzo C. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1343.) “[I]t is only in an extraordinary
case that preservation of the parent’s rights will prevail over the Legislature’s preference
for adoptive placement.” (In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1350.)
The parental benefit or beneficial relationship exception has two prongs. First, the
parent must show that he or she has “maintained regular visitation and contact with the
11 minor.’ ” (In re Derek W. (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 823, 826.) Second, the parent must
show that his or her relationship with the child “promotes the well-being of the child to
such a degree as to outweigh the well-being the child would gain in a permanent home
with new, adoptive parents.” (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 575 (Autumn
H.).)
“When applying the beneficial parent-child relationship exception, the court
balances the strength and quality of the parent-child relationship in a tenuous placement
against the security and sense of belonging that a stable family would confer on the child.
If severing the existing parental relationship would deprive the child of ‘a substantial,
positive emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed, the
preference for adoption is overcome and the natural parent’s rights are not terminated.”
(In re B.D. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 1218, 1234-1235.)
“We apply the substantial evidence standard of review to the factual issue of the
existence of a beneficial parental relationship, and the abuse of discretion standard to the
determination of whether there is a compelling reason for finding that termination would
be detrimental to the child.” (In re Anthony B. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 389, 395
(Anthony B.); accord, In re E.T. (2018) 31 Cal.App.5th 68, 76 (E.T.).)
The juvenile court found that Mother maintained regular visitation and contact
with L. Mother thus satisfied the first prong of the beneficial relationship exception.
But, Mother provides no specific argument on the second prong. She does not explain
why terminating her parental rights to L. would “greatly harm” the child. Mother
12 likewise provides no argument as to why her relationship with L. is “so significant and
compelling . . . that the benefit of preserving it outweighed the stability and benefits of
adoption.” (Anthony B., supra, 239 Cal.App.4th at p. 396.)
“The juvenile court’s orders are ‘presumed to be correct, and it is [an] appellant’s
burden to affirmatively show error.’ ” (In re J.F. (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 70, 79.)
Because Mother does not explain why she satisfied the second prong of the beneficial
relationship exception, besides stating the mutual love between them and noting the
positive visits she had with L., she has failed to show the juvenile court erroneously
found that the exception did not apply. And because her only argument on appeal is that
the juvenile court erroneously failed to apply the beneficial relationship exception, she
has “not met [her] burden of demonstrating reversible error through reasoned argument.”
(Id. at pp. 79-80.) We therefore “deem [her] challenge to the order terminating [her]
parental rights to be waived.” (Ibid.; see In re S.R. (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 204, 206, fn. 1
[declining to address argument that appellant failed to properly brief].)
In any event, Mother’s challenge to the order terminating her parental rights fails
on the merits. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in finding that there was no
“compelling reason for finding that termination [of parental rights] would be detrimental
to the child. [Citations.]” (Anthony B., supra, 239 Cal.App.4th at p. 395.)
Mother contends she had a parental relationship with L. However, even if she did,
nothing in the record suggests that “terminating [her] familial relationship would cause
[the child] great harm.” (E.T., supra, 31 Cal.App.5th at p. 77.) There is no evidence that
13 Mother occupied a “meaningful and significant parental role.” (In re Andrea R. (1999)
75 Cal.App.4th 1093, 1109.)
L. was initially removed from Mother’s custody in April 2015 when he was only
18 months old and placed in a medically fragile foster care facility. After Mother
successfully completed reunification services, L. was returned to Mother’s care under
family maintenance services in October 2015. However, two months later, L. was again
removed from Mother’s custody after he suffered a non-accidental head injury in
December 2015. For over five years, L. resided with someone other than Mother. And,
for the last three and a half years, L. resided with his prospective adoptive parents, Mr.
and Mrs. M. L. is safe and well-cared for in his prospective adoptive home. L. is bonded
with Mr. and Mrs. M., who are committed to adopting him and providing him with a
permanent, safe, and stable home. For over three years, Mr. and Mrs. M. provided all
L.’s needs, including his medical, developmental, emotional, and educational needs.
The juvenile court reasonably found that Mother’s frequent contact with L. was
not sufficient to establish a beneficial parental relationship exception. (In re Marcelo B.
(2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 635, 644-645; In re K.P. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 614, 621-622.)
Although Mother regularly visited L. and maintained a relationship with him, Mother’s
relationship with L. during the dependency proceedings was that of a friendly visitor,
rather than that of a parent. They had fun, enjoyable visits together, and L. called Mother
“mom” and told her he loved her. However, Mother did not hold a parental role,
14 disciplining L., protecting L., and providing for his everyday needs. Mother had not
lived with L. for over five years, and her visits had remained short and supervised.
The juvenile court thus reasonably found that the benefit L. would derive from a
parental relationship with Mother does not “outweigh the well-being [he] would gain in a
permanent home with new, adoptive parents.” (Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at
p. 575.) Mother failed to show anything more than that she had frequent contact with the
child that raised no concerns. But, a loving and friendly relationship is “ ‘not enough to
outweigh the sense of security and belonging an adoptive home would provide.’ ” (In re
Jason J. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 922, 938.) The juvenile court thus did not abuse its
discretion in finding that the benefits of adoption outweighed the benefits of continuing
Mother’s relationship with the child. We therefore conclude the juvenile court properly
terminated Mother’s parental rights to L. and freed him for adoption.
DISPOSITION
The order terminating parental rights to L. is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
MILLER J. We concur:
RAMIREZ P. J.
McKINSTER J.