In Re LBH Associates Ltd. Partnership

109 B.R. 157, 1989 Bankr. LEXIS 2268, 1989 WL 158087
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, D. Maryland
DecidedOctober 31, 1989
Docket19-12665
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 109 B.R. 157 (In Re LBH Associates Ltd. Partnership) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Maryland primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re LBH Associates Ltd. Partnership, 109 B.R. 157, 1989 Bankr. LEXIS 2268, 1989 WL 158087 (Md. 1989).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION OVERRULING OBJECTION TO APPLICATION OF DEBTOR’S COUNSEL FOR FINAL COMPENSATION

JAMES F. SCHNEIDER, Bankruptcy Judge.

Quality Inns and its affiliates [“Quality”] filed the instant objection [P. 559] to the application for final compensation [P. 553] filed by Frank, Bernstein, Conaway & Goldman [“Frank, Bernstein”] as counsel to the debtor. The objection will be overruled and the application will be allowed in its entirety.

The debtor and Quality are natural enemies. They endured an unhappy relationship during the life of franchise and management agreements when Quality was operating the debtor’s newly-renovated Lord Baltimore Hotel [“Hotel”] in Baltimore, Maryland. Among the reasons behind the filing of the instant Chapter 11 petition was the debtor’s desire to be rid of Quality’s management contract, which this Court authorized. On the day the petition was filed, the debtor ousted the Quality management from the hotel premises. Thereafter, Quality became the debtor’s nemesis, availing itself of every opportunity to erect obstacles in the debtor’s progress toward confirmation of a plan. Even after confirmation was granted, Quality has continued to pursue litigation with a vengeance, both in this Court and on appeal in the district court. Counsel for the debtor describes the litigation between the debtor and Quality as “intense and bitter.” To this the Court adds that it was also dogged and perverse. The unstated plan of Quality from beginning to end seems to have been the debtor’s destruction, without regard to Quality’s own injury and expense. It is in light of this history that the Court views this objection of Quality Inns to the application of debtor’s counsel for compensation.

Quality objects to the amount of compensation requested ($470,209.50) for services rendered from March 1, 1988 through December 9, 1988, complains that the case was not economically staffed and that the work performed was excessive, duplicative and unnecessary. However, the very reason the fee is so high was Quality’s implacable opposition to every attempt to reorganize undertaken by the debtor. For this reason, the objection is hypocritical and not made in good faith. Having spent a fortune trying to litigate this debtor to death, Quality now speaks piously of conserving the assets of the estate. Quality quibbles over the number of office conferences disclosed by debtor’s counsel in its time records, but Quality is not required to disclose its own records of time spent litigating in this case. Quality’s economic superiority has enabled it to initiate excessive and seemingly limitless conflict with the debtor. Under these circumstances, Quality is estopped from objecting to the size of a fee which its own conduct has materially increased. This is a court of equity and Quality does not appear before it with clean hands.

Nevertheless, even in the absence of objection, the bankruptcy court is required to make an independent inquiry as to the *159 reasonableness of fees requested by debt- or’s counsel. See In re Inslaw, 106 B.R. 331 (Bankr.D.C.1989). The reasonableness of such a fee request is to be measured against the following standards articulated in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, 488 F.2d 714, 717-719 (5th Cir.1974), expressly adopted by the Fourth Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals in Barber v. Kimbrell's, Inc., 577 F.2d 216 (4th Cir.1978), Anderson v. Morris, 658 F.2d 246, 249 (4th Cir.1981) and Harman v. Levin, 772 F.2d 1150 (4th Cir.1985):

1. The time and labor required;

2. The novelty and difficulty of the questions;

3. The skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;

4. The preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to the acceptance of the case;

5. The customary fee;

6. Whether the fee is fixed or contingent;

7. The time limitations imposed by the client or circumstances;

8. The amount involved and the results obtained;
9. The experience, reputation, and ability of the attorney;
10. The “undesirability” of the case;

11. The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; and

12. Awards in similar cases.

The time and labor required. The fee application sets forth the following enumeration of time expended in this case by attorneys, paralegals and law clerks between March 1, 1988 and December 9, 1988:

Average

Name Position No. of Hours Hourly Rate

Harvey M. Lebowitz Partner 468.0 222.35

James C. Oliver Partner 11.8 160.00

Irving E. Walker Partner 826.3 157.50

Neal Serotte Partner 50.6 155.00

Jay A. Shulman Partner 165.0 152.05

Robert M. Ercole Partner 14.2 150.00

Julien A. Hecht Partner 62.0 145.00

Paula Krahn Merkle Associate 81.3 125.00

James R. Wooton Associate 294.7 117.30

Joseph A. Guzinski Associate 710.1 99.94

Joseph M. Bellew Associate 16.8 95.00

William S. Galkin Associate 37.7 85.00

Mark H. Berman Associate 313.5 74.91

Kathleen G. McCruden Paralegal 149.4 62.48

Laura Glass Paralegal 55.3 52.50

Patricia L. Adams Paralegal 571.8 47.27

Karen J. Fry Paralegal 132.2 45.00

Alan J. Ostfield Law Clerk 39.9 50.00

Other 69.1 97.72

Total Hours 4069.7

The Court has examined the time records supplied in support of the application and has prepared the following condensation:

Amount Claimed Time Name Page No.

42.00 L. Cohen 1 DO

35.00 R.B. Curran 1 DO

70.00 Woloszyn 1 4^

*160 Page No. Amount Claimed Time 1 1 1 1-2 2 3 3 3 5-10 10 10 10 10-30 30 30 30-32 32 32 32 32-34 34 34 34-36 36 36 36-55 55 55-59 59 59 59 59 59-63 63 63 63-65 65 65 65-76 76 76-81 81 81 81-82 82 82-83 83 92 92 92-95 95 95 95 95 95 95-96 98 98-100 100-101 101 101 135.00 351.00 357.00 243.00 63.00 1,197.00 108.00 60.00 104,715.00 460.00 112.00 90.00 124,973.00 67.50 598.50 8,990.00 12.50 1,888.00 572.00 10.162.50 737.50 34.00 24.637.50 272.00 3.204.50 69,338.00 26.00 35.491.50 1,610.00 40.00 675.00 15.00 5,499.00 76.50 6.50 9,646.00 141.00 13.50 26.392.50 212.50 24,225.00 21.00 15.00 375.00 1,995.00 2,010.00 62.50 42.00 790.50 7,713.00 10.00 150.00 441.00 57.00 494.50 2.783.50 1,793.00 5.731.50 1.435.50 408.50 869.00 Name Walker Guzinski Braymer Engler Helmlinger Lebowitz Hoffberg McCruden Lebowitz Schwait Hillman Lawler Walker J.G.

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Bluebook (online)
109 B.R. 157, 1989 Bankr. LEXIS 2268, 1989 WL 158087, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-lbh-associates-ltd-partnership-mdb-1989.