In Re Latimer

395 B.R. 304, 60 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 1843, 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 2922, 2008 WL 4694555
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. New York
DecidedOctober 27, 2008
Docket1-19-10307
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 395 B.R. 304 (In Re Latimer) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Latimer, 395 B.R. 304, 60 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 1843, 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 2922, 2008 WL 4694555 (N.Y. 2008).

Opinion

DECISION & ORDER

JOHN C. NINFO, II, Bankruptcy Judge.

BACKGROUND

On May 22, 2008, Larry M. Latimer and Harriet C. Latimer (the “Debtors”) filed a petition initiating a Chapter 13 case. On the Schedules and Statements required to be filed by Section 521 and Rule 1007, the Debtors indicated that they owned a residence at 5716 Dacola Shores Road, Cone-sus, New York (the “Dacola Shores Road Property”), which had a fair market value of $80,000.00 and was encumbered by: (1) a first mortgage in favor of Coldwell Banker/PHH Mortgage (the “Coldwell Mortgage”), with a current balance of approximately $77,000.00; and (2) a second mortgage in favor of State Farm Bank, FSB (the “State Farm Bank Mortgage”), with a current balance of approximately $10,200.00.

On August 13, 2008, after filing a series of plans treating the State Farm Bank Mortgage as fully secured, the Debtors filed an Amended Chapter 13 plan (the “Plan”), which proposed to bifurcate the State Farm Bank Mortgage into an allowed secured claim in the amount of $222.25, to be paid together with interest at seven percent (7%) per annum by monthly payments of $20.00, and an unsecured claim in the amount of $10,173.07.

In furtherance of the Plan, on August 13, 2008, the Debtors filed a Motion (the “Valuation Motion”), pursuant to Section 506(a)(1) 1 , for the Court to determine the secured status of the State Farm Bank Mortgage. The Valuation Motion asserted that: (1) the Dacola Shores Road Property had a fair market value of $80,000.00; (2) pursuant to a proof of claim filed in the Debtor’s Chapter 13 case, the Coldwell Mortgage had a balance due of $79,777.75, leaving a secured value of $222.25 remaining for the State Farm Bank Mortgage; (3) the State Farm Bank Mortgage matured on May 15, 2010, which was before the final payment under the Debtor’s five-year Plan would be due; (4) Section *306 1322(c)(2) 2 permitted a Chapter 13 plan to modify a mortgage, like the State Farm Bank Mortgage, that is secured solely by a debtor’s residence, pursuant to the provisions of Section 1325(a)(5)(B) 3 , which includes the ability to modify a claim into an allowed secured claim, based upon a valuation determination pursuant to Section 506(a)(1), and a remaining unsecured claim; and (5) the Court, pursuant to Section 506(a)(1), should determine that State Farm Bank, FSB had an allowed secured claim for its Mortgage of $222.25, and a remaining unsecured claim of $10,173.07.

On September 10, 2008, State Farm Bank, FSB interposed opposition to the Valuation Motion, which: (1) correctly asserted that, in accordance with the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in In re Pond, 252 F.3d 122 (2d Cir.2001) {“Pond”), its mortgage claim and lien on the debtor’s residence could not be bifurcated into an allowed secured and an unsecured claim; but (2) failed to address the Debtor’s assertion in the Valuation Motion that such a bifurcation was specifically permitted by the provisions of Sections 1322(c)(2) and 1325(a)(5).

On October 7, 2008, the Debtors filed a Memorandum of Law which asserted that: (1) with the exception of a single Circuit Court decision, In re Witt, 113 F.3d 508 (4th Cir.1997) (“Witt”), every other Federal Court that has addressed the issue of whether Section 1322(c)(2) in conjunction with the modification provisions of Section 1325(a)(5) permitted the bifurcation of an undersecured mortgage that becomes due prior to the final payment due under a Chapter 13 plan, including In re Paschen, 296 F.3d 1203 (11th Cir.2002) (“Paschen’’) and In re Eubanks, 219 B.R. 468 (6th Cir. BAP 1998) (“Eubanks”), have found that those Sections do permit the Debtor’s proposed bifurcation and modification; and (2) the fundamental difference between the Witt and Paschen decisions is that the Court in Witt found that Section 1322(c)(2) only provides for the modification of the payment of the full mortgage claim, whereas the Court in Paschen found that the *307 subsection permits all of the modifications of a claim permitted by Section 1325(a)(5), including the ability to modify the mortgage claim by bifurcating it into an allowed secured claim and an unsecured claim.

On October 8, 2008, State Farm Bank, FSB filed a Memorandum of Law which essentially asserted that the Court should follow the reasoning set forth in Witt.

DISCUSSION

This Court (the Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of New York, Rochester Division) finds that, for the reasons set forth in the decisions in Paschen and Eubanks, the claim of the holder of a mortgage secured solely by a debtor’s residence (a “Home Mortgage”), when the mortgage claim is undersecured and is due in full at the time of the filing of the petition or becomes due by its terms during a debtor’s Chapter 13 plan, can be modified, including by being bifurcated into an allowed secured and a remaining unsecured claim, in accordance with the provisions of Sections 1322(c)(2) and 1325(a)(5), and for the following additional reasons:

1. Although this Court is persuaded by the Paschen and Eubanks decisions, the decision in Witt is not unreasonable for the following reasons:
A. The language of Section 1322(c)(2) is in fact ambiguous. Prior to the filing of the Valuation Motion and the Memorandum of Law filed by each of the parties, the Chapter 13 Trustee for the Rochester Division read Section 1322(c)(2) as permitting the payment in full of such a qualifying Home Mortgage over the term of a debtor’s Chapter 13 plan, together with interest set by the Court, pursuant to the provisions of Section 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii). This became a requirement for confirmation in the Rochester Division, although it was not a frequent occurrence. 4 This practice was consistent with the decision in Witt, but not made with reference to Witt.
B. Notwithstanding the discussions in Paschen and Eubanks of the legislative history dealing with the possible treatment of wholly unsecured and undersecured Home Mortgages, the legislation was not enacted. The reality is that Congress has never, with the exception of Section 1322(c)(2), enacted legislation dealing directly with the modification of wholly unsecured or undersecured Home Mortgages. This has resulted in a body of judicial law with respect to wholly unsecured Home Mortgages being developed by the Courts in decisions such as Pond. 5

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Bluebook (online)
395 B.R. 304, 60 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 1843, 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 2922, 2008 WL 4694555, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-latimer-nywb-2008.