In re K.T.

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: May 21, 2026
• Docket: 115818
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as In re K.T., 2026-Ohio-1872.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

IN RE K.T., ET AL. : : No. 115818 [Appeal by N.W., Mother] :

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: May 21, 2026

Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Juvenile Division Case Nos. AD24902691 and AD24902692

Appearances:

Scott J. Friedman, for appellant.

Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Lindsay N. Molnar, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.

MARY J. BOYLE, J.:

Appellant N.W. (“Mother”) appeals the decision of the Cuyahoga

County Juvenile Court terminating her parental rights and awarding custody of two

of her minor sons, K.T., born June 2019 (“Older Boy”), and S.T., born April 2021

(“Younger Boy”) (collectively “the Boys”), to the Cuyahoga County Division of Children and Family Services (“the agency”). After careful review of the record, we

affirm the juvenile court’s decision.

Facts and Procedural History

Mother has eight children. The oldest son and oldest daughter are

emancipated. Mother has another son born in 2007 and three daughters born

between 2010 and 2013. These children live with their paternal grandmother, and

they are not parties to this appeal.

The agency became involved with the children in fall 2023, when both

Mother and father were jailed for domestic violence. (6-12-24 tr. 16-17.)1 However,

that child intervention case could not be resolved within the statutory deadline, and

the agency dismissed that case and filed the complaint for the present case on March

18, 2024. Thus, the children have remained in the uninterrupted custody of the

agency since November 21, 2023, when the children were committed to the

predispositional custody of the agency. (6-12-24 tr. 17; trial exhibit Nos. 5 and 6.)

In addition to the domestic violence, the March 18, 2024 complaint

avers that Mother did not have a safe and appropriate house for her children and

that she lacked the necessary judgment and decision-making skills to care for her

children because of, inter alia, her behavior, her depression, and lack of sobriety

because of alcohol. The children were continued in predispositional custody. The

agency offered Mother substance-abuse assessment and treatment, domestic-

1 Unless otherwise specified, reference to the transcript is from the October 28,

2025 hearing for permanent custody. violence and mental-health services, and referral to the neighborhood collab to

address the housing problem. (3-18-24 tr. 11.)

In June 2024, the juvenile court adjudicated the Boys neglected and

dependent and granted temporary custody to the agency. Mother stipulated to the

amended complaint that specified the following: Mother needs to attend and benefit

from domestic-violence classes, successfully complete behavioral health services,

demonstrate she can co-parent, provide safe, clean, and appropriate housing,2 to

complete substance-abuse treatment and to maintain sobriety.

Initially, the Boys were placed with their maternal grandmother.

However, the agency determined that the placement was inappropriate. The Boys

were then placed with their older sister in September 2024. However, on November

21, 2024, the agency took custody of the Boys because the older sister was not

properly caring for them and placed them in a foster home. The Younger Boy had

missed medical appointments, had pneumonia, had difficulty in swallowing, and

was malnourished. (4-10-2025 tr. 12-13 and tr. 38-43.)

On December 23, 2024, the agency moved for permanent custody. At

the April 10, 2025 hearing for arraignment on the permanent custody motion before

a magistrate, social worker Dominque Emory testified that Mother’s case plan

consisted of housing, mental-health services, substance-abuse treatment, and

parenting classes. She noted that the holes in the home had been patched and

2 The initial reports of the home were that it contained rodents, spoiled food,

exposed wiring, and holes in the ceiling. (Apr. 17, 2024 Family Case Plan.) painted, but that the bathroom floor looked unsafe. (4-10-2025 tr. 13.) However,

she had not been in the house recently. (4-10-2025 tr. 9-10.) Moreover, Mother was

not currently enrolled in any services and the random drug tests had come back

positive for alcohol. (4-10-2025 tr. 10.) Mother visited the Boys every week, except

for two missed visits. Mother brought food and other things for the Boys. However,

she did not interact with them; she gave them her cell phone, and they played with

that. (4-10-2025 tr. 11-12.) Emory further testified that the father wanted nothing

to do with the agency and had not done anything with the case plan.

On August 18, 2025, the juvenile court judge conducted an

arraignment on the permanent-custody motion. The agency had not perfected

service on the father; his lawyer said that the father would not be able to make the

hearings because of work but wanted the lawyer to represent what he wanted in the

case. (8-18-2025 tr. 5.) The social worker stated that Mother had completed

parenting classes in June 2025, but that was the only compliance. Mother’s last

random drug screen was in December 2024 and that was positive for alcohol. (8-

18-2-25 tr. 19 and 21.) Moreover, the social worker had not been in Mother’s home

since March 2024, and she believed that Mother and father were residing together.

(8-18-2025 tr. 19.)

The juvenile court conducted the trial for permanent custody on

October 28, 2025. The father’s attorney admitted that he had no contact with the

father since March 2025. The father was not at the hearing. Social worker Emory testified and reiterated that the father had not engaged with the case plan and did

not want anything to do with the agency. (Tr. 29-30.)

Emory testified that Mother’s case plan was to conduct a mental-

health assessment and follow any recommendations ordered concerning substance

abuse, parenting, housing, and meeting the basic needs of her children. (Tr. 22.)

Emory continued that the agency had referred Mother to Moore Counseling and

Mediations Services to address the mental-health concerns, but she was discharged

from the program unsuccessfully because she missed appointments and did not

follow through with recommendations, which included six to nine months of

intensive outpatient care. Even after regaining medical benefits, Mother did not

complete the engaged services. (Tr. 22-23 and 66.)

Emory testified that to address substantive abuse she asked Mother

to conduct random drug screenings, at least once a month. However, there had been

no drug screenings since December 2024. Emory had referred Mother to Moore

Counseling and Mediation and the St. Martin de Porres Collab, but Mother did not

follow through. (Tr. 23-24.) The agency seeks a minimum of six months of

documented sobriety before allowing extended visits. (Tr. 67.)

Emory testified that Mother had successfully completed parenting

classes and visited with the Boys. (Tr. 24-25.) From her observations of the visits,

Emory concluded that Mother and the Boys love each other. However, there is very

little interaction among Mother and the Boys. She gives them a phone or a tablet, and the Boys play with those. Emory thought that this exposed the Boys to

inappropriate material. (Tr. 32-33.)

Emory said that at the beginning of the custody case, Mother’s home

was in deplorable condition, with trash, wires, and holes throughout the house.

However, Emory testified that she had not been inside the house. Attempts were

made to inspect the house when Mother was there, but Mother was not present at

the time of the inspections. (Tr. 25-26.)

Emory confirmed that Mother was engaged with Able Counseling to

address anger-management and domestic-violence concerns, but Emory was

uncertain about the progress report she received from Able. (Tr. 27.) Moreover,

Emory questioned the efficacy of Mother’s participation because too many of the

sessions were Zoom sessions; Emory opined that to be effective the sessions needed

to be in person. (Tr. 54.) Nor did Emory think that the one report from Able was

sufficient to show progress. (Tr. 55.)

Emory on cross-examination from the guardian ad litem (“GAL”)

testified that the Older Boy was very behind academically, but in foster care has

improved greatly. Similarly, the Younger Boy was having all of his medical and other

needs met in foster care. (Tr. 73-74.)

Mother presented Mona Hdeib of Able Counseling for her case. Hdeib

testified that Mother has been involved in traditional therapy sessions, both group

and individual, for at least a month and a half. (Tr. 78-79.) Thus, Mother was about

halfway through anger management and domestic violence programs, after which Able Counseling would present her with a certificate. (Tr. 80-81.) Hdeib believed

that Mother has shown much improvement and progress. (Tr. 83.)

The GAL recommended that the agency have permanent custody of

the Boys. Despite the Boys having been in the agency’s custody for 23 months,

Mother had not completed her case plan. She never completed a substance-abuse

assessment and the one drug testing came back positive for alcohol. The agency

could not confirm the suitability of Mother’s home. Mother was living with father

with whom she had a physically abusive relationship, and she had not finished her

domestic-violence program. Moreover, the Boys were doing well in their foster

home.

On October 29, 2025, the juvenile court granted the agency’s motion

for permanent custody of the Boys. The court found that the father had abandoned

the Boys. Furthermore, the Boys had been in the custody of the agency for more

than 12 months of a consecutive 22-month period and the Boys will soon no longer

qualify for temporary custody pursuant to R.C. 2151.415(B) and could not be placed

with one of the Boys’ parents within a reasonable period of time or should not be

placed with either parent. Pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(E), Mother failed to

substantially remedy the conditions causing the Boys to be placed outside of their

Mother timely appealed and raised the following assignment of error.

The juvenile court erred in terminating Mother’s parental rights in violation of her rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 16 of the Ohio Constitution. Law and Analysis

Initially, we recognize that the right to raise one’s own child is “an

‘essential’ and ‘basic civil right.’” In re Murray, 52 Ohio St.3d 155, 156, (1990),

quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, (1972); In re B.B.C., 2024-Ohio-588, ¶ 14,

(8th Dist.). “Parents have a ‘fundamental liberty interest’ in the care, custody, and

management of the child.” Id., quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753,

(1982). This right, however, is not absolute. “‘The natural rights of a parent are not

absolute, but are always subject to the ultimate welfare of the child, which is the

polestar or controlling principle to be observed.’” In re Cunningham, 59 Ohio St.2d

100, 106, (1979), quoting In re R.J.C., 300 So.2d 54, 58 (Fla. App. 1974).

Mother clarifies in her brief that what she is actually arguing is the

decision to terminate her parental rights was not supported by sufficient evidence

and was against the manifest weight of the evidence. We note that while “sufficiency

and manifest weight are distinct legal concepts, a finding that a judgment is

supported by the manifest weight of the evidence necessarily includes a finding that

sufficient evidence supports the judgment.” In re R.M., 2024-Ohio-1885, ¶ 46 (8th

Dist.), citing In re P.S., 2023-Ohio-144, ¶ 30 (8th Dist.), citing In re C.N., 2015-Ohio-

2546, ¶ 9 (10th Dist.), citing State v. Howze, 2013-Ohio-4800, ¶ 10 (10th Dist.).

Therefore, we will review this matter under the manifest-weight-of-the-evidence

standard.

In the case of In re Z.C., 2023-Ohio-4703, the Supreme Court of Ohio

reexplained the manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard stating that [w]hen reviewing for manifest weight, the appellate court must weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of the witnesses, and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the finder of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the judgment must be reversed and a new trial ordered. [Eastley v. Volkman, 132 Ohio St. 3d 328, 2012- Ohio-2179, ¶ 20, 972 N.E.2d 517]. “In weighing the evidence, the court of appeals must always be mindful of the presumption in favor of the finder of fact.” Id. at ¶ 21. “The underlying rationale of giving deference to the findings of the trial court rests with the knowledge that the trial judge is best able to view the witnesses and observe their demeanor, gestures and voice inflections, and use these observations in weighing the credibility of the proffered testimony.” Seasons Coal Co., Inc. v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80, 10 Ohio B. 408, 461 N.E.2d 1273 (1984). “‘If the evidence is susceptible of more than one construction, the reviewing court is bound to give it that interpretation which is consistent with the verdict and judgment, most favorable to sustaining the verdict and judgment.’” Id. at fn. 3, quoting 5 Ohio Jurisprudence 3d, Appellate Review, Section 603, at 191-192 (1978).

Id. at ¶ 14.

Permanent Custody — R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)

R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) sets forth a two-pronged analysis for juvenile

courts to apply when determining whether to grant a motion for permanent custody.

Permanent custody may be granted to the agency if the trial court determines, by

clear and convincing evidence, that (1) any one of the five factors set forth in

R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a)-(e) exists, and (2) permanent custody is in the best interest

of the child after considering the factors set forth in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1). “‘Clear and

convincing evidence is that measure or degree of proof which is more than a mere

“preponderance of the evidence,” but not to the extent of such certainty as is

required “beyond a reasonable doubt” in criminal cases, and which will produce in

the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established.’” In re Z.C at ¶ 7, quoting Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469, (1954),

paragraph three of the syllabus.

In the instant case, the juvenile court found pursuant to

R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) that the Boys had been in the temporary custody of a public-

children services agency under one or more separate orders of disposition for twelve

or more months of a consecutive 22-month period. The evidence established the

Boys had been in the agency’s uninterrupted custody since November 21, 2023. The

juvenile court had granted the agency temporary custody of the Boys in June 2024,

and the permanent custody hearing was on October 28, 2025. Thus, the first prong

of R.C. 2151.414(B) is established by clear and convincing evidence.

Having found that the juvenile court properly determined that at least

one of the R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) factors applies by clear and convincing evidence, we

must next determine whether the juvenile court appropriately found by clear and

convincing evidence that granting permanent custody to the agency is in the Boys’

best interest under R.C. 2151.414(D).

Best Interest Determination under R.C. 2151.414(D)

In determining whether permanent custody is in the child’s best

interest, the juvenile court must consider the relevant factors set forth in either

R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) or (D)(2). In re U.B., 2025-Ohio-1265 ¶ 27 (8th Dist.).

Pursuant to (D)(1) the court found the following:

Upon considering the interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child’s parents, siblings, relatives, and foster parents; the wishes of the child; the custodial history of the child, including whether the child has been in temporary custody of a public children services agency or private child placing agency under one or more separate orders of disposition for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two month period; the child’s need for a legally secure permanent placement and whether that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of permanent custody; and, the report of the Guardian ad Litem, the Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that a grant of permanent custody is in the best interests of the child and the child cannot be placed with one of the child’s parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent.

The record clearly and convincingly supports the juvenile court’s

findings. The father abandoned the Boys by not trying to effect the case plan, by not

appearing at court hearings, and by making it clear that he wanted nothing to do

with the agency.

The Mother’s argument is to highlight her partial compliance with the

case plan. The GAL at the June 2024 hearing said the concerns about the Mother’s

home had been remedied. Mother had completed the parenting classes and was

actively engaged in anger-management and domestic-violence counseling. She was

taking medication for her depression and regularly visited her children. Thus, she

concluded that the evidence failed to support the juvenile court’s conclusion that

Mother failed to remedy the conditions that led to her children’s removal.

However, a closer examination of the evidence clearly and

convincingly establishes that the juvenile court properly ruled that permanent

custody was in the Boys’ best interest. Despite having nearly two years to effectuate

the case plan and despite multiple referrals from the agency, Mother did not

complete the case plan and establish that she had remedied the causes for the removal of her children. She did not establish sobriety. She refused to submit drug

screenings after December 2024, and that screening was positive for alcohol. She

did not remedy the domestic violence that resulted in her and the father being sent

to jail and being the catalyst that caused the agency’s involvement. She continued

to live with the father. She undertook domestic-violence services too late to be

completed within the scope of the case plan. Similarly, she eschewed the mental-

health services from Moore Counseling and its intensive outpatient

recommendation. Instead, she undertook mental-health services with Able

Counseling and it was too late to be completed timely. She did not establish that she

could provide the Boys with safe housing. She was never present when the agency

went to view her home. In his October 19, 2025 report, the GAL noted that the

agency had not gotten access to Mother’s home. When she visited the Boys, she did

not interact with them; she handed off her role as mother to her cell phone and a

tablet.

In contrast, the Boys are doing well in foster care. The Older Boy was

behind academically. Now he is improving in school and now just a little behind.

The Younger Boy was malnourished and missing necessary medical appointments.

Now he too has improved. Their needs are being met. (4-10-25 tr. 14, tr. 39-44, 73-

74, and 117.)

Conclusion

In light of the foregoing, we find that there is clear and convincing

evidence in the record to support the juvenile court’s determination that permanent custody to the agency is in the Boys’ best interest. We further find the court’s

decision to grant permanent custody to the agency is not against the weight of the

evidence.

Accordingly, the assignment of error is overruled.

Judgment is affirmed.

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court, juvenile division, to carry this judgment into execution.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule

27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

MARY J. BOYLE, JUDGE

EMANUELLA D. GROVES, P.J., and SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR