[Cite as In re K.S., 2011-Ohio-5981.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT CLARK COUNTY
IN THE MATTER OF: : : Appellate Case No. 2010-CA-56 R.S. and K.S. : : Trial Court Case Nos. 2009-1772 : Trial Court Case Nos. 2009-1775 : : (Juvenile Appeal from : (Common Pleas Court) : ........... OPINION Rendered on the 18th day of November, 2011. ...........
ANDREW R. PICEK, Atty. Reg. #0082121, Clark County Prosecutor’s Office, 50 East Columbia Street, 4th Floor, Post Office Box 1608, Springfield, Ohio 45501 Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee, Clark County Dept. Of Job & Family Services
JAMES GRIFFIN, Atty. Reg. #0015917, 8 North Limestone Street, Suite D, Springfield, Ohio 45502 Attorney for Appellee, father
MARK A. DETERS, Atty. Reg. #0085094, 371 West First Street, Dayton, Ohio 45402 Attorney for Defendant-Appellant, mother
.............
HALL, J.
{¶ 1} N.R. (“Mother”) appeals from the trial court’s decision and entry
granting her former husband, J.S. (“Father”), legal custody of their two children,
R.S. and K.S. 2
{¶ 2} Mother advances two assignments of error on appeal. First, she
contends the trial court erred when it failed to comply with the requirements for
modifying a prior custody order under R.C. 3109.04(E)(1). Second, she claims the
trial court abused its discretion by modifying a prior custody decree.
{¶ 3} The record reflects that the present dispute began as two separate
dependency/abuse actions filed by Clark County Children’s Services (CCCS). The
agency filed the actions in juvenile court on December 4, 2009. At that time, Mother
had remarried. She and her new husband, R.R., live in Springfield, Ohio, with six
children. The appellee is the father of two of those children, R.S. and K.S. He now
lives in Kansas with his new wife and their one child.
{¶ 4} In its two dependency/abuse complaints, CCCS alleged that it had
become involved in this case based on allegations of sexual activity between two of
the minor children in Mother’s household. Although the sexual activity did not
involve R.S. and K.S., who then were ten and twelve years old, CCCS requested a
finding of abuse or neglect and the issuance of a protective-supervision order. In the
body of its complaints, the agency alternatively requested other dispositions.
{¶ 5} The trial court consolidated the two complaints. On December 21,
2009, it made a finding that R.S. and K.S. were dependent children. The trial court
then issued an agreed protective-supervision order. The trial court indicated that the
order would remain in effect for six months unless modified, extended, or terminated.
The trial court also noted that Father had filed a motion seeking legal custody of R.S.
and K.S. Finally, the trial court stated that it would hold a dispositional review hearing
on or before June 21, 2010. 3
{¶ 6} Thereafter, on April 19, 2010, the trial court held the promised hearing.
After considering the evidence presented, reviewing a guardian ad litem’s report, and
speaking to R.S. and K.S. privately, the trial court filed a decision and entry in which
it repeated its earlier finding that the children were dependent. It then granted
Father’s motion for legal custody and awarded Mother visitation. This appeal
followed.
{¶ 7} On April 26, 2011, we filed a decision and entry clarifying the issues
before us, suspending the appeal, and remanding the cause for the trial court to
make additional findings. In particular, we clarified the nature of the appeal, rejecting
Mother’s argument that it did not stem from a dependency complaint. Despite that
conclusion, we ultimately agreed with Mother’s claim “that the trial court was required
to comply with R.C. 3109.04 before granting legal custody to [Father].” We then
determined that the trial court had failed to make all of the findings required by R.C.
3109.04(E)(1)(a), which provides:
{¶ 8} “The court shall not modify a prior decree allocating parental rights and
responsibilities for the care of children unless it finds, based on facts that have arisen
since the prior decree or that were unknown to the court at the time of the prior
decree, that a change has occurred in the circumstances of the child, the child’s
residential parent, or either of the parents subject to a shared parenting decree, and
that the modification is necessary to serve the best interest of the child. In applying
these standards, the court shall retain the residential parent designated by the prior
decree or the prior shared parenting decree, unless a modification is in the best
interest of the child and one of the following applies: 4
{¶ 9} “* * *
{¶ 10} “(iii) The harm likely to be caused by a change of environment is
outweighed by the advantages of the change of environment to the child.”
{¶ 11} In our April 26, 2011 ruling, we reasoned:
{¶ 12} “In the present case, the trial court made no specific reference to R.C.
3109.04. It made no finding of a change in circumstances since the time of the prior
custody decree, and it made no finding that the harm caused by a change of
environment would be outweighed by the advantages to R.S. and K.S. if [Father]
obtained custody.
{¶ 13} “Although we might be tempted to make the foregoing findings on our
own, we decline to do so. Based on the record before us, we deem it best that the
trial court determine whether either requirement has been met.”
{¶ 14} As a result, we suspended Mother’s appeal and remanded the cause
“for the limited purpose of allowing the trial court to decide whether a change in
circumstances exists and whether the benefits from a change of custody outweigh
any harm to R.S. and K.S.” The trial court responded to our remand with a June 1,
2011 judgment entry in which it made additional findings. Thereafter, we granted
both parties leave to file supplemental briefs addressing the trial court’s new findings.
Having reviewed those briefs, as well as the trial court’s original ruling and its
additional findings, we turn now to the merits of Mother’s appeal.
{¶ 15} In her first assignment of error, Mother contends the trial court failed to
comply with the requirements for modifying a prior custody order under R.C.
3109.04(E)(1). In particular, she claims the trial court erred in failing to find: (1) that 5
there was a change in circumstances for each child and (2) that the harm likely to be
caused by a change of environment was outweighed by the advantages of the
change. As set forth above, although the trial court’s original ruling omitted these
findings, we remanded the cause for the trial court to make them. In her
supplemental brief, however, Mother asserts that the trial court’s most recent
judgment entry still failed to include the second finding. As for the first finding,
Mother acknowledges that the trial court now has made it. She argues, however, that
the evidence fails to demonstrate a change in circumstances.
{¶ 16} Our review of the trial court’s most recent ruling reveals that it found a
change in circumstances for each child and that the harm likely to be caused by a
change of environment was outweighed by the advantages of the change. The
evidence supports both findings.
{¶ 17} In its June 1, 2011 judgment entry, the trial court found “repeated and
significant changes in circumstances in the home of the mother, and in the
circumstances of the children since the prior decree.” The trial court addressed those
changes as follows:
{¶ 18} “[S]ince the last decree the mother has remarried. In fact, she has
indicated through her testimony that she has been married two (2) times, since the
divorce from the boys’ father. Since the last decree as well, the mother has taken up
residence and now lives with a husband that is extremely volatile, angry, and
unpredictable. His behavior has caused the home of the mother to be chaotic by her
own admission. The mother’s home is not safe, stable, or secure. She has
repeatedly indicated a desire to separate from her husband. She has even had to 6
move out of the home that she shares with her husband out of fear. Additionally, her
husband had been gone from the home for a period of three (3) months exhibiting
the instability and unpredictability that is obvious to all that know [R.R.] She
expressed a desire to rectify the instability and unpredictability and chaos in the
home, but is [sic] seemingly been unable to do so. In addition, since the last decree,
a child in the home of the mother has been sexually abused and had to be removed
from the home. This occurred on mother’s watch when she was the owner and
operator of the home. Since the last decree, it has been determined that one (1) of
her children has ADHD and another is bi-polar. Both children are in significant need
of counseling services and perhaps medication. One child is flunking in school and
the other is very consumed with video games to the point of being distracted. The
chaos in the home is causing instability of the lives and emotional well-being of the
boys. They crave, need, and deserve a home that is safe, stable, and secure. The
mother’s home does not offer that. There have been many substantial changes in the
lives of the mother and the boys.”
{¶ 19} In her supplemental brief, Mother contends the foregoing findings by
the trial court are distorted, telling only part of the story. Although she has been
married multiple times, Mother notes that she married her current husband, R.R., in
2004. With regard to instability and chaos in the home, Mother attributes them to
stress caused by the sexual abuse allegations. Mother points out that the child who
committed the abuse, R.R.’s son from another relationship, has been removed from
her home and lives out-of-state with a relative. Mother contends she and R.R. have
resolved much of the tension that previously existed between them. She also 7
contends the trial court erred in essentially holding her strictly responsible for the
sexual abuse that occurred in her home, for the fact that R.S. and K.S. have been
diagnosed with mental issues, and for the fact that R.S. is failing in school. According
to mother, she did her best to remedy the sexual abuse issue upon discovering it,
she obtained medication and treatment for R.S. and K.S., and she worked with the
school to address R.S.’s academic problems.
{¶ 20} Mother’s own hearing testimony supports her claims. But even taking
that testimony into account, the evidence, as a whole, supports the trial court’s
central finding that chaos and instability in the home, attributable largely to her
marriage to R.R., have produced a change in circumstances since the last decree
allocating parental rights. While the problems in the home may have subsided
somewhat after the sexual abuse issue was resolved, the record contains ample
evidence to support a finding that R.R. remains a hostile, destabilizing force in the
lives of the children. Social worker Julie Sullivan summarized the situation in the
home at the time of the hearing as follows:
{¶ 21} “I think they’re working through a lot of their issues, [Mother and R.R.]
are; they’re working through their problems. [R.R.] is still very resistant, doesn’t think
he’s got an anger problem, which all of the children have reported that he gets very
angry, yells and screams, the house is kind of chaotic when [R.R.’s] upset. They are
working through those. He did complete an assessment on Thursday at Family
Service Agency, which he completed one months before but did not follow through
with recommendations.” (Hearing transcript at 28).
{¶ 22} In her testimony, Mother admitted that R.R. “does have some issues 8
with some anger[.]” (Id. at 91). Most notably, R.R. testified at the hearing and
displayed his anger and volatility first-hand. In testimony that the trial court accurately
characterized as “entirely lacking in credibility,” R.R. exhibited open hostility and
eventually walked off of the witness stand, resulting in the trial court having him taken
into custody and held in contempt. When questioned by Father, R.R. became
uncooperative and professed not to recall anything about anything. The hearing
transcript reveals the patent insincerity of his testimony. (Id. at 155-162). After
several minutes of questioning, R.R. announced that he was “finished” and that he
would not answer another question. (Id. at 163). After the trial court ordered him to
continue or go to jail, R.R. proceeded to deny everything asked. (Id. at 163-164).
When Father eventually attempted to impeach R.R. with a tape-recorded telephone
conversation, R.R. ignored the trial court’s order to remain seated and left the
courtroom. (Id. at 168-170). This contemptuous behavior by R.R. fully supports the
trial court’s finding that he is volatile, angry, and unpredictable and that he has
caused Mother’s home to be unstable.
{¶ 23} The Ohio Supreme Court has recognized that a change in
circumstances must be one of substance, not slight or inconsequential, to justify
modifying a prior custody order. Davis v. Flickinger, 77 Ohio St.3d 415, 418,
1997-Ohio-260. “In determining whether a change in circumstances has occurred so
as to warrant a change in custody, a trial judge, as the trier of fact, must be given
wide latitude to consider all issues which support such a change.” Id. at syllabus. A
new marriage, alone, ordinarily does not constitute a sufficient change in
circumstances to warrant a change in custody. Id. at 419. In Davis, however, the 9
Ohio Supreme Court recognized that “a new marriage that creates hostility by the
residential parent and spouse toward the nonresidential parent, frustrating attempts
at visitation, may be an unforeseen change in circumstances warranting further
inquiry into the best interest of the child.” Id. at 419.
{¶ 24} Although R.R.’s volatility and anger may not have frustrated Father’s
visitation attempts, this does not mean Mother’s remarriage cannot constitute a
change in circumstances. We do not read Davis to imply that the only way a new
marriage can qualify as a change in circumstances is if it creates visitation-related
hostility. To the contrary, we believe the trial court acted within its discretion in finding
a change in circumstances based on the instability that R.R.’s hostility and volatility
introduced into Mother’s home and the adverse impact his conduct had on R.S. and
K.S. The instability and chaos the trial court attributed to R.R.’s presence in the home
reasonably qualifies as an adverse change of substance in the circumstances of the
children. Therefore, the trial court did not err in finding a change in circumstances
since the time of the prior custody decree.1
{¶ 25} Contrary to Mother’s argument, the trial court also adequately found
that the harm likely to be cause by a change of environment was outweighed by the
advantages of the change. Although Mother contends this finding remains absent
from the trial court’s most recent judgment entry, the trial court made the finding,
albeit perhaps inferentially, on the bottom of page four of its decision. After finding
that the “instability and chaos” attributable to R.R.’s presence in the home qualified
1 Parenthetically, we note that the prior custody decree was entered when Mother and Father divorced. Therefore, that decree pre-dated Mother’s new marriage to R.R. 10
as a change in circumstances, the trial court continued:
{¶ 26} “[T]he Court of Appeals for the Third Appellate District determined that
a Juvenile Court did not abuse its discretion when it modified a custody order and
granted custody of a 16 year old child to his father, when the evidence showed that
the advantages of the custody change out weighted the disadvantages * * * because
: (1) the critical element missing from the child’s life was stability, (2) the mother who
was given custody, but unable to provide stability to the child, (3) the child would
have a stable home with his father who had financially support [sic] him and kept in
contact with him throughout his young life, In re Rutan, [Union App. No. 14-03-52,]
2004-Ohio-4022 (2004).”(Emphasis added).
{¶ 27} In citing Rutan, the trial court plainly was drawing a parallel between
that case and the case before it, insofar as both cases involved attempts to remedy
instability in a child’s home life by providing a more secure, stable home. By
recognizing that the advantages of a custody change outweigh the disadvantages
when the change will produce greater stability for a child, the trial court effectively
made a finding that, as in Rutan, the harm likely to be caused to R.S. and K.S. by a
change of environment was outweighed by the advantages of the change to them.
Although the trial court could have said so more directly, the import of its analysis is
evident.
{¶ 28} Finally, we reject Mother’s assertion that the harm likely to be caused to
R.S. and K.S. by a change of environment outweighs any benefit to them. In
evaluating the harm and the advantages to R.S. and K.S. if Father obtains custody,
we note that the children have lived with Mother for their entire lives. Although they 11
have had lengthy and regular periods of visitation with Father in Kansas, the trial
court’s interview with the children established that one of them was ambivalent about
a custody change. The other child expressed a desire to remain with Mother.
Although these wishes are not dispositive, they are relevant given the children’s
ages.
{¶ 29} On the other hand, the record reflects that the boys love Father and
have spent extensive vacation time with them. Given the unstable home environment
the boys have had with Mother and R.R., the trial court reasonably concluded that
the benefits of sending them to Kansas to live with Father would outweigh any
potential harm. Although resolution of this issue is perhaps close, the trial court was
best positioned to make this determination based on its familiarity with the parties
and the insights it had gained by watching them in court. Our function as an appellate
court is to review the trial court’s determination, after it is made, for an abuse of
discretion. Pellettiere v. Pellettiere, Montgomery App. No. 23141, 2009-Ohio-5407,
¶12; Beismann v. Beismann, Montgomery App. No. 22323, 2008-Ohio-984, ¶20
(“The discretion which a trial court enjoys in custody matters should be afforded the
utmost respect, given the nature of the proceeding and the impact the court’s
determination will have on the lives of the parties concerned. The knowledge a trial
court gains through observing the witnesses and the parties in a custody proceeding
cannot be conveyed to a reviewing court by a printed record. * * * Thus, a reviewing
court may not reverse a custody determination unless the trial court has abused its
discretion.”). We see no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s determination that the
benefit to R.S. and K.S. from a change of environment outweighs any harm likely to 12
be caused by the change. Accordingly, Mother’s first assignment of error is
overruled.
{¶ 30} In her second assignment of error, Mother claims the trial abused its
discretion by modifying the prior domestic relations court decree that had awarded
her custody of R.S. and K.S. She advances five arguments in support. The first
three arguments concern the requirements of R.C. 3109.04(E). Specifically, Mother
contends (1) there was not a change in circumstances sufficient to warrant granting
Father custody, (2) the reallocation of parental rights was not in either child’s best
interest, and (3) the advantages of the change did not outweigh the likely harm to the
children. Mother also argues (4) that the trial court erred in finding R.S. and K.S.
dependent when ruling on Father’s custody motion, and (5) that it erred in failing to
grant the guardian ad litem’s motion for a continuance.
{¶ 31} Upon review, we reject Mother’s arguments about a change in
circumstances or whether the benefits of awarding Father custody outweighed the
likely harm to the children. We fully addressed those issues above and need not
repeat that analysis here. As for the best-interest determination, the trial court’s
original judgment entry found a change of custody to be in the best interest of R.S.
and K.S. The record supports this determination.
{¶ 32} When determining the best interest of a child in a dependency action, a
trial court may consider any relevant circumstances, including any relevant
best-interest factors under R.C. 3109.04(F). In re Fulton, Butler App. No.
CA2002-09-236, 2003-Ohio-5984, ¶11. A trial court need not recite those factors or
discuss each of them in its judgment entry. It is sufficient if the trial court refers to 13
evidence that supports its best-interest determination. Chelman v. Chelman, Greene
App. No. 2007 CA 79, 2008-Ohio-4634, ¶38-39.
{¶ 33} In the present case, the trial court’s original judgment entry included the
following factual findings upon which it based its best-interest determination:
{¶ 34} “CHILDREN: The children are physically healthy, but admittedly lazy.
The children indicate through in-camera interviews that they have a love for both their
mother and father. Both children admit some adjustment concerns in the home of the
father. Both boys are capable of successfully matriculating through grade school and
high school. [R.S.] is failing many courses at this time. Both children could do
significantly better in the classroom. Their school performances and their mental
health have been adversely affected by a chaotic and disruptive home life. The boys
express a genuine desire to live with each other and to have regular contact with
both parents.
{¶ 35} “MOTHER: The mother, [N.R.], presents as trying very hard to meet the
needs of her children and step-children. Her home was full of children. The mother of
the children is gainfully employed outside the home and works hard to provide for
their needs. She is married to an angry, difficult man. He is often difficult to work with,
and difficult to control. His behavior in the courtroom at the trial proceedings was
contemptuous and his testimony was entirely unbelievable. Some of the children in
mother’s home were sexually abused. There is ample evidence that the children’s
needs were not met, and that for a significant period of time the abuse was
undetected or not addressed, when it should have been. It is equally clear that the
volatile behavior of the step-father, [R.R.], has caused the home to be unstable and 14
the children to be on pins and needles. There is frequent talk of divorce and
separation between the mother and the step-father. There have been repeated
accusations of physical and mental abuse by both parties. The mother relies
significantly on her parents for help in raising her children. The home of the mother is
not conducive to a loving, supportive, stable, and nurturing environment for the boys.
{¶ 36} “FATHER: The father is married and lives in Kansas City, Kansas, with
his wife and their small child. While his past record of being a parent is not as good
as it could be and should be, he has in recent years, done all that he could
reasonably do to meet the needs of his sons. His home is stable. His employment is
secure. The step-mother in the home is appropriate. The father has the physical,
mental, emotional, and financial means to meet the needs of the boys.
{¶ 37} “The father expressed a genuine interest in raising his sons, and to
remove them from the chaos that they have called home in Springfield, Ohio. He can
meet their needs and placement with him would be in the best interest of the
children. The Guardian Ad Litem recommended the boys be placed in the home of
the father.” (Doc. #27 at 1-2).
{¶ 38} For the most part, the foregoing findings are supported by evidence
presented at the April 19, 2010 hearing on Father’s motion for legal custody. The trial
court failed to mention, however, that one of the children particularly liked Mother’s
new husband (his stepfather, R.R.), particularly disliked Father’s new wife (his
stepmother), and described his relationship with Father as being “not too well.” This
same child mentioned having many friends in Springfield and no friends in Kansas
City. The other child was more ambivalent about where he lived, seemingly enjoying 15
both places.
{¶ 39} With regard to Mother, the record supports the trial court’s finding that
her new husband, R.R., is generally angry and difficult to deal with. We note,
however, that her home no longer is full of children and the perpetrator of the sexual
abuse no longer resides there. Moreover, talk about separation and divorce appears
to have subsided with the passage of time since the improper sexual activity
occurred. The trial court still reasonably could have concluded, however, that R.S.
and K.S. would be better off living with Father rather than with their step-father, R.R.,
who made a poor impression at the hearing. At the time of the hearing, one of the
two children was failing in almost all of his classes at school. The record supports a
finding that there is a general lack of discipline and direction in Mother’s home and
that the situation may be better in Father’s home. Although one of the children did
not particularly want to move to Kansas City, the wishes of the children are not
dispositive. One reason that child cited for not getting along well with Father involved
a one-time dispute about performing a chore.
{¶ 40} On appeal, Mother points out that Kansas City is far from where R.S.
and K.S. have been raised. She also stresses the presence of family and friends in
Springfield. Mother further expresses concerns about Father’s wife not having been
around the children much, about Father’s ability to support the children, about
Father’s strictness and his one-time use of a paddle for discipline, about Father’s
failure to give the children their medication, and about Father being delinquent on his
child-support obligation. The trial court heard testimony about these concerns and
took them into consideration. 16
{¶ 41} With regard to financial resources, we note that the record supports the
trial court’s finding that Father has relatively secure employment and the ability to
provide for the children. As for Father’s strictness, the evidence did not compel a
finding that he is overly strict. The record indicates that Father has rules, requires the
children to perform chores, and disciplines them. As “a last resort,” he once
disciplined the boys by striking them one time each with a paddle. We note, however,
that Mother’s new husband, R.R., also admitted spanking the children. In any event,
“parents have the right to use reasonable physical discipline, or corporal punishment,
to prevent and punish a child’s misconduct.” In re J.L., 176 Ohio App.3d 186, 190,
2008-Ohio-1488, ¶12. Nothing before us establishes that any of the discipline
imposed by anyone in this case exceeded the bounds of reasonableness.
{¶ 42} The record also supports the trial court’s belief that R.R. has a temper
and came across at trial as being angry and volatile. With regard to child support, the
only times Father fell behind were when he was unemployed. At the time of the
hearing, he was making regular payments, paying toward his arrearage, and
maintaining employment. As for the medication issue, Father assured the trial court
that he would give it to the children if a psychiatrist deemed it necessary. Notably, the
medication at issue here was prescribed by a psychiatrist.
{¶ 43} Although the issue is perhaps a close one, we do not believe the trial
court abused its discretion in finding a change of custody to be in the best interest of
R.S. and K.S. In reaching this conclusion, we recognize that “the discretion which a
trial court enjoys in custody matters should be afforded the utmost respect, given the
nature of the proceeding and the impact the court's determination will have on the 17
lives of the parties concerned. The knowledge a trial court gains through observing
the witnesses and the parties in a custody proceeding cannot be conveyed to a
reviewing court by a printed record.” Goldsboro v. Goldsboro, Miami App. No. 2006
CA 48, 2007-Ohio-2135, ¶12.
{¶ 44} Mother next argues that the trial court erred in finding R.S. and K.S. to
be dependent children in its ruling on Father’s motion for legal custody. She asserts
that the issue was not properly before the trial court because it previously had found
the children to be dependent when it issued its protective supervision order.
{¶ 45} Upon review, we fail to see any harm or prejudice to Mother as a result
of the trial court repeating its earlier finding of dependency. Mother did not contest
the trial court’s original finding that R.S. and K.S. were dependent, and she
consented to the issuance of a protective supervision order. That determination gave
the juvenile court continuing jurisdiction over the children until their eighteenth
birthday. In the exercise of its continuing jurisdiction, the trial court was authorized to
grant Father legal custody. The fact that the trial court repeated its earlier
dependency finding in its ruling on Father’s motion is of little significance.
{¶ 46} Finally, we reject Mother’s argument that the trial court abused its
discretion in failing to grant the guardian ad litem a continuance. This argument
concerns the trial court’s denial of the guardian ad litem’s February 25, 2010 motion
to reschedule the April 19, 2010 evidentiary hearing due to his unavailability. The trial
court overruled the motion without explanation on March 3, 2010.
{¶ 47} On appeal, Mother claims the guardian ad litem’s absence from the
hearing deprived her of the ability to cross examine him about findings in his report 18
and his recommendation that R.S. and K.S. should live with Father. This argument is
unpersuasive. Notably, Mother did not join in the guardian ad litem’s motion for a
continuance and failed to object to his absence from the hearing. She never
attempted to call the guardian ad litem as a witness or to subpoena him. Mother has
forfeited her ability to complain about the guardian ad litem’s absence from the
hearing by failing to raise the issue below. In the Matter of Shawn W. (Sept. 30,
1996), Lucas App. No. L-95-267 (“Appellant never objected to the lack of the
guardian ad litem’s presence at the hearings, thereby waiving any right to raise this
issue on appeal.”). Moreover, as a matter of trial strategy, Mother’s counsel
purposely may have avoided raising the guardian ad litem’s absence as an issue
below. Given that the guardian ad litem’s report was unfavorable to Mother, counsel
may have wished to minimize its impact in the case by not calling its author as a
witness and highlighting it. Cf. In re E.W., Franklin App. No. 05AP-1088,
2006-Ohio-2609, ¶17 (recognizing that counsel’s failure to cross examine a guardian
ad litem could have been a reasonable trial strategy). Based on the reasoning set
forth above, we overrule Mother’s second assignment of error.
{¶ 48} Having overruled both of Mother’s assignments of error, we affirm the
trial court’s judgment granting Father legal custody of R.S. and K.S.
GRADY, P.J., and DONOVAN, J., concur.
Copies mailed to:
Andrew Picek James Griffin 19
Mark A. Deters Hon. Joseph N. Monnin