In Re Knight

701 S.E.2d 29, 390 S.C. 248, 2010 S.C. LEXIS 325
CourtSupreme Court of South Carolina
DecidedOctober 11, 2010
Docket26884
StatusPublished

This text of 701 S.E.2d 29 (In Re Knight) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of South Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Knight, 701 S.E.2d 29, 390 S.C. 248, 2010 S.C. LEXIS 325 (S.C. 2010).

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

This attorney disciplinary matter is before the Court pursuant to the reciprocal disciplinary provisions of Rule 29, RLDE, Rule 413, SCACR.

FACTS

By order dated June 28, 2010, the Supreme Court of Georgia accepted respondent’s Petition for Voluntary Surrender of License pursuant to Rule 4-104 of the Rules of the State Bar of Georgia, 1 which that court stated “is tantamount *250 to disbarment,” and directed that respondent’s name be removed from the rolls of persons authorized to practice law in the State of Georgia. Respondent filed the petition after three formal complaints and seven additional grievances were filed against him alleging he forged his former law partner’s name to bank documents, removed client funds from his trust account, deposited checks payable to his firm into his personal bank account, converted firm checks payable to third parties to his own use, accepted fees from clients then failed to communicate with them, willfully abandoned clients’ cases, and converted funds he received in a fiduciary capacity to his own use. Respondent admitted all of the material allegations in the formal complaints and the grievances and admitted he suffered from drug addiction to the extent that it impaired his competency as a lawyer.

Respondent did not notify the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (ODC) of the action taken by the Georgia Supreme Court, as required by Rule 29(a) of the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement, Rule 413, SCACR. However, ODC obtained a certified copy of the order and filed it with this Court. Rule 29(a), RLDE. The Clerk of Court sent respondent notice of receipt of the certified order and directed him to inform the Court of any claim he may have that the imposition of the *251 identical discipline in South Carolina would be unwarranted and the reasons for that claim. Rule 29(b), RLDE.

Respondent has filed a return in which he seeks imposition of a lesser discipline under Rule 29(d)(5), RLDE. 2 Respondent states the Georgia Supreme Court accepted his Petition for Voluntary Surrender of License pursuant to State Bar of Georgia Rule 4-104 regarding mental incapacity and substance abuse. Respondent admits he was incapacitated due to drug addiction, but states he began treatment in the summer of 2008, which he continues to date, and was authorized by his psychiatrist to return to work on a limited basis in January 2009 and on an unrestricted basis in March 2009. He states his “mental capacity has recovered” and that the reason for surrender of his license no longer exists. Respondent has offered his medical records for consideration by the Court in imposing a lesser discipline than surrender of his license to practice law in South Carolina. Finally, respondent states none of his clients suffered monetary loss other than in retaining substitute counsel in the matters in which he represented them and that no funds were illegally taken by him.

ODC has filed a reply in which it maintains Rule 29(d)(5), upon which respondent relies, is inapplicable because it applies in cases in which a lawyer is placed on incapacity inactive status in another state and reciprocal imposition of incapacity inactive status is being considered in South Carolina. ODC contends that in this case, respondent was not placed on incapacity inactive status in Georgia, but was instead disciplined. ODC states South Carolina does not have a procedure similar to the procedure Georgia has for the voluntary surrender of a license to practice law; 3 however, ODC asserts that *253 because “voluntary surrender in Georgia is the equivalent of disbarment,” disbarment is appropriate in the case at hand.

ODC also notes that in order for this Court to deviate from the discipline imposed by the Georgia Supreme Court, it must find that it is clear from the face of the record from which the discipline is predicated that identical discipline should not be imposed. ODC contends respondent is asking this Court to consider matters outside that record and essentially seeking a re-investigation of the underlying disciplinary matters that gave rise to the disciplinary action in Georgia. ODC submits the purpose of reciprocal discipline is to avoid the necessity to re-investigate and re-litigate disciplinary matters that have already been decided by the authorities in another jurisdiction. Accordingly, ODC asks that the Court reject respondent’s request that reciprocal discipline not be imposed and issue an order disbarring respondent.

LAW

When a lawyer has been disciplined in another jurisdiction, this Court will impose the identical discipline or incapacity inactive status unless the lawyer or disciplinary counsel demonstrates, or the Court finds, that it clearly appears on the face of the record from which the discipline is predicated, that (a) the procedure was so lacking in notice or opportunity to be heard as to constitute a deprivation of due process; (2) there was such infirmity of proof establishing the misconduct as to give rise to the clear conviction that the Court could not, consistent with its duty, accept as final the conclusion on that subject; (3) the imposition of the same discipline by the Court would result in grave injustice; (4) the misconduct established warrants substantially different discipline in this state; or (5) the reason for the original transfer to incapacity inactive status no longer exists. Rule 29(d), RLDE. The burden is on the party seeking different discipline in this jurisdiction to demonstrate that the imposition of the same discipline is not appropriate. Id. If the Court determines that any of the elements above exist, it can enter such other order as it deems *254 appropriate. Id. The burden is on the party seeking different discipline in this jurisdiction to demonstrate that the imposition of the same discipline is not appropriate. Id. In all other aspects, a final adjudication in another jurisdiction that a lawyer has been guilty of misconduct or should be transferred to incapacity inactive status shall establish conclusively the misconduct or the incapacity for purposes of a disciplinary or incapacity proceeding in this state. Rule 29(e), RLDE.

Rule 4-104 of the Rules of the State Bar of Georgia clearly provides that a lawyer may be removed from the practice of law in Georgia if he suffers from a drug addiction that impairs his competency as a lawyer. Pursuant to Rules 4 — 110(f) and 4-227, a lawyer may voluntarily submit to such discipline by filing a Petition for Voluntary Surrender of License, which is the equivalent of disbarment.

Similarly, Rule 28(b)(6) of the South Carolina Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement states that if this Court concludes a lawyer suffers from a physical or mental condition that adversely affects the lawyer’s ability to practice law, it may enter any order appropriate to the circumstances, the nature of the incapacity and probable length of the period of incapacity.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
701 S.E.2d 29, 390 S.C. 248, 2010 S.C. LEXIS 325, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-knight-sc-2010.