[Cite as In re K.K., 2025-Ohio-4376.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
IN RE K.K. : : No. 114809 [Appeal by Mother, H.K.] :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: September 18, 2025
Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Juvenile Division Case No. AD22909433
Appearances:
Michael P. Dunham, for appellant.
Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Joseph C. Young, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
LISA B. FORBES, P.J.:
H.K. (“Mother”) appeals the juvenile court’s decision denying her
motion to award legal custody of K.K. (or “the Child”) to J.C. (“Aunt”), terminating
Mother’s parental rights, and committing K.K. to the permanent custody of the
Cuyahoga County Division of Children and Family Services (“CCDCFS” or “the
Agency”). For the following reasons, we affirm the juvenile court’s decision. I. Facts and Procedural History
On September 20, 2022, CCDCFS filed a complaint alleging that K.K.
was abused, neglected, and dependent and requesting that the Child be committed
to the temporary custody of CCDCFS. By journal entry dated January 4, 2023, K.K.
was adjudicated dependent and placed in temporary Agency custody.
Pertinent to this appeal, on April 9, 2024, the Agency filed a motion
for permanent custody. Mother moved for legal custody to Aunt.
The juvenile court initially tried these motions on August 15, 2024,
and September 5, 2024, after which the court held the motions in abeyance. In a
journal entry dated September 10, 2024, the court ordered, “The proposed legal
guardian [Aunt] is to stop all alcohol and Kratom use.” The court took further
testimony on October 10, 2024, and January 14, 2025.
The court issued a journal entry dated January 16, 2025, finding clear
and convincing evidence that it was in K.K.’s best interest to be placed in permanent
Agency custody. The court terminated Mother’s parental rights, denied Mother’s
motion for legal custody to Aunt, and committed K.K. to the permanent custody of
CCDCFS.
From this order, Mother appeals, raising the following assignment of
error:
The Judgment of the Trial Court terminating Mother Ms. H.K. of her parental rights, denying her motion to award legal custody to an interested third party, and, awarding permanent custody to the State was made with insufficient evidence and against the manifest weight of the evidence. II. Trial Testimony
A. August 15, 2024 Hearing
1. Jenny Lemmer
Jenny Lemmer (“Lemmer”) testified that she was a licensed social
worker for a substance abuse assessment facility (“Clinic”). Lemmer stated that,
during a substance-abuse assessment, the Clinic’s counselors ask patients questions
and collect a urine sample to test for drugs. The counselors then recommend
treatment plans, if needed. Lemmer reviews substance-abuse assessments and
approves or denies recommendations for treatment.
Lemmer stated that the Clinic assessed Aunt for substance abuse in
June 2024. Per Lemmer, Aunt reported past use of drugs including marijuana,
benzodiazepines, methamphetamines, oxycodone, crack cocaine, and heroin. Aunt
reported that she first used these substances between the ages of 13 and 19 but
stopped in 2016. Aunt took prescribed oxycodone again in 2024 after developing
kidney stones. Aunt used this prescription “as needed” and “was done with it” when
the Clinic assessed her. The Clinic diagnosed Aunt with several substance-use
disorders, including mild alcohol-use disorder and severe opioid-use disorder.
Lemmer acknowledged the latter condition was in “sustained remission,” meaning
that Aunt had not used opioids in more than 12 months.
Following her assessment, Aunt’s urine tested positive for nicotine,
alcohol, and kratom. Lemmer testified that kratom is a mood-altering substance
that has no recognized medical use in the United States. Lemmer further opined that use of even a legal mood-altering substance “could lead . . . to [Aunt] using other
substances that she had struggled with in the past.” Lemmer acknowledged that
kratom is legal in the United States and can be purchased in leaf-form at “a health
food store.” Lemmer also admitted that she could not tell, based on Aunt’s urine
analysis, how much nicotine, alcohol, or kratom Aunt had used in the 72 hours
before the Clinic took her urine sample.
2. Kimberly Palmer
Kimberly Palmer (“Palmer”) testified that she worked for CCDCFS
and had been assigned to K.K.’s case since April 2024. After CCDCFS was granted
temporary custody of K.K., the Agency placed the Child with a foster family. Palmer
observed K.K. interact with his foster family and described him as “very playful” and
“generally pretty happy.” Palmer stated K.K.’s foster family included a husband, a
wife —Brenda Corchado (“Corchado”), and their children. One of the children was
of similar age to K.K.; per Palmer, the children “play[ed] pretty well together.”
Palmer stated that she observed K.K. interact with every member of his foster
household and that the Child appeared to have bonded with them all.
Palmer testified that K.K. was assessed for autism because he
experienced sensory issues and was “clingy” with his caregivers.1 K.K. received
behavioral therapy to help him develop his vocabulary and “manage his behavior if
he decides to act out.” Palmer stated that Corchado was “very attentive” and “able
to comfort” K.K. when he was moody or had a tantrum. During these episodes, K.K.
1 As discussed below, K.K. has since been diagnosed with autism. listened to Corchado’s attempts to “redirect” him to another activity. K.K.’s foster
family provided him with a “crash pad” that is “used for children with . . . autism”
and that “helps [K.K.] calm down.”
Regarding K.K.’s blood relatives, Palmer testified that Mother was
supposed to meet with the Agency monthly but had done so only once between
January and July 2024. Palmer testified that during that same period, Mother had
not visited K.K. or contacted the Agency to initiate a visit. Per Palmer, Mother had
been convicted of drug possession in June 2024 and was on probation.
Palmer testified that Aunt and her husband (“P.C.”) visited with K.K.
biweekly until May 2024, when they began to visit the Child weekly. Palmer
supervised most of these visits. Per Palmer, it took K.K. “a little while to warm up,”
although she noted K.K. likes to play independently and that Aunt “did make sure
to be attentive and try to interact with him.” Palmer also stated that Aunt’s home
was clean.
Palmer further testified that, in 2015, CCDCFS had filed a complaint
against Aunt regarding her own biological child (“C.K.”). In that proceeding, C.K.
was adjudicated dependent after Aunt stipulated to several allegations, including
substance abuse. C.K. remained in Aunt’s custody but was placed under the
Agency’s protective supervision, which was terminated in 2017. B. September 5, 2024 Hearing
1. Blaise Freeland
Blaise Freeland (“Freeland”), a counselor, assessed Aunt for
substance abuse in July 2024. Per Freeland, during their conversation, Aunt shared
that she had been sober from opiates for nine years but had tested positive for
alcohol and kratom.
Freeland stated that “[t]here’s a lot of conflicting evidence” regarding
kratom’s effects but acknowledged that it can have opiate-like effects. Freeland
admitted that she had not evaluated anyone for kratom dependency before assessing
Aunt.
During her assessment, Aunt described her alcohol and kratom use to
Freeland. Freeland stated she did not identify that Aunt’s use of these substances
was at the time causing legal trouble, conflicts with family and friends, financial
strain, or mental or physical health problems. On this basis, Freeland concluded
that Aunt’s use of alcohol and kratom was not causing “negative consequences” or
“an impairment in her life.” For this reason, Freeland did not refer Aunt to social
services related to substance abuse. Freeland opined that she had no reason to
believe Aunt’s disclosures were untruthful.
On cross-examination, Freeland stated that Aunt’s prior opiate use
had caused “significant impairment in her personal life.” Freeland also stated that
Aunt reported using suboxone, which curbs opiate cravings and withdrawal
symptoms. 2. Kelli Severt
Kelli Severt (“Severt”) testified that she had two children with Aunt’s
now-husband, P.C. P.C. still shares responsibility for his children with Severt. P.C.
introduced Aunt to Severt, and they had known each other for eight years. Severt
allowed Aunt to care for the children she had with P.C. and sometimes allowed them
to stay with Aunt overnight. Severt stated that she trusted Aunt’s ability to care for
children. Severt was aware of Aunt’s past use of alcohol and drugs and had observed
her drink alcohol. Severt stated she never observed Aunt’s substance use interfere
with her ability to care for children.
On cross-examination, Severt acknowledged that she had only
observed Aunt with K.K. “one or two times.” Severt also admitted that she was aware
that Mother had once overdosed on drugs while watching K.K.’s biological sibling
(“K.K.’s Sister”), who was in Agency custody. On that occasion, Aunt had been
babysitting K.K.’s Sister and had allowed Mother to watch that child unsupervised,
violating her safety plan.
3. P.C.
P.C. testified that he was married to Aunt, with whom he had two
children. For the past ten years, P.C. had been employed “on and off” by a restaurant
that accommodates his childcare obligations by allowing him to work part time. P.C.
testified that he handles household chores including “[l]aundry, dishes, cook[ing],
homework, whatever needs to be done.” He stated that Aunt and Severt help him
care for the children and coordinate their schedules. Per P.C., he and Aunt visited with K.K. biweekly beginning in
February or March 2024, then began to visit him weekly. P.C. stated that K.K. was
“standoffish” during the first few visits, but “after that the visits were amazing.” K.K.
“warmed up to us really quick.” P.C. and Aunt brought their two children to visit
with K.K., and “they were just . . . peas in a pod.”
P.C. stated that he had seen Aunt drink alcohol, at most once per
week. Aunt’s alcohol consumption “never really exceed[ed] two drinks,” which was
the number required for her to become intoxicated. P.C. described Aunt’s
intoxication as “really laughy, talking, just reminiscing and enjoying our time
together on the couch.” P.C. had not “seen her like throwing up or falling on the
ground . . . .” P.C. knew Aunt took medication for anxiety or to sleep but did not
know what type. He had not known what kratom was before Aunt tested positive
for it. P.C. was also aware of Aunt’s past substance abuse but had not observed
substances affect her ability to care for children.
4. Aunt
Aunt testified that she lived in a house with P.C. and their two
children, where P.C.’s two children with Severt also lived part time. Per Aunt, the
house was furnished and the utilities were functioning. Everyone that lived in the
house had their own bed, and children’s books and toys were available.
Aunt stated that she worked full time as a customer-relations
manager and that P.C. worked part time for a restaurant. From these jobs, Aunt and P.C. earned a monthly household income between $7,000 and $7,500. With this
income, Aunt and P.C. had no issues meeting their family’s basic needs.
Aunt stated that she and P.C. visited with K.K. for “eight or nine
months,” beginning in January 2024. Aunt and P.C. attended these visits
consistently. Aunt described their visits with K.K. as “wonderful.” K.K. was “closed-
off” at first, but his relationship with Aunt, P.C., and their two children “blossomed.”
Aunt stated that, to prepare for the possibility that she would be
granted legal custody of K.K, she had contacted “a handful of programs” that offer
daycare and early learning services. Aunt did not know whether these programs
offered specialized services for children with autism.
Aunt admitted that her own biological child, C.K., had been
adjudicated dependent and placed under protective supervision because of her past
opiate use. Because Aunt complied with C.K.’s case plan, protective supervision was
terminated. Aunt also admitted that, while babysitting K.K.’s Sister in 2020, she
allowed Mother to watch that child unsupervised, which violated that child’s safety
plan. While alone with K.K.’s Sister, Mother overdosed on drugs.
On cross-examination, Aunt admitted using to alcohol and kratom.
Aunt denied knowing that kratom had “opiate-like effects,” but acknowledged that
the substance did not have a recognized medical use in the United States. Aunt
stated that she purchased kratom at a gas station and that it is marketed as a “plant-
based herbal supplement.” Aunt stated that she did not intend to keep using kratom
but believed that continuing to consume alcohol was not an issue. Aunt acknowledged using opiates from 2013 to 2016, during which
time she used heroin and oxycodone regularly. Aunt stated that taking legal custody
of K.K. would require her to interact with Mother, with whom she had consumed
illegal drugs “probably twice” in the past. Aunt explained that she had gone through
drug treatment and that her “triggers” no longer make her “want to go use.” Per
Aunt, she first began using drugs to manage pain from an ovarian cyst.
In response to the court’s questions, Aunt stated that she does not
contact Mother unless Mother reaches out in need of something. Per Aunt, Mother
resides with their father — K.K.’s grandfather, with whom Aunt has “not a great”
relationship. Aunt stated that if she were granted legal custody of K.K., all of the
Child’s future visits with Mother would be supervised.
Aunt also described how she began to use kratom. Following her
opioid addiction, Aunt was prescribed suboxone, which she used for more than four
years. Aunt stopped using suboxone when her insurance no longer covered it. After
“coming off . . . suboxone,” Aunt “had no energy.” Aunt read online about an energy
supplement called “Feel Free,” a liquid that contains kratom. Aunt described its
effects as “like a cup of coffee” that “helped [her] focus.” Aunt did not know that
Feel Free contained kratom when she began using it. She agreed that she would stop
taking kratom if the court instructed her to.
At the close of testimony on September 5, 2024, the court instructed
Aunt, “Stop with the kratom. Okay?” 5. Corchado
Corchado testified that she was K.K.’s foster mother. Corchado
resided with her husband, her two biological children, and K.K. Per Corchado,
nobody that resided in the home had past issues with crime or substance abuse.
Corchado stated that K.K. had bonded with the members of her immediate
household, particularly her biological son.
Also residing in Corchado’s home was another foster child, a three-
year-old girl who has been diagnosed with autism. By caring for this girl, Corchado
has become “very familiar” with autism. She had “done all of the treatments with
[the foster child]” and “worked with her caregivers.” Corchado “did a lot of . . .
research” and has “taken additional training” related to caring for autistic children.
Per Corchado, at the time of her testimony, K.K. had resided with her
family for six months. Corchado described him as “a great kid,” but stated she had
observed that he had “a lot of behavioral and social communication deficits.” K.K.
would have “frequent tantrums,” which could be “triggered by minor things” and
lasted between “15 to 20 minutes.” Corchado stated that the “crash pad” located in
K.K.’s room helped him regulate sensory issues.
Corchado testified that K.K. was evaluated by a licensed psychiatrist
on August 28, 2024, and was diagnosed as “mild-moderately autistic.” The
psychiatrist had recommended 20 to 40 hours of weekly applied behavioral health
therapy. Per Corchado, some of the symptoms of autism that K.K. exhibits,
including repetitive behaviors, are not necessarily observable during brief visits. On cross-examination, Corchado admitted that K.K. lived with her
family on and off from March 2024 until CCDCFS placed him with the family full
time in July 2024. Corchado agreed that structure and routine are important to
managing autism, which switching between homes would not have provided.
Corchado also testified that the other foster child that lived in the home was severely
autistic, nonverbal, and had frequent tantrums. Corchado believed that her family
was equipped to care for multiple autistic children.
Corchado stated that her family had a good relationship with the
foster family in custody of K.K.’s Sister. She testified that, if possible, she would
continue to facilitate a relationship between K.K. and his biological sibling, as well
as between K.K., Aunt, and P.C.
6. Michael Telep
Michael Telep (“Telep”) testified that he was the guardian ad litem
(“GAL”) for K.K. Per Telep, K.K. has “some severe needs” that he was not sure Aunt
was prepared to handle. Telep was also concerned that Aunt was maintaining
contact with Mother. On this basis, Telep recommended that Mother’s motion for
legal custody to Aunt be denied.
C. October 10, 2024 Hearing
1. Corchado
K.K.’s foster mother testified for a second time, stating that a
specialist had recommended that K.K. undergo 35 hours of weekly therapy, focusing
on behavior management and emotional regulation. Corchado testified that she had shared K.K.’s therapy schedule with P.C. and Aunt, but that neither one had
attended K.K.’s appointments.
Before visits with P.C. and Aunt, K.K. was “[v]ery resistant to leaving”
his foster home and was “very clingy” with Corchado. The Agency introduced audio
and video that Corchado recorded of the Child leaving the foster home. In these
clips, K.K. cried and said, “no” and “I’m scared.” Corchado also claimed that K.K.
had begun to charge at other people and that his physical aggression was more
intense after he had visited P.C. and Aunt.
On cross-examination, Corchado admitted that K.K. resisted
activities other than visiting Aunt and P.C., including using the bathroom. Corchado
also admitted that K.K. had been more physically aggressive than usual during and
after certain appointments, not just after visits with P.C. and Aunt.
2. Palmer
K.K.’s CCDCFS caseworker testified for a second time, stating that
K.K. was “very bonded to the [foster] family” and “seems generally pretty happy
whenever I . . . come to the [foster] home for a visit.”
Palmer had observed K.K. resist being driven to visit Aunt and P.C.
Per Palmer, on this occasion, K.K. said he did not want to visit, “kept running away”
from the car, and would not “sit down completely” to be belted into his seat.
Palmer stated that the Agency suspected that Aunt, against the
Agency’s instructions, had taken K.K. to see Mother. Palmer believed that this visit
occurred at the house where Mother lived with K.K.’s grandparents. Palmer also stated that Aunt had tested positive for kratom on
September 19, and September 24, 2024.
3. K.S.
K.S. testified that she is K.K.’s grandmother (“Grandmother”).
Grandmother stated that when K.K. visited her home, Mother was in Florida and,
therefore, had not seen the Child.
4. Kenny Kinder
Kenny Kinder (“Kinder”) testified that he was a social worker for the
Cuyahoga County Public Defender’s office. Kinder had observed K.K. with Aunt and
P.C. for a visit that lasted two hours. Per Kinder, K.K. “was really happy where he
was” and was “attached to all of” the members of Aunt’s household. K.K. spent the
visit “playing with the other two kids in the home.” “Whatever [the children] did,
they did it together.” The house had video games, balls, books, Legos, and train sets
for the children to play with.
Kinder did not observe K.K. act aggressively, throw tantrums, or
resist Aunt and P.C. Kinder stated that, although Aunt and P.C. had not been
formally trained in caring for an autistic child, they were “very attentive to [K.K.’s]
needs.”
On cross-examination, Kinder admitted that he had not observed
K.K. at appointments or with other caregivers, including his foster family. 5. Aunt
Aunt testified for a second time, stating that she had begun a formal
training on caring for autistic children.
Aunt also stated that her family had moved to a larger home. Per
Aunt, her family’s relocation was the reason K.K. had recently resisted visiting them.
“[M]y house went from a . . . nice warm home, to a . . . box-stacked house” with no
toys, and “that’s when [K.K.’s resistance to visiting Aunt] started to happen.”
On cross-examination, Aunt stated that her training covered
redirecting autistic children during tantrums. Aunt believed that her job flexibility
and P.C. and Severt’s help would allow K.K. to attend 35 hours of behavioral therapy,
if he were placed in her legal custody.
Aunt also stated that, although Corchado had informed Aunt of K.K.’s
therapy schedule, Corchado had not invited Aunt to attend appointments, which
was the reason Aunt had not come. Aunt nonetheless texted Corchado for updates
regarding K.K.’s appointments.
6. Telep
GAL for K.K. again recommended the Child be placed in the Agency’s
permanent custody, where he would remain with Corchado. Telep noted that Aunt’s
visits with K.K. had been brief, while Corchado otherwise cared for the Child. For
this reason, in Telep’s view, Corchado had better experience handling K.K.’s unique
developmental needs. D. January 14, 2025 Hearing
1. Kelly Mueller
Kelly Mueller (“Mueller”) testified that she is a pediatric
occupational-therapy assistant and that K.K. had been her patient. Mueller
observed K.K. with both Corchado and Aunt, each of whom had attended most of
Mueller’s sessions with the Child. Mueller stated she had not observed anything that
made her concerned about Aunt’s ability to care for K.K.’s special needs, although
she had mostly worked with the Child one on one.
Mueller stated that K.K. has trouble with “transitions,” i.e., ending
one activity and beginning another. She also noted that K.K. transitioned between
activities more smoothly during one session to which Aunt alone brought the Child.
Per Mueller, K.K.’s aggressive behavior had improved over the course of her sessions
with him.
2. Corchado
K.K.’s foster mother testified for a third time, stating that K.K. had
“been [doing] really good” in her home. K.K. had started preschool, so “a lot of . . .
routine [was] kicking in for him . . . .” Per Corchado, K.K.’s bond with the foster
family was “just so good,” especially with Corchado’s biological son. “We love him
and he loves us.”
Although K.K.’s Sister lived 45 minutes away with a different foster
family, Corchado had maintained contact between the children. K.K.’s Sister
attended a surprise birthday party for K.K. and “they had a blast running around,” although Corchado acknowledged that both siblings “started crying” when they had
to say goodbye to each other.
Corchado stated that K.K.’s appointments were “up and down” and
frequently included tantrums. Aunt was present for K.K.’s tantrums; but, Corchado
claimed that she, rather than Aunt, calmed K.K. down.
K.K. also began to spend nights at Aunt’s home. Per Corchado, upon
returning from these overnight stays, K.K. was “hypersensitiv[e] from the moment
he walk[ed] in the door,” behaving “a little bit more impulsive, less predictable.”
K.K. also became clingier and had bitten himself, which was a new behavior.
3. Palmer
K.K.’s Agency caseworker testified for a third time, stating that she
was not aware of Mother engaging with K.K. or completing her case-plan objectives
since the previous hearing.
Palmer stated that K.K. had a “very good bond” with Corchado and
her family, who do “very well” redirecting him during tantrums. Palmer had
observed K.K. visit with Aunt and her family, too. “He was very . . . excited to play
with” Aunt’s family.
Palmer testified that Aunt had tested positive for kratom on
October 29, November 7, and November 25, 2024. Aunt did not complete all the
drug screens that the Agency had requested. Palmer stated that the Agency requests
screens randomly, giving people 24 hours to complete them. Per Palmer, Aunt did
not complete some screens that purportedly conflicted with her work schedule. 4. Adrionna Barrett
Adrionna Barrett (“Barrett”) testified that she works for CCDCFS and
requested drug screens for the Agency. Per Barrett, these screens were scheduled
randomly so that participants could not “clean their system out” or “obtain fake
urine” before testing. Barrett stated that she had initiated screens for Aunt
approximately three times per month over a seven-month span. She could
remember only one time that Aunt did not attend a drug screen, purportedly
because of a work conflict. Aunt followed up several days later to make up the
missed screen.
5. Aunt
Aunt testified for a third time and agreed that she had not attended
one of the drug screens that the Agency had arranged. Per Aunt, the Agency sent
this request at 9 a.m. on a Friday when she was already at work. The next day, the
drug screening facility was only open from 10 a.m. until 1 p.m. Aunt was scheduled
to work from 9 a.m. until 5 p.m. that day. For this reason, Aunt told the Agency she
could not perform a drug test within the requested 24-hour timeframe. Aunt
“followed up on Monday” with the Agency and was then tested.
Aunt stated that her overnights with K.K. were “going wonderfully.”
Per Aunt, the time and length of his tantrums had decreased. “He ha[d] built a . . .
strong relationship with” both of Aunt’s children. Aunt stated that K.K. slept well in
her home. Aunt said she “was trying to educate [herself] on autism” because she
just “want[ed] [K.K.] to thrive.” Aunt stated that she had attended all but one of
K.K.’s speech-therapy, physical-therapy, and occupational-therapy appointments.
Aunt stated that she had continued to use kratom, even though she
was aware that the court had ordered her not to. Per Aunt, “I cut back and . . . tried
other things,” including energy drinks, but “life got busy,” so she “started taking
[kratom] again more often.” Without it, “I’m just not getting the energy that I need
for my busy life . . . .” Aunt compared the effect of kratom on her to a cup of coffee.
She estimated that she consumed “Feel Free” supplements, which include kratom,
every two to three days.
GAL for the child reiterated his recommendation that K.K. be placed
in Corchado’s permanent custody because, in his view, she was better equipped to
care for an autistic child. GAL also felt that K.K.’s bond with Corchado was stronger
than his bond with Aunt.
On cross-examination, Telep admitted that he had not observed K.K.
during therapy or at school, nor had he spoken to the Child’s therapists or teachers.
Telep’s information regarding K.K.’s therapy and education came primarily from
Corchado. Telep also admitted that he had observed the Child’s emotional outbursts
with both Aunt and Corchado. III. Law and Analysis
In her sole assignment of error, Mother asserts that the record
included insufficient evidence to support denying her motion for legal custody to
Aunt, terminating Mother’s parental rights, and placing K.K. in permanent Agency
custody. Mother also asserts that doing so was against the manifest weight of the
evidence. Mother argues that the court instead should have granted Aunt legal
custody. We disagree.
Although the terms “sufficiency” and “weight” of the evidence are
“quantitatively and qualitatively different,” we address these issues together in this
case, while applying distinct standards of review, because they are closely related.
See State v. Perry, 2018-Ohio-487, ¶ 10 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Thompkins, 78
Ohio St.3d 380, 386 (1997).
“A claim of insufficient evidence raises the question whether the
evidence is legally sufficient to support the verdict as a matter of law.” State v.
Parker, 2022-Ohio-1237, ¶ 7 (8th Dist.), citing Thompkins at 386. When making a
sufficiency determination, an appellate court does not review whether the State’s
evidence is to be believed but whether, if believed, the evidence admitted at trial
supports the verdict. State v. Starks, 2009-Ohio-3375, ¶ 25 (8th Dist.), citing
Thompkins at 386.
In contrast to sufficiency, a manifest-weight-of-the-evidence
challenge “addresses the evidence’s effect of inducing belief,” i.e., “whose evidence
is more persuasive — the state’s or the defendant’s?” State v. Wilson, 2007-Ohio- 2202, ¶ 25, citing Thompkins at 386-387. When considering an appellant’s claim
that a conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence, the Ohio Supreme
Court recently explained, “sitting as the ‘thirteenth juror,’ [the] court looks at the
entire record and ‘“weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the
credibility of witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the
evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of
justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered,”’” State v.
Brown, 2025-Ohio-2804, ¶ 30, quoting Thompkins at 387, quoting State v. Martin,
20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist. 1983). Reversal on manifest-weight grounds is
reserved for the “‘exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the
conviction.’” Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387, quoting Martin at 172.
A juvenile court may grant a movant permanent custody of a child if
the court finds, at hearing, by clear and convincing evidence, that permanent
custody is in the child’s best interest and any of the factors listed in
R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) through (e) applies. R.C. 2151.414(B)(1), see also In re D.H.,
2024-Ohio-748, ¶ 13 (8th Dist.), citing In re Z.C., 2023-Ohio-4703, ¶ 7.
The Ohio Supreme Court has described the clear-and-convincing
evidence standard as follows:
“Clear and convincing evidence is that measure or degree of proof which is more than a mere ‘preponderance of the evidence,’ but not to the extent of such certainty as is required ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ in criminal cases, and which will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established.” In re Z.C. at ¶ 7, quoting Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469 (1954), paragraph three
of the syllabus.
A. R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a)-(e) Factors
In its journal entry granting the Agency permanent custody, the
juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence that K.K. had been in
temporary agency custody “for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two
month period.” We agree.
When ruling on a motion for permanent custody, a juvenile court
considers whether a “child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public
children services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more
months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period . . . .” R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d).
“Only one of the [R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)] factors must be present for the first prong of
the permanent custody analysis to be satisfied.” In re S.C., 2018-Ohio-2523, ¶ 20
(8th Dist.), quoting In re L.W., 2017-Ohio-657, ¶ 28 (8th Dist.).
K.K. was adjudicated dependent and placed in temporary Agency
custody on January 4, 2023. At issue in this appeal is the juvenile court’s ruling on
the Agency’s motion for permanent custody that the Agency filed on April 9, 2024.
The parties do not dispute that K.K. remained in Agency custody between these
dates, during which time 15 consecutive months elapsed. While R.C.
2141.414(B)(1)(d) considers whether a child has been in custody for 12 months of a
consecutive 22-month period, “nothing in the plain language of the statute requires
a public agency to wait until a child has been in its custody for twenty-two months before filing a motion for permanent custody.” In re T.R., 2025-Ohio-2531, ¶ 34
(8th Dist.), citing In re N.M.P., 2020-Ohio-1458, ¶ 23. The court therefore properly
found that K.K. had been in temporary agency custody for 12 months of a
consecutive 22-month period under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d), which supports
permanent custody to the Agency.
B. R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) Best-Interest Factors
R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) requires, in determining the best interests of the
child, that juvenile courts
consider all relevant factors, including, but not limited to: (a) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child’s parents, siblings, relatives, foster caregivers and out-of-home providers, and any other person who may significantly affect the child; (b) The wishes of the child, as expressed directly by the child or through the child’s guardian ad litem, with due regard for the maturity of the child; (c) The custodial history of the child, including whether the child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period, or the child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period and, as described in division (D)(1) of section 2151.413 of the Revised Code, the child was previously in the temporary custody of an equivalent agency in another state; (d) The child’s need for a legally secure permanent placement and whether that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of permanent custody to the agency; (e) Whether any of the factors in divisions (E)(7) to (11) of this section apply in relation to the parents and child.
When analyzing whether terminating parental rights or permanent
custody to the Agency is in the best interest of the child, “[t]here is not one element
that is given greater weight than the others pursuant to the statute.” In re Schaefer, 2006-Ohio-5513, ¶ 56. “This court has stated that only one of the enumerated
factors needs to be resolved in favor of the award of permanent custody.” In re S.C.,
2015-Ohio-2410, ¶ 30 (8th Dist.). “R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) does not require a juvenile
court to expressly discuss each of the best interest factors in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a)
through (e). Consideration is all the statute requires.” In re A.M., 2020-Ohio-5102,
¶ 31.
Regarding Mother’s motion for custody to Aunt, we note that
‘“[c]ourts are not required to favor a relative if, after considering all the factors, it is
in the child’s best interest for the agency to be granted permanent custody.”’ In re
C.T., 2021-Ohio-2274, ¶ 79 (8th Dist.), citing In re S.F., 2020-Ohio-693, ¶ 50 (2d
Dist.), quoting In re A.A., 2009-Ohio-2172, ¶ 19 (2d Dist.). “A juvenile court need
not find, by clear and convincing evidence, that a relative is an unsuitable placement
option prior to granting an agency’s motion for permanent custody.” In re I.S.-S.,
2021-Ohio-1720, ¶ 27 (8th Dist.), citing In re B.D., 2008-Ohio-6273, ¶ 29 (4th Dist.).
The trial court found clear and convincing evidence that it was in
K.K.’s best interest to be placed in permanent custody to the Agency. In its January
16, 2025 entry, the court expressly considered each of the “best interests” factors
under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a) through (e), finding that they all weighed in favor of
temporary agency custody. We agree.
Regarding R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a) — the interaction and
interrelationship of the Child with parents, siblings, relatives, foster caregivers, out-
of-home providers, and other persons significantly affecting the child — clear and convincing evidence supported permanent agency custody. K.K.’s caseworker,
Palmer, testified that Mother was supposed to meet with the Agency monthly but
had done so only once between January and July 2024. Palmer testified that during
that same period, Mother had not visited K.K. or contacted the Agency to initiate a
visit.
Further supporting an award of permanent agency custody is the
evidence that Corchado was best equipped to handle K.K.’s significant
developmental needs. K.K. had been diagnosed as “mild-moderately autistic,”
which caused K.K. to have frequent tantrums and sensory regulation issues. As a
result, the Child’s care providers recommended 35 hours of speech-therapy,
physical-therapy, and occupational-therapy appointments. Corchado was “very
familiar” with autism because she cared for another autistic foster child. Corchado
testified that she had “done all of the treatments with [the foster child]” and “worked
with her caregivers.” Corchado “did a lot of . . . research” and has “taken additional
training” related to caring for autistic children. We commend Aunt for undertaking
training, too. However, Aunt’s training was ongoing at the time of trial. Corchado’s
training and experience as a caregiver for another autistic foster child makes her
better suited to handle K.K.’s developmental needs.
In addition, the record includes evidence that moving K.K. from his
foster home to reside with Aunt would be uniquely difficult. Mueller — K.K.’s
pediatric occupational therapy assistant — testified that K.K.’s autism causes him
issues with “transitions,” i.e., changes. Audiovisual exhibits and testimony demonstrated that K.K. was “clingy” with his caregivers and that he became
especially upset while coming and going between Aunt’s and Corchado’s homes. By
the end of this trial, K.K. had resided with Corchado for more than nine months.
Granting the Agency permanent custody of K.K. avoided disrupting the Child’s living
arrangements, which supports the court’s decision that doing so was in his best
interests.
The wishes of the Child, as expressed through the child’s GAL, also
weighed in favor of permanent agency custody. “The juvenile court properly
considers the GAL’s recommendation on the permanent-custody motion as part of
the R.C. 2141.313(D)(1)(b) analysis where the children are too young to express their
wishes.” In re I.A.-W., 2022-Ohio-1766, ¶ 37 (8th Dist.), citing In re B/K Children,
2020-Ohio-1095, ¶ 45 (1st Dist.). Telep noted in his report that K.K., who was three
years old at the end of this trial, was too young to express his views. K.K.’s GAL
testified three times, recommending permanent agency custody each time. The GAL
testified that, in his view, Corchado was better equipped than Aunt to handle K.K.’s
significant developmental needs. The GAL also stated that he believed that K.K.
demonstrated a stronger bond with his foster family than with Aunt’s family.
The Child’s custodial history also weighs in favor of permanent
agency custody. As stated above, by the end of this trial, the Child had been in
CCDCFS’s uninterrupted temporary custody for more than two years and for 15
months from the Agency’s motion for permanent custody. The record also includes clear and convincing evidence supporting
permanent agency custody regarding the Child’s need for legally secure permanent
placement and whether that type of placement could be achieved without granting
permanent custody. The court was required to grant permanent custody in this case
because, by the end of the trial on January 14, 2025, K.K. had been in temporary
agency custody since January 4, 2023, for more than two years. R.C. 2151.415(D)(4)
prevents a court from ordering temporary custody to continue beyond two years
after the date on which the complaint was filed.
Further, Aunt’s past substance abuse and ongoing use of kratom –
despite the court’s order that she stop doing so – supports a finding that permanent
Agency custody offered K.K. the best likelihood of legally secure permanent
placement. Social worker Lemmer, who assessed Aunt for substance abuse,
concluded that Aunt had mild alcohol-use disorder and severe opioid-use disorder.
This diagnosis was based on Aunt’s own description of her past drug use. Between
the ages of 13 and 19, Aunt used drugs including marijuana, benzodiazepines,
methamphetamines, oxycodone, crack cocaine, and heroin. Lemmer believed that
Aunt’s opioid use was in “sustained remission,” i.e., that Mother had not used
opioids in more than 12 months. We applaud Aunt for this achievement.
However, the record demonstrates that Aunt used kratom throughout
trial. Though the substance is legal, Freeland, who also assessed Aunt for substance
abuse, agreed that kratom can have “opiate-like effects.” Lemmer testified that
kratom is a mood-altering substance. Per Lemmer, use of mood-altering substances “could lead . . . to [Aunt] using other substances that she had struggled with in the
past.” After the September 5, 2024 hearing, the court ordered Aunt to stop using
alcohol and kratom. Per Palmer, K.K.’s CCDCFS caseworker, Aunt nonetheless
tested positive for kratom in September, October, and November 2024.
Finally, under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(e), the court considered the
additional “factors in divisions (E)(7) to (11) of this section,” finding that “(E)(10)
and (11) apply.” Clear and convincing evidence supported the court’s determination,
under R.C. 2151.414(E)(10) that Mother “abandoned the child.” “[A] child shall be
presumed abandoned when the parents of the child have failed to visit or maintain
contact with the child for more than ninety days, regardless of whether the parents
resume contact after that period of ninety days.” R.C. 2151.011(C). Again, the
evidence, including Palmer’s testimony, demonstrated that throughout 2024,
Mother failed to meet with the Agency, had not visited K.K, or contacted the Agency
to initiate a visit.
The record also supports the court’s conclusion, under
R.C. 2151.414(E)(11), that Mother had parental rights involuntarily terminated with
respect to a sibling of K.K. and failed to provide clear and convincing evidence that
she nonetheless could provide K.K. secure permanent placement and adequate care.
K.K.’s Sister was committed to permanent agency custody in 2024 and lived with a
nearby foster family. Further, Mother provided no evidence that she could provide
K.K. secure permanent placement and adequate care; instead, she requested that
K.K. be committed to Aunt’s custody. Having found clear and convincing evidence regarding each of the R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) “best interests” factors, we find that
sufficient evidence supported the court’s decision granting CCDCFS permanent
custody of K.K.
Regarding Mother’s claim that the court’s award of permanent agency
custody contradicted the manifest weight of the evidence, we note that Ohio courts
consistently hold that the factfinder is “in the best position to assess the credibility
of the witnesses who testified at trial” and is free to believe all, part or none of each
witness’ testimony. State v. Jones, 2020-Ohio-3367, ¶ 85 (8th Dist.). At trial, the
finder of fact is in the “best position to view the witnesses and observe their
demeanor, gestures, and voice inflections that are critical observations in
determining the credibility of a witness and his or her testimony.” State v. Sheline,
2019-Ohio-528, ¶ 100 (8th Dist.). Mother raises no issues regarding witness
credibility, and we identify none. As a result, given our above discussion of the
evidence, we cannot say the juvenile court clearly lost its way by granting the Agency
permanent custody of K.K. Therefore, the court’s decision was not against the
manifest weight of the evidence.
Accordingly, Mother’s sole assignment of error is overruled.
Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the
common pleas court, juvenile division, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
____________________________ LISA B. FORBES, PRESIDING JUDGE
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J., and KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J., CONCUR