In re K.J.

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: June 9, 2026
• Docket: L-25-00314
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as In re K.J., 2026-Ohio-2161.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT LUCAS COUNTY

In re K.J. Court of Appeals No. {48}L-25-00314

Trial Court No. 24302843

DECISION AND JUDGMENT

Decided: June 9, 2026

*****

Janna E. Waltz, for appellee.

Dan M. Weiss, for appellant.

***** DUHART, J.

{¶ 1} This is an appeal by appellant, S.L, the mother of K.J., from the December

30, 2025 judgment of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division,

granting permanent custody of K.J. to appellee, Lucas County Children’s Services

(“LCCS” or “the agency”). For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment.

{¶ 2} Mother sets forth one assignment of error:

The Juvenile Court committed reversible error by proceeding with the permanent custody hearing without determining that [mother] had intentionally, knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived [her] right to counsel. Background

{¶ 3} K.J. was born in December 2014 to mother and T.J., father. Mother and

father were not married.

{¶ 4} In October 2024, the agency became involved with the family when father,

the custodial parent of K.J., failed to pick up K.J. from school. Eventually the school

made contact with father’s girlfriend, and she agreed to pick up K.J., but requested police

presence due to domestic violence (“DV”) concerns between her and father.

{¶ 5} On November 26, 2024, a complaint in dependency and neglect was filed in

juvenile court due to concerns with mother and father’s mental health, substance use, DV

and previous involvement with children services in Michigan. That same day, an

emergency shelter care hearing was held. Neither mother nor father attended the hearing,

as mother was in jail and father was out of town. Interim temporary custody of K.J. was

awarded to the agency. K.J. was placed in a foster home.

{¶ 6} On December 19, 2024, LCCS filed a case plan with the court. On March

11, 2025, the court adopted the case plan as its order.

{¶ 7} On February 25, 2025, an adjudicatory hearing was held, which mother

attended. Mother waived her right to a hearing and agreed to a finding of dependency

and neglect. Mother, via counsel, requested that the dispositional hearing be held at a

later date.

2. {¶ 8} On March 11, 2025, the dispositional hearing was held; mother was not

present. Mother’s counsel represented the following to the magistrate:

Your Honor . . . [mother] has not appeared here today. I did have a chance to speak with her at our last court date when she had asked me to set the disposition out. Since that time, despite my attempt to reach her, I have been unable to reach her, so I’m not sure why she’s not here today. I do know she did meet with the [GAL] shortly after our last hearing, but at this time I’d ask the court to waive my appearance. I don’t think it prejudices [mother] in that there is a case plan with a goal of reunification. At this time there’s services offered to my client, she definitely knows who her caseworker is because she’s met with her. She’s met with the [GAL]. And it’s my understanding that my client has not had contact with this child in a number of years. So I know she is interested in reunifying with the child, but I can’t tell the court why she’s not here. . . [Mother] directed me to bifurcate, Your Honor, and after that time she did not make our meeting that we had scheduled or contact meeting and she does have my contact information because she’ s used it. . . . [p]rior to the last hearing.

{¶ 9} The magistrate waived counsel’s appearance at the hearing. The hearing

proceeded. The agency caseworker testified, inter alia, that K.J. was linked with a

therapist and made some progress. K.J. “has a very difficult time with building

relationships with people and trusting due to him living so many different places with

father and then also losing contact with those people. He ha[s] felt very abandoned. So

right now one of the only people he really trusts is foster mom.” K.J. last had contact

with mother in 2019. The agency was working with K.J. to develop a visitation plan

between him and mother, and K.J. has worked with his therapist to develop a plan to start

phone calls with mother, and if K.J. was comfortable with calls, he could move to Zoom

chats, and then to in-person visits. However, there have been no phone calls between

K.J. and mother because K.J. has had no interest.

3. {¶ 10} At the conclusion of the hearing, the magistrate awarded temporary custody

of K.J. to the agency.

{¶ 11} On September 12, 2025, the agency filed a motion for permanent custody.

{¶ 12} On October 23, 2025, a permanent custody pretrial was held before the

juvenile court and neither father nor mother appeared. However, the court acknowledged

that there was a service issue as to mother, as mother’s certified mail was unclaimed.

{¶ 13} On December 10, 2025, the permanent custody trial was held. Neither

father nor mother appeared. Prior to the start of trial, the following exchanges occurred

between the court and father’s counsel and the court and mother’s counsel:

THE COURT: Good morning. We are here scheduled for trial in this matter. So we can start with you, [father’s counsel], since you have a preliminary matter.

[FATHER’S COUNSEL]: Yes, Your Honor. Thank you. I have had no contact with [father] and it is my belief I cannot have an effective presentation for his wishes as there has been no contact or any discussion as to his wishes in this matter, and it would be - I would therefore request to be relieved of my duty to [father] and withdraw from the case. ...

THE COURT: Thank you, [father’s counsel], for your service thus far. We will let you be removed from the case. ...

[MOTHER’S COUNSEL]: Your Honor, I too am going to make a motion to withdraw. I have had contact with my client and at times it’s been frequent. She does have my personal cellphone number. She has met with me. She has come to court in the past. Around September[,] she had sent me a new phone [number] and I had been trying to contact it to no avail. I have an address for her. I have written three letters in preparation for today’s hearing, as well as text[ed] her and called her on the four numbers I have for her. I also reached out to the caseworker to see if there is any new contact information. She had the same numbers and address that I had. So

4. as we sit here today[,] I don't know what her wishes are as far as this motion and I’m not sure how to proceed on her behalf. . . Since I’ve had no response back from either letter, text, or phone calls from her.

THE COURT: All right. It is 9:44, the matter was scheduled for 9:30. There is service. So thank you. I assume no objection?

[AGENCY’S STAFF ATTORNEY]: No objection.

[GAL]: No objection.

THE COURT: Thank you, [mother’s counsel]. . .

{¶ 14} The permanent custody trial proceeded.

{¶ 15} On December 30, 2025, the juvenile court issued its judgment entry. The

court found that the parties were properly served and summoned. The court further found

that mother’s counsel “has not had any recent contact with [mother] despite her best

efforts to communicate with her, including placing phone calls to her last known

telephone number and sending letters to her last known address,” and that mother’s

failure to interact with her counsel made it “unreasonably difficult” for mother’s counsel

to continue her representation. Therefore, the court granted mother’s counsel’s oral

motion to withdraw.

{¶ 16} In addition, the court found, by clear and convincing evidence, after

considering all admissible and relevant evidence, that K.J. “cannot be placed with his

parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with his parents, in accordance

with R.C. 2151.414(B)(l)(a); and is abandoned, in accordance with R.C

2151.414(B)(l)(b).” The court also found, “by clear and convincing evidence, that a grant

5. of permanent custody to LCCS is in [K.J.]’s best interest, under R.C. 2151.414(D).” The

court granted the agency’s motion for permanent custody.

{¶ 17} Mother appealed. Father did not appeal and is not a party to this appeal.

Assignment of Error

{¶ 18} Mother argues the juvenile court erred by proceeding with the permanent

custody hearing without determining that she had intentionally, knowingly, intelligently

and voluntarily waived her right to counsel. Mother asserts the Supreme Court of Ohio,

in In re R.K., 2018-Ohio-23, held that a juvenile court may not infer that a parent has

waived his or her right to counsel based on the parent’s unexplained failure to appear at

the permanent custody hearing.

{¶ 19} Mother asserts that the juvenile court “granted a withdraw[al] of counsel

and made know [sic] finding that [mother] waived her right to counsel,” but “[t]he record

shows no valid waiver of [her] right to counsel.” Mother cites to her counsel’s

explanation for moving to withdraw: “‘I have had contact with my client and at times it

has been frequent. She does have my personal cellphone number. She has met with me.

She has come to court in the past[.]’ . . . Critical to [mother’s] position is counsel’s

statement to the court: ‘I don’t know what her wishes are as far as this motion and I’m

not sure how to proceed on her behalf.’” Mother contends that her “[c]ounsel’s statement

highlights the absence of a valid waive[r] by [mother], as neither [c]ounsel nor the [c]ourt

provided information to find that [mother] intentionally, knowingly, and voluntarily

waived her right to counsel.”

6. {¶ 20} Mother further argues that her “[c]ounsel could not state that [mother]

knew she had a right to counsel, and if she knew she had a right to counsel that she

intentionally relinquished and abandoned that right because she failed to appear on

December 10, 2025.” Mother insists that the record shows that she was at the juvenile

court on October 23, 2025, and was served while at court. She claims “[t]he record does

not reflect that [she] at any point made any statement that she wanted to waive her right

to counsel nor that she had a sufficient understanding of the proceedings to intelligently,

knowingly, and voluntarily waive her right to counsel.”

Law

{¶ 21} In In re R.K., the issue before the Supreme Court was whether the parent

had waived her right to counsel when she did not appear at the final permanent custody

hearing. Id. at ¶ 6. The Supreme Court cited and relied on In re Sadie R., 2005-Ohio-325

(6th Dist.), where this court held that in order to protect the rights of a parent in the same

type of situation, a juvenile court must make two inquiries before permitting a parent’s

attorney to withdraw. The two inquiries are:

“First, the court must ‘ascertain that counsel’s attempts to communicate with and obtain the cooperation of the client were reasonable,’ and ‘[s]econd, the court must verify that “the failure of this communication resulted in the inability of counsel to ascertain the client’s wishes.’” [In re Sadie R.] at ¶ 36, quoting In re Savannah M., . . . 2003-Ohio-5855, . . . ¶ 45 (6th Dist.) . . . (Singer, J., concurring).”

In re R.K. at ¶ 6.

7. {¶ 22} The In re R.K. court determined that the juvenile court

made no inquiries into [the parent’s] whereabouts, why she was not present, the attorney’s past attorney-client relationship with [the parent], or the substance of her response to the attorney’s letter. Instead, the court simply granted the attorney’s oral motion to immediately withdraw, apparently without giving any consideration to whether [the parent] had waived her right to counsel. The juvenile court’s apparent stance was that a parent’s failure to appear for a permanent-custody hearing automatically constitutes a waiver of that parent’s right to counsel. We cannot condone that approach.

Id. at ¶ 7.

{¶ 23} In In re O.M.S-W., 2020-Ohio-201, ¶ 3 (10th Dist.), the appellate court

explained, in applying In re R.K., that when a juvenile court is considering whether a

parent has waived his or her right to counsel, it is essential for the juvenile court to

engage in “real ‘consideration’ and ‘discussion’” of the alleged waiver. In re O.M.S-W. at

¶ 3, quoting In re R.K. at ¶ 7. The appellate court further explained that “[t]he aim of that

careful examination must be to determine whether the right to counsel has been waived

voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.” In re O.M.S-W. at ¶ 3. See also In re Ja.S.,

2023-Ohio-722 (10th Dist.) and G.M. v. T.B., 2025-Ohio-5450 (6th Dist.).

Analysis

{¶ 24} Based on mother’s assigned error, the question before us is whether she

waived her right to counsel when she did not attend the permanent custody trial. Thus,

we will limit our discussion to this narrow issue.

{¶ 25} In order to protect mother’s rights, the juvenile court was required to make

two inquiries before allowing the mother’s counsel to withdraw: (1) whether counsel’s

8. attempts to communicate with mother and obtain the cooperation of the client were

reasonable, and (2) whether this failure to communicate resulted in counsel’s inability to

ascertain the client’s wishes.

{¶ 26} A review of the record shows that although the juvenile court did not

expressly examine mother’s counsel, counsel volunteered the information necessary for

the court to determine the answers to the two inquiries set forth in In re R.K., in order to

protect mother’s rights.

{¶ 27} As to the first inquiry, mother’s counsel detailed that she had had contact

with mother - at times frequent contact. Counsel met with mother, mother had counsel’s

personal cellphone number, counsel had mother’s address and mother was present in

court in the past. Then, in September 2025, some months before the trial, mother sent

counsel a new phone number, which counsel tried to use to contact mother, to no avail.

Counsel wrote three letters to mother in preparation for trial, counsel texted and called

mother on the four numbers that counsel had for mother; counsel received no reply from

mother. In addition, counsel reached out to the caseworker for any new contact

information for mother, but the caseworker had the same numbers and address that

counsel had.

{¶ 28} As to the second inquiry, counsel declared that she was not sure how to

proceed on mother’s behalf given that counsel had no response back from the letter, text

or phone calls.

9. {¶ 29} The record further reveals that in the juvenile court’s December 30, 2025

judgment entry, the court found that mother was properly served and summoned and that

mother’s counsel “has not had any recent contact with her client despite her best efforts to

communicate with her” and that mother’s failure to interact with counsel made it

“unreasonably difficult” for counsel to continue to represent mother.

{¶ 30} We find that before the juvenile court granted counsel’s request to

withdraw, the court had information about counsel’s past attorney-client relationship and

previous contact with mother, as well as counsel’s efforts to reach mother in the months

prior to trial and mother’s complete lack of communication with counsel during that time

period. While the court did not inquire as to mother’s whereabouts or why mother did

not appear for trial, the record clearly shows that mother had had no interaction with her

counsel for months, so it can be assumed that counsel would not possess the answers to

these questions. Unlike In re R.K., this is not a case where the juvenile court considered

that mother’s failure to attend the trial automatically constituted a waiver of mother’s

right to counsel.

{¶ 31} We therefore find that the juvenile court adequately protected mother’s

right to counsel, as the court determined that mother’s counsel used her best efforts to

attempt to communicate with mother and obtain mother’s cooperation (which efforts we

find to be more than reasonable), and mother’s lack of contact with counsel resulted in

counsel’s inability to ascertain or know mother’s wishes. Moreover, we find that the

10. juvenile court complied with the mandates of In re R.K., such that mother voluntarily,

knowingly, and intelligently waived her right to counsel.

{¶ 32} Accordingly, mother’s sole assignment of error is not well-taken.

Conclusion

{¶ 33} The judgment of the Lucas County Common Pleas Court, Juvenile

Division, is affirmed. Pursuant to App.R. 24, mother is hereby ordered to pay the costs

incurred on appeal.

Judgment affirmed.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.

Christine E. Mayle, J. ____________________________ JUDGE Myron C. Duhart, J. ____________________________ Charles E. Sulek, J. JUDGE CONCUR. ____________________________ JUDGE

This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at: http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.

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