In re Kirk

537 B.R. 856, 74 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 405, 2015 Bankr. LEXIS 2907, 2015 WL 5097741
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Ohio
DecidedAugust 27, 2015
DocketCASE NUMBER 14-42186
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 537 B.R. 856 (In re Kirk) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Ohio primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re Kirk, 537 B.R. 856, 74 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 405, 2015 Bankr. LEXIS 2907, 2015 WL 5097741 (Ohio 2015).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION REGARDING DISBURSEMENT OF FUNDS HELD BY THE CHAPTER 13 TRUSTEE

Kay Woods, United States Bankruptcy Judge

This Court is being asked to determine how funds held by the chapter 13 trustee [858]*858should be distributed when a case is dismissed prior to confirmation. Before the Court are two motions: (i) Motion for Order Authorizing Distribution of Funds on Deposit with Chapter 13 Trustee (“Trustee’s Motion”) (Doc. 41) filed by Michael A. Gallo, Standing Chapter 13 Trustee (“Trustee”), on June 23, 2015; and (ii) Motion for Order Instructing Trustee to Disperse [sic] Fees (“Counsel’s Motion”) (Doc. 42) filed by Brett Billec, Esq., counsel for Debtors Janine C. Kirk and Andrew M. Kirk, Sr., on June 24, 2015. Attached to Counsel’s Motion at page two is Application for Fees.

On August 13, 2015, the Court held a hearing on the motions, at which appeared the Trustee and Mr. Billec. At the hearing, Mr. Billec requested the opportunity to file a brief in further support of his position, which the Court granted. On August 17, 2015, Mr. Billec filed Brief in Support of Motion for Order Instructing Trustee to Disburse Fees (“Brief’) (Doc. 47).

The Trustee takes no position regarding distribution of the funds he is holding. Mr. Billec requests payment of post-petition attorney fees in the amount of $1,200.00 before the Trustee distributes the remaining funds. For the reasons set forth herein, the Court finds that Mr. Bil-lec is entitled to payment of attorney fees in the amount of $1,000.00 as a § 503(b)(2)1 administrative expense claim and that the remaining funds held by the Trustee are to be returned to the Debtors.

I. BACKGROUND

The Debtors filed a voluntary petition pursuant to chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code on October 12, 2014. Despite the filing of a chapter 13 plan (Doc. 5) and modified chapter 13 plan (Doc. 16), a chapter 13 plan was never confirmed in this case. Nevertheless, the Debtors were required to make monthly plan payments to the Trustee pursuant to the proposed plans commencing ten days after the petition date. (See Am. Admin. Order No. 05-10 ¶ 1.)

On May 14, 2015, the Trustee filed Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 37) based on the failure of the Debtors to make required plan payments. After a hearing on the Motion to Dismiss, on June 3, 2015, the Court entered Order Dismissing Chapter 13 Case and Notice to Secured Creditors and Debtor’s Counsel (Doc. 39).

At the time this case was dismissed, the Trustee held $3,606.84 in proposed plan payments contributed by the Debtors. (Trustee’s Mot. ¶4.) Of the funds being held, $147.92 had accrued as adequate protection payments for Santander Consumer USA, Inc. (“Santander”), a secured creditor of the Debtors. (Id. ¶ 5.)

Although the Trustee takes no position regarding how the funds he possesses should be distributed, he postulates, without further analysis, that Harris v. Viegelahn, — U.S. —, 135 S.Ct. 1829, 191 L.Ed.2d 783 (2015), applies to this case.

Although the Harris case involved the post confirmation distribution of funds on hand with the Trustee at the time of the conversion of the debtor’s case from a Chapter 13 to a Chapter 7 case, it would appear that the rationale of the Harris case would be applicable to the within proceedings.

(Trustee’s Mot. ¶ 8.) Mr. Billec contends that Harris is not applicable because this case was dismissed rather than converted. (Br. at 1.) Instead, Mr. Billec states that § 1326(a)(2) dictates Ków funds are to be distributed if a chapter 13 case is dis[859]*859missed prior to confirmation of a chapter 13 plan. (Id. at 1-2.)

II. ANALYSIS

A. Harris v. Viegelahn

In Harris, the Supreme Court of the United States found that plan payments made by a chapter 13 debtor from his or her post-petition wages and held by the trustee at the time a case is converted to chapter 7 must be returned to the debt- or rather than distributed to creditors. The Supreme Court rejected the chapter 13 trustee’s argument that, upon conversion, undisbursed funds must be distributed to creditors pursuant to §§ 1326(a)(2) and 1327(a).

When a debtor exercises his statutory right to convert, the ease is placed under Chapter 7’s governance, arid no Chapter 13 provision holds sway. § 103(i) (“Chapter 13 ... applies only in a case under [that] chapter.”). Harris having converted the case, the Chapter 13 plan was no longer “binding].” § 1327(a). And Viegelahn, by then the former Chapter 13 trustee, lacked authority to distribute “payment[s] in accordance with the plan.” § 1326(a)(2); see § 348(e).

Harris, 135 S.Ct. at 1838. Referring to § 348(f)(1)(A), the Supreme Court stated, “A debtor’s post-petition wages, including undisbursed funds in the hands of a trustee, ordinarily do not become part of the Chapter 7 estate created by conversion.”2 Id. at 1837. Because § 348(f)(1)(A) removes post-petition wages from the pool of assets that may be distributed to creditors in a case converted to chapter 7, “[a]llow-ing a terminated Chapter 13 trustee to disburse the very same earnings to the very same creditors is incompatible with that statutory design.” Id.

The Court agrees with Mr. Billec that the holding in Harris does not apply in a chapter 13 case that has been dismissed. Specifically, the Supreme Court based its holding in Harris on § 348, which only governs conversion.3 Unlike a case converted from chapter 13 to chapter 7, which is no longer governed by any chapter 13 provision,4 certain provisions of chapter 13 — e.g., § 1326(a)(2) — statutorily and necessarily apply in a chapter 13 case that has been dismissed but not yet closed.

B. Sections 349(b)(3) and 1326(a)(2)

Unlike conversion of a chapter 13 case, which is governed by § 348, dismissal of a [860]*860chapter 13 case is governed by § 349. Section 349(b)(3) states, “(b) Unless the court, for cause, orders otherwise, a dismissal of a case other than under section 742 of this title— ... (3) revests the property of the estate in the entity in which such property was vested immediately before the commencement of the case under this title.” 11 U.S.C. § 349(b)(3) (2015).

However, § 349 is not the only section of the Bankruptcy Code that is implicated when a chapter 13 case is dismissed. The Court must also look to § 1326(a), which provides, in pertinent part,

[a](l) Unless the court orders otherwise, the debtor shall commence making payments ... in the amount—
(A) proposed by the plan to the trustee;
(C) that provides adequate protection directly to a creditor holding an allowed claim secured by personal property....
(2) A payment made under paragraph (1)(A) shall be retained by the trustee until confirmation or denial of confirmation. If a plan is confirmed, the trustee shall distribute any such payment in accordance with the plan as soon as is practicable.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
537 B.R. 856, 74 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 405, 2015 Bankr. LEXIS 2907, 2015 WL 5097741, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-kirk-ohnb-2015.