NOTICE 2020 IL App (4th) 200420-U FILED This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited December 15, 2020 as precedent by any party except in Carla Bender the limited circumstances allowed NO. 4-20-0420 4th District Appellate under Rule 23(e)(1). Court, IL IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
In re K.H. and D.H., Minors ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of (The People of the State of Illinois, ) Champaign County Petitioner-Appellee, ) No. 17JA28 v. ) Jaineka B., ) Honorable Respondent-Appellant). ) John R. Kennedy, ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE TURNER delivered the judgment of the court. Justices DeArmond and Harris concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The circuit court’s findings respondent was unfit under section 1(D)(m)(ii) of the Adoption Act and it was in the minor children’s best interests to terminate respondent’s parental rights were not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶2 In February 2020, the State filed a motion for the termination of the parental
rights of respondent, Jaineka B., as to her minor children, K.H. (born in May 2014) and D.H.
(born in April 2017). After a two-day hearing, the Champaign County circuit court found
respondent unfit as alleged in the termination motion. At an August 2020 hearing, the court
found it was in the minor children’s best interests to terminate respondent’s parental rights.
¶3 Respondent appeals, asserting the circuit court erred by (1) finding her unfit and
(2) concluding it was in the minor children’s best interests to terminate her parental rights. We
affirm.
¶4 I. BACKGROUND ¶5 The minor children’s fathers are not parties to this appeal. In May 2017, the State
filed a petition for the adjudication of wardship of the minor children. The first count of the
petition alleged the minor children were neglected pursuant to section 2-3(1)(b) of the Juvenile
Court Act of 1987 (Juvenile Court Act) (705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2016)) because their
environment was injurious to their welfare when they resided with respondent and/or D.H.’s
father in that said environment exposed the minor children to domestic violence. The second
count asserted D.H. was neglected pursuant to sections 2-3(1)(b) of the Juvenile Court Act (705
ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2016)) because his environment was injurious to his welfare when he
resided with his father in that said environment exposed him to illegal substances. After an
August 2017 hearing, the circuit court found the minor children neglected as alleged in the first
count and dismissed the second count. At a September 2017 hearing, the court entered a
dispositional order finding respondent was unfit and unable to care for, protect, train, or
discipline the minor children. The order noted respondent had significant issues related to
(1) domestic violence and her reaction to it for the safety of herself and her family, (2) substance
abuse, and (3) mental health. The court noted respondent had not been able to address any of
those issues honestly and effectively and could not provide a safe home for the minor children.
The court made the minor children wards of the court and appointed the Department of Children
and Family Services (DCFS) as the minor children’s guardian and custodian.
¶6 In February 2019, the State filed a motion to terminate respondent’s parental
rights to her minor children. The motion asserted respondent was unfit because she failed to
make reasonable progress toward the minor children’s return during any nine-month period after
the neglect adjudication, specifically May 25, 2018, to February 25, 2019. See 750 ILCS
50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 2018). The motion also contended respondent was unfit for failing to
-2- maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to the minor children’s
welfare. See 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b) (West 2018). In February 2020, the State filed an amended
motion for termination of parental rights, asserting respondent was unfit because she failed to
make (1) reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that were the basis for the minor children’s
removal from her during any nine-month period following the neglect adjudication (750 ILCS
50/1(D)(m)(i) (West 2018)) and (2) reasonable progress toward the minor children’s return
during any nine-month period after the neglect adjudication (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(i) (West
2018)). Both counts alleged the relevant nine-month period was May 10, 2019, to February 10,
2020.
¶7 In June 2020, the circuit court commenced the fitness hearing. The State
presented the testimony of (1) Sherri Cummins, case manager from March to August 2019;
(2) Desiree Woodson, case manager since September 2019; (3) Sairah Jahangir, case supervisor
since September 2019; (4) David Griffet, detective sergeant with the Champaign police; and
(5) Patricia Ray, substance abuse and mental health counselor. The State also asked the court to
take judicial notice of the following two criminal cases, involving Keontae C., the father of
respondent’s infant born in February 2020: (1) a July 2019 charge for possession with the intent
to deliver a controlled substance (People v. Keontae C., No. 19-CF-1019 (Cir. Ct. Champaign
County)) and (2) September 2019 charges for unlawful possession of a controlled substance and
manufacturing or delivery of a controlled substance (People v. Keontae C., No. 19-CF-1344 (Cir.
Ct. Champaign County)). The court also took judicial notice of all of the prior orders in this
case. Respondent presented one exhibit, a July 11, 2020, certificate of completion signed by
Ray. The certificate noted respondent began services on March 8, 2019, and respondent had
completed the following: (1) 42 sessions of partner abuse intervention/relationship groups, (2) 8
-3- sessions of parenting education, (3) 8 sessions of anger management/problem solving, (4) 4
sessions of relationship counseling, (5) 40 hours of homework and worksheet completion,
(6) “multiple hours” of telephone discussions with her counselor, and (7) 21 hours of parenting
and relationship videos with homework assignments. The certificate stated respondent
completed all work assigned and all requirements of respondent’s program. It further noted
respondent’s progress was good and her prognosis was good if she used the material provided.
¶8 Cummins testified she took over the case in March 2019, and at that time,
respondent was participating in individual counseling, including some domestic violence
counseling. To the best of Cummins’s knowledge, respondent was still in counseling when
Cummins left the case. While Cummins was the case manager, she did not refer respondent for
any additional services. Moreover, Cummins testified she did not have any difficulty contacting
respondent. As to visitation, Cummins testified respondent was just starting third-party
supervised visits, and respondent would visit the minor children at their grandmother’s home.
Cummins observed respondent’s May 19, 2019, visit with the minor children. According to
Cummins, the minor children seemed to have a good time during the visit. Cummins discussed
with respondent the possibility of changing to unsupervised visits, but visits were not changed
because a new case manager was taking over the case. Cummins also testified respondent did
find housing in July 2019, and the residence was located on Rodney Drive. Respondent reported
she was living alone, although Cummins had heard respondent was in a relationship and was
unsure if respondent was living with someone. Cummins did not have any concerns about
respondent’s housing.
¶9 Woodson testified she took over the case in September 2019 and met with
respondent in the Champaign County jail. Respondent was serving a 30-day sentence and was
-4- not engaged in services during that time. After her release to the end of December 2019,
respondent regularly visited the minor children. Woodson observed one visit between
respondent and the minor children at their grandmother’s home, and the visit went well.
Respondent was supposed to move to unsupervised visitation when Woodson took over the case,
but respondent remained on third-party supervised visitation. Woodson explained respondent’s
visitation remained the same because respondent’s paramour, Keontae, had been arrested at
respondent’s home with illegal substances on his person when respondent was in jail. When
asked about her relationship with Keontae, respondent denied Keontae lived at respondent’s
home but never denied she was in a relationship with him. Respondent gave birth to Keontae’s
child on February 21, 2020. Woodson spoke with respondent and Keontae about the need for
Keontae to be involved in this case if the goal was return home. Woodson was never able to
refer Keontae for services because he did not sign any consents. Woodson further testified she
never recommended unsupervised visitation because she was unsure if respondent was still in a
relationship with Keontae. Woodson explained to respondent she was concerned about Keontae
because he was a violent person and a drug dealer and a previous paramour of respondent had
been killed in respondent’s home. Woodson did not believe respondent “fully processed” being
around Keontae was a safety concern for the minor children. Woodson wanted to ensure the
safety of the minor children before respondent received unsupervised visits.
¶ 10 According to Woodson, respondent was attending individual counseling, domestic
violence counseling, and a parenting class. However, respondent had not completed any services
by February 10, 2020. Woodson testified respondent’s counselor wanted to complete counseling
in January 2020 but Woodson did not agree. Woodson explained respondent was in jail in
September and October 2019 and respondent was not engaged in services in November 2019.
-5- Woodson did not personally refer respondent to any other services from September 2019 to
February 2020. However, Woodson believed her supervisor referred respondent to finish
parenting classes and maybe another service. Additionally, Woodson testified she had a hard
time getting in touch with respondent in January 2020. Woodson explained she had to meet with
respondent once a month, and that month she needed to assess respondent’s home because
respondent had moved. Woodson described her contact with respondent as “phone tag.”
Woodson further testified her supervisor was able to assess respondent’s home.
¶ 11 Jahangir testified she and Woodson had trouble contacting respondent after she
was released from jail. Respondent did attend a meeting on November 21, 2019, during which
they addressed the safety concerns related to respondent’s relationship with Keontae since he
was arrested in her home with 12 grams of cocaine. Jahangir noted respondent had lied to
Cummins, Woodson, and Jahangir about being in a relationship with Keontae. Respondent
admitted to being in a relationship with him but denied he lived with her. Jahangir and Woodson
also expressed concern over respondent’s lack of progress. Respondent was very upset Woodson
had requested respondent’s counseling be extended because respondent felt she was ready to
complete counseling. Jahangir testified respondent was expected to reengage in counseling upon
her release from jail but respondent had been inconsistent in her engagement in October 2019
and into November 2019. Additionally, Jahangir testified respondent “no-showed” the meeting
in December 2019 and the residence assessment in January 2020. Jahangir was able to meet
with respondent on February 17, 2020, at the minor children’s grandmother’s home.
¶ 12 Detective Sergeant Griffet testified he went to a home on Austin Drive in Urbana
on July 8, 2019, to locate a Keith C. Keith C. was not present, but Keontae was outside the
residence. The residence was Keontae’s parent’s home and was listed as Keontae’s address for
-6- parole purposes. The police obtained a search warrant for the Austin Drive residence and located
52 grams of cocaine and a loaded pistol. On September 16, 2019, Detective Sergeant Griffet
conducted surveillance of 2202 Rodney Drive due to Keontae having an outstanding warrant for
the July 2019 incident. He observed Keontae exit the residence with a female. The female got
into a vehicle and left. Keontae then went back into the residence. With the assistance of other
officers, Detective Sergeant Griffet knocked on the west side door of the residence. Keontae
opened the door and then slammed it in Detective Sergeant Griffet’s face. Another officer forced
the door open, and they arrested Keontae inside the door at the kitchen. Keontae had two bags of
suspected cocaine on his person, which ultimately weighed 12 grams. The officers also found a
small digital scale on the kitchen counter.
¶ 13 Ray testified she was respondent’s individual counselor. Ray noted respondent
was also in a partner abuse intervention program and a parenting class, which began in March
2020. Respondent began counseling with Ray in March 2019 for substance abuse and partner
abuse. Ray met with respondent once a week. From March until June 2019, respondent attended
counseling consistently. Thereafter, respondent only came to one session in June, two sessions
in July, one session in August, and none in September and October. Respondent did attend every
session in November and a session the first week of December 2019. Respondent did not attend
counseling again until February 26, 2020. When she resumed counseling in February 2020,
respondent consistently attended every week. Respondent was “a very good participant.”
¶ 14 When respondent resumed counseling in February 2020, Ray asked respondent
about her previous inconsistent attendance. Respondent explained she was very discouraged
when she learned her treatment needed to be extended. Ray told respondent she felt respondent
needed additional services because respondent’s residence was raided and thus was an unsafe
-7- environment for the minor children. As to attendance, respondent also noted her incarceration
and new baby.
¶ 15 At the conclusion of the hearing, the circuit court found respondent unfit on both
grounds alleged in the termination motion.
¶ 16 On August 20, 2020, the circuit court held the best interests hearing. The State
only presented the best interests report, and respondent testified on her own behalf. The best
interests report stated K.H. was then six years old and had been in foster care since he was three.
D.H. was three years old and had been in foster care since birth. While in foster care, K.H. and
D.H. had resided in the same placement with their maternal grandmother, Mary B. Respondent’s
baby, born in February 2020, also lived in Mary’s home. According to the report, K.H. and D.H.
were thriving in their grandmother’s care and were “very bonded” to her. Mary was “extremely
committed to providing permanency via adoption” for both minor children. She was also “very
willing and supportive of maintaining a bond” between the minor children and respondent as
long as respondent was safe.
¶ 17 Moreover, the best interests report stated the minor children did have an apparent
bond with respondent and visits went well. Respondent did a good job of engaging the minor
children and focused on the minor children during visits. Respondent’s visitation had remained
on third-party supervised visitation since July 2019 because of concerns of respondent engaging
in an unsafe relationship. Respondent had a three-bedroom apartment. She had also successfully
completed substance abuse counseling. Respondent was still required to do random drug tests.
Her drug tests had all been negative, but she had failed to appear for the tests five times from
June 2020 to August 2020. Respondent was still engaged in individual counseling.
¶ 18 The report recommended respondent’s parental rights be terminated. It noted
-8- respondent “ha[d] shown great inconsistency and dangerous decision making in the almost three
years her case ha[d] been open.” While respondent had periods of engagement where she
seemed motivated and ready to turn things around, she would then engage in unsafe situations
and relationships and seek to hide information from her case manager. Specifically, respondent
was not forthcoming with information “regarding the situation of her home, other people living
in her home or frequenting her home, and the types of risks and situations her relationships
would expose herself and her children too [sic].” Respondent clearly loved her children but had
not demonstrated a consistent ability to avoid unsafe interactions, relationships, and situations.
¶ 19 Respondent testified she had a great relationship with the minor children. She had
a two-bedroom home and had recently been allowed unsupervised visits with her infant.
Respondent denied being in a current relationship with Keontae and described her past
relationship with him as only a sexual one. She felt she had come a long way and learned a lot of
parenting skills. Respondent had also learned to stay the course and not get discouraged and
depressed.
¶ 20 At the conclusion of the evidence, the State argued respondent’s parental rights
should be terminated. The guardian ad litem agreed with the State’s recommendation.
Respondent’s counsel argued against termination of parental rights, noting a substantial change
in circumstances had occurred since the filing of the motion to terminate. Respondent had
completed her services and learned from them. She had remained active in the minor children’s
lives and had good visits with them. Moreover, counsel argued respondent will likely retain
parental rights to her baby, so it would not be in the minor children’s best interests to be
separated from the baby. After hearing the parties’ arguments, the circuit court found the
termination of respondent’s parental rights was in the minor children’s best interests.
-9- Respondent asked to speak and the court allowed her to do so. She asked the court to give her
six months to prove she could stay on the straight and narrow path. Respondent also emphasized
a termination of parental rights would separate her children. After hearing respondent speak, the
circuit court did not change its decision.
¶ 21 On August 28, 2020, respondent filed a notice of appeal in sufficient compliance
with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 303 (eff. July 1, 2017). See Ill. S. Ct. R. 660(b) (eff. Oct. 1,
2001) (providing the rules governing civil cases also govern appeals from final judgments in all
proceedings under the Juvenile Court Act, except for delinquency cases). Thus, this court has
jurisdiction of the appeal pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 307(a)(6) (eff. Nov. 1, 2017).
¶ 22 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 23 Under section 2-29(2) of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/2-29(2) (West
2018)), the involuntary termination of parental rights involves a two-step process. First, the
State must prove by clear and convincing evidence the parent is “unfit,” as that term is defined in
section 1(D) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2018)). In re Donald A.G., 221 Ill.
2d 234, 244, 850 N.E.2d 172, 177 (2006). If the circuit court makes a finding of unfitness, then
the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence it is in the minor children’s best
interests that parental rights be terminated. In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 347, 366, 818 N.E.2d 1214,
1228 (2004).
¶ 24 Since the circuit court has the best opportunity to observe the demeanor and
conduct of the parties and witnesses, it is in the best position to determine the credibility and
weight of the witnesses’ testimony. In re E.S., 324 Ill. App. 3d 661, 667, 756 N.E.2d 422, 427
(2001). Further, in matters involving minors, the circuit court receives broad discretion and great
deference. E.S., 324 Ill. App. 3d at 667, 756 N.E.2d at 427. Thus, a reviewing court will not
- 10 - disturb a circuit court’s unfitness finding and best-interests determination unless they are
contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. See In re Gwynne P., 215 Ill. 2d 340, 354, 830
N.E.2d 508, 516-17 (2005) (fitness finding); In re J.L., 236 Ill. 2d 329, 344, 924 N.E.2d 961, 970
(2010) (best-interests determination). A circuit court’s decision is against the manifest weight of
the evidence only where the opposite conclusion is clearly apparent. Gwynne P., 215 Ill. 2d at
354, 830 N.E.2d at 517.
¶ 25 A. Respondent’s Fitness
¶ 26 Respondent contends the circuit court erred by finding her unfit. In this case, the
circuit court found respondent unfit on both grounds alleged in the petition. One basis for the
circuit court’s unfitness finding was section 1(D)(m)(ii) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS
50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 2018)), which provides a parent may be declared unfit if he or she fails “to
make reasonable progress toward the return of the child[ren] to the parent during any 9-month
period following the adjudication of neglected or abused minor under Section 2-3 of the Juvenile
Court Act.” Illinois courts have defined “reasonable progress” as “demonstrable movement
toward the goal of reunification.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Reiny S., 374 Ill.
App. 3d 1036, 1046, 871 N.E.2d 835, 844 (2007) (quoting In re C.N., 196 Ill. 2d 181, 211, 752
N.E.2d 1030, 1047 (2001)). Moreover, they have explained reasonable progress as follows:
“ ‘[T]he benchmark for measuring a parent’s “progress toward the
return of the child[ren]” under section 1(D)(m) of the Adoption
Act encompasses the parent’s compliance with the service plans
and the court’s directives, in light of the condition which gave rise
to the removal of the child[ren], and in light of other conditions
which later became known and which would prevent the court
- 11 - from returning custody of the child[ren] to the parent.’ ” Reiny S.,
374 Ill. App. 3d at 1046, 871 N.E.2d at 844 (quoting C.N., 196 Ill.
2d at 216-17, 752 N.E.2d at 1050).
Additionally, this court has explained reasonable progress exists when a circuit court “can
conclude that *** the court, in the near future, will be able to order the child[ren] returned to
parental custody. The court will be able to order the child[ren] returned to parental custody in
the near future because, at that point, the parent will have fully complied with the directives
previously given to the parent in order to regain custody of the child[ren].” (Emphases in
original.) In re L.L.S., 218 Ill. App. 3d 444, 461, 577 N.E.2d 1375, 1387 (1991). We have also
emphasized “ ‘reasonable progress’ is an ‘objective standard.’ ” In re F.P., 2014 IL App (4th)
140360, ¶ 88, 19 N.E.3d 227 (quoting L.L.S., 218 Ill. App. 3d at 461, 577 N.E.2d at 1387).
¶ 27 In determining a parent’s fitness based on reasonable progress, a court may only
consider evidence from the relevant time period. Reiny S., 374 Ill. App. 3d at 1046, 871 N.E.2d
at 844 (citing In re D.F., 208 Ill. 2d 223, 237-38, 802 N.E.2d 800, 809 (2003)). Courts are
limited to that period “because reliance upon evidence of any subsequent time period could
improperly allow a parent to circumvent her own unfitness because of a bureaucratic delay in
bringing her case to trial.” Reiny S., 374 Ill. App. 3d at 1046, 871 N.E.2d at 844. In this case,
the petition alleged the relevant nine-month period was May 10, 2019, to February 10, 2020.
¶ 28 Here, the evidence showed respondent was not close to having the minor children
returned to her during the relevant nine-month period. While respondent made progress early in
the nine-month period and was going to receive unsupervised visitation with the minor children,
the case manager did not change respondent’s visitation because of safety concerns as a result of
Keontae’s arrest and possession of a controlled substance at respondent’s residence. Respondent
- 12 - denied being in a relationship with Keontae, but she was pregnant with his child during the
nine-month period. Respondent was also incarcerated for 30 days during the nine-month period
and did not consistently engage in counseling after her release from jail. Her counseling services
were also extended during the relevant nine-month period due to concerns about respondent’s
ability to provide a safe environment. We disagree with respondent’s suggestion her
incarceration, pregnancy, and frustration over an extension of her services excuse her failure to
make progress towards the minor children’s return during the relevant nine-month period.
Accordingly, the circuit court’s finding respondent was unfit based on failure to make reasonable
progress was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 29 Since we have upheld the circuit court’s determination respondent met the
statutory definition of an “unfit person” on the basis of respondent’s failure to make reasonable
progress (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 2018)), we do not address the other basis for
respondent’s unfitness finding. See In re Tiffany M., 353 Ill. App. 3d 883, 891, 819 N.E.2d 813,
820 (2004).
¶ 30 B. Minor Children’s Best Interests
¶ 31 Respondent also challenges the circuit court’s finding it was in the minor
children’s best interests to terminate her parental rights. The State disagrees and contends the
court’s finding was proper.
¶ 32 During the best interests hearing, the circuit court focuses on “the child[ren]’s
welfare and whether termination would improve the child[ren]’s future financial, social and
emotional atmosphere.” In re D.M., 336 Ill. App. 3d 766, 772, 784 N.E.2d 304, 309 (2002). In
doing so, the court considers the factors set forth in section 1-3(4.05) of the Juvenile Court Act
(705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05) (West 2018)) in the context of the children’s age and developmental
- 13 - needs. See In re T.A., 359 Ill. App. 3d 953, 959-60, 835 N.E.2d 908, 912-13 (2005). Those
factors include the following: the children’s physical safety and welfare; the development of the
children’s identity; the children’s family, cultural, and religious background and ties; the
children’s sense of attachments, including continuity of affection for the children, the children’s
feelings of love, being valued, security, and familiarity, and taking into account the least
disruptive placement for the children; the children’s own wishes and long-term goals; the
children’s community ties, including church, school, and friends; the children’s need for
permanence, which includes the children’s need for stability and continuity of relationships with
parent figures, siblings, and other relatives; the uniqueness of every family and each child; the
risks attendant to entering and being in substitute care; and the wishes of the persons available to
care for the children. 705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05) (West 2018).
¶ 33 We note a parent’s unfitness to have custody of his or her children does not
automatically result in the termination of the parent’s legal relationship with the children. In re
M.F., 326 Ill. App. 3d 1110, 1115, 762 N.E.2d 701, 706 (2002). As stated, the State must prove
by a preponderance of the evidence the termination of parental rights is in the minor children’s
best interests. See D.T., 212 Ill. 2d at 366, 818 N.E.2d at 1228. “Proof by a preponderance of
the evidence means that the fact at issue *** is rendered more likely than not.” People v. Houar,
365 Ill. App. 3d 682, 686, 850 N.E.2d 327, 331 (2006).
¶ 34 In this case, the best interests factors all favor termination of respondent’s
parental rights. D.H. had been in the care of his maternal grandmother his entire life, and K.H.
had been in her care for half of his life. The minor children were bonded with their grandmother,
who desired to adopt them. The maternal grandmother also allowed the minor children to visit
with their mother safely and appropriately. Thus, if respondent retains her parental rights to her
- 14 - infant, the minor children will still be able to have a relationship with the infant. While we
commend respondent on the progress she made recently on her services, the minor children are
entitled to permanency. Three years is a long time in foster care. Given respondent’s prior
inconsistency in making safe decisions, a definite risk exists she will not stay on the straight and
narrow path if given another six months to prove her ability to safely parent the minor children.
Additionally, both the case manager and guardian ad litem recommended termination of
respondent’s parental rights.
¶ 35 Accordingly, we find the circuit court’s conclusion it was in the minor children’s
best interests to terminate respondent’s parental rights was not against the manifest weight of the
evidence.
¶ 36 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 37 For the reasons stated, we affirm the Champaign County circuit court’s judgment.
¶ 38 Affirmed.
- 15 -