In re Ketchum

102 A. 1032, 92 Vt. 280, 1918 Vt. LEXIS 165
CourtSupreme Court of Vermont
DecidedFebruary 25, 1918
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 102 A. 1032 (In re Ketchum) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Vermont primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re Ketchum, 102 A. 1032, 92 Vt. 280, 1918 Vt. LEXIS 165 (Vt. 1918).

Opinion

Haselton, J.

Francis Ketchum, the petitioner, was at the June Term, 1917, of the Bennington county court, convicted of ,the crime of murder in the first degree and the sentence of the law was duly imposed. That sentence provides that the petitioner be put to death by electrocution during the week of Monday next after the first day of March, 1918. The formal sentence need not be recited here. The trial was conducted by the court with eminent fairness, as the official transcript shows, and the respondent therein, the petitioner here, brought no bill of exceptions to this Court. One of the defences on trial was that of insanity, of which the State was given notice some months before the trial. On trial that was the principal defence, though the question of whether, if the petitioner was guilty of a felonious homicide, he was guilty of manslaughter, of murder in the second degree or murder in the first degree was- necessarily in the case and was carefully treated by the court in its charge to the jury. The evidence, too, was such that the. court felt called upon to charge upon the doctrine of self-defence. At the January Term, 1918, of this Court, this petition was heard on the sole ground [282]*282that it originally set up, that of newly discovered evidence of insanity on the part of the petitioner. A few days after the adjournment of the January Term, the petition was amended so that it set up as a further ground for a new trial facts and circumstances newly discovered relating to the fitness of one of the jurymen, F. Ii. Ferguson, to sit in the trial of the cause. No question is made or can be made that the facts and circumstances relied on in the amendment to the petition were unknown to the petitioner and his counsel, and also to the representatives of the State, until after the trial; nor was the failure to learn of these facts and circumstances, before they were brought to light, due to any lack of diligence on either side.

The conviction of the petitioner was for the murder of one William Costello, September 16, 1916. In the evening of that day, at.a place near the grounds of the Soldiers’ Home, where the track of a trolley car line crosses a highway, the dead body of Costello was found. On the trial facts and circumstances as to its condition, location and appearance were testified to, with very considerable particularity, by various witnesses called by the State. After the introduction of the evidence as to such and other facts and circumstances the State introduced evidence of two oral confessions made by the petitioner, in both of which he confessed that he shot and killed Costello on the evening in question at the place where the body of Costello was found. On trial the petitioner took the witness stand in his own behalf and admitted the shooting and killing.

Before making further reference to the evidence we may here logically point out the situation in which the juryman Ferguson stood with reference to his ability to try each and every issue in the case solely upon the evidence given in open court. In his examination on the voir dire the juryman gave apparently fair answers to the precise questions put to him, taking such questions in a strictly literal sense. Those questions elicited nothing more-with regard to his knowledge of the crime alleged, or any matter connected with it, than that a few days after the crime was committed he heard it talked about on the street, and, as he presumed, participated in conversation so had and may, possibly, have heard persons in such conversation attempt to go into the details as they were alleged to have happened, had, as he presumed, read whatever account appeared in the Bennington Banner at the time. His statements on the voir dire suggested [283]*283no reason whatever why he was not in every way a person qualified to sit with propriety in the trial of the ease.

We turn now to the affidavits relating to the amendment to the petition for a new trial.

Roy Paddock of Bennington deposed that he is by occupation an undertaker, and that the juryman, Ferguson, occasionally assists him. -He goes on to say that he remembers the night, in September, 1916, when William Costello was shot, that he received word to go to the place of the shooting, that he immediately called Mr. Ferguson by telephone, met him at the Walbridge undertaking rooms and drove in an ambulance with Mr. Ferguson and one Charles Percey to the scene of the shooting. Continuing the deponent says: “Said Ferguson and I left the ambulance, taking with us a stretcher, and went to the place where the body of Costello was lying on the ground. We remained there a few minutes, then placed the body upon a stretcher, and to the best of my recollection Ferguson, Percey, police officer Hurley and I carried Costello’s body on the stretcher to the ambulance. Said Ferguson, Percey and I then drove to the Walbridge undertaking rooms and we then placed said body in said rooms. Ferguson and I remained for about one-half hour in and about the room where said body lay, although I cannot recall the exact length of time Ferguson remained in the rooms after the body was brought in. ’ ’

As the deponent Paddock was a witness in the ease, and we shall have occasion to refer to his testimony, we note here that in his affidavit, he further says that at the trial he saw Ferguson sitting as one of the jurors.

Charles Percey, referred to in the foregoing affidavit, makes an affidavit in which, referring to the night in which Costello was shot, he deposes as follows: “ I received word from F. H. Ferguson of said Bennington that Roy Paddock wished me to accompany him to the place of the shooting. Said Ferguson, Paddock and I drove in an ambulance to the scene of the shooting, remained there for several minutes. I then assisted the said Ferguson, Paddock and police officer Hurley in taking Costello’s body from the ground and carrying it on a stretcher to the ambulance. Said Ferguson, Paddock and I then drove in the ambulance to the Walbridge undertaking rooms and put the body in said rooms. ’ ’

[284]*284The juryman Ferguson makes a counter affidavit so called, in which he deposes as follows: ‘ ‘ That I did assist the undertaker in removing the body of William Costello from the place where he is alleged to have been killed, in September, 1916, to the undertaking rooms of J. Ed. Walbridge in said Bennington. That I went to the place at the request and in the company of Boy Paddock who was there in the employ of said Walbridge. That nothing was said by any person either while we were going to or from that place or while we were there as to how said Costello met his death; that no mention was made of the respondent or of any other person in connection with that matter; that there was no discussion concerning him, said Costello; that there was no examination of the ground or of surrounding objects; that it was late in the evening, not far from eleven o ’clock, I should judge; that we merely removed the body and 1 then went away with said Paddock and heard nothing more of the case, excepting that it was claimed that Costello had been killed, until the evidence was submitted when the respondent was on trial. ’ ’

The above, omitting the formal parts is the entire affidavit of the juryman. He says nothing as to what he in fact observed or did not observe about the body or the place where it was found. However, it is highly probable that he could not have failed to observe certain things or the absence of certain things to which considerable testimony related.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

State v. Brown
163 A.2d 845 (Supreme Court of Vermont, 1960)
Bradley v. Kelley & Trustee
168 A. 554 (Supreme Court of Vermont, 1933)
Catto v. Liberty Granite Co.
141 A. 684 (Supreme Court of Vermont, 1928)
State v. Maguire
138 A. 741 (Supreme Court of Vermont, 1927)
Woodhouse v. Woodhouse Et Ux.
130 A. 758 (Supreme Court of Vermont, 1925)
Walsh v. Cole
123 A. 850 (Supreme Court of Vermont, 1924)
Halloran v. New England Telephone & Telegraph Co.
115 A. 143 (Supreme Court of Vermont, 1921)
State v. Warm
105 A. 244 (Supreme Court of Vermont, 1918)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
102 A. 1032, 92 Vt. 280, 1918 Vt. LEXIS 165, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-ketchum-vt-1918.