In re Kernochan

84 Misc. 565, 146 N.Y.S. 1026
CourtNew York Supreme Court
DecidedMarch 15, 1914
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 84 Misc. 565 (In re Kernochan) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re Kernochan, 84 Misc. 565, 146 N.Y.S. 1026 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1914).

Opinion

Cohalan, J.

Application of Marshall B. Kernochan for an order directing the committee of the estate of Marie Marshall to pay him out of the incompetent’s income the sum of $12,000 per annum. The questions raised by the petition were referred by an order entered herein on the 26th day of August, 1913, to a referee to take proof of the facts and to report with his opinion in regard to the propriety of granting such an allowance. The referee’s report was filed on the 4th day of February, 1914. He found that the facts set forth in the petition were true and he was [566]*566of opinion that the young man, for a period of five years, was entitled out of this incompetent’s estate to an annual allowance of $9,000. The referee was not appointed to hear and determine; his duty was to take proof -of the facts, and with his opinion to make his report. The recommendation of the referee in no sense meets the approval of the court. The application is unusual and extraordinary, and the testimony elicited in support of the petition discloses a peculiar state of facts. It shows a young man, thirty-three years of age, who has lived an idle and luxurious life, now attempting, on the plea that he.desires to further a taste for music, to increase his income by obtaining an allowance out of his aunt’s estate of the sum of $12,000 per year. The petitioner, an only son, was bom into and is now surrounded by large wealth. His mother’s estate was summarized as of January 1,1913, in the sum of $1,154,534.22; her gross annual income in 1913 was $39,660.17. In her city home twelve servants are employed, and in her country home at Pittsfield, Mass., there are twenty-five. Martha M. Wysong, another of his aunts and a widow sixty-seven years of age, is without issue and is possessed of an estate of $2,525,000, which produced an annual gross income of $81,000. Upon attaining his majority the petitioner received from the estate of his father about $101,000. A portion of this money was lost in speculation, but a gift .of $50,000 from his mother so made up the loss that his estate at the present time is practically intact. He resides with his mother, contributes nothing to the household expenses and derives from his own property an income of about $3,750 per year. The petitioner in 1900- took up musical composition, and has made extensive studies in New York and Germany. His average income from this source has not exceeded $30 per year, [567]*567although his expenses for advertising his songs and his one cantata amount-to $175 per year. He belongs to twelve clubs as follows: The Union, Brook, Racquet, Knickerbocker, G-rolier, Players, Tuxedo, Lenox, Pittsfield Country Club, Stockbridge, The Tennis Club and the Automobile Club. He has an automobile and pays his chauffeur $100 per month. He has followed no occupation other than his diversion for music. In brief, this healthy and athletic young man, from an environment of luxury, wealth and position, declares that since neither his mother nor his aunt, Mrs. Wysong,. will give him an allowance, this court should decree him one from the estate of his incompetent aunt —a woman who became insane eight years prior to Ms birth and whom he never saw but once, and that time some eight years ago. He seeks to persuade the court to tMs conclusion by the statement that if this allowance is not granted he will be relegated to tMs position: (1) He will be compelled to resign from all his clubs except the Union and Knickerbocker; (2) he will be restricted in the entertainment of his friends; (3) his forms of recreation will not be as expensive as they are at the present time, and (4) he will be compelled to abandon Ms automobile. Another reason assigned for an allowance is that with it there will be a reasonable prospect of Ms marriage. His testimony on this point is of interest: Q. Mr. Kernochan, is it your wish and desire to marry? A. It certainly is. Q. And is it the wish of your mother that you should marry? A. Yes; very much so. Q. And has your mother said to you that in view of her financial situation she could not give you any adequate allowance to enable you to marry? A. Yes. Q. And you feel that you are not able to marry with your present income? A. I do; it is impossible. Q. Does the fact [568]*568that your income is so small prévent you at the present time from making an offer of marriage? A. Yes, it does. Q. And if the allowance asked for should be granted to you would you make an offer of marriage with the fair hope of receiving an acceptance? A. I should think I might. Q. Well, you would make the offer? A. I probably should. Q. And if you do not receive the allowance will your mode of life continue as it has been in past? A. No; I will have to change it very radically.” The power of the court to make direction, under proper circumstances, in respect of the disposition of' the incompetent’s estate is conceded. Code Civ. Pro., §§ 2320-2322. The court, however, must preserve the incompetent’s property from waste or destruction, and the jurisdiction of the court must be exercised by means of a committee of the person or a committee of the property of the incompetent. In the last analysis and in its essence the court’s power is one founded in its sound discretion, and its exercise is guided and controlled by the welfare of the incompetent. It is scarcely conceivable that the incompetent herein will ever be restored to sound mind. However, if she ever does arrive at that condition she will be ■entitled to the restoration of her property without diminution, except for her support and the usual cost of administration. Ex parte Whitbread, 2 Meriv. 99. Moreover, even if she were not restored to arrive at that condition she will be, entitled to the restoration of her property without diminution, except for her support and the usual cost of administration. Ex parte Whitbread, 2 Meriv. 99. Moreover, even if she were not restored to reason, it is possible that, situated as she is, surrounded by every comfort, her physical health might enable her to outlive both her sisters and her nephew, the petitioner. Upon her [569]*569death thereafter without a will and a resident of Virginia, her property would pass to relatives who are not parties to this proceeding; that there are such relatives is shown by the testimony of Frederick C. Kernochan, one of the committee. The incompetent is under no duty to support the petitioner. If the application had been presented by the son or wife of an incompetent, or an indigent person who stood in such relationship to the incompetent that the incompetent would be under an obligation to support the petitioner, the duty and the power of the court, limited only by the amount involved, would be obvious. Ex parte Whitbread, supra. However, this condition does not here exist: The petitioner is the nephew of the incompetent. He is of full age, of ripe experience, sound mind and under no disability. His mother is living, and he has another aunt who is perfectly competent and no less well circumstanced. There is nothing in the relationship of the petitioner to the incompetent which would cast upon her the duty or the obligation of supporting him. There is no duty on the incompetent to maintain the petitioner in his “ social position ” or to enable him to reach a station in life.”- In this country, with its free institutions, rank and position are not recognized Gould v. Gould, 61 Misc. Rep. 120; Matter of Brown, 80 id. 4. It is to the credit of the committee that they have opposed this application, and there is no lack of authority to sustain their position. The law may be briefly stated.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

In re Dana
119 Misc. 2d 815 (New York Supreme Court, 1982)
In re Hymes
102 Misc. 2d 821 (New York Surrogate's Court, 1979)
In re the Estate of Fairbairn
56 A.D.2d 259 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1977)
In re duPont
194 A.2d 309 (Court of Chancery of Delaware, 1963)
In re Schley
201 Misc. 522 (New York Supreme Court, 1951)
Monds v. Dugger
144 S.W.2d 761 (Tennessee Supreme Court, 1940)
In re the Estate of Fleming
173 Misc. 851 (New York Supreme Court, 1940)
In Re Johnson
162 A. 96 (New Jersey Court of Chancery, 1932)
In re Rockhill
131 Misc. 430 (New York Supreme Court, 1927)
In re Flagler
130 Misc. 554 (New York Supreme Court, 1926)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
84 Misc. 565, 146 N.Y.S. 1026, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-kernochan-nysupct-1914.