IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA24-792
Filed 16 April 2025
Sampson County, No. 21JA000087-810
IN THE MATTER OF:
K.E.P., A Juvenile.
Appeal by respondent-mother from orders entered 10 April 2024 and 3 May
2024 by Judge Shelly S. Holt in Sampson County District Court. Heard in the Court
of Appeals 18 March 2025.
Mary McCullers Reece and The Law Office of W. Joel Starling, Jr. PLLC, by W. Joel Starling, Jr., for petitioner-appellee Sampson County Department of Social Services.
NC Guardian Ad Litem Program, by Michelle FormyDuval Lynch, for appellee guardian ad litem.
BJK Legal, by Benjamin J. Kull, for respondent-appellant mother.
ZACHARY, Judge.
Respondent-Mother appeals from the trial court’s orders adjudicating her
minor child “Karina”1 to be an abused and neglected juvenile and placing Karina in
the sole legal and physical custody of Respondent-Father. After careful review, we
affirm.
1 For ease of reading and to protect the identity of the minor child, we use the pseudonym to
which the parties stipulated. See N.C.R. App. P. 42(b). IN RE: K.E.P.
Opinion of the Court
I. Background
Karina was born to Respondents in April 2018, when they were living in
Cumberland County. Within months of Karina’s birth, Respondents’ relationship
drastically deteriorated, with each parent making allegations of domestic violence
against the other. Respondent-Mother filed an action seeking custody of Karina in
2018. In 2019, a child custody order was entered in Cumberland County District
Court awarding Respondent-Mother custody of Karina and granting Respondent-
Father visitation.
From 2018 to 2021, the Cumberland County Department of Social Services
(“CCDSS”) received five child welfare reports concerning Respondent-Father’s
alleged maltreatment of Karina. The first report was not investigated, and CCDSS
determined that the allegations of the next four reports were unsubstantiated.
Nevertheless, after receiving the fifth report, CCDSS sought to have a child medical
examination conducted on Karina. Dr. Danielle Thomas-Taylor initially objected to
performing the examination, as Karina had already been evaluated for sexual
allegations twice before and Dr. Thomas-Taylor believed that further physical
examination could be traumatic for Karina.
By 2021, Karina and Respondent-Mother were living in Sampson County with
Karina’s maternal grandmother and step-grandfather. On 23 March 2021, the
Sampson County Department of Social Services (“SCDSS”) received its first child
welfare report that Respondent-Father had sexually abused Karina. Dr. Thomas-
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Taylor agreed to conduct a child medical examination in the hopes that this would
“potentially . . . stop having [Karina] evaluated so many times and give the family an
answer and recommendations for moving forward for the safety and well-being of
their child.” SCDSS determined that the allegations were unsubstantiated; however,
in her written report (“the CME”), Dr. Thomas-Taylor expressed “concerns for the
frequency with which [Karina] has presented to the emergency department with
request for thorough evaluation for concerns of sexual abuse.”
In July 2021, SCDSS received two more child welfare reports alleging
Respondent-Father’s maltreatment of Karina. Further involvement by SCDSS in
Karina’s case led a child protective services worker to develop “concerns for control
and manipulation” of Respondent-Mother. SCDSS determined that Dr. Maria O’Tuel
should perform a child and family forensic evaluation (“the CFE”) “to help determine
the presence or absence of abuse, to determine the extent of abuse or neglect if found,”
and to provide a basis for informed treatment recommendations.
As part of the CFE, Dr. O’Tuel conducted interviews and reviewed Karina’s
medical records and reports drafted by child protective services workers from both
counties, including the CME. Dr. O’Tuel concluded, inter alia, “that it was highly
improbable that [Karina] had been sexually abused as alleged” and instead
“concluded that it was highly likely that [Karina] had sustained some emotional
abuse” by Respondent-Mother and her family. Consistent with Dr. O’Tuel’s
recommendations, SCDSS attempted to implement a safety plan allowing Karina to
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reside with Respondent-Father, but Respondent-Mother refused to agree to its terms.
On 8 September 2021, SCDSS filed a juvenile petition alleging that Karina was
an abused and neglected juvenile. SCDSS obtained nonsecure custody of Karina that
same day and placed her with Respondent-Father.
This matter came on for hearing on 26 February 2024 in Sampson County
District Court. Child protective services workers from CCDSS and SCDSS testified,
as did Dr. Thomas-Taylor and Dr. O’Tuel. The CME and the five child welfare reports
alleging Respondent-Father’s maltreatment of Karina that were received by CCDSS
were admitted into evidence; however, the CFE and various hospital and medical
records upon which the CME was partially based were not.
On 10 April 2024, the trial court entered an order in which it adjudicated
Karina to be an abused and neglected juvenile. On 3 May 2024, the court entered its
disposition order, determining that it was in Karina’s best interests for Respondent-
Father to be granted sole legal and physical custody of Karina and for Respondent-
Mother to be granted visitation. That same day, the court entered a Chapter 7B-911
custody order to that effect. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-911 (2023).
Respondent-Mother timely filed notice of appeal.
II. Discussion
On appeal, Respondent-Mother challenges the evidentiary support for several
of the trial court’s adjudicatory findings of fact and further contends that the
adjudicatory findings lack necessary clarity. Finally, she argues that the adjudication
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order “must be reversed because even as written, the adjudicatory findings lack one
necessary factual determination: that the reports of Karina’s suspected sexual abuse
were somehow made in bad faith.” We disagree.
A. Standard of Review
In an appeal from an initial adjudication in a juvenile proceeding, “the sole
question for the reviewing court is whether the trial court’s conclusions of law are
supported by adequate findings and whether those findings, in turn, are supported
by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence.” In re A.J., 386 N.C. 409, 411–12, 904
S.E.2d 707, 711 (2024) (cleaned up). “When assessing whether a particular finding is
supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence, the reviewing court must
consider any properly preserved challenges to the admission of the supporting
evidence.” Id. at 412, 904 S.E.2d at 711.
It is well established that “the North Carolina Rules of Evidence apply at the
adjudication stage of these juvenile proceedings. Thus, statements that constitute
inadmissible hearsay are not clear, cogent, and convincing evidence on which the trial
court may rely.” Id. (citation omitted). “Assuming an evidentiary objection is properly
preserved, a party may argue on appeal that any findings supported solely by
inadmissible evidence are infirm and cannot support the trial court’s conclusions of
law.” Id.
Moreover, “[i]n a non-jury [juvenile] adjudication, the trial court’s findings of
fact supported by clear and convincing competent evidence are deemed conclusive,
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even where some evidence supports contrary findings. If competent evidence supports
the findings, they are binding on appeal.” In re L.Z.A., 249 N.C. App. 628, 632, 792
S.E.2d 160, 165 (2016) (cleaned up).
B. Analysis
On appeal, Respondent-Mother raises a series of arguments concerning the
sufficiency of the trial court’s findings of fact in the adjudication order, which she
contends must be reversed. She further asserts that if her arguments succeed, then
“the disposition order—as well as the private custody order resulting from it—must
also be reversed.” However, she offers no independent arguments concerning those
orders; her appeal rests entirely on the sufficiency of the adjudication order.
The trial court adjudicated Karina to be an abused juvenile pursuant to N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(1)(e) and a neglected juvenile pursuant to § 7B-101(15)(a) and
(e). A juvenile may be adjudicated as abused if the juvenile’s parent, guardian,
custodian, or caretaker “[c]reates or allows to be created serious emotional damage to
the juvenile; serious emotional damage is evidenced by a juvenile’s severe anxiety,
depression, withdrawal, or aggressive behavior toward himself or others.” N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 7B-101(1)(e). A juvenile may be adjudicated as neglected if the juvenile’s
parent, guardian, custodian, or caretaker “[d]oes not provide proper care, supervision,
or discipline” or “[c]reates or allows to be created a living environment that is
injurious to the juvenile’s welfare.” Id. § 7B-101(15)(a), (e).
1. Evidentiary Support for Adjudicatory Findings
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We first address Respondent-Mother’s argument that many of the trial court’s
adjudicatory findings of fact were “based on evidence that was not offered to prove
the truth of the matter(s) contained therein” and therefore “cannot be considered” in
our appellate review of whether the court’s findings support the conclusions of law.
In particular, Respondent-Mother focuses on findings of fact that she alleges were
based on evidence received at the hearing (1) “for explaining the background of
SCDSS’s investigation,” and (2) “for explaining the factual bases of the two experts’
opinions.”
As an initial matter, the guardian ad litem contends that many of Respondent-
Mother’s arguments concerning the findings of fact “are broadside challenges stating
the finding relied on evidence that was either not admitted into evidence or does not
contain the information in the finding with no reference to objections,
acknowledgment of testimonial evidence supporting the finding, and little to no
citation to legal authority.” It is well established that a single general challenge to
“the sufficiency of the evidence to support numerous findings of fact is broadside and
ineffective.” In re K.D., 178 N.C. App. 322, 327, 631 S.E.2d 150, 154 (2006) (cleaned
up). We agree that Respondent-Mother wages broadside attacks against many of the
findings of fact that she challenges, including findings #11–20, 22–24, 38–39, and 52.
However, even assuming, arguendo, that the general thrust of Respondent-Mother’s
arguments provides sufficient support for review of these challenges, they still lack
merit.
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a. Child Welfare Reports
The first two groups of findings that Respondent-Mother challenges are those
based on the five child welfare reports concerning Karina that CCDSS received, all of
which were admitted into evidence pursuant to the business records exception to the
hearsay rule. Because Respondent-Mother’s argument regarding these reports is
based on a misunderstanding of this exception to the hearsay rule, we begin with a
brief overview of that rule.
“Hearsay” is defined by our Rules of Evidence as “a statement, other than one
made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to
prove the truth of the matter asserted.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 801(c). “Hearsay
is not admissible except as provided by statute or by” the Rules of Evidence. Id. § 8C-
1, Rule 802. One such exception is the business records exception, “which provides
that business records of regularly conducted activity are not excluded by the hearsay
rule, even though the declarant is unavailable as a witness.” In re S.D.J., 192 N.C.
App. 478, 482, 665 S.E.2d 818, 821 (2008); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 803(6).
Rule 803(6) provides that the following types of evidence, if properly
authenticated, are not excluded by the hearsay rule:
A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if (i) kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity and (ii) it was the regular practice of that business activity to make the memorandum, report, record, or data compilation . . . .
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N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 803(6).
The records of a juvenile case, kept by a department of social services, upon
which a child protective services worker relies in her testimony, may qualify as a
business record under this exception. In re C.R.B., 245 N.C. App. 65, 69–70, 781
S.E.2d 846, 850–51, disc. review denied, 368 N.C. 916, 787 S.E.2d 23 (2016). As this
Court has recognized, “even though a witness’s knowledge was limited to the contents
of . . . [a parent]’s file with which [s]he had familiarized h[er]self, [s]he could properly
testify about the records and their significance so long as the records themselves were
admissible under the business records exception to the hearsay rule.” Id. at 69, 781
S.E.2d at 850 (cleaned up).
Qualifying business records are admissible under Rule 803(6) “when a proper
foundation is laid by testimony of a witness who is familiar with the records and the
methods under which they were made so as to satisfy the court that the methods, the
sources of information, and the time of preparation render such evidence
trustworthy.” Id. at 70, 781 S.E.2d at 850 (cleaned up). “While the foundation must
be laid by a person familiar with the records and the system under which they are
made, there is no requirement that the records be authenticated by the person who
made them.” Id. at 70, 781 S.E.2d at 850–51 (cleaned up).
At the hearing below, SCDSS consistently maintained that it was offering the
child welfare reports into evidence pursuant to the business records exception to the
hearsay rule, and our careful review of the transcript clearly shows that the trial
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court admitted all five reports under this exception. Indeed, Respondent-Mother’s
counsel acknowledged as much when she objected to the records’ admission—arguing
that the records were, in fact, being offered as substantive evidence—and when she
subsequently renewed her objection to the court’s ruling on the grounds of
“authentication, hearsay, and no business record exception.”
On appeal, Respondent-Mother does not argue that these child welfare reports
were improperly admitted pursuant to the business records exception. Respondent-
Mother does not challenge the reports’ admission into evidence, nor does she raise
any of her arguments that were more vigorously asserted below regarding the reports’
authentication and any alleged hearsay therein. Instead, she argues that the findings
of fact based on the child welfare reports should be treated as “non-substantive
evidentiary findings.” In re A.J.L.H., 384 N.C. 45, 52, 884 S.E.2d 687, 692, reh’g
denied, 384 N.C. 670, ___ S.E.2d ___ (2023). This argument fails for several reasons.
In support of her argument, Respondent-Mother relies upon A.J.L.H. and In re
Mashburn, 162 N.C. App. 386, 591 S.E.2d 584, appeal dismissed, 359 N.C. 68, 603
S.E.2d 884 (2004). However, the portions of these cases relevant to Respondent-
Mother’s argument concern admissible nonhearsay, rather than hearsay properly
admitted pursuant to the business records exception, as was the case here. See
A.J.L.H., 384 N.C. at 52, 884 S.E.2d at 692; Mashburn, 162 N.C. App. at 392–93, 591
S.E.2d at 589.
Respondent-Mother’s citation to A.J.L.H. is particularly inapposite because, in
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a portion of this Court’s opinion that was not appealed to our Supreme Court, we
upheld the trial court’s finding of fact summarizing the details of previous child
welfare reports that were admitted into evidence as properly authenticated business
records. In re A.J.L.H., 275 N.C. App. 11, 19–20, 853 S.E.2d 459, 466 (2020), rev’d
and remanded on other grounds, 384 N.C. 45, 884 S.E.2d 687 (2023). Indeed, it is well
established that properly authenticated records kept by a department of social
services in a juvenile matter may be “admissible under the business records exception
to the hearsay rule.” In re Smith, 56 N.C. App. 142, 148, 287 S.E.2d 440, 444, cert.
denied, 306 N.C. 385, 294 S.E.2d 212 (1982).
In that Respondent-Mother neither claims that the reports were not properly
authenticated, nor raises any concern of double-hearsay within the reports, she has
thus abandoned any such arguments on appeal. See N.C.R. App. P. 28(b)(6). The
argument that she does raise lacks merit, and therefore her challenge to the court’s
adjudicatory findings #11–15, 29, 38–39, and 61 is overruled.
b. Bases for Expert Opinions
Respondent-Mother next challenges a series of adjudicatory findings based
upon the testimony of Dr. Thomas-Taylor and Dr. O’Tuel, asserting that “the evidence
that forms the factual basis for an expert’s opinion is not admissible for the truth of
the matter(s) asserted therein.” She claims that therefore any of the trial court’s
findings of fact based on this type of evidence—such as “the experts’ testimony
regarding the content of the hospital/medical records and the content of interviews
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they conducted in the course of forming their opinions, or the [CME]”—“are not
findings regarding the truth of the matters asserted therein” and “serve no practical
purpose” in our appellate review of the adjudication order.
However, the CME was admitted into evidence. At the hearing, SCDSS not
only offered the CME into evidence on the ground that it contained “the information
that formed the basis of [Dr. Thomas-Taylor’s] conclusions” as an expert witness, but
it also noted that the out-of-court statements within the CME were “made for the
purposes of a medical evaluation or medical treatment” and were therefore
admissible hearsay. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 803(4) (providing that out-of-
court “[s]tatements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and
describing medical history” are not excluded by the hearsay rule). The trial court
admitted the CME—which Respondent-Mother admits “also discussed” the factual
bases for the experts’ opinions—with the explanation that “any statements [in the
CME] made by other individuals were done as the basis of preparing her, conducting
her examination and . . . the foundation of her conclusions.” Consequently, the CME
was admitted not only as the basis for expert testimony but also as statements made
for purposes of medical treatment. See id. Again, Respondent-Mother’s counsel
confirmed this when she subsequently noted her objections for “lack of foundation,
hearsay, and various other violations of [Respondent-Mother]’s constitutional state
and federal rights.”
On appeal, however, Respondent-Mother raises no argument concerning the
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CME’s admission into evidence, nor does she challenge any potential hearsay
statements contained therein. As a result, any such arguments are abandoned. See
N.C.R. App. P. 28(b)(6). The trial court properly considered the CME when making
its findings of fact. In that the CME, with its descriptions of Karina’s medical history,
supports the challenged portions of findings #16–20, 22–24, 31–32, 35, 37, 48, 50, 52,
55, and 57–59, these challenges are likewise overruled.
c. Other Challenged Findings
In addition to the two primary groups of findings that Respondent-Mother
challenges, she also challenges several others on a variety of grounds that are
similarly unsuccessful. For example, Respondent-Mother challenges finding of fact
#6, but that finding is unnecessary to support the trial court’s conclusions of law and
thus may be disregarded. See, e.g., In re J.K., 253 N.C. App. 57, 60, 799 S.E.2d 439,
441–42 (2017) (“[E]rroneous findings that are unnecessary to support the trial court’s
conclusions of law may be disregarded as harmless.” (citation omitted)).
We further note that challenged findings of fact #38–39, 49, and 61 are
supported by the testimony of a SCDSS child protective services worker. To the extent
that Respondent-Mother challenges findings #49 and 60 as mere recitations of
testimony, we note that these findings appropriately carry “indication[s] that the trial
court evaluated the credibility of the relevant witness[es] or resolved any
contradictions in [their] testimony.” In re A.E., 379 N.C. 177, 185, 864 S.E.2d 487,
495 (2021). Moreover, to the extent that Respondent-Mother asks us to reconsider the
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trial court’s credibility determinations regarding the various testifying witnesses
from the adjudication hearing below, it is not the role of this Court to question such
credibility determinations on appeal. See In re J.A.M., 372 N.C. 1, 11, 822 S.E.2d 693,
700 (2019) (“[A]n important aspect of the trial court’s role as finder of fact is assessing
the demeanor and credibility of witnesses, often in light of inconsistencies or
contradictory evidence. It is in part because the trial court is uniquely situated to
make this credibility determination that appellate courts may not reweigh the
underlying evidence presented at trial.”).
Finally, as Respondent-Mother aptly notes, challenged findings #63–64 are
actually conclusions of law, which we treat as such on appeal. See, e.g., In re K.J.M.,
288 N.C. App. 332, 341–42, 886 S.E.2d 589, 596 (2023).
As indicated herein, our careful review of the record reveals that the
unchallenged findings, combined with the challenged findings of fact that are
supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence, amply support the trial court’s
conclusions of law. Therefore, Respondent-Mother’s evidentiary arguments are
overruled.
2. Clarity of Findings
Respondent-Mother next argues that “the adjudicatory findings lack the clarity
needed to determine whether [she] ‘allowed’ the non-caretaker Maternal
Grandparents to take Karina to the hospital for three vaginal exams.” This argument
is wholly without merit.
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Respondent-Mother contends that “the adjudicatory findings fail to specifically
identify who took Karina to the hospital for those emergency room visits and exams.”
Instead, she notes that finding of fact #16 “says that it was either
[Respondent-]Mother, Maternal Grandmother, ‘and/or’ Maternal Grandfather who
took her.” Critically, finding of fact #18 explains that Respondent-Mother “either took
[Karina] to these emergency room visits herself or gave permission for [Karina] to
receive medical treatment during the emergency room visits.” (Emphasis added).
This finding of fact satisfies the “allows to be created” elements of the
definitions of abused and neglected juveniles. N.C. Gen. Stat § 7B-101(1)(e), (15)(e).
As this finding of fact—which resolves the alleged ambiguity that Respondent-Mother
sees—is binding on appeal, as discussed above, Respondent-Mother’s argument is
meritless. As the guardian ad litem notes: “There is no ambiguity; it is clear that
Respondent[-]Mother either took Karina to the ER when invasive physical exams
were completed, or allowed the maternal grandparents to take her.” Respondent-
Mother’s clarity argument is also overruled.
3. Failure to Find Bad Faith
Finally, we address Respondent-Mother’s argument that the trial court erred
“because even as written, the adjudicatory findings lack one necessary factual
determination: that the reports of Karina’s suspected sexual abuse were somehow
made in bad faith.”
First, this is essentially a policy argument, wherein Respondent-Mother
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presages “a terrifying dilemma for any parent.” According to Respondent-Mother: “If
you withhold your suspicions [of sexual abuse] out of fear of being wrong, then you
risk criminal liability; but if you report your suspicions and end up being wrong, then
even if you acted in good faith, your mistaken reporting can be used against you and
your family.” But such rhetoric is ineffective, as we remain “an error-correcting body,
not a policy-making or law-making one.” In re I.B., 262 N.C. App. 402, 408, 822 S.E.2d
472, 476 (2018) (citation omitted), abrogated on other grounds by In re L.E.M., 372
N.C. 396, 831 S.E.2d 341 (2019).
Second, and more fundamentally, there is simply no requirement in our
Juvenile Code that a parent’s reports of suspected sexual abuse must be made in bad
faith in order to adjudicate a juvenile as abused or neglected. In support of her
contention, Respondent-Mother cites the immunity provision of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-
309, which states that a person who makes “a good-faith report of child abuse or
neglect . . . is immune from any civil or criminal liability that might otherwise be
incurred or imposed for that action provided that that person was acting in good
faith.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-309. She further cites our Supreme Court’s statement
that § 7B-309 “is intended to encourage citizens to report suspected instances of child
abuse without fear of potential liability if [the] report [is] made in good faith.” Dobson
v. Harris, 352 N.C. 77, 82, 530 S.E.2d 829, 835 (2000). These citations are unavailing.
As SCDSS aptly observes, “the adjudication of a child as neglected or abused
is not a matter of monetary damages or ‘civil liability’ for her parents. As such, the
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cooperation requirement of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-309 cannot provide ‘cover’ against
adjudications of abuse or neglect.”
Moreover, with specific regard to neglect, it is well established that “[i]n
determining whether a child is neglected, the determinative factors are the
circumstances and conditions surrounding the child, not the fault or culpability of the
parent.” In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. 101, 109, 316 S.E.2d 246, 252 (1984).2
Indeed, this Court recently reviewed a similar case involving a mother’s
treatment of her children amidst an investigation of reported allegations of sexual
abuse against the children’s father. In re B.C., No. 23-830, 2025 WL 850051, slip op.
at *5 (N.C. App. Mar. 19, 2025). “[A]lthough the DSS investigation into the
allegations of the father’s alleged sexual abuse remained ongoing, DSS was
sufficiently concerned about [the r]espondent-[m]other’s actions to file juvenile
petitions” alleging that the children were abused, neglected, and dependent. Id. On
appeal, the respondent-mother argued, inter alia, “that she was not able to present ‘a
full defense’ ” because “she was not able to present evidence that the father had
2 Respondent-Mother claims that this oft-cited precedent is no longer good law, asserting that
recent legislative amendments to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(15) have “brought the definition of ‘neglected juvenile’ in line with that for ‘abused juvenile,’ which is likewise written in terms of the parent’s (or other caregiver’s) actions, rather than the child’s conditions or circumstances.” (Citation omitted). We disagree. Notwithstanding the supposedly precedent-altering legislative amendments that Respondent- Mother cites, this Court has continued to cite this well-known proposition from Montgomery as good law. See, e.g., In re M.C., 286 N.C. App. 632, 641, 881 S.E.2d 871, 878 (2022). Our Supreme Court has not overruled Montgomery, “and this Court is bound by precedent from our Supreme Court.” In re N.R.R.N., ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 911 S.E.2d 510, 516 (2025).
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sexually abused [the children] such that her actions in light of that belief were
justified, appropriate, and could not have constituted abuse or neglect of the
children.” Id. at *20. This Court was unpersuaded and instead approvingly cited the
trial court’s findings that the respondent-mother did “not appear to understand the
nuances of what DSS’s investigation entailed”; “that DSS’s role was to monitor and
try to create a plan”; and further, that “whether the father ha[d] sexually abused these
children or not and whether the sexual abuse happened or not, [the children] ha[d]
been traumatized by the way that [the r]espondent-[m]other ha[d] handled the
situation with them.” Id. at *23 (cleaned up).
Here, Respondent-Mother’s claim that the trial court erred by failing to make
an adjudicatory finding of bad faith is likewise misguided and reflects a similar
misunderstanding of the focus of the proceedings at the adjudication phase. As
illustrated by B.C., when a parent’s reports of sexual abuse precipitate further
investigation in an ongoing juvenile case, the proper focus of the trial court in an
adjudication hearing is on the effect of those reports—and their investigation—on the
child, not the sincerity of the parent’s reporting. See id. at *19.
This argument is also overruled.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s adjudicatory order is affirmed.
Because Respondent-Mother raises no independent arguments concerning the
disposition order or the private custody order, those orders are also affirmed.
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AFFIRMED.
Judges STROUD and COLLINS concur.
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