In Re Kent

District of Columbia Court of Appeals

In Re Kent

179 A.2d 727, 1962 D.C. App. LEXIS 279

CourtDistrict of Columbia Court of Appeals

DecidedApril 13, 1962

Docket2944

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 179 A.2d 727 (In Re Kent) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District of Columbia Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

In Re Kent, 179 A.2d 727, 1962 D.C. App. LEXIS 279 (D.C. 1962).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM.

Appellant seeks a review of an order of the Juvenile Court, which recited that after full investigation it waived jurisdiction over him in connection with some fourteen charges, and ordered him held for trial under the regular procedure of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Code 1961, 11-914. Embraced in the order were seven charges of housebreaking, two charges of assault, two charges of assault with intent to commit rape, and three charges of rape. Indictments were later returned in the District Court.

Appellant says the statute was not complied with because the waiver of jurisdiction was not preceded by a “full investigation,” and because the court did not make known the reasons therefor. These questions have been considered and decided in Wilhite v. United States, 108 U.S.App.D.C. 279, 280, 281 F.2d 642, 643, and Briggs v. United States, 96 U.S.App.D.C. 392, 226 F.2d 350. Under those decisions it must be held that the procedure followed by the Ju *728 venile Court in this case was not violative of the statute.

Another argument is that if the inquiry conducted by the Juvenile Court is deemed to satisfy the statutory standard of a full investigation, it would still offend the constitutional standard of fundamental fairness. This contention was answered in¡ the Briggs case, supra, where the waiver statute was held constitutional and valid.

Affirmed.

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PER CURIAM.

Appellant seeks a review of an order of the Juvenile Court, which recited that after full investigation it waived jurisdiction over him in connection with some fourteen charges, and ordered him held for trial under the regular procedure of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Code 1961, 11-914. Embraced in the order were seven charges of housebreaking, two charges of assault, two charges of assault with intent to commit rape, and three charges of rape. Indictments were later returned in the District Court.

Appellant says the statute was not complied with because the waiver of jurisdiction was not preceded by a “full investigation,” and because the court did not make known the reasons therefor. These questions have been considered and decided in Wilhite v. United States, 108 U.S.App.D.C. 279, 280, 281 F.2d 642, 643, and Briggs v. United States, 96 U.S.App.D.C. 392, 226 F.2d 350. Under those decisions it must be held that the procedure followed by the Ju *728 venile Court in this case was not violative of the statute.

Another argument is that if the inquiry conducted by the Juvenile Court is deemed to satisfy the statutory standard of a full investigation, it would still offend the constitutional standard of fundamental fairness. This contention was answered in¡ the Briggs case, supra, where the waiver statute was held constitutional and valid.

Affirmed.

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Bluebook (online)

179 A.2d 727, 1962 D.C. App. LEXIS 279, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-kent-dc-1962.

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