In re Kennedy

36 Misc. 721, 74 N.Y.S. 369
CourtNew York Supreme Court
DecidedJanuary 15, 1902
StatusPublished

This text of 36 Misc. 721 (In re Kennedy) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re Kennedy, 36 Misc. 721, 74 N.Y.S. 369 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1902).

Opinion

Scott, J.

This is a proceeding instituted for the purpose of reviewing the determination of the Board of Elections that Perry Belmont was duly and legally nominated as the candidate of the Democratic party for the office of Representative in Congress for the Seventh Congressional district of this State. The district comprises parts of three assembly districts within the county of New York and the county of Richmond. The convention to nominate a candidate was duly called by the proper authorities of the Democratic party, No. 184 Hudson street being designated as the place, and Saturday, December 21, 1901, at eight o’clock n. m. as the time for holding the convention. Michael 0. Murphy was duly designated, pursuant to section 10 of the Primary Election Law, as the person to call such convention to order. The place designated for the meeting of the convention was a room belonging to the Hickory Club, of which said Murphy is president. The whole number of delegates composing the convention was two hundred and seventy-eight, of whom one hundred and thirty-eight were apportioned to the county of Richmond, and one hundred [723]*723and forty to that portion of the district within the county of New York. The room in which the convention was called to meet was about twenty feet wide by sixty feet long. There were no seats in it, except a few chairs for the officers and newspaper reporters, the other chairs which had been in it having been removed some hours before the convention met. Admission to the room was by card, but these cards were apparently distributed with some degree of generosity, so that when the convention was called to order the room was overcrowded, there being some, and apparently many persons present who were not delegates. Before the meeting of the convention suggestions that an adjournment should be taken were made by Murphy, but were not acceded to by those to whom the suggestion was made. The convention was called to order, and in due course was organized by the election of one Walsh, as chairman, and one Willis, as secretary, with assistant secretaries' from the several assembly district delegations. The credentials of the delegates were presented and the roll of delegates begun to be called, commencing with those from Richmond county. Up to this point the proceedings had been harmonious, everything being done by unanimous consent. While the roll of the Richmond delegates was being called there was considerable noise and confusion during which several motions were made which were not put. At length, however, and before the roll was completed, a motion was made to adjourn the convention until Monday, December twenty-third. Many delegates protested against the adjournment, and a protest was also made against entertaining any motion until the roll-call had been completed. Disregarding these protests the chairman put the motion, taking a viva voce vote thereon; declared the motion carried, and immediately vacated the chair and left the hall accompanied by the secretary Willis, and part of the delegates. A number of delegates remained in the hall, elected another chairman and secretary and proceeded to carry forward the work of the convention. The police, acting under instructions from Walsh, the chairman first elected, proceeded to forcibly clear the hall, whereupon the delegates who had remained after Walsh had left adopted a resolution adjourning the convention to No. 141 Hudson street, whither they proceeded and nominated a candidate, the aforesaid Belmont, and then adjourned. The delegates who left the hall with Walsh reconvened at No. 5 Battery place on the evening of December twenty-third [724]*724and undertook to nominate Joseph F. O’Grady. Both Belmont and O’Grady filed certificates of nomination with the Boar.d of Elections, objections were filed and a hearing had, resulting in a decision of said board in favor of Belmont. It is to review that determination that this proceeding is brought. The question involved is as to the regularity of the adjourned convention at which Belmont was nominated, for if that convention was regular and had power to nominate, the subsequent attempted nomination of O’Grady must necessarily fail. It cannot be doubted that a. majority of a convention has the right to control and direct its actions. For all practical purposes it is the convention. That there was a majority of duly elected delegates present when the chairman, Walsh, entertained and put the motion to adjourn to the twenty-third is not questioned by any one. Was that motion properly put, and if so, was it carried? To put it when and as it was put was certainly improper and irregular for, by the method adopted by Walsh, it was very difficult, if not quite impossible, to determine whether it was carried or not. The first business of a convention held under the forms of law, should be to determine the composition of the convention itself. This can only be done by ascertaining first, who are its accredited members; and secondly, how many and which of these members are present. If then a vote is to be taken upon any question which may affect the validity of the result to be attained by the convention, that vote should be taken by a call of the roll or by some other method, such as voting by delegations through a chosen spokesman, as will indicate clearly and unmistakably whether a majority have voted for or against the question. It appears that there were present in the room at this particular convention a number of persons, probably a large number who were not delegates and who had no right to participate. Upon a viva voce vote all those people might vote, and it would be impossible for the chairman to determine how many votes on one side or the. other of the question were given by delegates and how many by outsiders. His declaration, therefore, that the motion to adjourn had been carried, although it may have expressed his honest conviction that a majority of the voices were for adjournment, was not equivalent to a declaration that a majority of the delegates had ¡so voted. No one had a right to vote upon the motion to adjourn except the delegates, and it could be carried only by the vote of a majority [725]*725of the delegates present. Since, under the conditions then prevailing, and the manner in which the vote was taken, the chairman could not possibly tell whether a majority of the delegates present had voted in favor of the motion, his declaration of the result of the vote is worthless as evidence of the fact, and the Board of Elections was justified in seeking, as the court is compelled to seek, other evidence upon the subject. Unless the motion to adjourn was properly carried the chairman could not deprive the majority of the convention of its right to go on and complete the work for which it was convened by abandoning the chair and leaving the meeting. If the motion to adjourn had not, in fact, been carried, the convention had a right to go on with its work, and, if any of the officers abandoned their offices, it had the right to elect others in their places. From the affidavits filed with the Board of Elections, and submitted on this motion, it appears that at least one hundred and forty-seven persons, claiming to have been duly chosen delegates to the convention, voted against the motion to adjourn; -remained in the hall after the chairman had declared the meeting adjourned and left the hall; elected another chairman and secretary, and proceeded to make a nomination This number constituted a majority of the delegates, and if they did in fact vote against the resolution to adjourn, the motion was never legally carried and they had a right to disregard the chairman’s declaration regarding it, and to remain and continue the convention.

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Bluebook (online)
36 Misc. 721, 74 N.Y.S. 369, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-kennedy-nysupct-1902.