In Re Keegan Management Co., Securities Litigation

794 F. Supp. 939, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15822, 1992 WL 113411
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. California
DecidedMay 29, 1992
DocketC-91-20084 SW, C-91-20141 SW
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 794 F. Supp. 939 (In Re Keegan Management Co., Securities Litigation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Keegan Management Co., Securities Litigation, 794 F. Supp. 939, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15822, 1992 WL 113411 (N.D. Cal. 1992).

Opinion

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

SPENCER WILLIAMS, District Judge.

Last September, when Defendants moved to dismiss this action, they urged this Court to spare them the expense and burden of discovery, arguing that Plaintiffs had no evidence to support their allegations. Defendants insisted that Plaintiffs were prosecuting this case solely on the basis of a hope that, during discovery, they would uncover some evidence that Defendants had advance warning of the events which ultimately caused Plaintiffs’ injury.

*941 Most of Plaintiffs’ claims survived the motion to dismiss because Plaintiffs were careful to properly allege every element of each claim they asserted. Consequently, Defendants were not spared the expense and burden of discovery. However, having completed discovery, Defendants now move for summary judgment, arguing that Plaintiffs have been unsuccessful in uncovering any evidence that would justify the further burden and expense of trial. This time, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56, the Court agrees.

Accordingly, because Plaintiffs have produced no evidence that Defendants’ prospectus contained a misrepresentation or omitted a material fact, Defendants’ motions for summary judgment are GRANTED. Plaintiffs’ motions for summary judgment on their Section 11 of Securities Act of 1933, claims and for class certification of their state law claims are DENIED.

BACKGROUND

In December 1989, Defendant Keegan Management Company (“Keegan”) was the largest franchisee of Nutri/System Weight Loss Centers (“Nutri/System”) in the United States, operating some 64 of those centers in the San Francisco Bay Area and other locations. On December 20, 1989, Keegan made an initial public offering (“IPO”) of stock, selling 1.25 million shares to its broker-dealer H.J. Meyers & Co. (“Meyers”) for $7 per share. Meyers, in turn, resold the shares to the public, pursuant to a prospectus filed on Form S-l with the Securities and Exchange Commission.

Within months of the IPO, events took a sharp turn for the worse for Keegan. In early 1990, allegations began to emerge that various weight-loss programs, including the Nutri/System program, caused or contributed to gallbladder problems. These allegations were first raised in several personal injury lawsuits filed against Nutri/System in Florida. They subsequently gained nationwide exposure when Congress began a series of hearings relating to the safety of diet plans in March 1990.

Not unexpectedly, Keegan experienced a downturn in client signups. This downturn led to a decline in profits and Keegan’s decision in May 1990 to sell 31 of its Nu-tri/System centers. By August 1990, Kee-gan was itself a defendant in Nutri/System personal injury lawsuits, and its stock had plunged an average of ten dollars per share.

After suffering substantial losses, Kee-gan shareholders Michael Moore and John Vislocky filed the first of these two, now consolidated, class action lawsuits in February 1991. Conceding that Defendants disclosed the existence and impact of this negative publicity in April 1990, Plaintiffs charged that Defendants knew, or were reckless in not knowing, about these matters much earlier. Specifically, Plaintiffs alleged that, prior to the IPO, Defendants were aware of information calling into question the safety of the Nutri/System program, but they failed to warn investors in their issuing prospectus of these potential health risks or the potential for personal injury litigation against Keegan.

DISCUSSION

I. LEGAL STANDARD ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT

A. Burdens

The moving party bears “the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion....” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The moving party must demonstrate that no genuine issue of material fact exists for trial. Id. at 322, 106 S.Ct. at 2552. However, the moving party is not required to negate those portions of the nonmoving party’s claim on which the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof. Id.

Once the moving party demonstrates that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party must designate “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553. The nonmoving party must “make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that *942 party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Id. at 322, 106 S.Ct. at 2552.

B. Evaluating the Evidence

The adjudication of a summary judgment motion is not a “trial on affidavits.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2513, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Credibility determinations and weighing of the evidence are solely jury functions. Id. at 255, 106 S.Ct. at 2513. Inferences drawn from underlying facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (citing United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S.Ct. 993, 994, 8 L.Ed.2d 176 (1962)).

However, there may be no genuine issue of material fact if “the evidence is of insufficient caliber or quantity to allow a rational finder of fact” to find for the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 254, 106 S.Ct. at 2513. And in some circumstances the factual context may render the non-moving party’s claim implausible, and the nonmoving party must come forward with “more persuasive evidence” to support the claim “than would otherwise be necessary.” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. at 1356.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Introduction

Plaintiffs’ entire lawsuit depends upon their allegation that, prior to December 20, 1989, there was (1) information suggesting a link between the Nutri/System diet plan and gallbladder disease, or (2) information indicating that such a link would be alleged in the future, specifically in personal injury lawsuits brought against Keegan-owned Nutri/System centers. If there was no such information, or if the available information would not influence the average prudent investor, then the omission of this information from the prospectus is not actionable under any state or federal law. No law requires the prospectus to contain im

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794 F. Supp. 939, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15822, 1992 WL 113411, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-keegan-management-co-securities-litigation-cand-1992.