2025 IL App (1st) 242265-U
SECOND DIVISION August 12, 2025
No. 1-24-2265
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________
In re K.B. and L.W., Minors, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of ) Cook County. (The People of the State of Illinois, ) ) Petitioner-Appellee, ) ) Nos. 19JA0683 v. ) 20JA1011 ) J.D., ) ) Honorable Respondent-Appellant). ) Andrea M. Buford, ) Judge Presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE McBRIDE delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Howse and Ellis concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The trial court’s order terminating respondent mother J.D.’s parental rights as to K.B. and L.W. is affirmed where the trial court’s finding of parental unfitness was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶2 Respondent J.D. appeals the trial court’s order finding her to be unfit under sections
50/1(D)(b) and (m) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b), (m) (West 2022)) and
terminating her parental rights over her minor children, K.B. and L.W. She argues that the trial No. 1-24-2265
court’s finding was against the manifest weight of the evidence because: (1) she had made
reasonable efforts to correct the conditions which were the basis for the removal of the minors
and reasonable progress toward the return of the minors within the specified nine-month
statutory periods under section 1(D)(m) (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m) (West 2022)) and section 2-29
(705 ILCS 405/2-29 (West 2022)); and (2) she continually showed interest, concern, and
responsibility for her children throughout the proceedings as required under section 1(D)(b) of
the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b) (West 2022)) and section 2-29 of the Juvenile Court Act
of 1987 (Juvenile Court Act) (705 ILCS 405/2-29 (West 2022)).
¶3 K.B., a male child, was born on May 12, 2017. L.W., a female child, was born June 27,
2020. Respondent is the natural mother of both minors. 1
¶4 A petition for adjudication of wardship for K.B. was filed on July 1, 2019, alleging that
K.B. was neglected due to an injurious environment pursuant to section 2-3(1)(b) of the Juvenile
Court Act (705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2018)), and abused due to the infliction of physical
injury under section 2-3(2)(i) of the Juvenile Court Act (id. § 2-3(2)(i)) and a substantial risk of
physical injury under section 2-3(2)(ii) of the Juvenile Court Act (id. § 2-3(2)(ii)). The
supporting facts for these allegations stated:
“Mother has one prior indicated report for substantial risk of physical
injury/environment injurious to health and welfare by abuse. On January 10, 2019
an intact case was opened to offer services to this family. Mother is non-
compliant with services including therapy, parenting classes and completing a
mental health and substance abuse assessments to see if treatment was needed.
1 Joshua M. was named in the petition for adjudication of wardship as K.B.’s father and a default order was entered against him and all whom it may concern. He is not a party to this appeal. Edward W. was determined to be L.W.’s father and is deceased. 2 No. 1-24-2265
Mother admits to smoking marijuana and states she was previously diagnosed
with bipolar disorder. On June 27, 2019 the apartment where mother and minor
were residing at was observed to have a strong odor of marijuana emitting
throughout. The [Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS)]
investigator had concerns with the condition of the apartment if minor was to
remain there. On that same date, this minor was observed to have multiple marks
and bruises on various parts of his body. Medical personnel diagnosed this minor
with child maltreatment syndrome. There was a domestic altercation between her
and paramour in May of 2019. Mother resides with her paramour. Putative
father’s whereabouts are unknown. Paternity has not been established.”
¶5 A petition for adjudication of wardship for L.W. was filed on July 9, 2020, alleging that
L.W. was neglected due to an injurious environment pursuant to section 2-3(1)(b) of the Juvenile
Court Act (705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2018)), and abused due to a substantial risk of
physical injury under section 2-3(2)(ii) of the Juvenile Court Act (id. § 2-3(2)(ii)). The
“Natural mother has one prior indicated report for substantial risk of physical
injury/environment injurious to health and welfare by abuse. Natural mother has
two other minors not in her care and custody one of which is in the temporary
custody of DCFS with findings of probable cause for abuse and neglect having
been entered. Mother was previously non-compliant with offered and
recommended intact family services as to this minor’s sibling and is currently in
need of ongoing reunification services. In June 2019, this minor’s sibling was
observed to have multiple marks and bruises on various parts of his body after
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which medical personnel diagnosed that minor with child maltreatment syndrome.
Natural mother and putative father have a history of domestic violence including
an incident which occurred during mother’s pregnancy with this minor wherein
putative father struck her in the abdomen and ribs. There is currently a domestic
violence order of protection limiting contact between mother and putative father.
Mother has not been forthcoming about where she resides currently and has
expressed an intention to reside with putative father. Paternity has not been
established.”
¶6 The trial court entered an adjudication order for K.B. on April 16, 2021, finding that K.B.
had been neglected due to an injurious environment and abused due to a substantial risk of
physical injury.
¶7 On May 11, 2021, the trial court conducted an adjudication hearing for L.W. and
combined disposition hearing for K.B. and L.W. The adjudication order found that L.W. had
been abused or neglected due to an injurious environment. The parties stipulated to the facts at
the hearing. If called to testify, an investigator would testify that respondent hid her pregnancy
with L.W. from her caseworker and told the hospital where L.W. was born that she had custody
of all her children because she was afraid L.W. would be taken from her care. Respondent had
not completed reunification services for K.B. If called to testify, a DCFS caseworker would
testify that respondent had outstanding services. She was engaged in but had not completed
individual therapy and parenting coaching. Respondent had successfully completed parenting
classes. The caseworker was unaware that respondent was pregnant with L.W.
¶8 The May 2021 disposition orders for both minors found that it was in their best interest to
be adjudged wards of the court. Respondent was found unable to care for, protect, train, or
4 No. 1-24-2265
discipline K.B. and L.W. The permanency order set the goal of return home within 12 months
and that respondent had not made substantial progress towards the return home of the minors and
respondent “has not consistently engaged in or made significant progress in services.”
Respondent was granted day visits supervised by a DCFS or private agency caseworker.
¶9 Subsequent permanency hearings were conducted between November 2021 and February
2024. The order from November 2021 continued the goal of return home within 12 months for
both minors and noted that respondent had outstanding services.
¶ 10 A permanency hearing report from DCFS with a family services plan was submitted for
the July 2022 permanency hearing. The report indicated that respondent had not made
satisfactory progress or reasonable efforts towards the permanency goal. Respondent was not
consistent in attending therapy and had failed to appear for four of the five most recent random
drug drops. She tested positive for THC and barbiturates at the one drop she attended. Following
the hearing, the trial court changed the permanency goal for K.B. to private guardianship and set
forth the reasons for this goal, “Return home has been ruled out based on lack of progress in
services. [K.B.] knows his mother and has a relationship with her. Maternal aunt wishes to
pursue guardianship of the minor.” L.W.’s permanency goal was changed to substitute care
pending court determination on termination of parental rights with the following reasons for the
change, “Return home has been ruled out based on lack of progress in services and inconsistent
visitation. [L.W.] has been in this foster home since she was 3 days old. Foster parent wishes to
adopt.” These permanency goals were continued in January 2023 and August 2023. Following
the February 2024 permanency hearing, the permanency goal for both minors was set as
substitute care pending court determination on termination of parental rights.
5 No. 1-24-2265
¶ 11 The State filed petitions for the termination of parental rights for both minors. The
petitions alleged that respondent had failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern,
or responsibility as to the children’s welfare in violation of section 1(D)(b) of the Adoption Act
(750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b) (West 2022)) and section 2-29 of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/2-
29 (West 2022)), and she had failed to make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions which
were the basis for the removal of the children and reasonable progress toward the return of the
children under section 1(D)(m) (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m) (West 2022)) and section 2-29 (705 ILCS
405/2-29 (West 2022)). The petitions further alleged that it was in the best interests of the minors
that a guardian be appointed with the right to consent to adoption where the children had been
living with their foster parents for an extended period of time, the foster parents desired to adopt
the minors, and the adoption was in the best interests of the children. The State also filed
pleadings specifying multiple nine-month time periods for ground (m) under the Adoption Act
for each minor. The dates specified for K.B. were: April 17, 2021 to January 17, 2022; January
17, 2022 to October 17, 2022; October 17, 2022 to July 17, 2023; and July 17, 2023, to April 17,
2024. 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m) (West 2022). The dates specified for L.W. were: May 12, 2021 to
February 12, 2022; February 12, 2022 to November 12, 2022; November 12, 2022 to August 12,
2023; and August 12, 2023, to May 12, 2024. Id.
¶ 12 On November 6, 2023, the trial court conducted the termination hearing for both minors
with respondent present via videoconference and represented by counsel. The following evidence
was adduced at the hearing.
¶ 13 Lanisha Mix testified that she was employed as a caseworker with DCFS and was
assigned to this case from December 2020 to February 2023. Respondent had been
recommended multiple services, including individual therapy, the nurturing parents program,
6 No. 1-24-2265
domestic violence program, a substance abuse assessment, and random drug testing drops. When
Mix was assigned to the case, respondent was not engaged in any of the services and Mix then
made referrals. As far as Mix knew, respondent did not have a learning disability and respondent
never told Mix that she had such disability.
¶ 14 Respondent successfully completed the domestic violence service in September 2021, but
DCFS continued to have concerns about domestic violence in respondent’s relationship.
Respondent was living with her paramour, and in December 2021, Mix was informed of a fight
between respondent and her paramour. She spoke with respondent and offered respondent
supportive services, but respondent did not make herself available. Mix was concerned that
respondent had been injured, but respondent did not allow Mix to view her. Mix continued to
recommend additional domestic violence services for respondent, but respondent never
successfully completed those services while Mix was assigned to the case.
¶ 15 Mix also referred respondent to a substance abuse assessment. Mix also requested weekly
random urine drops from respondent. Respondent tested positive for THC and barbiturates twice
in 2022, in February and May. After the positive tests, Mix explained to respondent that
respondent’s failure to participate in a substance abuse assessment would prevent the return
home of the minors, but respondent still did not participate. Respondent told Mix that she had
participated in the substance abuse assessment, but Mix never received a letter of completion or
any signed documents to verify respondent’s completion.
¶ 16 Respondent participated “sporadically” in her individual therapy. Mix received reports on
respondent’s therapy progress but was unable to determine if respondent made any significant
progress. Respondent’s therapist attended the child and family team meetings and stated that
respondent was not addressing the issues that brought the minors into DCFS care. When
7 No. 1-24-2265
respondent’s initial therapist left, a new therapist was assigned but respondent never met with the
new therapist while Mix was assigned to the case. Respondent completed the nurturing parent
program, but did not pass the test at the conclusion, which was considered an unsuccessful
completion. Respondent was referred again but was dropped from the program due to an
argument between respondent and her peers in the class. She was referred another time but only
attended twice and then stopped attending. In total, respondent was referred to this program five
times but did not successfully complete it while Mix was the caseworker.
¶ 17 In December 2020, respondent was allowed unsupervised visitation with K.B. The visits
became supervised in January 2021 after Mix learned that respondent was driving around with
K.B. and taking him “to some questionable places.” For the unsupervised visit, respondent was
supposed to provide a location of the visit to DCFS to allow the agency to “drop in.” Respondent
did not provide locations and DCFS had concerns about K.B.’s safety. Respondent had
supervised visits with L.W. twice a month for two hours, but respondent did not attend visits at
the DCFS office in Harvey. The visits were moved closer to respondent’s work in June 2022, but
respondent remained inconsistent in visitation, visiting about ten percent of the time. During the
visits, respondent needed to be redirected to focus on the children.
¶ 18 Kacey Taylor testified that she was employed as a caseworker with the Hephzibah
Children’s Association and she was assigned to K.B.’s case in November or December 2022 and
for L.W.’s case in February 2023. At the time of her assignment, Taylor reviewed the services
referred for respondent. She believed that respondent had successfully completed the domestic
violence service. Taylor later received documentation for respondent’s participation in the
substance abuse assessment. Respondent was not participating in individual therapy. Taylor
8 No. 1-24-2265
referred respondent in the middle of 2023 and respondent engaged in therapy, but Taylor did not
receive any documentation that respondent was making substantial progress.
¶ 19 Taylor changed K.B.’s goal from return home to termination of parental rights around
May 2024. She was unable to recommend that respondent receive unsupervised visits with either
child while assigned to the case. Taylor was also unable to recommend that either child return
home to respondent. K.B. had a bond with respondent, but L.W. did not have as much of a bond.
Taylor testified that respondent had been consistent with visitation.
¶ 20 Multiple service plans from June 2021 to February 2024 were admitted into evidence for
the State as exhibits.
¶ 21 Respondent testified that she was unable to complete the referred services because she
had multiple surgeries for bunion removals and was in a car accident. As a result, it was difficult
for her to travel because it was hard for her to stand on her feet all day. She stated that her
records indicated that she had been diagnosed with bipolar disorder. She had completed the
parenting class but did not pass the test, completed the outpatient rehabilitation, and was
continuing to attend therapy. She told the trial court that she was trying the best she could as a
mother and was not perfect. She did not have any guidance or a support system. She was sorry to
have put her children through this, and she had tried.
¶ 22 In closing arguments, the State asked the court to find respondent unfit under both
grounds. The State specified the following nine-month statutory periods as the basis for ground
(m): (1) for K.B., from April 17, 2021 to January 17, 2022, and from January 17, 2022 to
October 17, 2022; and (2) for L.W., from May 12, 2021 to February 12, 2022, and from February
12, 2022 to November 12, 2022.
9 No. 1-24-2265
¶ 23 The trial court found respondent was unfit by clear and convincing evidence and she
failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to her children’s
welfare. The court explained its findings as follows.
“She has failed to make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions for the
basis for the removal and failed to make reasonable progress towards the return
home of the children to her.
The Court finds that the testimony of Ms. Mix was credible. And that the
testimony of Ms. Taylor was not as credible in that she did not have a clear recall
on the specifics of this case.
The mother failed to complete all the services necessary including a
failure to reengage in domestic violence services after [domestic violence]
incidents continued after the initial completion of her [domestic violence]
services.
She has failed to complete the substance abuse assessment or she
continued to test positive. She did not make significant progress in individual
therapy or address the issues that brought the family into care.
She did not successfully complete [nurturing parent program] after
multiple re referrals during this -- and this is all during the relevant time period.
***
Mother’s visit[s] were described as inconsistent. She made approximately
ten percent of the visits possibly due to location of the visits.
The Court ordered the visits take place closer to mom’s home. The visits
continued to be inconsistent. Again making only about ten percent of the visits.
10 No. 1-24-2265
There were also safety concerns during the visits. And for those reasons
the state has met its burden by clear and convincing evidence.”
¶ 24 The court then proceeded to the best interest portion of the hearing.
¶ 25 Taylor testified that the minors were placed in separate foster homes. K.B. was placed
with a maternal aunt at his maternal grandmother’s home. He has been in this placement since
coming into DCFS care. Taylor or someone from the agency visited the home and found it safe
and appropriate with no signs of abuse, neglect, or corporal punishment. K.B. was in the second
grade and had a 504 plan. K.B. is not on medication and has been engaged in individual therapy.
K.B. is bonded with his foster mother and has called her mom.
¶ 26 L.W. was placed with a nonrelative foster home. The home is safe and appropriate with
no signs of abuse, neglect, or corporal punishment. L.W. suffered a traumatic brain injury in a
previous foster home and received specialized care, including physical therapy, occupational
therapy, and speech therapy. Taylor stated L.W. has an “IEP” and was attending a
prekindergarten class. Her foster mother understood and was able to advocate for L.W.’s special
needs. L.W. was bonded to her foster mother and referred to her foster mother as “mommy.”
L.W. was always happy around her foster parent.
¶ 27 Taylor stated that she met with her supervisor two weeks before the hearing and it was
determined that it was in the children’s best interest to have their parental rights terminated.
Taylor explained that it was in K.B.’s best interest “for the simple fact that his case has just kind
of been open for a very long time.” She stated that respondent had been given multiple chances
to complete services but there had not been much of an effort. It was also in K.B.’s best interest
to stay with his foster parent due to the amount of time he had been with her, and he was
attached to her. Taylor also found it was in L.W.’s best interest for similar reasons. L.W. does
11 No. 1-24-2265
not “really know the mom” and was attached to her foster mother. L.W. does not have that bond
with respondent.
¶ 28 Brianna M. testified that she had been L.W.’s foster mother for almost three years and
wished to adopt her. L.W. is part of the family and has been integrated into the extended family.
She was willing to continue the sibling bond with K.B.
¶ 29 Jasmin D. testified that she was K.B.’s maternal aunt and K.B. had been in her care for
six years. She wished to adopt K.B. because they have a connection and he is part of the family.
She planned to continue the relationship with L.W. if allowed to adopt K.B.
¶ 30 At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found it was in the children’s best interest
to terminate respondent’s parental rights. The court specifically observed that the children
deserved permanency and were bonded to their respective foster parents.
¶ 31 Respondent filed a timely notice of appeal of the court’s ordering terminating her
parental rights for both minors.
¶ 32 On appeal, respondent argues that the trial court’s finding of unfitness was against the
manifest weight of the evidence. More specifically, she asserts that the State failed to meet its
burden of proof that she was unfit under either ground by clear and convincing evidence. Both
the State and the Guardian maintain that the trial court’s unfitness findings were not against the
manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 33 Respondent does not challenge the trial court’s best interest finding at the termination
hearing. Accordingly, respondent has forfeited any argument that the trial court’s best interest
ruling was against the manifest weight of the evidence and we will not consider this issue on
appeal. See In re M.R., 2020 IL App (1st) 191716, ¶ 26; see also Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct.
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1, 2020) (“Points not argued are forfeited and shall not be raised in the reply brief, in oral
argument, or on petition for rehearing.”)
¶ 34 Respondent contends that the State failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence:
(1) her failure to make reasonable efforts or progress toward reunification in the specified nine-
month time periods pursuant to ground (m) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m) (West
2022)); and (2) her failure to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility
as to the minors’ welfare pursuant to ground (b) of the Adoption Act (id. § 1(D)(b)). According
to respondent, the evidence demonstrated that she visited her children and attempted to complete
all assessed services and Mix’s testimony lacked specificity and was contradicted by Taylor’s
testimony.
¶ 35 The authority to involuntarily terminate parental rights in Illinois is purely statutory and
the scope of the court’s authority is defined by the Juvenile Court Act and the Adoption Act. In
re M.I., 2016 IL 120232, ¶ 19. This policy favors parents’ superior right to the custody of their
own children. Id.
¶ 36 The termination of parental rights is a two-step process. First, the State must prove by
clear and convincing evidence that the parent is “unfit” as defined by section 1(D) of the
Adoption Act. 750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2022); 705 ILCS 405/2-29(2) (West 2022). The finding
of parental unfitness must be shown by clear and convincing evidence. In re Adoption of K.B.D.,
2012 IL App (1st) 121558, ¶ 196. Second, after the parent is found unfit, the circuit court then
considers whether it is in the best interests of the children to terminate parental rights. In re J.B.,
2014 IL App (1st) 140773, ¶ 49. The child’s best interests are not considered by the trial court
when considering parental unfitness. In re M.I., 2016 IL 120232, ¶ 20. Each case concerning
parental unfitness is considered sui generis and is decided on its own facts and circumstances
13 No. 1-24-2265
presented. In re Gwynne P., 215 Ill. 2d 340, 354 (2005). The court may not terminate a parent’s
rights on grounds not alleged in the termination petition and the State is not required to prove
every ground it alleged in the petition to support the finding of unfitness. Id. at 349. If a single
alleged ground of unfitness is proven by clear and convincing evidence, then parental rights may
be terminated. Id.
¶ 37 This court will not disturb the finding of unfitness unless it is contrary to the manifest
weight of the evidence and the record clearly demonstrates that the opposite result was proper. In
re Faith S., 2019 IL App (1st) 182290, ¶ 78. We give great deference to the trial court’s finding
of unfitness, defer to the trial court’s factual findings and credibility assessments, and will not
reweigh the evidence on appeal. Id. This court will only find the trial court’s ruling to be against
the manifest weight of the evidence when the opposite conclusion is clearly evident from a
review of the evidence presented. In re Nicholas C., 2017 IL App (1st) 162101, ¶ 25. Further, we
may affirm the finding of unfitness on any basis supported by the record. In re Brianna B., 334
Ill. App. 3d 651, 655 (2002).
¶ 38 The termination petitions for both K.B. and L.W. alleged that respondent was unfit under
sections 1(D)(b) and 1(D)(m) of the Adoption Act. 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b), (m) (West 2022). After
the unfitness hearing, the trial court found respondent unfit under both grounds for both children.
The failure to comply with an imposed service plan and infrequent or irregular visitation with the
child may support a finding of unfitness under both sections (b) and (m). In re Jeanette L., 2017
IL App (1st) 161944, ¶ 18.
¶ 39 We first review the trial the trial court’s finding that respondent was unfit pursuant to
section 1(D)(m) of the Adoption Act, for her failure to make reasonable efforts to correct the
conditions that were the basis for the removal of the children and reasonable progress toward the
14 No. 1-24-2265
return of the minors during the specified 9-month periods following the adjudication of neglect.
750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m) (West 2022).
¶ 40 The grounds for unfitness set forth in section 1(D)(m) of the Adoption Act are phrased in
the disjunctive. In re C.N., 196 Ill. 2d 181, 210 (2001). “Thus, section 1(D)(m) provides two
independent bases for a finding of unfitness: (1) the failure by a parent to make
reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that were the basis for the removal of the child, or (2)
the failure to make reasonable progress toward the return of the child.” (Emphasis in original.)
Id. at 210-11.
¶ 41 Reasonable efforts concern the goal of correcting the conditions that caused the removal
of the child from the parent. In re L.J.S., 2018 IL App (3d) 180218, ¶ 24. The reasonable efforts
inquiry is subjective and focuses on the efforts of the parent that would be reasonable for that
parent under the circumstances. In re J.O., 2021 IL App (3d) 210248, ¶ 51. This inquiry is
narrow because it considers only the correction of those conditions that provided the original
basis for removal of the children. Id.
¶ 42 Reasonable progress is viewed under an objective standard based upon the amount of
progress measured from the conditions existing at the time custody was taken from the parent. In
re Je. A., 2019 IL App (1st) 190467, ¶ 62. Progress is considered in light of both the
circumstances that gave rise to the original loss of custody as well as any other conditions that
later become known. In re J.O., 2021 IL App (3d) 210248, ¶ 57. “At minimum, reasonable
progress necessitates measurable or demonstrable movement toward the goal of reunification.”
In re Je. A., 2019 IL App (1st) 190467, ¶ 62. Reasonable progress occurs when the trial court can
conclude that it will be able to return the child to parental custody in the near future. Id.
15 No. 1-24-2265
¶ 43 Termination under section 1(D)(m) contains a timeframe limitation (750 ILCS
50/1(D)(m) (West 2022)), and thus in this section, we narrow our examination of respondent’s
progress towards reunification, including aspects such as her service plan and regularity of
visitation, within the nine-month periods set forth by the State. Here, the State designated the
following nine-month periods for each minor: (1) for K.B., from April 17, 2021 to January 17,
2022, and from January 17, 2022 to October 17, 2022; and (2) for L.W., from May 12, 2021 to
February 12, 2022, and from February 12, 2022 to November 12, 2022.
¶ 44 The reasonable efforts and reasonable progress grounds are based on respondent’s actions
to correct the conditions that led to the removal of the minors from her care. Contrary to her
argument, the record does not show that she made a reasonable effort to reunify with her
children. After completing the domestic violence class, respondent continued in a relationship
involving domestic violence and did not reengage with this service. She did not address the
reasons why her children were brought into DCFS care. Respondent’s argument regarding
reasonable progress fails to demonstrate any measurable progress. While she initially completed
the nurturing parenting program, her failure of the test made it an unsuccessful completion. She
was referred to this class several times but failed to successfully complete it. She did not
demonstrate progress in her substance abuse as she missed several random urine drops and tested
positive multiple times. She also showed inconsistent progress with both her individual therapy
and her visitation with the children.
¶ 45 The service plans encompassing these relevant time periods were admitted as evidence
during the termination hearing. Each of the service plans demonstrated that respondent
repeatedly failed to make reasonable efforts or progress toward reunification with the minors.
She was inconsistent with visitation and therapy. While she completed the domestic violence
16 No. 1-24-2265
service, respondent continued in a relationship involving domestic violence and did not retake
the domestic violence classes, as referred. She also failed to engage in her other services, such as,
the nurturing parent program, a substance abuse assessment, and drug testing. She was only
allowed supervised visitation during these time periods.
¶ 46 The June 2021 service plan detailed that respondent had made “inconsistent progress
towards correcting the conditions that placed her children in unsafe environments” and
“continued to lack adequate housing and employment.” The service plan summarized the family
progress since the last review.
“[Respondent] has been inconsistent with completing recommend services. On
3/8/21, [respondent’s] paramour and [L.W.’s] father, Edward W[.]was killed on
119th Michigan Ave, Chicago , IL due to gun violence. [Respondent] is
struggling with the loss and has withdrawn from CWS. [Respondent] has a history
of enrolling into services and not following through. As of 6/1/21, [respondent]
has made an appointment to continue individual therapy with her selected
Therapist. She has enrolled in domestic violence counseling, but has not enrolled
in substance abuse treatment. She does not have stable housing or employment.
Recently, [respondent] has started to engage in regular communication with CWS
again. [Respondent] has not visit[ed] with [L.W.] since December 2020 and her
visit with [K.B.] are inconsistent. [Respondent] stated she feels uncomfortable
visiting with [L.W.] at foster parent home. At the last court hearing the judge
order[ed] the visit to be at the DCFS Harvey office. She attended a parent and
child visit and sibling visit on 5/21/21.”
¶ 47 Similarly, the December 2021 service plan stated that the case remained opened because
17 No. 1-24-2265
respondent continued to make “inconsistent progress towards correcting the conditions that
placed her children in unsafe environments,” “lack[ed] adequate housing and employment,” was
“inconsistent with recommended services, individual therapy, substance abuse treatment, and
following visitation plan with children.” The service plan further detailed the progress since the
previous plan.
“[Respondent] has been inconsistent with completing service recommendations.
[Respondent] continues to grieve the loss of paramour. She has not made progress
towards correcting the conditions that brought the children into care.
[Respondent] has been inconsistent with visitation plan for children majority of
this reporting period. On 10/15/21, she started to visit with the children more
frequently. The last visit was on 12/3/21. [Respondent] completed domestic
violence class on 9/5/21. However, she still has pending services; [nurturing
parent program], consistent with individual therapy, substance abuse treatment,
drug screen toxicity, employment and stable housing.”
¶ 48 The service plan further indicated that respondent had been “inconsistent” with individual
therapy. She missed several appointments and refused to address her past and current trauma,
substance abuse, why her children were brought into care, and her poor decision making.
Respondent’s therapy was changed to twice a month and her therapist reported that respondent
had been compliant for the last 45 days. Respondent did not complete substance abuse
assessment or participate in drug screening during this reporting period. Respondent was
unemployed but had received a housing voucher to pay her rent for one year and was seeking
housing through the Chicago Housing Authority (CHA).
¶ 49 The June 2022 service plan again indicated that respondent had not made progress toward
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correcting the conditions that placed the minors into DCFS care. She remained “inconsistent with
recommended services of individual therapy sessions, substance abuse treatment, random drops
and following visitation plan with children.” The progress summary stated:
“During this reporting period, [respondent] has not made progress towards
correcting the conditions that placed her children into care. She is inconsistent
with recommended services of individual therapy sessions, substance abuse
treatment, random drops and following visitation plan with children. On 5/27/22,
[Respondent] was dropped from [nurturing parent program] class because she did
not complete weekly assignments and would not participate in group discussion.
CWS completed a Cerap on 5/10/22 of the home. The apartment was not safe and
appropriate for children. Additionally, she has a poor support system.”
¶ 50 The same issues continued through to the end of the relevant time periods under this
ground. The December 2022 service plan covered part of the second nine-month time period.
That plan stated that during that reporting period, respondent had “not made progress towards
correcting the conditions that placed her children into care. She [was] inconsistent with
recommended services of individual therapy sessions, substance abuse treatment, random drops
and following visitation plan with children.”
¶ 51 Additionally, within the second nine-month time frame, respondent tested positive during
random testing drops. On February 16, 2022, and April 13, 2022, she tested positive for THC
and barbiturates. She also failed to appear for four drops, which are considered a positive result.
The July 2022 permanency hearing report further stated that five random drops were performed
between May 18, 2022, and June 24, 2022. Respondent failed to appear for four of the drops and
tested positive for THC and barbiturates on the May 27, 2022 drop.
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¶ 52 Further, Mix, the caseworker during these specified time periods, provided compelling
testimony about respondent’s failure to make reasonable progress as required under the statute.
The trial court specifically found Mix to be “credible.” In all of these service plans, Mix found
that respondent was making unsatisfactory progress in her services. Respondent’s apartment was
also found “not safe and appropriate for children.”
¶ 53 Mix testified that respondent completed the domestic violence class in September 2021
but continued to reside with her paramour and a domestic violence incident occurred in
December 2021. Based on that incident, respondent was referred again to the domestic violence
services, but she failed to participate. Mix also stated that while respondent took the nurturing
parent class, she failed the test at the conclusion. Respondent was repeatedly referred to the
nurturing parent class, but she failed to complete it. Respondent did not provide proof of her
completion of the substance abuse assessment while Mix was the caseworker, but Taylor
testified that respondent later provided her with a certification for participation between February
and May 2022. However, during this time period, respondent repeatedly missed her random drug
testing drops and tested positive multiple times.
¶ 54 Further, the service plans and Mix’s testimony show that respondent was inconsistent
with her individual therapy and the scheduled visitation with her children. Respondent’s therapist
indicated in team meetings that respondent was not addressing the reasons the case came into the
system. Mix was unable to determine if respondent made any significant progress in her therapy.
During visitation, Mix needed to redirect respondent to focus on the children. Mix testified that
respondent had been “sporadically visiting throughout the case.” Throughout the relevant time
periods, respondent was allowed only supervised visitation with each of the minors.
¶ 55 Respondent contends that she made “movement by completing her domestic violence
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classes, her substance abuse assessment, completing her parenting class and by increasing the
consistency of her visits.” However, respondent’s argument regarding reasonable progress fails
to demonstrate any measurable progress. She failed to reengage with domestic violence after a
fight with her paramour in December 2021. While respondent completed the nurturing parenting
class, her failure of the test was considered an unsuccessful completion. She was repeatedly
referred to the class but failed to complete it. As the June 2022 service plan noted, respondent
was dropped from the class for failing to complete assignments and refusing to participate in
group discussions. Although respondent did complete the substance abuse assessment,
respondent also routinely either missed her random drug tests or tested positive.
¶ 56 The record firmly established that respondent failed to make reasonable efforts and
progress toward regaining custody of her children. As previously observed, the reasonable efforts
inquiry focuses on respondent’s efforts to correct the conditions originally providing the basis for
removal of the children. In re J.O., 2021 IL App (3d) 210248, ¶ 51. Reasonable progress, at a
minimum, requires measurable or demonstrable movement toward the goal of reunification. In re
Je. A., 2019 IL App (1st) 190467, ¶ 62. The record before us fails to show any measurable
movement under either basis made by respondent during either of the specified time periods. She
failed to consistently engage in services and was sporadic in her visitation with her children. The
service plans repeatedly observed that respondent failed to address any of the issues that caused
her children to be taken into DCFS care. This does not reflect any reasonable efforts or progress
towards reunification during any of the nine-month timeframes set forth for each of the minors.
Based on the evidence presented, we cannot say the trial court’s finding of unfitness on these
grounds was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
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¶ 57 Because we have found that the trial court’s finding under ground (m) was supported by
clear and convincing evidence and not against the manifest weight of the evidence, we need not
reach the court’s additional finding under ground (b). A trial court’s finding of unfitness will
stand if supported by any one of the statutory grounds set forth in section 1(D) of the Adoption
Act. In re Je. A., 2019 IL App (1st) 190467, ¶ 47. Since respondent has not challenged the
court’s best interest finding, we find that the trial court’s orders terminating respondent’s
parental rights to K.B. and L.W. were not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 58 Based on the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the circuit court of Cook
County.
¶ 59 Affirmed.