In Re Kathleen Lynn Vandever, Relator v. the State of Texas

• Court: Texas Court of Appeals, 7th District (Amarillo)
• Decided: March 3, 2026
• Docket: 07-26-00143-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

In The Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

No. 07-26-00143-CV

IN RE KATHLEEN LYNN VANDEVER, RELATOR

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING

March 3, 2026 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before PARKER, C.J., and DOSS and YARBROUGH, JJ.

Kathleen Lynn Vandever, proceeding pro se, filed a petition in this Court seeking

issuance of a writ of habeas corpus ordering Deborah Wilkinson to return S.V.V., a minor

child, to her or, alternatively, a writ of attachment directing a sheriff or constable to take

possession of the child and deliver the child to her. Because this Court lacks jurisdiction

to grant the requested relief, we dismiss this original proceeding.

Vandever previously appealed from a Default Order in Suit Affecting the Parent-

Child Relationship issued by the 360th Judicial District Court of Tarrant County. That

order appoints Deborah Wilkinson as sole managing conservator of S.V.V. and appoints

Vandever as possessory conservator. The appeal was originally filed in the Second Court of Appeals but was subsequently transferred to this Court by the Texas Supreme Court

pursuant to its docket equalization efforts, where it remains pending. See TEX. GOV’T

CODE § 73.001.

In the present original proceeding, Vandever seeks relief under Section 157.371(a)

of the Family Code which permits a person to file a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in

either the court of continuing, exclusive jurisdiction or in a court with jurisdiction to issue

a writ of habeas corpus in the county in which the child is found.” This Court falls within

neither of the categories of courts authorized by the statute to grant such relief.

The 360th District Court of Tarrant County has rendered a final order in connection

with S.V.V. Accordingly, it retains continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over the matters

affecting the parent-child relationship. See TEX. FAMILY CODE §§ 155.001(a), 155.002.

Further, nothing in the petition alleges that the child is located or restrained in a county

within the Seventh Court of Appeals District. See TEX. GOV’T CODE § 22.201(h)

(identifying the counties comprising the Seventh Court of Appeals District). The petition

instead situates the child in Tarrant County, which is within the Second Court of Appeals

District. See TEX. GOV’T CODE § 22.201(c).

Our jurisdiction to issue writs is further governed by Section 22.221 of the

Government Code. Under that provision, appellate courts may issue (1) “writs necessary

to enforce the jurisdiction of the court,” and (2) writs of habeas corpus in the “court of

appeals district in which a person is restrained in his liberty . . . when it appears that the

restraint of liberty is by virtue of an order, process, or commitment issued by a court or

judge because of the violation of an order, judgment, or decree previously made,

2 rendered, or entered by the court or judge in a civil case.” See TEX. GOV’T CODE §

22.221(a), (d). Vandever has not demonstrated that a writ of habeas corpus is necessary

to protect or enforce our jurisdiction. Nor does she allege that S.V.V. is restrained within

this Court’s territorial jurisdiction under circumstances that would invoke our habeas

authority under section 22.221. See TEX. GOV’T CODE § 22.201(h). Absent such a

showing, this Court lacks jurisdiction to grant the requested relief.

Accordingly, Vandever’s petition for writ of habeas corpus or writ of attachment is

dismissed for want of jurisdiction. 1

Per Curiam

1 Vandever may be able to seek relief under Family Code 157.371(a) by filing an application for writ

of habeas corpus with the trial court or the Second Court of Appeals. 3